Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

tleman usher; and, as to any other public function, how can he be possibly fit for it? Bernadotte will ride over him. He will tread him down into the dirt; and we should not be at all surprized to hear, that the unfortunate representative of our Sovereign had been literally driven from the city of Washington. This is a hopeful prospect with respect to a country much more important to us, at this time in particular, than any other in the world.

three

DECREE AT MARTINICO.-On the 19th of February a decree was issued at Martinico, by VILLARET JOYEUSE, Captain General of that Island and of st. Lucia, concerning foreigners established in the said colonies. This decree, which will be found at full length in page 618 of the present sheet, has been, in some of the London papers, represented as a violation of the treaty of Amiens, on the part of France, because it is said to compel British subjects, in those islands, to dispose of their property by the 20th of June next. The 3d resolve of the decree has no such meaning as this. It only provides, that, from (that is to say after) the 20th of June next, such persons, if they dispose of their shops and warehouses at all, shall, on even offers, give the preference to French merchants and captains of ships; and, there must be every reason to presume, that none but such persons will make them any offers. According to the treaty of Amiens, article XIII. British subjects are allowed years "to dispose of all their property, whe"ther acquired or possessed by them, be"fore, or during the continuance of the "war." This certainly can be extended no farther than to the property, which they had in the colonies at the time the treaty was concluded. It can never be construed to mean, that they should continue to import, to buy as well as to dispose of property. And, therefore, it does appear to us, that their having been allowed to bring goods from France to make up assortments, in order to get their own goods off, ought to be considered as an indulgence.-The 4th re solve of the decree is necessary to the due execution of the third; and as to the 5th, it relates merely to Frenchmen, who have foreigners under them or connected with them. We have thought these observations not altogether unnecessary at this time, because, when a party has just ground of complaint, he never ought to weaken it by frivolous charges; and, it is truly lamentable to hear the decree at Martinico a subject of outery in the mouths of those very persons, who revile you for representing as breaches of treaty, the subjugation of Holland and the partition of Germany.

TONNAGE-DUTY.-When people complain against taxes, of any sort, their complaints are always to be heard with great caution, not to say suspicion. Till something can be found to re-place it, most assuredly this tax ought not to be given up; but, if any thing can be so found, to persevere in a duty on tonnage will require arguments such as we have not yet heard to support a justification of the minister. At any rate, his conduct has in this, as in every other instance, been marked by a most disgusting mixture of cunning and of folly. He knew, that the Lord Mayor had been instructed to bring forward and support a petition for the repeal of the duty on tonnage. He obtains a suspension of the Lord Mayor's proceedings, under the pretext that they might indirectly tend to embarrass the negotiations going on with France, and during this suspension, he brings forward his consolidation act, including and confirming the duty on tonnage! And, will any one say, then, that he is not worthy of the house in Richmond Park? The consolidation act once past, with what consistency can the Parliament entertain a proposition for the total repeal of a duty, which they have just before confirmed, by making its rates part of a permanent code of custom-house law! The shipowners, aware of the obvious intention of the Minister, have, however, begun to take measures to frustrate it. They held a meeting, at the London Tavern on the 26th inst. at which they resolved to bring their griev ances immediately forward. It was stated at this meeting, that " the Chancellor of "the Exchequer had called this tax, a tax "of experiment, and that he stood pledged to "the House of Commons and to the coun

[ocr errors]

try, to shew and prove the result of it. "That he had now had the experience of

66

a year. We are (said one of the meeting) "here assembled to consider of the farther "means necessary to oppose it, and we "have a body of evidence to bring forward "in sapport of our objections, and to prove "that we are navigating our ships to no profit ; "the Minister stands pledged to the public "and us to prove what has been the state of "the shipping-interest for the last twelve "months."-In this we perfectly agree. We, too, have proof, in abundauce, that the shipping and the sailors are fast departing from the country. What we foretold, above a twelvemonth ago, has been perfectly realized. We opposed this duty, the moment it made its appearance; but, we cannot forget, that MR. BURDON, the favourite of the ship-owners, sanctioned the peace, which has produced the far greater part of the falling off in their profits, and that, so late as

December last, the said Mr. BURDON stood foremost amongst the eulogists of that very minister, of whom they now complain, not because he has bartered away the honours won by the valour of their forefathers, not because he has imprinted indelible infamy on their country, not because he has done a deed that will bring the grey hairs of their Sovereign with sorrow to the grave, but because he has laid his hand upon their beggarly interests!-Nevertheless, as these interests are intimately connected, more so than those of almost any other description of men, with not only the interests, but with the naval strength and the independent existence of the country, they will, we hope, be manfully and effectually supported by the parliament.

THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.-By referring to our domestic intelligence, p 626, it will be perceived, that the Cape of Good Hope, has, at last, been surrendered entirely into the hands of the Dutch, and that, too, at the very moment when we were arming for a war, in which the Dutch, according to existing treaties, sanctioned by the treaty of Amiens, must be our enemies! We imagine, that this news will give a new turn to the present negotiations; and, we are very happy to see, that the orders and the counterorders, respecting this important colony, have, at last, become a subject of discussion in Parliament. LORD FOLKSTONE brought forward, on the 28th instant, a motion for copies of the dispatches sent to, and received from, our commander at the Cape. This motion was superseded by the order of the day, upon the ground, on the part of the ministers, that it tended to embarrass the present negotiations with France! But what can the Cape of Good Hope, which is now no longer in our hands, which was finally surrendered in virtue of an order sent out in November last; what, in the name of common sense, can this colony have to do with negotiations now pending with France, negotiations upon a dispute, which must necessarily have arisen SINCE the date of that order! The ministers said, they had hoped, that no detached questions, respecting their conduct, would be agitated, but that the whole would be embraced in one discussion. This is precisely the evasive language which they held previous to the discussion of the definitive treaty. They wish to crowd all the numerous and important subjects necessary to be discussed, the rise, the progress, the result, and the probable consequences of their remonstrances respecting Switzerland, of their re capture and subsequent surrender of the Cape, of their non-evacuation of Goree, of their delay to evacuate Egypt, of their new

conventions respecting Malta, of their present retention of that island, of their Message to Parliament, of their calling out the militia without lawful cause, of the decrepitude of the navy, and of the depreciation. of public credit; all these they wish to crowd into the discussion of one single evening, consisting of eight hours, six of which will be taken up with their own studied sophistical harangues. How is the Parliament to proceed to an examination into their conduct, without being previously possessed of the papers, from which alone a just opinion of that conduct can be formed? And of these papers, what part is at once so necessary and so entirely unconnected with the subjects of the present negotiation, as that part which relates to the Cape of Good Hope? This colony is no longer ours: it once was; and, surely, it may now be permitted to the House of Commons to enquire when, and how it was disposed of! But, say they, LORD FOLKSTONE, at the same time that he disavows any intention to embarrass the present negotiations, clearly signifies it to be his opinion, that these negotiations are closely connected with our proceedings at the Cape. Not so. His lordship said (we quote the True Briton), that "he wanted "to compare the date of the receipt of the "dispatches, which informed ministers of "the detention, or re-capture, of the Cape, "with the date of his Majesty's Message to "that House, because he did believe, that "those dispatches conduced to the Message and "the consequent armament." And, in order to show that these measures could be produced by no other cause, his lordship cited the declarations of the French official paper, and of Buonaparté himself. But, because he thought that the news of the recapture of the Cape was the real cause of the Message and of the armament; because he thought, that the present dispute with France was invented for the purpose of disguising the real motive of that Message and that armament, did it follow, thence, that he regarded the Cape itself as a subject of discussion at this time, when it is known that the place is no longer in our hands? All that his lordship seems to have asked for, was, to be informed of the time when mi, nisters received an account of the re-capture of the Cape, in order that he might compare it with the date of the King's Message. What possible inconvenience to the present nego, tiations could arise from the giving of this information? It might, however, have produced great inconvenience to the ministers; for, unless we are greatly deceived, the papers, called for by LORD FOLKSTONE, would have completely stripped off their

[ocr errors]

"of

mask, and would have discovered to the astonished beholders, that the Cape of Good Hope, that this colony now no longer in our possession, and on which we shall never set foot again, has been the cause, the only true cause of all our warlike array!--- The French allege, and with every appearance of truth, that the King's Message, together with the subsequent hostile preparations on the part of this country, had no other foundation than the apprehensions, which the ministers entertained of the consequences that might arise from their forcible retention of the Cape.-The French official gazette has uniformly asserted, in flat contradiction to the Message, that, as to military preparations carrying on in the ports of France and Holland,' there were none other than those which had been carrying on ever since the conclusion of the peace: and that, with respect to "discussions subsisting between his Majesty and the French government," there were, at the date of the Message, not only none great importance," but that there were no discussions at all then so subsisting. These assertions have been corroborated by Buonaparte's own declaration, made to Lord Whitworth, in the presence of the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe; and, we, for our parts, believe them to be perfectly correct. Upon a mature consideration, therefore, of all the circumstances, past, present, and prospective, we look upon the following as being the true history of the message and of the armament, and to this disgraceful history we beg leave to call the attention of every one of our readers.-In the month of October last, the ministers were seized with a fit of vigour, which led them to resolve on keeping possession of Malta, the Cape, Demerara, &c. by way of counterpoise against the encroachments of France, in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. In consequence of this resolution, they dispatched an order to retain the Cape, Demerara, &c. and soon after inserted, in the True Briton, the following observations, intended to prepare the Public for a favourable reception of the measure. "His Majesty's "ministers cannot proceed to carry into "effect the articles of the treaty with France, "which relate to the cessions to be made, "without new stipulations. If the Chief "Consul annexes Piedmont to the republic, "let us keep Malta; if he interferes in the "affairs of Holland, let us keep the Cape, "Demerara, and Essequibo." This article appeared on the 30th of October, the order to retain the Cape and Demerara having been some days at sea. On the 1st of November arrived the Moniteur, containing a

sort of manifesto, (1) in which France repeated her determination to exclude this country from any concern whatever in the affairs of the continent, but, in which manifesto, the Consul threw all the blame of misunderstanding, not upon the English ministers, but upon their restless opponents, expressing, at the same time, his hope, that those turbulent spirits would not be "able "to produce a change in the PRUDENT "MINISTRY by which Great Britain is "governed." This manifesto caused an entire, and almost instantaneous, change of system in the English cabinet; and, on the 5th of November, only four days after the manifesto was received in London, the True Briton conveyed an indication of this change: "The King's ministers will be moderate, but "firm. They must recollect how much the "relative situation of France with this coun"try is changed since the signature of the "treaty of Amiens; but, if any compromise 66 can be made with respect to the conquests we "still retain, reserving to us even less than our just demands, we trust, they will be disposed to evince their moderation by ac"cepting such compromise, rather than bave

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

recourse to the dreadful alternative of war." In conformity with this sentiment, though France had, in the interim, formally completed the annexation of Piedmont, and had interfered, in a manner more direct than ever, in the affairs of Holland, the ministers determined to revoke their order for the retention of the Cape, Demerara, &c. and the counter-order was, accordingly dispatched, in the hope that it would overtake the order for retention, which, in that case, would never have been either executed or heard of. But, on the other hand, if the order for the retention arrived first, and in time to be executed, they had to prepare against the odium and the hostility, to which the intelligence of its execution must inevitably give rise. In this state of suspense, therefore, they called upon Parliament for large peace establishments, disguising the real motive under the broad pretext of being in a state of preparation against the vast power and ambitious views of France, as if that power and those views had recently made their ap pearance! If news had arrived, that the counter-order (the order to give up the Cape) had overtaken the order to retain it; if such news had been received, then an excuse would have been framed for reducing the establishments, or, those establishments would have existed upon paper only. But, unfortunately for the Richmond-Park mi

(1) See Register, Vol. II. p. 565.

nisters, though their order against Demerara was too late, that for the retention of the Cape arrived in time, and was punctually executed. Of this they bad intelligence on the 6th of March, in the night. On the 7th, at seven o'clock in the morning, dispatches arrived at Windsor, whereupon the King, who was preparing to hunt that day, gave directions for his immediate return to London. He arrived about one o'clock, and a cabinet council was held at BuckinghamHouse at three o'clock, at which council the message was determined on, and the proclamation, for encouraging seamen to enter, was signed. The next day, the 8th of March, the message was communicated to Parliament, and press warrants were issued and executed. On the 10th of March, two days after the message had been communicated, the Public heard rumours of the retention of the Cape; and, a few days later, that event was circumstantially announced, through the English news papers, to the astonished governments of France and Holland, who had never before received the slightest intimation of the matter! This was war to all in

[ocr errors]

tents and purposes. General Dundas absolutely captured the Cape, and the instrument by which he took possession of it was, accordingly, called a capitulation. The effect which this would have had, if it had found us in a state of profound peace, the ministers foresaw; and, therefore, they invented the pretexts, held forth in his Majesty's message, of military preparations in the ports "of France and Holland," and of "impor"tant discussions between his Majesty and "the French government." To have suffered the capitulation of the Dutch garrison at the Cape to come upon the country unarmed, unprepared for, and unexpecting war; to have suffered this event to be an nounced to Europe, at a moment when our ministers were, in every possible way, inculcating the opinion of permanent peace; this would have been too glaring, too evidently perfidious, and too hostile to the interests of the country, not to have shocked even the most stupid and most base part of the nation. Therefore they armed; therefore they feigned pretexts of alarm; therefore they raised a war-like bustle, amidst the circumstances of which, the re-capture of the Cape might find a sort of tacit justification, in the minds, at least, of all those who would not reflect, that the "military preparations" and important discussions" of the month of March could form no ground for re-capturing the Cape in the preceding December.Having grounded their armament upon the double pretext of extraordinary military preparations, and of diplomatic discussions,

[ocr errors]

and, being well assured, that the former did not exist, they were compelled to make the latter; and, if ever the papers relative to the present negotiation are made public, it will be seen, that it originated with them, and that, too, at the very same time that the message was resolved on. Why did they fix on Malta as the subject of dispute? Because they bad nothing else left in their hands. Their counter-order would, they knew, deprive them of the Cape; Demerara, &c. were gone before; Egypt was demanded by the Porte, and nothing remained but Malta. That there existed, previous to the message, no dispute about this place is evident from several circumstances. They had, we now find, given up the point as to the suppression of the Langues of Castille and Aragon; they had consented to the mode of election, by which the Bailli Thomasi became Grand Master; the non acceptance of the powers invited to join in the guarantee could be no lawful obstacle to the fulfilment of the treaty; and, the Consul of France, in opening the session of the legislature, stated the final evacuation to be at hand. Some "British troops," said he, "still remain at "Alexandria and Malta: of this our go"vernment had a right to complain, but it "has learned, that the ships destined to con

66

66

[ocr errors]

vey them to Europe, are in the Mediterra"nean." This was the light in which the Consul viewed the state of the affair of Malta, on the 22d of February, only thirteen days previous to the date of the King's message. The French government had, before that time, had a "right to complain" of delay in the evacuation of Malta; but, at the time of making the address (22d of February,)" it bad learned" that the ships, destined to convey our troops home, were "in the Mediterranean." From whom had it learned this? From our ministers? Yes; and we would venture our lives, that they put off, from day to day, the evacuation of Malta, for no other purpose in the world, than that of having something to make a dispute about, some excuse for arming the country, in case their order for retaining the Cape should be carried into execution before their counterorder arrived. At any rate, there could not be, on the 22d of February, any discussions respecting Malta between his Majesty and the government of France; for, if there had, Buonaparté never would have spoken on the subject in the words here correctly cited from his speech; he never would have described all matter of complaint as being put an end to by the arrival of the ships destined, to carry away the British troops. If, then, there were no discussions existing, thirteen. days previous to the date of the message

what "important discussions" could have arisen in that short space of time? Buonaparté has declared, that there were no discussions at all existing, even at the date of the message; and, as the ministers have not contradicted him, so we believe they cannot do it, without being guilty of a direct and unqualified falsehood, which it is in his power, at any time, to detect and expose.-To the retention of the Cape, therefore, and to that alone, we must look for the real cause of the message, of the armament, of the present negotiation, and of the war, if a war should be the result: to an order, issued on no better ground than the republican sallies of the news-papers in favour of the Swiss, and revoked from no other motive than that of preserving ministerial power and emolument through the friendship of Buonaparté; to this order, to this act so worthy of the “safe "politicians," we must attribute all the alarm, the uncertainty and embarrassment that have arisen, all the enormous expense that will arise, and all the blood that may dow, from the present hostile preparations.-That Malta, or any other of our conquests, would be justly retained is certain; because France has been, from the day the treaty was concluded, in a continual infraction of it: that war, too, is necessary, and that, in a few months, it will be unavoidable by any other means than that of subjugation to France, no man not blinded by ignorance or baseness will deny: but, that Malta should have been retained, and that the country should be placed in its present situation, from a cause such as we have described, is a consideration that would rouze any people not perfectly reconciled to rumiliation and disgrace.-Towards such a people the ministers, provided they can come with peace in their mouths, will not find it difficult to make a satisfactory excuse for their conduct. The most trifling shew of compensation for all this embarrassment and expense will suffice. Something, however, must be invented. With a very great majority nothing at all, nothing but the bare name of peace, will be necessary; but there are a few persons, who will ask for a little more, and to obtain this little is, we imagine, the only object which the ministers now have in view. Buonaparté, on the other hand, thinks himself sufficiently generous in pardoning their capitulation at the Cape; yet, for the sake of keeping them in their places, 'till he is quite prepared to make an attack upon Ireland or England, he may possibly furnish them with something wherewith to give to their measures the appearance of having had a legitimate and landable object. To obtain this boon they are now

at.

upon their knees before him; and, as they will, in return, make to him any sacrifice of the permanent interests of their country, they will; for this and for the before-mentioned forcible reason, be very likely to obtain it. The precise nature and amount of this boon it would be difficult even to guess Some miserable accommodation about Malta will probably take place; some quirking compact, which shall have the sound of dignity with the sense of disgrace; something or other that shall satisfy the selfish, deceive the ignorant, and, by the means of their united noise, silence the loyal, the patriotic, and the wise. Not for their country, therefore, but for themselves are they now negotiating with Buonaparté, seeing that no hope can be entertained of success with Mr. Pitt.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.-And, is it with men like these that the Fitzwilliams, the Spencers, the Grenvilles, the Pitts, and the Windhams are to join! Will they assume a share of the responsibility for the retention of the Cape? Will they, too, crouch at the feet of Buonaparté? Will the Moiras and the Greys do this, for the sake of partaking in the honours of the Richmond Park ministry? No. Most assuredly they will not; and, therefore, no change. will take place, 'till we receive a blow that shall shake the monarchy itself to the centre. -Lord Melville, indeed, together with the Roses, the Longs, and some few others of that description, are, we believe, tendering their services to the ministry; but, this set is worn out; they are absolutely blown upon by the nation. The ministers want protection, and that, they well know, is not to be found from those who are willing to join them. They want shelter, which they would not find under the battered, brazen shield of Lord Melville, though backed by his trusty and well-disciplined clan -No; the ministers, the "safe politicians," want associates whose talents and whose influence will operate as an act of oblivion for all that has been done since the signature of the peace. For this end, they would surrender a part of their power and emoluments; but, if their conduct is to be enquired into, if they are, in good earnest, to be made answerable for the great 'and numerous evils which they have brought upon their country, then there is no motive for yielding any portion of their places, which they, doubtless, regard as a sort of bushmoncy, given to those who may join them. And, again we ask, will the Fitzwilliams, the Moiras, the Spencers, the Grenvilles, the Pitts, the Windhams, or the Greys, take this hush-money? Will they thus dishonour

« ForrigeFortsett »