this practice, It was possible for us to be so try. He here referred to the annexation of credulous and childish, as to act on the belief Piedmont, as the first act by which the that Buonaparte would abandon the projects French government had proceeded, subse he had formed, only because he had himself quent to the treaty, to pursue the same sys old us he would persist in them; and whe.tem of aggrandizement, which had appeared ther we thought that if, for whatever reason, in all their previous conduct, and which it was he had been led prematurely to disclose this vainly hoped they had relinquished. He reproject, even while Malta, the great security ferred also to the transaction respecting the against its execution, was still in our posses- German indemnities, where the French gosion, he would renounce the attempt when vernment, with an arrogance, he believed, un that security had been surrendered by us, and precedented in the history of Europe, had preput, in fact, into his possession? If then the sumed to dictate to all Germany the detailed design against Egypt was apparent, he desired mode of arranging those indemnities, on which the House to consider whether, upon every the Diet of the Empire was expressly conprinciple of justice and self-defence, admitted vened to deliberate, pursuant to the treaty of by all the systems of the law of nations, and Luneville, and had publicly announced their adopted by the practice of all countries, we scheme as settled and decided, before it was have not the clear right to take, from this even communicated to those to whom it ought, moment, such measures of prevention and se- in the first instance, to have been proposed. carity as are sufficient to guard against the He next passed to the violence offered to danger to which we should be in consequence Switzerland, on which he thought it the less exposed-whether it was not admitted, on necessary to dwell, because he believed the almost all hands, that our possession of Malta conduct of France towards that unfortunate was essential, or at least in the highest degree and devoted country had excited one universal material, for the defence of Egypt--whether sentiment of detestation. He wished here to the importance of Egypt to this country was declare (as this had been a subject so often adnot in itself sufficiently evident, from its converted to on former occasions, when he had nexion with the safety of our Indian posses- been unavoidably absent) that he considered sions, and whether it might not at this day be the interference of his Majesty's Ministers on considered as a point to our national policy, this subject, as not only evidently warranted already decided and attested by the glorious by the circumstances, but such as it was their efforts which had been made, and the heroic duty to employ to the extent to which he unblood which had been shed in the last war for derstood it to have been carried, in order to recovering it from France, and which had in a give time for learning whether a confederacy manner consecrated it in the hearts and affec- could be formed in Europe, really sufficient tions of Englishmen? He therefore wished for saving that country from the yoke of the House to consider what was to be our fu- France; but that when upon trial all hopes of ture conduct, if, after all the warnings given such a confederacy vanished, he thought them us, we were now to surrender Malta out of equally right in not pushing the contest, on our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to the part of this country, to extremities.follow in six or in twelve months afterwards. He then adverted to the continuance of the Were we prepared for the ridiculous, but disas- French armies in Holland, which appeared trous alternative to which we should be re- from the papers on the table to have been diduced, of either submitting without a strug-rectly inconsistent with the principles on which gle to national calamity and disgrace, because, the treaty of Amiens had been negotiated, foreseeing our danger, we had voluntarily and and with the engagements which were known wantonly sacrificed the best means of avert to subsist between France and Holland. After ing it; or, when it was perhaps too late to en-dwelling on these points, he stated, however, ter upon a difficult and almost hopeless contest, that he thought it less material to discuss whe having by our own act given up the arms by ther they were each in itself sufficient causes which we could be enabled to conduct it to a of war on the part of this country, because he successful issue? If the question were closed admitted, that, whatever might be the justice here, Mr. Pitt observed, that, for the reasons of the case, our conduct upon them at the he had given, he was prepared to maintain, time was necessarily regulated, not by that that on these grounds alone the war was both consideration only, but by the question of pojust and necessary, and such as ought to call licy which was unavoidably dependant upon forth the utmost exertions of Parliament and the state of the continent: but that whatever the nation in its support. But so far was this it might be right to decide upon them at from being the case, that there was not any the time they occurred, it was impossible to one of the leading transactions subsequent to contend that they were not now material, as the treaty of Amiens, to which his Majesty's symptoms of that deliberate system of ambi declaration referred, which was not, in his tion and encroachment which had been thus opinion, as far as justice was concerned, a clear uniformly pursued towards others, and which and evident cause of war, and such as would was now directed to a quarter where it imme have been acted upon, if there were sufficient diately affected our separate interests, and was means of co-operation on the continent, in al-in direct violation of the treaty with this most every period of the history of this coun-country itself. He here drew a strong pie

ture of the continued and rapid succession of | part the kingdom within twenty-four hours, the acts of violence and oppression which reserving it to himself afterwards to require during this period had desolated so many of from France the reparation due for so gross an the countries of Europe; and after comparing insult.-He did not think it necessary to dwell the irresistible force and overwhelming pro- separately on another head of complaint, the gress of French ambition to those dreadful violence committed against the vessels and convulsions of nature by which provinces property of his Majesty's subjects in the and kingdoms were consumed and buried in French ports, and the withholding to this ruins, he asked whether we could contemplate hour all satisfaction for those injuries. These those scenes of havock and destruction without proceedings, he said, would have been suffireflecting how soon that torrent of liquid fire cient ground of complaint in ordinary times, might direct its ravages against ourselves? but they could scarcely give additional force Having here closed his review of what had to the outrageous transactions which he had passed on the continent, he next observed, just enumerated, and which appeared to him that the period of which he had been speaking as if they had been designedly calculated to was marked not only by the hostile acts which include, under two distinct heads, the grossest he had detailed, with respect to other powers insults that could be offered to the independ in Europe, but by others immediately affect-ence of any country. The first pretension of ing the separate rights and interests of this which he had spoken, that of restraining the country. He referred, he said, principally to liberty of the press, was nothing short of two points which appeared in the Correspond-claiming the right to dictate to us in a point ence. The first point was the demand which of municipal law, and to require that we had been made by the French government, should sacrifice to the caprice of the First respecting the restraints on the liberty of the Consul a known and important privilege of press, and the expulsion of the French emi- our constitution, and model at his pleasure grants now remaining in the country. On this the judicial proceedings and internal regulait was unnecessary to enlarge, because the in- tions of the country. The second pretension, solence of the proposition was sufficiently felt, that respecting his commercial agents, maniand because it had been at the time resisted by fested, as had been already stated, an avowed his Majesty's Ministers, on grounds which determination to introduce, in defiance of were stated with great force and ability in one our formal refusal, authorized emissaries into of the papers on the table, and which, he was our arsenals and ports, in order to prepare, persuaded, every Member of the House had in time of peace, the most effectual means read with the highest approbation. The se-for our annoyance and destruction in time of cond point related to the commercial agents: the indignity and outrage which attended their mission, was one of which it was difficult to speak with composure. The French government had made a formal proposition to send persons of this description, who had never been found necessary even when a commercial treaty subsisted, at a time when not only there was no such treaty, but when, as appears from the papers on the table, the commercial intercourse of his Majesty's subjects with France was suffering every degree of violence and oppression. This proposition had naturally and wisely been refused. The French government then proceeded clandestinely to send these agents in the train of their Ambassador; and not content with this breach of the law of nations, they afterwards addressed to them instructions, under the official character in which they had received admittance; and the object of these instructions was to direct them to take measures, in time of peace, for ascertaining the soundings of ports, and for obtaining military information of districts; acts for which they would have been hanged as spies in time of war. Under such circumstances, he could not but lament to find that his Majesty's Ministers had contented themselves with merely applying to the French government to withdraw those persons, and had not at once advised his Majesty, by his own authority, to order them to deVOL. III.

war. This was nothing less than to insist on our surrendering beforehand the right and the means of national defence; and if the former claim had struck at the liberty, this struck as directly at the actual safety of the country. It was true, he believed and hoped, that the commercial agents had at length been withdrawn, upon the representation of his Majesty's Ministers; but, as he had already stated and lamented, it did not appear that any disavowal had been obtained of the prin. ciple on which they had been sent. The claim respecting the restraint upon the press, and the expulsion of the emigrants, had also been suspended for a time, in consequence of the unanswerable representations in the dispatch before referred to. But the first part of this claim had since been expressly revived in the course of the late negotiation. At all events, he contended that the circumstance of the First Consul having even suspended it as he did, only afforded a striking lesson of the benefit to be derived from a firm and seasonable resistance: but that the fact of such pretensions having at any time been urged (whether they were persisted in or withdrawn), must be remembered as the strongest proof of the nature of the views which he really entertained, and which he would unquestionably accomplish whenever he found it in his power. He maintained, therefore, that all these indignities and insults, as well as the *XX

the first of these purposes, it was not, in his judgment, sufficient to make those naval and military preparations, which would pre vent any invasion that might be attempted from being ultimately successful (an event which he trusted he was justified, in common with others, in considering as utterly impossi ble), but to make such vigorous and extensive arrangements for national defence, as might diffuse a sense of the most complete security against even the temporary impression to be produced by such an attempt, and might erable every individual to lay down his head to rest, in the persuasion and confi ience that nothing was omitted which could enable us at once to meet and repel the danger at any 130ment, and in any quarter, in which it might threaten us.-In order to disappoint the se cond object, that of wearing out our resources, he trusted the House would, from the begin ning, form its system of finance, not with a view only to the expense which might be ne

encroachments and violences of which he had before been speaking, on the continent, must enter deeply into our consideration, in judging of the character and ultimate views and policy of our enemy. They must decisively confirm us in the resolution to employ, with out hesitation, the most vigorous and determined resistance, when, in addition to these proofs of his general disposition, both to wards this country and towards Europe, we found him now engaged in that project of direct and separate hostility against curselves, which had already been argued.-On all these grounds, he felt convinced that there never was an occasion on which it more clearly became the indispensable duty of Parliament to concur with his Majesty in the declaration of the necessity and justice of the war in which we were engaged, and to assure him of their firm and effectual support. But in giving these assurances, he trusted that other Gent. felt impressed with the same sense which he did of the awful importance of the engage-cessary in the first year of the contest, but ment into which they were preparing to enter, that they would look at once to the possibility and that they considered those assurances not of its being protracted to as long a period as that as formal words of ceremony or custom, but which was lately terminated; that they would as a solemn and deliberate pledge on behalf of | consider fully what, on the probable scale of themselves and the nation whom they repre- the war, would be the whole extent of the sented-knowing and feeling to their full ex- burdens necessary to be imposed on that suptent the real difficulties and dangers of their position. He was persuaded, that it could situation, and of the arduous struggle which only be by providing in the outset means adeit compelled them to endure, and being pre-quate to the whole extent of these purposes, pared to meet those difficulties and dangers with every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the public safety. For his own part, although he considered the war as a war of necessity, and one which we could not decline without surrendering both our security and our honour, he should enter upon it with little hopes of ultimate success, if these sentiments were not deeply impressed on the minds of Parliament and the people. The scale of our exertions could not be measured by those of former times, or confined within the limits even of the great, and, till then, unexampled efforts of the last war. He was convinced that some system, far more vigorous and effectual than any even then adopted, would be found necessary, both in our finance, and in the preparation for national defence. On the provisions to be made for these two primary and paramount objects, it would principally depend whether we could effectually disconcert the favourite projects, and disappoint the main hopes of the enemy. It was evident, that if they indulged themselves in any expectation of success in the present contest, it was built chiefly on the supposition that they could either break the spirit, and shake the determination of the country, by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, or that they could impair our resources, and undermine our credit, by the effects of an expensive and protracted contest. To defeat

that we could, in fact, prevent the ultimate amount of our expenses from being unneces sarily, and perhaps intolerably, augmented; or that we could ensure the best chance either of bringing the contest to a speedy conclusion, by convincing the enemy of our sufficiency to maintain it, or could meet its continued exigencies, if necessary, without the annual re currence of growing and accumulated embar rassments. He trusted, therefore, that his Majesty's Ministers would, on their part, feel the necessity of bringing both these points under consideration with all practicable promptitude and dispatch, and that, if possi ble, not even a fortnight might be suffered to clapse without enabling Parliament to adopt such measures as would convince both France and the world that we had from that hour pro vided the means of supporting the force, and defraying the expenditure which might be ne cessary for maintaining our internal security, and for the vigorous and effectual prosecution of the war, to any period to which it could reasonably be supposed to extend. He re peated, that he was aware that these measures could not be effected without material and extensive personal sacrifices, and without great additional burdens, which must to a degree affect the case, convenience, and even com fort of many classes of society-that he la mented these consequences as much as any man, and if he saw any prospect that, by present concession, we could obtain a real and desirable interval of peace, security, and

France would observe the treaties she had that, and doubt that there had been in the mind made. Now, when there was a general sys- of Buonaparté an hostile view with respect to tem of ambition and aggrandizement on the Egypt, a disposition to act directly contrary to part of France, it was said it was no subject his own guarantee of the integrity of the Turk. of complaint: be it so. But should this coun-ish empire? This was even not all; but when, try not be prepared to check that ambition? | in the Declaration of his Majesty, it was stated To say that the influence of France was so that the French government had suggested the great in Holland and Switzerland, that there-idea of a partition of the Turkish empire, he fore it ought not to be resisted, was so strange must suppose that it related to a regular proan argument, that he did not think it neces-posal made by France to a great northern sary to pursue it any further. All these acts power, for such a partition. With respect to were not only altogether, but each of them, a this point, no documents were offered; but sufficient cause for war, and such as in other if Ministers had not referred to it, they would times had been acted upon vigorously and have done less than their duty; and to have successfully. Here he wished to recur to referred to it more distinctly, would have what related to Egypt, in which there was a been more than was called for. Before he direct breach of the treaty of Amiens. By quitted this subject, he could not help advertthat treaty the French republic was solemnly ing to an expression that had been used, that bound to guaranty the integrity of the Turkish Buonaparté had a desire to possess himself of dominions, which became an important object Egypt. If it was meant to be said that there to us, not only in itself, but because of the was an abstract wish on the part of the Great great necessity which existed for it, for the Consul, possessing half the world, secretly, security of our own possessions. In that view silently, and piously to add Egypt to his dohe conceived that we demanded security from minions, he could not conceive that such a France against any attempt in that quarter. simple abstract wish could be a cause for war. Egypt was evacuated by our troops, and the But putting together facts, would any man evacuation made a sacrifice to peace, whilst assert that it was a fair interpretation of those we demanded the guarantee as a security for facts, to say merely that Buonaparté had a our Eastern possessions. If any man doubted desire to possess himself of Egypt? That the insincerity of France, after reading the desire was manifested by acts so manifestly in Report of Sebastiani, it would be extremely breach of the treaty which he had signed, difficult to prove it: yet the Report was said that we were justified in saying that it was a to be commercial. Vain and idle pretext! on hostile breach of faith. Steps had been taken which the purpose of it was attempted to be by the First Consul, which clearly indicated done away. Was it possible to conceive that the means by which his designs were to be it could be a commercial mission? If any man executed. From the moment that any hostile doubted, however, upon the subject, he de-act was committed by France, we were justisired to refer him to higher authority, to Buonaparté himself, who had distinctly described it as a military mission; and to Andreossi, the French Ambassador, who had not attempted to conceal the purpose of the mission under the semblance of commerce, but who distinctly designated it as a military mission. Thus, then, the Report of Sebastiani was confirmed in all its military character. But was that all? Look at the supplementary part of the Report, view Sebastiani travelling in the republic of the Seven Islands: that republic was, however, not confined to Sebas-ence between our retaining Malta, if France tiani's Report; another supplementary account committed a breach of faith, and our right of amongst the papers on the table, informed possessing ourselves of it again after a breach them that the First Consul had granted his of the treaty of Amiens, and having previously protection to the Catholic church of the Seven given it up. In this view of the subject, he Íslands, and that when the members of that would not go into a minute discussion respect communion prayed to God, they must praying the roth article of the treaty of Amiens. for the First Consul. Thus stood the case with respect to Egypt. If the Report of Sebastiani had merely consisted of an intercepted letter, it might have been said, that it was not a sufficient act of hostility on the part of France towards this country, though he should have contended that it was; but when, in addition to the Report, it was adopted by the First Consul, and by the French Ambassador here, could any reasonable man, he asked, read

fied in using every means for our own secu rity. The best means by which the_First Consul could execute his projects upon Egypt were those which he thought the most necessary to the accomplishment of his desire; they depended upon Malta, and if we had evacuated Malta, we should have been justi fied, after the Report of Sebastiani, in endeavouring to retake it. Would any man say, that if it was just to retake it, it was not also just to retain it when it was already in our possession? He could not see the least differ

He would grant, that if the stipulations of the treaty had been fulfilled, and we had then refused to deliver up Malta, a breach of that treaty might have been alleged against us; but no case had ever been made out by France, which gave her a right to demand the evacuation of Malta by us. "He really thought that there never was a period in which so many and such invincible grounds of war, on the part of this country, were so cleanţ