HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 13.—[Min. p. 906.]

[THE BUDGET.] THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER brought forward the Budget, for which sce page 906 of this volume.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, June 14.—[Min. p. 971.]

the bringing up of the report, nor to the taxes pro-
posed, but to avail myself of this regular and parlia
mentary opportunity, of entering into some consider.
ation of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. Of
the taxes in detail, I can say nothing, at present;
because, if they be liable to objections, frequent op-
portunities will occur, hereafter, of stating them;
but, on the general system of taxation now adopted,
that of raising money for the support of the expenses
of the war in each current year, by what are called
war-taxes, I must say a word or two.
To that sys-
tem, I, for one, must object, as tending to make the
war unpopular.

men, great part of whom were at present in arms; that they did not rely upon the regular force of the country, which was at present greater than at any other period, except when an embarkation was about to take place; that they did not rely upon the brave and loyal yeomanry of the country, but that they were prepared to bring forward measures for the purpose of providing a large subsidiary force, to be officered in the manner pointed out by his right honorable friend. The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Windham) had complained of the large proportion of militia force, but that had been completely answered by his right honorable friend, at least that part of the [REPORT OF THE BUDGET.]-LORD FOLKESTONE. right honorable gentleman's argument which related-I do not rise, Sir, for the purpose of objecting to to a system entirely defensive. In looking to the population of the country, and the means of constituting a large and effective force, it was not merely an option on the part of government, whether such a force should be called out; it was not because the right honorable gentleman or government might think it possible to procure a large proportion of regular troops, but they must consider how, consistently with the feelings and opinions of the country, and the avocations of men of business, the largest and most effective force could be provided for defensive and offensive operations; it appeared to him, that those means ought to be resorted to which were calculated to provide such a force with the The war in which we are engaged, is confessed, greatest public advantage, and the least possible in- on all hands, to be one of necessity, and for the very convenience. The right honorable gentleman had existence of the country. Every thing, therefore, adverted to the danger arising from an invading that tends towards bringing it into disrepute should enemy; that right honorable gentleman would do be carefully avoided. Such a system may be good him the justice to recollect that he never under-rated in theory; there may be something noble and mag. that danger, though he thought at the same time nanimous in the idea of a people submitting to bear that it had been greatly over-rated. He begged leave the whole burden of their own wars, a d not to ento refer the right honorable gentleman to the conduct tail on posterity any inconveniences arising from their of government in the summer of 1801, and many quarrels. But the policy of putting such a theory in individuals then in the House, upon whose justice practice depends upon circumstances, and the cirhe confidently relied, would attest that there was cumstances of the present times are clearly such as during that period no want of exertion on the part of to render it impolitic. If the people were so eager government. The country was not generally aware for war, as to be ready at any, the slightest affront, of the extent of the preparations in the French ports to rush headlong into it; then such a system would at that period, nor of the steps taken by government to be both just and politic; then it would be certainly meet the threatened danger. At the time when proper to make them bear the whole burden of a the ships which defended our rivers were sent to the contest brought on, perhaps, by their own precipiBaltic, then was the period of real danger. Govern- tancy, and to endeavour to check that disposition, ment neither slumbered nor slept, but adopted by making them feel the whole inconvenience of it. all those measures which the exigencies of the But if, on the other hand, the temper of the people moment required, with a fixed determination to be such, as in point of fact, we know to be the case call forth all the exertions of the country to repel with the people of this country at present; that they the danger which then threatened us, but which are rather too backward than too eager to begin the did not happen. He was therefore entitled to refer contest, that they are rather inclined to submit to to their conduct at that period as a pledge of their insults, than to undergo the hardships and expenses disposition. It had been stated, that a pledge ought of war to repel them, then it is, certainly, most imto be given on the part of Parliament, that it would politic to add, to that backwardness and reluctance make such provision as circumstances should re- for war, all the selfish feelings of dislike to make just quire. He conceived that Parliament had given that sacrifices, and to undergo heavy burdens, which every pledge; he conceived. that when it carried to the one knows will be called forth by the present enorfoot of the throne the address in answer to his Ma- mous taxes. On this ground, I, for one, think the jesty's message, though there was no specific pledge system of war-taxes objectionable. Such a war as as to any particular measure, yet that a distinct and the present should be rendered as palatable and as solemn pledge was given on the part of the country, popular as possible, inasmuch as the safety and very that they would make every exertion which the exi- existence of the country, depend on the firmness, the gencies of the case might require. That those exer- vigour, and perseverance with which it is carried on. tions must be great he not only admitted, but con- With respect to the mode in which ministers seem tended; but he flattered himself that whenever he inclined to carry on that war, as far as I can judge of should appeal to the House either to meet financial it, I must disapp ove of it. I must disapprove of difficulties, or to provide for increased military ex- that defensive system which seems to be the one ertions, that such an appeal would not be made in adopted. I know that I may be stopped here, in vain. If any obloquy was attached to any such mea-imine, and told that that is not the system intinded sures, he would cheerfully share it; but he trusted, that on the part of the people there would be on such an ocsasion but one sentiment and one opinion.

to be pursued.. But I must be permitted to ret in my opinion on that subject, as long as I see no more symptoms of activity and preparation than I, at pre

mour,

if the greatest expedition of this sort that we could send out were to meet with complete success, we should not have advanced one step towards gaining security for ourselves, or impairing the power of the enemy. Such a success would produce no greater effect than the scratch of a pin on a man's hand. From this mode of offence, therefore, no hope can be derived. What then remains? There remains, either, to animate the continental powers to join and make common cause with us in the contest, and so to attack France externally, or to attempt to destroy the government itself, and for this purpose, to raise up the royalists that remain in that country to join with us in the attempt. Now, whatever hopes might, under these circumstances, be derived from these modes of operation, must be greatly weakened so long as his Majesty's present ministers direct the affais of state. For it is not to be conceived that any set of men, who can be selected, will be so unlikely to inspire confidence as the persons now in office. What confidence can any foreign power have in men, who have universally, whenever it suited them, abandoned and deserted the allies of the country? In men who lay it down as the very basis and foun dation of all their negotiations with France, and who now send forth to the world, under their own signa

sent, witness. If a different sort of conduct were adopted, we should undoubtedly hear of plans of offence, we should see greater stir and more active preparation than are at present discernible. Nothing of this kind is any where to be met with; and, indeed, the universal idea amongst the public seems to be, that defence, and defence alone, is to be our object: that we are to stand on our own shore prepared to resist any attack made on us; but that any attack, on our parts, is wholly out of the question. This, certainly, may not be the plan of his Majesty's ministers; but this is certain, that all their measures lead one to suspect that it is, and they never have given this House a single reason to imagine that they have any other. But against this plan, whether it be theirs or not (I hope it is not), I must object in rolo, and for this very plain and simple reason, that of all the plans that can be pursued, this, more surely than any other, will bring on the country, speedy and inevitable destruction; and the more complete the plan, the more likely to be adequate to the proposed effect, the more speedy and the more certain will be the ruin. In that case, the country will perish by the weight of its own defence. It will then be exactly in the case with a man, who, when attacked by an active enemy, should say, I do not want to hurt my enemy, I only wish to defend my-tures, that their principle is, that they shall retain self; so I will wrap myself up in a good suit of ar- compensation out of the conquests which this counin a coat of mail, that I know to be impene- try may make for the increased power and territories trable, and then I may be perfectly at ease, because of France? Now, to a man of plain understanding, I know he cannot hurt me. But what would be the this principle is no other than this-France may enevent? not only if any of the nails were to give way, rich herself by robbery, pillage, and rapine; we or if there were to be a little rust, or any, weak part, will not grumble or find fault if she will but allow or the joints were to open, would the enemy be ena- us to have some share in the boy, so that we may bled immediately to thrust in his poniard, and give a in some degree keep pace with her, Will any man mortal stab; but, without any such accident, would be astonished, in case the noble secretary of state it not be certain that this man must soon fall down were to direct any of his Majesty's ministers, at the faint and oppressed, by the weight of his own arms? foreign courts of Europe, to sound the dispositions of In like manner, if this defensive system, which is so the government, and to find out whether they were popular, is to be adopted, will the country in a short willing to join with us in the present contest; in time most inevitably faint, and fall down under the such a case, would any man be astonished, or would weight of its own armour; and the stronger the ar- the noble lord himself be astonished, it he were to mour, the greater the means of defence, the more receive for answer-" We cannot trust you, we canspeedily will the necessary faintness and ruin come "not place any confidence in you. How can we be on.-Gentlemen seem to confound the idea of a de- "sure that you will not abandon us, as you abanfensive war, or a war of self-defence, with the de- "doned the King of Sardinia? How can we be sure fensive mode of carrying on war. They are things" that you will not desert us, as you have deserted perfectly distinct. In strictness, a war of self-defence" in his time of need the Prince of Orange? How against present or future dangers, is the only justi- " do we know that you will not sell us, as you have fiable war. But a defensive war may as well be car- "sold the Queen of Portugal for a colony or a sugarried on by offensive operations as by defensive, by" island?" A man might rather wonder if his Maweakening or destroying your adversary, as by repell-jesty's ministers were to receive any other answer ing his attacks on you. Does a besieged garrison content itself with repelling the assaults of the besiegers? Do they not make sallies, and, in their turn, attack the assailants? Does not every schoolboy know, that Rome was defended under the walls of Carthage? Precaution for defence, in case of attack, must certainly be made, but our views must not be directed to defence alone. We must have recourse to more vigorous, to offensive measures.-Let us then consider a little what are the measures of offence that can be adopted in the present circumstances, and what means this country has for offensive operations. Now, generally speaking, the means of attacking France are threefold-1. By external attacks made by ourselves.-2. By external attacks made by the continental powers; and, 3, by internal attacks on the government of the country. With respect to the first of these methods of offensive operations, this country is pretty nearly impotent. We might attack and seize a sea-port, or destroy a fortress; but, after all,

than this. In like manner, too, it is impossible that any royalist in France could feel greater reliance on the faith of ministers. Once betrayed by them, once abandoned by them to the cruelties of their relentless enemies, after they had been exhorted to come forward by our declarations, by our promises of succour and assistance, by our assurances of support, without, as far as we know, a single word being spoken in their behalf, but certainly without any stipulation at all in their favour; thus betrayed and abandoned, will they, can they be expected to put that confidence in such men, as to be roused by them again to brave all the dangers, to undergo all the hardships and toils, to expose themselves to all the vengeance and cruelties from which they have now once escaped? Will they be willing to run the risk of all those calamities again, without some better security that they will not be again deserted? Or, have the published sentiments of the noble secretary of state any thing in them that is likely to

wipe off this crime in their eyes, and to teach | by entering into all the reasons which induce them to put their trust in him? Will any man me, if this plan be openly and manfully pursued, of loyalty, can any royalist in principle ever to entertain the most sanguine hopes of success. entertain that feeling for a man, who, as minister I will only now state what will be the immediate for this country, negotiating with a foreign effect of such a declaration and conduct. At power, has not hesitated to state, that, in his home, I think, it will excite a new spirit, and give opinion, the French royalist emigrants would do a new energy to our measures. Abroad, it will well to lay aside the orders which they wear, those give confidence in our plans, and convince other rewards of ancient deeds of valour, which they nations of the rectitude of our views. In France, have received from the hands of their sovereign, it will give new hopes and courage to all the loyal and which they wear as emblems of their fide- now remaining. It will, at once, bring them all lity and attachment to him? Can the royalists into our interests. But the most important effect confide in a man, who, without a blush, can give will be that which I think it will have on the this to the world as his deliberate opinion? Sure-government. It will palsy all its exertions and ly not. May that noble lord never have the unhinge all its plans: so much so, that I do not means of putting his opinions in practice! May hesitate to say, that if I were asked how I would it ever be out of his power to throw that disgrace prevent an invasion of Buonaparté, I would say, on his sovereign, which, in his deliberate judg-make this declaration. If I were asked how I ment, it would be proper for him, in certain circum- would defend Hanover, I would answer, declare stances, to do!—For these reasons, his Majesty's for the King of France. If I were asked how I present ministers are the most unfit men in the would rescue Holland from the gripe of France; world to apply, with effect, the means of offence how I would secure Portugal from her attacks, or which this country may have, against France. But | relieve Spain from her fraternity, I would to all as they are still his Majesty's ministers, as they these questions answer, make this declaration.still have his confidence, and the support of this I find that the House is impatient: I am sorry, House, it is their duty to employ those means as and beg pardon for having detained them so long; well as they can. Now what is the best method but this idea has pressed so strongly on my mind to exert these means? Confidence is to be gained for some time paft, that I could no longer rethat is the first and principal point. The conti- concile it to myself to let slip an opportunity of nental powers, on the one hand, the loyal part of ftating it. If Gentlemen's minds and attention are France, on the other, are to be convinced that directed to it, my object is in a great degree we will not again fail and desert them. And how answered, as I am convinced that the more they can they be convinced of this, but by an open, ex- think of it, the more they will incline to my plicit, unreserved declaration, on our part, of opinion. our views and objects? And what ought this object to be? The object most likely to gain that confidence is the destruction of the revolutionary government of France. And, Sir, this object is exactly conformable to the doctrines and opinions lately held by the two noble lords on the Treasury Bench. For if it is allowed to refer, for one moment, to what passed in former debates, the House will recollect that the first argument, used the other night by those noble lords, in defence of the necessity of the present war, was, that there existed, in the revolutionary government of France, such an hostile mind against this country, that it was quite impossible (and every one, it was concluded, must be convinced that it was impossible) to be at peace with the revolutionary government of France. If this is so, and my mind was fully, and long enough ago, convinced that it was so, what then is the necessary inference? What but this? Either that you must give up all hopes of ever having peace, or you must destroy the revolutionary government of France. A third alternative there is not. Now it would be as unnecessary as insulting to the House to ask; if you would destroy the government of France, what other government would you raise in its room? None other, surely, but the monarchy in the person of the legitimate claimant of the crown. This, then, is the object to which I have been endeavouring to draw the attention of the House. This is the object to be declared and held forth to the people of France, on the one hand, and all Europe on the other. It must be declared explicitly, plainly, and decidedly. If it is not declared in that way, nothing is done; but if it is, the greatest hopes may yet be entertained of final success in our present undertaking. I will not detain the House

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, June 16. (Min. p. 972).

[DOCK-YARDS.]—Mr. WHITBREAD said, that in bringing this business forward he had no desire to anticipate any judgment which might be formed on the reports of the commissioners ap pointed to inquire into abuses in the navy. A right hon. Gent. opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had pledged himself to found a proposition on these reports, which he had no inclination even to embarrass. He had different grounds for pressing his motion on the consideration of the House. Gent. were not unaware that the noble lord who, with so much honour to himself and so important advantage to the country, had fought our battles abroad, and whe with not less honour had instituted inquires into abuses in the department over which he presided, had been exposed to a great deal of calumny and abuse. In nothing more than with respect to his conduct in examining into and providing remedies for the abuses in the dockyards, had he been exposed to very gross censure. To do away any impression which these calumnies might have produced, he thought there was no better way of proceeding than by laying before the House a copy of the minutes taken by the noble lord, and the other noble lords, in the course of their visit of inquiry last year, and to which the commissioners in their first report alluded. In that report it was stated, that the conduct of the Admiralty Board was not only fiee from censure, but highly commendable. It was also stated, that cases of very flagrant delinquency

existed. It was therefore fair and just that the that Board to which he would not subscribe, but delinquents, should as speedily as possible be he could not pay the same compliment to their brought to justice, and he should with this view civil conduct, because he thought it had been atmove for the production of the minutes, as attended with consequences injurious to the public g once clearing the conduct of the Board of Ad-it had produced a great disgust, and if persisted in, miralty from injurious imputations thrown on would produce the most serious consequences to their conduct, and bringing those delinquents, the country. whose villainies they had exposed, to a speedier punishment. He concluded with moving for a copy of the minutes relative to the abuses in the dock-yards, in terms of his speech.

the commission was appointed, and when the inquiry was going on. It had also been stated that there were delinquents whose cases ought to be brought before Parliament, in order that they might be prosecuted. But there was no reason why the minutes should be laid before the House for that purpose, because the Attorney General might be ordered to prosecute them. And it was but justice to the parties, if they were to be pro-lord. He was aware that the House would pay secuted, that it should be done in the usual way, and not by order of that House, which would certainly raise unfavourable prejudices against them. He trusted, therefore, that the House would consider this an unreasonable application, to take that inquiry out of the hands of the commissioners, against whom no charge had been made.

Col. BASTARD could not agree with those who thought that the situation of the country being dangerous, was a reason for not going into the inquiry; on the contrary he thought that the more dangerous that situation was, the more was the necessity for such an inquiry. Some had said that the public service had been impeded by the difference which had existed between the Navy and the Admiralty Board, and others had said that the service could not go on while these differences subsisted: this was a conclusive reason for the House coming to some decision upon the subject, otherwise the public service would be still further impeded.

queɛtion could be constitutionally entertained but that his conduct in such character might be discussed in that House. It was not for those who approved of, but for those who were dissatished with the conduct of the noble lord, to call for an inquiry into such conduct and sure he was, that whenever that investigation took place, it would redound highly to the honour of that noble no attention whatever to any libels which might have been published in any quarter upon this subject. But as the House had been told that the force of the Navy Board was impeded by the proceedings of the Admiralty Board, he thought that no time should be lost in adjusting the diffe rence between the two Boards at this momentous crisis. An investigation should therefore take place without delay, so that those who deserve honour shall receive honour, and those who de serve punishment shall suffer punishment.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, June 20. (Min. p. 973.)

[KING'S MESSAGE ON THE ARMY OF RESERVE.]

-LORD HOBART moved the order of the day, for taking into consideration the best means of car. rying into immediate execution, the desire expres ed in his Majefty's message for the more effectual defence and security of the United Kingdom, He should not take up the time of their Lordships, in demonftrating to the House the minutie of any par ticular plan. He was well convinced that, whatever difference of opinion might exift in the minds of Noble Lords, as to the manner of executing the wishes expressed in his Majefty's message, there could be no difference of sentiment as to their ex

Capt. HARVEY said, as to the character of the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, some persons had said some things against him, and others had vindicated him, but if the subject should ever come under discussion, he should say freely what he thought upon it, at the same time, he assured the House that he should not fall in with those who had praised. As to any crimi-pediency at the present crisis, when our country nality in any parties to which the report reterred, if there existed any such criminality, the Attorney General was the proper officer to prosecute on such an occasion. He thought the period might come when the circumstances stated in the report may come before the House, and then the House would do rightly in demanding all documents necessary to facilitate the discussion; but there was no such ground at present.

Sir FRANCIS BARING said, there was no man upon earth that had more respect than he had for Ld. St. Vincent, but he was extremely concerned that the subject of the visitation of the dock-yards had been brought forward on this occasion. In the case now before the House, evidence was taken in a particular manner, and either directly or indirectly reflecting on certain persons who had no power to put one question on the other side. The motion tended to hold forth to the world that a number of frauds had been committed on

the public, and might make a very great impression, when in truth the judgment of the public ought to be suspended until both sides had been

heard.

Mr. SHERIDAN could not agree that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty was not to be amenable to the House of Commons, because he was a member of the other House of Parliament. As he was first lord of the Admiralty, no

was avowedly threatened by a most implacable enemy. He thought it, however, respectful to their Lordships, and consistent with the duty of his situation, to ftate the outline of the plan which it was hus intention at a future period to submit to their consideration, in order that they might be the better prepared for the discussion when it came regularly before them. In the first place, he must observe, that he thought it not only neces sary that we should provide means for the detence of the Empire in case of any hoftile attack, but also that we should be prepared in such a manner as to evince to the enemy the utter impossibility of obtaining any success in an attack upon our coafts. Every possible exertion had been made in the military department; but that was not suffi cient for the present exigency: it was therefore necessary that a more extraordinary measure should be resorted to. He should be extremely sorry to introduce any plan of a compulsory nature, without the necessity of the state called for it in the strongest manner; and he was aware that it might be objected that such a measure would necessarily draw a large number of the community from their industry and the agriculture of the country. But when he looked at the danger to which the country was exposed, when he looked at the increased population and resources of the country, he saw, with the utmoft confidence, that there was nothing to fear. In the laft war we had a militia force of 114,300 men in England, Ireland,