This is substantially the rule laid down in the well-considered case of Patch v. Ward, L. R. 3 Ch. 203. But it is settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 519; U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 66. In the latter case the act of fraud relied on to support the bill was the false and fraudulent antedating of the grant, so as to impose on the court the belief that it was made at a time when the party or official executing the same had power to make it, and the supporting of such simulated and false document by perjured witnesses. Page 62. But there were other controlling facts and circumstances in the case, and the supreme court affirmed the decree of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to the bill and dismissing it on the merits. The case, in its general aspects, cannot be distinguished in principle from that under consideration. The bill of review now sought to be filed, if read in the light of the facts found by the special master and the supreme court, and the conclusions drawn therefrom in favor of Kimberly's right to share in the Grand Central purchase, is insufficient to impeach the decree, because it very clearly appears that the alleged fraudulent letter, and perjured evidence in connection therewith, were not controlling facts in inducing or leading the court to the conclusions reached on the merits. Again, it is settled that in order to obtain equitable relief against a judgment alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, it must be averred and shown that there is a valid defense on the merits. White v. Crow, 110 U. S. 184, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71. In view of the 7th, 8th, and 9th findings of the special master, which the supreme court, in its opinion, sustain as manifestly correct from the evidence, the defendants have not and cannot show that they have any valid defense on the merits. The antedated letter, and faise testimony in relation thereto, if true, would fall short of showing a valid defense on the merits. While a bill of review based solely on fraud in obtaining the decree complained of may be filed without the leave of the court which rendered such decree, because such a bill is regarded as an original bill, in the nature only of a bill of review, still, where that ground of relief is united in the same bill with others, which require the previous leave of the court, the bill cannot be separated into parts, and leave be granted as to part and refused as to other parts. The application is for leave to file the bill as a whole, and it must be acted upon as a whole, and not in parts. The supreme court take this view of such applications. Thus, in Ricker v. Powell, 100 U. S. 109, it is said: "The application was for leave to file the bill as a whole, and not in parts; and if, as a whole, it required leave, the part which, if it stood alone, could be put on file without, must stand or fall with the incumbrances that have been attached to it." In the present case the application is for leave to file the bill of review as a whole, and, as the part based upon fraud, even if such fraud were sufficient, standing alone, to be filed without leave, cannot be separated from the other branches, which require the previous leave of the court, it must stand or fall with the other grounds to which it is attached. It may be doubted whether it is in consonance with proper practice thus to join or unite in one bill several different and distinct grounds of review, which invoke different relief under each branch, and separate defenses to the several parts of the bill. The object and effect of that branch of the bill resting on fraud is to vacate the decree in toto, not to retry the case; and the fraud should be of such character as to warrant that relief. The object and effect of a bill of review for error of law apparent upon the face of the record is to reverse the decree so far as erroneous, and to retry the cause upon the original record, while the purpose and effect of a bill of review based upon newly-discovered evidence is to suspend the decree, and retry the cause upon the original and new proof. Moore v. Moore, 2 Ves. Sr. 596; Catterall v. Purchase, 1 Atk. 290; Cook v. Bamfield, 3 Swanst. Ch. 607. To unite these three grounds of review and relief in one and the same bill must lead to great confusion, and render the bill multifarious. Perry v. Phelips, 17 Ves. 183; Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Mylne & C. 618; Attorney General v. College, 7 Sim. 254. Upon the whole case, as presented by the record and by the proposed bill of review, the court is clearly of the opinion that the defendant's application for leave to file said bill of review should not be granted, and it is accordingly denied, with costs. MCCLASKEY et al. v. BARR et al. (Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio, W. D. December 4, 1889.) 1. EQUITY-PLEADING-BILL-ANSWER. A prayer that each of the defendants may be required to answer unto the premises, in a bill for relief, being a good general interrogatory, complainants are entitled to an answer to every material allegation of their bill. 2. SAME-EXCEPTIONS. The doctrine that exceptions to the answer for insufficiency are confined to cases where complainants are compelled to rely on defendants to prove their case, and are not properly taken where all the matters concerning which complainants ask discovery are of record, does not apply to bills for relief. 8. SAME-PARTITION-DISCOVERY. In a bill for partition, averments that complainants and defendants are tenants in common of the land sought to be partitioned, being in support of complainants' case, defendants are bound to discover their title in answer thereto. In Equity. Bill for partition. C. W. Cowan, Howard Ferris, and H. T. Fay, for complainants. SAGE, J. This cause is before the court upon exceptions for insufficiency to the answer of the defendant John Keeshan to the second amended bill, and to the amendment thereto. There are 24 exceptions. It is not necessary, nor would it come within the ordinary limits of an opinion, to set them out at length. The bill is for partition. There are 200 or 300 defendants, each holding one or more lots of the tract described in the bill, but all averred to be tenants in common with the complainants, who sue as heirs of Mary Jane Barr. It is averred in the amendment to the second amended bill that William Barr, Sr., died in 1816, seised of the real estate in the second amended bill fully described, also that he died testate, and that his will was admitted to probate; and the terms and conditions of said will are set forth in said amendment. It is further averred that upon the death of said Mary Jane Barr said real estate descended, by virtue of the facts set forth in said amendment, and of the laws of descent then in force in the state of Ohio, to the brothers and sisters of William Barr, Sr., and to the lineal descendants of those of them who are deceased. Also, that certain conveyances were made by Maria Bigelow, life-tenant of said real estate, and that certain other conveyances were subsequently made by her grantees, of lands of which said William Barr, Sr., died seised, and in which the complainants claim an interest as co-parceners; and that in said conveyances under which the defendants claim, and in certain legal proceedings concerning said lands, the same including the premises now occupied and claimed by the defendant Keeshan, there are recitals, binding upon him and the other defendants, indicating the recognition of the co-tenancy claimed by complainants, and inconsistent with the claim that defendants have held adversely more than 21 years, and thereby acquired exclusive rights. The exceptions are to the failure of the defendant Keeshan to answer any of said averments. The first proposition urged for the defendant is that exceptions for insufficiency are confined to cases where the complainants are compelled to rely upon the defendants to prove their case, and that all the matters concerning which the complainants ask discovery are matters of record; also, (citing Ingilby v. Shafto, 33 Beav. 31,) that discovery will never be compelled merely for the purpose of saving the complainants the labor of collecting and presenting their proof. The cases cited in support of this proposition are cases where the holding was with reference to bills for discovery merely, or where the question was considered as it arises on such bills. For illustration, in Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 656, the court said that it had nothing to do with any question but that of discovery. Also, in Ingilby v. Shafto, the bill was for discovery merely, in aid of the defense of actions of ejectment, and the court held that a complainant in such a case was not justified in coming into equity for the purpose, merely, of getting the defendant to admit documents, to save him the trouble of proving them. The court further said that there was a distinction between a bill for discovery, merely, and a bill asking for relief. Discovery is sought in both cases. In the latter, it is sought with reference to the case stated and the relief prayed by the bill, and the complainant may, within certain limits, call upon the defendant to state how, and on what ground, he can oppose the relief asked; because in such a suit the complainant may disprove the whole of it. But the court further said that, when the discovery is asked in aid of an action at law, all that the complainant can ask is for the discovery of facts and documents in the defendant's possession, knowledge of which will assist complainant in proving his own title in the action. Further on the court say that in bills for relief the complainant may compel the defendant to answer what defense he makes to the case, and on what grounds; and that is so for the reason that the court requires the case of each party to the suit to be pleaded, in order that neither may be taken by surprise. The case before the court is for relief, and not for discovery merely; and Ingilby v. Shafto is, properly considered, an authority against the defendant, and not in his favor. The complainant has the right to anticipate defenses, and to introduce into his bill, originally, or by amendment, by proper averments, a statement of the facts upon which he expects to rely to overcome those defenses. He is entitled to an answer to every material allegation in his bill of complaint, if for no other reason, in order that he may know precisely what is admitted, and what he will be required to establish by proof. The case of U. S. v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. Rep. 823, is cited as an authority that an answer cannot be required without interrogatories, general or special; and counsel insist that the amendments to the complainants' second amended bill contain no interrogatories of any description whatever. But these amendments do not constitute an independent pleading. They are only amendments to, and therefore a part of, the second amended bill. It is to be remembered that under the fortieth equity rule special interrogatories are not necessary, excepting where the bill is for discovery merely. But, say the defendant's counsel, there is not even a general interrogatory in the second amended bill. In this counsel are in error. The second amended bill contains a prayer that the defendants may each be required "to answer unto the premises;" and Ames v. Kiny, 9 Allen, 258, is a satisfactory authority that that is a good general interrogatory. Moreover, the interrogating part of a bill is not regarded by Justice Story as absolutely necessary, because, as he says in his works on Equity Pleading, § 38, “if the defendant fully answers to the matters of the bill, with their attendant circumstances, or fully denies them, in the proper manner, on oath, the object of the special interrogatories is completely accomplished." So, also, in Langdell on Equity Pleading, § 55, it is stated that all the substance of a bill in equity is contained in the stating part, the charging part, the interrogating part, and the prayer for relief; and that of these the second and third may be dispensed with, at the option of the draughtsman, "for all that ever was essential to a bill was a proper statement of the facts which the plaintiff' intended to prove, a specification of the relief which he claimed, and an indication of the legal grounds of such relief." The next contention by counsel for the defendant is that complainants are not entitled to discovery of defendant's title, and that they must rely upon the strength of their own title, and not upon the weakness of his. There is no doubt of the correctness of the general proposition here stated, as applied to bills for discovery. The rule, and the reason for it, are well stated in Bispham's Principles of Equity, § 561: "The defendant is bound to discover those matters only which relate to the plaintiff's title, and is not compellable to discover his own title, or the means v.40F.no.10-36 by which he expects to prove it. The reason of this rule is that experience has shown that the possible mischiefs of surprise at a trial are more than counterbalanced by the danger of perjury which must inevitably be incurred when either party is permitted before a trial to know the precise evidence against which he has to contend; and, accordingly, each party in a cause has thrown upon him the onus of supporting his own case, and meeting that of his adversary, without knowing beforehand by what evidence the case of his adversary is to be established, or his own opposed." But the author continues: "This reasoning, however, is not to be extended too far, for the right of the plaintiff to discovery in support of his own case is not to be abridged, as to any particular discovery, by the consideration that the matter of such particular discovery may be evidence of the defendant's case, in common with that of the plaintiff." So, in Story, Eq. Pl. § 859, if the documents and papers of which discovery is sought "relate solely to the defendant's title, they will not be required to be produced. If they relate to the plaintiff's title, they will." Now, here the question upon which the right to partition depends is whether the complainants and the defendant are co-tenants; and the averments which the defendant has failed to answer are directly in point. They set forth what title the defendant has; how it has been derived; that it is for an undivided interest only, and not the entirety. These averments are therefore in support of the complainants' case for partition. And right here it may be remarked that not one of them calls for any disclosure by the defendant. All relate to matters of public record. The complainants do not call for the production of a single deed or title paper of any description. They have no need to do so. Certified copies from the record are by the statute law of the state competent and sufficient evidence,-better, in fact, than the originals. There is therefore no danger of perjury because of full and complete answer by the defendant. It is only technically that it can be said that the amended bill, as amended, calls for discovery. It is true that there are averments that the defendant, and those under whom he claims, have not now, nor have they ever had, any title other than that set forth by the complainants; but no disclosure in that behalf is called for,—nothing more than an admission or denial. The fourth exception relates to the failure of the defendant to answer averments that Lot Pugh, on or about the 13th of September, 1839, quitclaimed all his interest in certain premises, included in the lands now sought to be partitioned, to Ephriam Morgan. Counsel for defendant wish to know what those averments have to do with the complainants' case. The answer is that prior averments set forth that, after the death of Mary Jane Barr, Maria Bigelow, the life-tenant of said premises, quitclaimed the same to Lot Pugh and Ephriam Morgan; and the averments with reference to which the inquiry is made set forth that Ephriam Morgan subsequently, by quitclaim from Lot Pugh, acquired the entire interest convey d by Maria Bigelow; these being links in the chain of defendant's title, and, what is more to the point, in the line of conveyances indicating that the complainants and the defendants are tenants |