exposed Portugal to be trampled on, which sanctioned the trampling on her, and which must be changed into war, before we can even think of preventing this degradation of our anrient and most faithful ally?" Permit," indeed! what a word to be made use of by him, who was nine years calling for peace" on any terms,' and who now tells the people of England, that they ay be subjugated but they must eat!" What a word to be made use of by a writer, who must know, that we cannot protect Portugal without arms, and who tells us, that, to employ those arms is certain and instant death!"Permit," truely if the present system is continued but a little longer, we shall not have to enquire what we ought to permit France to éc in Portugal, but what she will permit us to do there. She is not ready for the measure yet, but, the moment she is, she will order the ports and harbours of that country to be shut against us, by which operation she will call to her aid the clamours of no contemptible portion of our merchants and manufacturers, who will blame, not the ambition and injustice of France, but whatever may remain of the spirit of resistance in their own government. A FRENCH PUBLI- In page 182 of the CATION RELATIVE present Number will TO MR. WINDHAM. be found an article, published at Paris, in a paper called the ARGUS, which is well known to be conducted by the condemned and pardoned traitor ARTHUR O'CONNOR. This article repeats the charge, which has heretofore been preferred by the Moniteur against Mr. Windham, of having encouraged an attempt to assassinate Buonaparté, and the proof, which the Moniteur has obstinately refrained from producing, this vile traitor affects to have discovered in a speech delivered in Parliament by the gentleman accused. We should not have noticed this libel had not our attention been awakened by a defence of Mr. Windham inserted in the London Morning Chronicle, where, though the charge is repelled, the writer observes, that Mr. Windham said, upon the subject, what was, perhaps, not very discreet. Now, the fact is, that Mr. Windham, so far from ever having abetted, by any of his speeches, a scheme of assassination, has, on all occasions, declared his conviction, that no good could be expected to this country from any change that could possibly take place in the persons of the revolutionists at the head of the government of France. In his speech of 4. Nov., 1801, this opinion was fully and explicitly stated. Mr. Windham never attempted to build a hope upon so uncertain, so disgraceful a foundation. We, too, the Paris traitor has thought it worth his while to accuse of instigating the assassination of the Consul, and of speaking, on this subject the sentiments of Mr. Windham. If we have spoken that gentleman's sentiments, here they are, as expressed several months ago. Buonaparté has returned to "Paris safe and sound, in spite of the prayers "and predictions of the timid herd, who were "in hopes of losing their fears in his loss of "life. There are none but the basest of cow"ards, who look to the death of this man as a 46 See Register, Vol. II. p. 1164. "deliverance from danger. Yet, disgraceful "as is the facts, the hope of no small portion "of the advocates of peace have no better, no "more honourable foundation. Those who, "like ourselves, were opposed to a disgraceful peace with Buonaparte, do not, nor ever "did, entertain any such foolish hope; we "know that if he were dead to-morrow, ano ther, perhaps even more dangerous, would "arise to fill his place: we are for the em "ployment of no base means of offence or de"fence, but are for a fair and honourable con"test between the two nations, in which, with "God's good help, we should hope to come "off victorious, and to rescue our country from "impending ruin and slavery." + —In truth, there is no man of mind who counts the person of Buonaparté as of any great consequence, one way or the other. The little daring Corsican happened to be chosen as a proper organ of the will of the republican French, but almost any other man of courage would have done as well. He is perfectly illiterate; every thing that falls either from his lips or his pen bespeaks not only a want of acquired knowledge but a native emptiness, and, were it not for the million of soldiers that are at his back, his bombastical manifestoes and phillipics would excite nothing but disgust and ridicule. No, no, it is not this man that England and the world has to fear; it is the spirit of the French Republic, that restless, that ainbitious spirit, which must be subdued, or which will sedue this country. There are a thousand, ten thousand, men in France, either of whom would fill the Consulship as well, or tetter, than the Corsican. None but the cowards who tremble at his name, the vulgar politicians, whose views never extend beyond the present moment; none else, have any hope of good from the death of this man. Why this charge is so often revived against Mr. Windham is very evident. It is one of the ways, in which the French tell the people of England that Mr. Windham must be kept out of power. There was a time when such an intimation would have produced a contrary effect; for, it is pretty clear, that the man, whom our greatest enemy hates most, must be our best friend; but the preservation of the honour and independence of England is no longer the principal object of her degenerate sons, the preservation of peace, on any terms however degrading and ultimately destructive, is all they care for or think of, and, therefore it is, that the French are continually preferring, against Mr. Windham, such loud and outrageous complaints as must produce an impression in the minds of the people, that, if he, or his friends were in power, peace could not be preserved with France. We do not say that Mr. Windham is the only man capable of saving the country; but this we have no scruple to say, that, if it be saved from the tremendous dangers that threaten it, that salvation must be wrought by an adoption of the principles of Mr. Windham; those principles may, and those principles alone can, preserve this kingdom from being an appendage to France. No wonder, then, that he is hated by the French; no wonder that they rack their + Vol. II. p. 666. in company with TOM PAINE, a man famous As invention for charges against him; no wonder that they misrepresent what he has said, and impute to him what he never has said; no wonder, in short, that the traitor O'Connor should lend his hand to destroy the reputation of Mr. Windham, or that traitor should be indirectly seconded by the London Morning Chronicle, by that very paper in which O'Conner was defended. EMPLOYMENT It is still said, that English OF ENGLISH ships are to be employed by SHIPS BY THE the French in sending out FRENCH. troops to St. Domingo. The ministers, it seems, have acted with their usual candour. They have neither refused nor permitted the hire of the ships in question. Buonaparté will, if he be wise, have them at any price; because he will have the sailors along with them, and it will be his fault if the latter ever return to the service of England. It would, perhaps be prudent to send some of them back, by way of call-birds, to entice others, or, as occasion might serve, to inculcate, in the British fleet, those principles, which may, with.no very great difficulty, be taught thein during an expedition to St. Domingo. The fact is, that every British sailor, going upon this service, will fall by the yellow fever, or, which is infinitely worse, will become, in heart, a republican Frenchman. Another evil arising from this contract, is, the new and additional hold, which France will thereby obtain on the hearts, that is to say, the purses, of this nation. Every guinea, which she adds to her debts here, is another link added to the chain she is forging for us. The Americans owed us five millions sterling; a solemn treaty was made for its payment; they chose not to pay, and we commuted the sum for six hundred thousand pounds, because we would not go to war; and we would not go to war, because British subjects have always in America, seven millions of money owing to them for goods, and hold about ten millions more in the funds of that country. This fact, while it points out the consequences of our becoming the creditor of France, is no very feeble illustration of the maxim of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies, that the country is to be defended and preserved by its capital ready for any thing that may, either immediately or remotely injure Great Britain; a sort of feelDISPOSITION Much pains seems to haveing, in which, by the by, we are afraid they will OF THE AME-been taken to inculcate a belief, RICAN Go-that the American government VERNMENT. is hostile to France, and of course, friendly to England; but, we must confess, that we perceive no symptoms of either. The President's official declaration is, as we before observed, perfectly equivocal, and, in his more private acts, we can see nothing that favours the opinion above stated. He has, like Sir Joseph Banks, and Mr. Fox, accepted, with great satisfaction, the honour of a membership in the National Institute of France, the honour "WESTERN FAof being adopted into the MILY;" and, if what we see in the American papers be true, he has shown his friendship for alone. not find it extremely difficult to make the President participate. In short, we place no reliance on Mr. JEFFERSON's good disposition towards England. He hates England from the bottom of his soul; he must and he will hate her; and most cruelly will our government be disappointed, if it expects ever to receive from him any hearty cooperation for the purpose of frustrating the views of France. J. NOTICES. We have received, from our worthy friend Mr. TIETENSER," a parting word to Candidus with a little truth to Verax."-This letter shall appear in our next without fail. A new edition (being the fifth) of No. 25, of Vol. II. containing the NARRATIVE OF THE TAKING OF THE INVINCIBLE STANDARD, has just been our country and his respect for our King by in-printed, and may be had at every place where this viting the British Chargé des Affaires to dinner, work is usually sold. LONDON, MR. ADDINGTON AND THE MAIDSTONE SIR,-Observing a statement in the Sun Newspaper of Tuesday last, purporting to be a picture of the political parties in this country, wherein the writer has insidiously attempted to throw a most undeserved odiuni en Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, &c. and spoken in terms of great praise of certain political characters, on account of their having given their hitherto with-held support to Mr. Addington and his measures, and also insinuating that the late opposition to the Navy Bill for remedying abuses in the Dock-yards, &c. originated in pique and improper motives, I cannot suffer such a paper to pass unnoticed or unanswered.-The opposition to the Navy Bill was on two grounds; first, the infringement of the law of the land; and secondly, its inexpediency, and the pretext it afforded the Admiralty, and Navy Boards, of getting rid of a very great part of their business, at the public expense, and to the increase of an overbearing patronage. The opposition to that measure had in view the real, sound, and radical cure of the disorders in the Dockyards, by constitutional means, in a speedy and easy manner. It wished to compel those commissioners who had been for years receiving the public reward for their alleged services, to cure those disorders that had crept into the departments under their management, at least, in part through their lax attendance to the business entrusted to them. Let any one step forth and invalidate, if he can, the statements that have been made on this head. Let him advance, he shall be met with damning proofs, and proofs upon proofs. As to the other topic in that demiofficial paper, the acquisition of certain political characters to the ministerial party, I wish the minister much joy of his new associates. Alas! What does the public service gain by it? Had those same men come forward with their approbation and support of measures during the late contest for our very existence as a nation, we should not be under the painful necessity of having to make the allusions we do to our present dangerous situation. I assert, Sir, in the face of the whole kingdom, that our present difficulties and dangers in great part proceed from the uniform and systematic opposition of these very men, to every measure, however salutary, of the late administration: That opposition paved the way for the disgraceful peace of Amiens: that opposition did away all those vulgar prejudices, love of our king, country, and constitution. They began with the greatest praise of the French revolution, in and out of Parliament; that gloVOL. III, rious monument of buman wisdom was echoed in our ears at every meeting of the disaffected, that could be got together from the lowest dregs of the people. Nay, the speaker's mace (certainly in republican jargon, a bauble,) did not impose the decent and necessary restraint on parliamentary debate, but every expression of contempt and infamy, couched in language the most coarse, was bestowed on every measure that tended in the smailest degree to the protection of the British crown and constitution, and to the check of the horrors of republican success. On which side did these men range themselves? Did they vote supplies for carrying on the war into which we were forced by our inveterate enemy in our self defence? Did they not stigmatize every legal means resorted to (almost indeed too late) for the suppression of treason itself, as illegal and tyrannical? Did not they assert, over and over again, that no treasonable plots did exist; and to crowa all, did they not at Maidstone put the scal to their former conduct, by identifying their politics with those of the most infamous and abandoned traitor that ever did exist. Nay, has not the chief leader of that opposition repeatedly said, "I rejoice at peace because "it is glorious for France and the First Con"sul." And yet, can the respectable Mr. Addington, can he, the friend of Pitt and his gold; of that Pitt whose wise measures formed a saving barrier to the desolating career of French horrors, can he call these men to his aid in the hour of peril, when the gaunt banner of Buonaparté waves over Italy, Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland? The line of conduct pursued by these men, taught our foe to consider us as a divided people; it emboldened his unbounded pretensions and aggressions; it appalled the royalists; it kept back those from declaring themselves in our favour, who otherwise would have entered most heartily into our cause, the cause of Europe and the civilized world. But when the trials at Maidstone ended so triumphantly for treason, when the evidence there given was known in France, its rulers already promised themselves the utmost success here. When they heard that a nobleman of the highest rank, and a privy counsellor too, presided at a club, and gave as a toast the "sovereignty of the people," they pictured to themselves the Earl Marshall's staff of honour emblazoned with all the kingly achievements, by republican and jacobin arts turned into the deadly pike surmounted with the cap of liberty, and reeking with the blood of every thing ancient, noble, and honourable. It was on this division, in and out of Parliament, that they founded their H hopes of final triumph. It was this that raised and appointed the army of England. They argued, and very wisely too, that matters must be very far gone indeed, when British senators became their advocates and eulogists, and branded the confederacy entred into by England on the purest grounds, those of self defence, as a combination of tyrants and despots. To make good this part of my assertion, I appeal to the repeated declarations of honest X. Y. Talleyrand to Lord Malmesbury during his embassy at Paris. To our representations he opposed, as the strongest counterpart, the divisions among ourselves, and the bold designs of the patriotic party, as it was most falsely called. And can the acquisition of these men be a matter of triumph to any minister? No, no; surely not. It may indeed be a matter of triumph to the venal conductor of a newspaper, that is all things by turns to all men, to panegyrize such a coalition; but to those who have, the honour and interest of their country at heart, it is a matter of dismay. What good can come from such a monstrous union? Non tali auxilio ncc defensoribus istis Tempus eget. In this day we want those tried men, whose unseduced principles and firm attachment to the crown and constitution of these realms, bave steered us through the most troubled and dangerous period this country and Europe ever saw, and who have proved themselves well fitted to encounter the portentous difficulties which await us on every side. Those praisers of the French revolu tion are not the men; I fear them, I distrust them, I hate them in and out of place.They cannot serve God and Mammon, they cannot admire Republican France, and love Old England; they cannot worship the Goddess of Reason with her Pike and Bonnet Ronge, and venerate the Imperial British Crown and Mitre at the same time. 5th February, 1803. I am, &c. R. B. ON THE EVACUATION OF MALTA. SIR, I have observed that the intelligence and opinions given in your Register are for the most part well founded; but I suspect that the following article in your Paper of the Sth inst. was not inserted with your usual attention. "Malta will, we believe, be given up in a short time. "The pretended guarantee, which our ministers will affect to have obtained "from Russia is, in fact and in truth, a "mandate on the part of that power, con ' jointly with France, that we should ful" the treaty of Amiens." (p. 30). 66 That Russia and France may have required the evacuation of Malta in a mandatory style I can easily believe; and, notwithstanding the recruits lately sent thither, and the supposed orders for a part of the Egyptian army to re-inforce that garrison, notwithstanding the manifest and incalculable importance of this island to Great Britain, and our undeniable right under the existing circumstances to retain it, yet have I strong apprehensions that our ministry may be induced to yield to this imperious and unreasonable demand: but that this evacu ation of Malta has been demanded, or will be agreed to as a performance of the treaty of Amiens, I never can believe until I see it publicly avowed. For to set up this pretence in such pointed contradiction to the terms of that treaty would, on the parts of Russia and France, be an useless waste of insolence and falsehood; whilst on the part of our ministry, it would be a foolish and hopeless attempt to make the nation believe-basely prone as it seems to be to believe any thing that promises to defer, even for a single month, a renewal of the war-it would, I say, be impossible to dupe even this nation into a belief, that the evacuating of Malta, until a Grand Master, or his lawful commissaries were present in the island to assume the government of it, would, with any appearance of propriety or truth, be called a performance of the treaty of Amiens. No, Sir; whenever that baleful event shall take place, it must be in virtue of a new negotiation, derogatory from the treaty of Amiens. Under this conviction, I have repeatedly and carefuly examined the treaty; and the only passage which seems, as far as I can discover, to afford the slightest opening to a new negotiation on the subject of Malta, is to be found in the second stipulation of the tenth article. The words are these: "The governments. "of the French Republic and Great Bri"tain, desirous to place the order and island "of Malta in a state of entire indepen"dence with respect to themselves, agree,' &c. &c.--and then follow the particular stipulations. Now, I can imagine, that the Courts of St. Peterburgh and Paris, presuming on their own power and the apparent disposition and conduct of this country, might insist-That by the spirit of the above declaration, which serves as an introduction to all the subsequent stipulations relative to the evacuation of Malta, it is clear that the principal aim and primary object of the contracting powers were, that Malta should be completely independent of themselves. That by the words of the fourth stipulation the island was indeed to be restored to the Order, having assembled and regularly elected a Grand Master, which were considered to be such practicable and certain events, that they were expected to take place within three months, or possibly less, as appears from that being the time fixed for the withdrawing of the British troops.. But unforeseen circumstances having prevented those events for almost a whole year, and there being now no prospect or probability that the Order will assemble and elect a Grand Master; good faith requires that the treaty of Amiens shall be executed as far as it is practicable, and pursuant to its true spirit and meaning. For this purpose, it is become requisite that a negotiation should be opened, in order that a time may be fixed for the British forces to evacuate, and for the Neapolitan garrison to take possession of Malta, as it is provided by the treaty of Amiens; which garrison, under the protecting guarantee of Russia, may keep that island completely independent both of France and Great Britain.-Having thus stated the most plausible reasoning that occurs to me in favour of a new negotiation on this subject, I will now offer what seems to be a fair and honourable answer on the part of the British ministry. -By the express terms of the treaty of Amiens," the island of Malta is to be "restored to the Order, and the British "forces are to evacuate it, when a Grand "Master, duly elected, or his lawful com missaries shall be present to assume the government of it." The words are plain and positive; there is no alternative, no provision for our evacuating the island in favour of any other power, or under any other circumstances. And this you do in effect acknowledge, by appealing from the letter which admits of but one construction, to the spirit of the treaty, which might open a wide and dangerous field to vague conjecture and sophistical interpretation: and in truth, we may learn from history, that appeals of this sort seldom terminate in any increase of good understanding or amity. So that it seems upon the whole to be more for the good of mankind that treaties of peace should be performed to the letter, even with some inconvenience, rather than that the spirit of them should be too curiously inquired into, or insisted on. Having stated this remark as a ground of general objection to the proposed negotiation, we will now answer particularly to the arguments which you have offered in support of the proposal.-From the declaration in the beginning of the fourth stipulation you infer that the independence | of the island of Malta was the principal aim and primary object of the contracting powers. We deny that any such inference can be fairly drawn from that passage. The words are, "desirous to place the "order and the island in a state of indepen "dence." It is clear, that they were considered as one joint object; neither the one nor the other was a principal aim or primary object; they are never treated of as separate, or even separable; and as far as the form of the treaty can mark any priority of consideration, it is in favour of the Order, which occupies the three first stipulations of the tenth article, with provisions for its restoration; and in all the subsequent stipulations it is evidently supposed that the Order is re-established.~ You say, that "the assembling of the Order " and the election of a Grand Master were "expected to take place within three months, as s appears from that being the time fixed "for withdrawing the British forces."All the remaining knights being either Spaniards, Italians or Germans, France had facilities to procure an assemblage of them, which England could not have; possibly therefore you might at the time have good reason to expect that such an assemblage and an election might take place in three months. But we do not mean to discuss your expectations. For ourselves, we declare, that we formed no expectation as to the time when those events might take place; whether it were in three months or three years, was not, in our opinion, a matter of any consequence. The important point to us was, that the Order, and the Order only, should have possession of the island: because we thought, as we still think, that the Order would always find it to be its true interest to take no part in any war which England might hereafter have with France, or any other power, and would therefore always observe an impartial and strict neutrality. The peculiar institution and situation of the Order warrant this opinion, which we cannot extend to any other power in Europe; the situation of every other power being very obviously and essentially different.-But" unforeseen "circumstances have (it seems) prevented "the re-establishment of the Order." Supposing the knights to be, at the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens, disposed to re-establish their Order, we do not recollect any circumstances that have happened to change that disposition, except the confiscations of their estates in Spain and Germany, by which the revenues of the knights have been so considerably reduced, that they may think themselves no |