"all his interest and good will in the business of freighting vessels from Port au Prince and said Brett's Line, Haiti Packets," and, for $1,800 a year, promised that while H. Becker & Co. or their successors made shipments by sail to Port au Prince he would not solicit freights or do any business with Port au Prince in or from any place in the United States east of the Mississippi River. Plaintiff sues to recover money due under this contract and is met by the defense that the contract is illegal, being contrary to the United States Trust Act of 1890. Opinion. * * * The Federal act "certainly was not intended to prohibit a man from selling his business in the ordinary way and from thereupon obtaining the full value thereof through the instrumentality of an incidental covenant not to compete with the purchaser within some limited area. In our judgment the present contract is not in contravention of this Federal act. It certainly is not within its spirit. If that act were to be construed literally and technically so as to embrace such a contract as the present, it would involve consequences most harmful to the commercial community." The contract was legal. 82 Fed., 529. 171 U. S., 578. Statement. United States v. Hopkins et al. Circuit Court, September 20, 1897. Defendants were engaged as commission merchants in receiving, buying, selling, and handling live stock at the Kansas City stock-yards. These stock-yards furnished the only available public market for that purpose for an area including many states and territories. Defendants formed themselves into an association agreeing upon certain limits to the commissions charged and the number of persons that each member could employ to travel and solicit business, and agreeing that members should do no business with nonmembers. The United States seeks to enjoin defendants from acting under this agreement. Opinion of the Circuit Court. By receiving stock from foreign states and shipping stock to foreign states, defendants are engaged in interstate comThe agreement is in restraint of interstate commerce. 252A merce. -4 The Trust Act prohibits all restraints upon interstate trade, and it is immaterial under that law whether the restraints be reasonable or unreasonable. The injunction is granted. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court. Is The business of the members of this exchange is not interstate commerce. It affects it indirectly, but that is all. "The services of members of the different stock and produce exchanges throughout the country in effecting sales of the articles they deal in are of a similar nature. Members of the New York Stock Exchange buy and sell shares of stock of railroads and other corporations, and the property represented by such shares of stock is situated all over the country. a broker whose principal lives outside of New York state, and who sends him the shares of stock or the bonds of a corporation created and doing business in another state, for sale, engaged in interstate commerce? We think it would be an entirely novel view of the situation if all the members of these different exchanges throughout the country were to be regarded as engaged in interstate commerce. The bill of the United States is discharged. * * * United States v. Coal Dealers' Association of California et al. 85 Fed., 252. Statement. Circuit Court, January 28, 1898. Practically all the coal used in San Francisco is mined in Washington, Oregon and British Columbia. A very large number of the coal dealers in San Francisco formed themselves into an association, agreeing not to sell coal below certain prices. This association entered into a contract with the producers of coal in Washington, Oregon and British Columbia whereby the producers agreed to cooperate with the association to carry out its purposes, and the producers agreed not to sell coal to any non-member except for a much higher price than they charged members. United States seeks to enjoin proceedings under this arrangement. Opinion of the court. The combination affects the sale of coal as soon as it arrives in San Francisco from other states and before it has become a part of the mass of property in the state. Until it has become part of the mass of property in the state it remains in interstate commerce, and therefore comes under the Trust Act. It is unnecessary to discuss whether the restraint is reasonable, for the Trust Act forbids all restraints reasonable or not. Injunction is granted. 171 U. S., 604. Statement. Anderson v. United States. October 24, 1898. Plaintiff was a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, an association composed of live stock buyers at Kansas City. He was enjoined by the Circuit Court from acting under the following rules of the exchange: "This exchange will not recognize any yard trader unless he is a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange. When there are two or more parties trading together as partners, they shall each and all of them be members of this exchange. No member of this exchange shall employ any person to buy or sell cattle unless such person hold a certificate of membership in this exchange. No member of this exchange shall be allowed to pay any order buyer or salesman any sum of money as a fee for buying cattle from or selling cattle to such party." An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. Opinion. This association does not meddle with prices. In refusing to recognize any yard trader who is not a member of the exchange there is no purpose of thereby affecting or restraining interstate commerce. If that is affected at all, it is in a very remote manner. The rules have no direct tendency to restrain in any way interstate commerce in the cattle dealt in. Whether or not the business engaged in is interstate commerce is not decided. The bill by the United States is dismissed. United States v. Joint Traffic Association. 171 U. S., 505. Statement. October 24, 1898. Thirty-one railroad companies, engaged in transportation between Chicago and the Atlantic coast, formed themselves into an association known as the Joint Traffic Association, which was to determine what rates should be charged, and what portion of the business each company should do, so far as possible without violating the Interstate Commerce Act, or any other law applicable, or any provision of the charters of the companies. Every company was to follow the schedule of rates recommended by the managers of the association, except that any company's board of directors might disapprove the rates so fixed, and after thirty days' notice to the managers of the association, so far as the interest of that company was concerned, the rates need not be followed. The United States brought a bill in a Circuit Court to have proceedings under the agreement enjoined. The bill was there dismissed. On appeal to a Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. The United States now appeal again to the United States Supreme Court. Opinion. The natural, direct and necessary effect of the provisions of the agreement is to prevent any competition between the parties to it. The agreement affects interstate commerce by destroying competition. The power given Congress by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce vests it with power to declare that no contract or combination shall be · legal which restrains trade by shutting out the operation of the general law of competition; and Congress has exercised this power by passing the Trust Act of 1890. This act does not deprive the citizen of the liberty guaranteed him by the fifth amendment to the Constitution. The act is constitutional, and following the construction given it in the TransMissouri case,1 this combination is in violation of it. The judgments of the lower courts are reversed, and the case remanded to the Circuit Court with instructions to take such further proceedings therein as may be in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court. Harry W. Dickerman, Trustee, et al, v. The Northern Trust U. S., Statement. January 22, 1900. The Columbia Straw Paper Company, organized under the laws of New Jersey, obtained control of forty paper mills. In doing this a mortgage was given on its property to secure the payment of bonds. The bonds passed into the hands of 1166 U.S., 290; digested, p. 48. The bonds not being paid, holders in good faith for value. though due, a bill is filed to foreclose the mortgage. One defense is that the mortgage is part of a scheme to form an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, in violation of the act of Congress of July 2, 1890. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court. * * "If this were a proceeding in quo warranto to attack the organization of the corporation * or an action against a member of the combination to enforce any of the provisions of the original contract, the validity of such contract would become an important question. But in a suit to foreclose a mortgage upon the property of the concern it is difficult to see how the purpose for which the corporation was originally organized can become a material inquiry. So long as the corporation existed it had the power to create a mortgage, and when the mortgage became due the trustee had a right to foreclose." The mortgage can be foreclosed. COMMON-LAW DECISIONS. American Biscuit and Manufacturing Co. v. Klotz et al. 44 Fed., 721. January 8, 1891. Plaintiff had purchased with its stock thirty-five large bakeries. One of these, claiming that the sale was void, took possession of its property and tendered back the stock received in payment. Plaintiff comes into equity and asks that an injunction issue. An injunction is denied. It is suggested that the combination would be illegal by the Louisiana statute or by the United States Trust Act of 1890, and that such a combination being against public policy should not be aided by an equity court in any way. It is not decided that the anti-trust acts apply. The decision rests on the ground that such a combination is not to be aided by a court of equity. Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Company. Plaintiff corporation held a ninety-nine-year charter "to carry on the business of manufacturing sleeping cars under its patents and of hiring or letting the cars or other personal |