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have gone to swell the estate or assets of said Fidelity National Bank. Some cases are cited which seem to support this position, but they are not sound in principle, nor in harmony with the decided weight of authority. In seeking to follow and impress a trust character upon funds which an agent has misapplied, it is incumbent upon the principal to clearly trace such funds into the hands of the party against whom the relief is sought; and, so long as the trust fund or property, in either its original or substituted form, can be traced and identified, it may be followed and recovered by the true owner, provided it has not come into the possession of some bona fide holder for value without notice. This right of the principal "only ceases when the means of ascertainment fails," or when his property or fund has reached a bona fide holder for value, and without notice of the trust.

It is not deemed necessary to review the numerous authorities on this question. The rule is now well settled by repeated decisions both of the state and federal courts, which have followed and applied the principle laid down by Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562. The leading cases in this country are here simply referred to: Overseers of the Poor v. Bank, 2 Grat. 544; Whitley v. Foy, 6 Jones, Eq. 34; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232; Kip v. Bank, 10 Johns. 63; Van Alen v. Bank, 52 N. Y. 1; Bank v. King, 57 Pa. St. 202; Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332; Schuler v. Bank, 27 Fed. Rep. 424; Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54; Winters v. Armstrong, and Montgomery Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, heretofore decided by this court. Those authorities impose upon complainant the duty of tracing the funds it seeks to have impressed with a trust character into the defendant's possession, either in their original or in some substituted form, and the burden of identification is imposed upon all owners seeking to follow their property or its proceeds. No well-considered case has gone to the extent of holding that, when an agent converts or misappropriates his principal's property or funds, and thereafter fails, his general estate will be impressed with a trust for the reimbursement of such principal, on the ground that such estate has been benefited, and to an equal amount, by the agent's breach of duty. Every creditor could rest a like claim to priority of satisfaction on the same ground. The right of the owner to follow and recover his property rests upon a principle altogether different. In the present case the complainant, upon the doctrine of the cases cited, can only recover from the defendant such portions of the proceeds of its paper as it can trace into the hands of the receiver, either in their original or in some substituted form. The Fidelity National Bank having debit and credit balances with its numerous subagents or correspondents, who made the actual collection of complainant's paper, this court, upon the preliminary hearing of the cause, directed a reference to a special master to ascertain and report what funds derived from complainant's paper had come into the defendant's possession as receiver. The special master made his first report in the premises, which showed that complainant's said funds were mostly collected by subagents of the Fidelity Bank; that such subagents, having mutual accounts with the Fidelity National

Bank, credited the latter with the amount of such collection, and that at the date of the Fidelity Bank's suspension it had credit balances with some and debit balances with other of such subagents. This still left the fact sought to be ascertained in some doubt, and the court thereupon directed the special master to make an amended and supplemental report, and show what portion of the paper transmitted by complainant to the Fidelity National Bank between the 4th and 20th June, inclusive, was collected by correspondents of said Fidelity Bank, and credited to the latter, and in what cases the accounts between said Fidelity Bank and said correspondents exhibited a continuous balance due the former from the latter down to the date of the Fidelity Bank's failure, as large or larger than the amount of the proceeds of complainant's said paper so collected and credited by said correspondents, respectively, to said Fidelity Bank, and in what instances, and to what amounts, such balances so due from said correspondents at the time of the Fidelity Bank's suspension were subsequently paid over to and received by the defendant. The special master filed his amended report on the 27th of May, 1889, showing that the defendant had, subsequent to the suspension of the Fidelity Bank, received from said correspondents the proceeds of complainant's said paper to the amount of $7,209.59. Under the authorities the complainant could have reached and subjected those credits in the hands of said correspondents, which were made up by the proceeds of its paper. It can still follow the same in the hands of the defendant, to whose possession the funds belonging to complainant are thus clearly traced to the extent of $7,209.59.

Various exceptions are taken to the master's original and amended reports. They need not be noticed or considered in detail. In the judgment of the court the findings and conclusions of the special master are clearly sustained by the evidence, and the exceptions are overruled, and said amended report of May 27, 1889, is found to be correct, and is conA decree will be accordingly entered for complainant, directing the defendant to pay over to it or its counsel of record said sum of $7,209.59, and such dividend as he may hereafter receive on the sum of $1,577.89, collected by the Fifth National Bank of St. Louis on complainant's said paper, and credited to the Fidelity Bank. Each party will pay half the costs herein, including the fee of the special master, which is fixed by the court at the sum of $150.

MARTIN v. HOUSE et al.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Arkansas. June, 1888.)

UNITED STATES-PUBLIC LANDS-JURISDICTION.

Where land has been sold to the United States government, and jurisdiction over the same has been ceded to it by the state legislature, reserving the right to serve personal process thereon, no process issuing out of a state court upon a judgment lien to which the land was subject at the time of sale can affect the title thereto.

At Law. Action to recover land.

N. M. & G. B. Rose and J. W. Martin, for plaintiff.

J. W. House, for defendants.

BREWER, J. This is an action brought to recover possession of the south half of block 98, in the city of Little Rock, the same being the ground on which is situated the post-office building. Under the practice which obtains in this state, exceptions were filed to the deeds and other documentary evidence exhibited by plaintiff, and relied on as evidences of title. One matter only shall I notice, for that is fatal to plaintiff's right to recover.

On the 15th of May, 1874, one M. W. Benjamin, who had theretofore been the owner of the property, made a final conveyance to the United States. On the 4th of April, 1874, J. W. Martin recovered a judgment in the Pulaski circuit court against said Benjamin. Execution was issued on that judgment in March, 1875, this property levied on and sold to plaintiff. On June 7, 1872, the congress of the United States passed an act as follows:

"Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, that the secretary of the treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to purchase a site for, and cause to be constructed, a suitable building, with a fire-proof vault extending to each story, at the city of Little Rock, in the state of Arkansas, for the accommodation of the United States circuit and district courts, post-office, internal revenue, and other government offices, and for this purpose there is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, to be expended under the direction of the secretary of the treasury, who shall cause proper plans and estimates to be made, so that no expenditure shall be made or authorized for the full completion of said building and payment for the site thereof beyond the amount herein appropriated: provided, that no part of the sum herein appropriated shall be used or expended until a valid title to the site of said building shall be vested in the United States, and until the state of Arkansas shall duly release and relinquish its jurisdiction over the same, and its right to tax said site, and the property which may be thereon, during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof. Approved June 7, 1872."

The legislature of Arkansas, on the 21st day of February, 1873, passed the following act, to-wit:

"The state of Arkansas hereby consents to the purchase by the United States of a site for public buildings, and hereby cedes and grants

jurisdiction to the United States over any lot or lots, parcel, or block of ground within the corporate limits of the city of Little Rock, not exceeding in area three hundred (300) feet square, which shall or may be purchased by the United States as a site for a building for the accommodation of the United States circuit and district courts, post-office, internal revenue, and other government oflices, under the act of congress approved June 7, 1872; and the said state hereby releases and relinquishes her right to tax said site, and all improvements which may be thereon, during the time the United States shall be and remain the owner thereof: provided, that this grant of jurisdiction shall not prevent the execution of any process of this state, civil or criminal, on any person who may be on said premises."

The effect of these two acts was to vest exclusive jurisdiction over this tract of ground in the United States government, and this by virtue of section 8, art. 1, of the United States constitution. Now, at the time the cession of jurisdietion became operative and final, to-wit, on May 15, 1874, the government received a good title, as well as exclusive jurisdietion. True, the property was subject to a judgment lien, and, if the property had remained in the territorial jurisdiction of the state of Arkansas, this judgment lien might have ripened, through proceedings in the state courts, into a perfect title; but after the cession of jurisdiction the power of the Arkansas state courts over the property ceased. No process could issue out of any state court to disturb the title or affect the property. I do not mean to say that the cession of jurisdiction would destroy the lien, but it did compel the enforcement of any rights which the judgment creditor had by proceedings in the federal courts. The reservation as to service of process is as expressed to process which is purely personal, and therefore, ex vi termini, excludes process, mesne or final, touching property, real or personal. This seems to be the general consensus of opinion, as expressed in the various cases cited by the learned district attorney in his brief. The most authoritative case cited by him is that of Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995, from which I make this quotation:

"When the title is acquired by purchase, by consent of the legislatures of the states, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority. This follows from the declaration of the constitution that congress shall have ‘like authority' over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of gov ernment; that is, the power of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that of congress; and that no other authority can be exercised over them has been the uniform opinion of federal and state tribunals, and of the attorneys general. The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the states that civil and criminal process of the state courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them, but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice; and congress, by statute passed in 1795, declared that cessions from the states of the jurisdiction of places where light-houses, beacons, buoys, or public piers were or might be erected, with such reservations, should be deemed sufficient for the support and erection of such structures, and, if no such reservation had been made, or in future cessions for those purposes should be omitted, civil and criminal process, issued under the authority of the state or of the United States, might be served and executed within them. 1 St. 426, c. 40."

Several other cases are noticed by the court in subsequent portions of the opinion. In view of the decision of the supreme court in that case, further discussion by me would seem superfluous. The exceptions will be sustained.

UNITED STATES v. CUDDY.

(District Court, S. D. California. August 26, 1889.)

PERJURY-INDICTMENT.

An indictment for perjury which charges that defendant took an oath before Judge R. in the United States district court, in open court, which oath was administered by the duly-authorized clerk, who had authority to administer the oath, in a matter then pending, that he would tell the truth, and that he did willfully and corruptly swear to material matter which is set out in the indictment, is sufficient under Rev. St. U. S. § 5392, declaring such a person swearing to any material matter which he does not believe to be true to be guilty of perjury, and section 5396, providing that it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged, and by what court, and before whom the oath was taken, with proper averments to falsify the matter wherein the perjury is assigned.

On indictment for perjury.

A. W. Hutton, U. S. Atty.

Ross, J. The question in this case is as to the the sufficiency of the indictment, which charges that defendant, at a certain time and place, within the jurisdiction of this court

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"After having taken an oath before the Honorable E. M. Ross, judge of said court, which oath was administered to the said Cuddy in open court on said day by E. H. Owen, the duly-appointed, qualified, and acting clerk of said court, he, the said Owen, as such, being then and there a person having competent authority to administer said oath,-that in the matter then and there pending, entitled In the Matter of the Contempt of Thomas J. Cuddy,' he would tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, then and there willfully, falsely, corruptly, and contrary to such oath, did state certain material matter in his testimony then and there adduced, in open court as aforesaid, at the time and in the manner aforesaid, being in words and substance as follows, to-wit: 'I didn't know that Mr. McGarvin, or any other gentleman in particular, would be called on this occasion. (Meaning the trial of the case of the United States vs. W. More Young, which was a criminal cause pending against the said Young in the said court, and set for trial for February 12. 1889.) I never dreamed that he was to be a juryman, and don't now. (Meaning a juror in the cause last-above named.) I didn't know Mr. McGarvin was a juror. Didn't know anything about it. Didn't give the matter a thought. (Meaning that he, the said Cuddy, didn't know that the said McGarvin was a petit, to-wit, a term-trial, juror in said court at the time and at the place first above named.) I had no idea that Mr. McGarvin was one of them at this time. I didn't know anything about it.' (Meaning, by the words 'one of them,' one of the term-trial jurors duly impaneled and sworn in the said court, as aforesaid.) Whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Thomas J. Cuddy did know that the said Robert McGarvin was a petit, to-wit, a term

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