forth that the appellee was a nonresident of the State, whereas a decided preponderance of the evidence shows that appellee was not a nonresident, and that appellant knew at that time that she resided at Rogers, Arkansas. (5) II. Appellant contends that appellee is barred by laches. "It is generally conceded," says Cyc., "in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals and the interests of society require that the marriage relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner and for the causes prescribed by law." 14 Cyc., р. 578. The application of this principle should cause a court of chancery to set aside a decree of divorce that has been obtained through fraud when the party entitled to such relief acts promptly to obtain it. Application of the same principle should likewise cause the court to refuse to annul a decree of divorce, even though obtained by fraud, where the injured party, upon discovery of the fraud, fails to act promptly to have the decree of divorce annulled. Mr. Bishop gives an admirable statement of the policy of the law, which is quoted by us in Corney v. Corney, 97 Ark. 117, 122, as follows: "There are excellent reasons why judgments in matrimonal causes, whether of nullity, dissolution or separation, should be more stable, certainly not less, than in others, and so our courts hold. The matrimonal status of the parties draws with and after it so many collateral rights and interests of third persons that uncertainty and fluctuations in it would be greatly detrimental to the public. And particularly to an innocent person who has contracted a marriage on the faith of the decree of the court the calamity of having it reversed and the marriage made void is past estimation." Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, vol. 2, sec. 1533. The record shows that the decree of divorce was rendered on the 26th day of January, 1915. The appellant married the second Mrs. Vanness on the 3d of February, 1915. The appellee testified that she did not know that the suit for divorce had been filed against her in Cleburne County until the latter part of the month of April, 1915, and she instituted this suit to annul the decree on the 6th day of May, 1915. True, appellant testified that his marriage was public, so that the people in Rogers and Boone County all knew it; but this testimony does not tend to prove that the appellee knew it, and does not overcome her positive testimony that she did not learn of it until the latter part of April, 1915. After she learned of the decree in Cleburne County only a few days intervened before she instituted this suit to set it aside. She therefore acted promptly, and the court did not err, under the circumstances, in granting her the relief sought. The second Mrs. Vanness was not a party to the fraudulent decree, and the motion filed by the appellant to make her a party does not set forth any facts to show any interest that she has that would make her either a necessary or proper party to the proceeding. All the defenses that could have possibly been set up to the suit for annulling the fraudulent decree were brought into the record by the pleadings and the testimony on the part of the appellant, and the court correctly held that these could not avail against the relief sought by appellee. The decree is therefore affirmed. ROBINSON v. INDIANA & ARKANSAS LUMBER & Opinion delivered April 16, 1917. An exemption 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXEMPTION FROM TAXES. from taxes created by the Constitution will not be given a retrospective effect unless an intention that it shall have such an effect is clearly expressed, and held, Art. 16, § 5, Const. 1874, did not operate retrospectively. 2. ST. FRANCIS LEVEE DISTRICT-GOVERNMEN AL AGENCY. - The St. Francis Levee District is a quasi-corporation, to which has been delegated certain powers as a governmental agency. 3. TAXATION-EXEMPTION. - Under the Constitution of 1874, it is only when the property itself is actually and directly used for public charity, that it is exempt from taxation. 4. ST. FRANCIS LEVEE DISTRICT PURCHASE OF LANDS AT OWN TAX SALE-EXEMPTION FROM TAXES. - Lands were sold for the non-payment of taxes due the St. Francis Levee District, and were purchased by the district, and sometime later the district sold them. Held. The levee district acquired the lands in the exercise of its governmental functions, and that during the interval between its purchase and resale of the lands, that they were not subject to taxation. Appeal from Crittenden Chancery Court; C. D. Frierson, Chancellor; reversed. R. C. Brown, of Memphis, for appellant. 1. These lands were not subject to taxation for State and county purposes after they were purchased by the levee district, a governmental agency. 105 Ark. 261. The lands are nontaxable. 93 Ark. 490, 495; 95 Id. 65; 105 Ark. 261; 59 Id. 513; 103 Id. 127, 138-9; 107 Id. 189, 198; 90 Id. 236, 239; 79 Id. 550; Ib. 565; 36 Id. 155, 23 L. R. A. 200; 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026; 110 Ark. 416; Acts 1899, p. 48; Acts 1903, p. 58; 77 Ark. 519 is not applicable. 41 Ark. 45 has been overruled. 77 Ark. 177; 88 Id. 533. See, also, 93 Ark. 490. 2. The statute of limitations does not run. Nor is the State estopped. 39 Ark. 580; 42 Id. 118; 93 Id. 496; 95 Id. 65; 77 Id. 324; 105 Id. 261; 107 Id. 189, 198; 90 Id. 236; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746, 748; 47 Id. 907; 21 L. R. A. 63; 16 Id. 145; 56 Ark. 339. 3. The exemption acts are constitutional. 19 Ark. 360, 372; 21 Id. 4058; 49 L. R. A. 604, 609; 38 L. R. A. (Ν. S.) 907; 12 Id. 1163; 10 L. R. A. 377; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842; 103 S. W. 354; 27 So. 348; 110 La. 585; 4 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 ed.), 2436; 34 L. R. A. 146; 34 L. R. A. (Ν. S.) 143; 116 Tenn. 260. 4. Appellee has not paid taxes for seven years. 94 Ark. 122; 99 Id. 447; 114 Id. 376; 107 Id. 492; 89 Id. 296. The act of 1899 does not apply. 5. There has been no laches. 105 Ark. 268; 45 Id. 81; 68 Tenn. 129; 92 Ark. 497; 107 Id. 251; 105 Id. 663, etc.; 99 Id. 500; 103 Id. 251, 259, 260. 6. There is no element of estoppel. 93 Ark. 490; 105 Id. 268. The chancellor erred in his finding of facts and in holding that the lands were taxable. 78 Wash. 236; 139 Pac. 194; 145 Id. 458; 183 S. W. 1032; L. R. A. 1916-E 94, 97. Daggett & Daggett, for appellee. 1. The title is barred by the act March 18, 1899. The lands were subject to taxation. 77 Ark. 519; 62 Id. 481; 57 Id. 445; 95 Ιλ. 64. The attempted exemption is void. 55 Ark. 148; 69 Id. 284; 59 Id. 513; 58 Id. 151; 41 Id. 45; 93 Id. 490; 30 Id. 693; 40 Id. 34; 46 Id. 312; 120 U. S. 97; 62 Ark. 481; 57 Id. 445. 2. Appellant is barred by the seven years' tax act. 3. The district is estopped, and guilty of laches. 112 Ark. 467; 81 Id. 244; Acts 1901, p. 160, § 1, etc.; 90 Ark. 430; 95 Id. 6; 99 Id. 455. The decree is correct. STATEMENT BY THE COURT. J. L. Robinson instituted this action in the chancery court against the Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Manufacturing Company to quiet the title to certain wild and unoccupied lands in Crittenden County, Arkansas. The lumber company defended on the ground that it had acquired title by the payment of taxes for seven years under the act of March 18, 1899, and that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches in bringing his suit. The material facts are as follows: The lands in controversy were originally owned by Robert C. Brinkley, He died in 1878, and by the terms of his will the lands became the property of his children. The board of directors of the St. Francis Levee District instituted an action in the chancery court under our statute to enforce the collection of delinquent levee taxes for the year 1898. The whole of the northeast quarter of section 6, township -4 north, range 7 east, containing 409 acres in Crittenden County, Arkansas, was sold under the decree, and the levee district became the purchaser at its own sale. On September 11, 1899, the levee district conveyed to the defendant along with 20,000 acres of other lands, lots 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the northeast quarter of said section 6, for the sum of $1.00 per acre. On the 17th day of February, 1916, the devisees under the will of R. C. Brinkley executed a quitclaim deed to the defendant for these lots as well as the lots herein sued for. On the 6th day of October, 1915, the levee district executed a deed to plaintiff to lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the northeast quarter of said section 6, containing 249.19 acres, and on the 22d day of December, 1915, plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant to quiet his title to said lots. The lots in controversy have greatly increased in value since they were purchased by the levee district at its sale for levee taxes. It was shown by the defendant that a purchaser at a tax sale for the taxes of 1887, which is conceded to be void, executed to it a warranty deed to said lots. It was also shown by the defendant that it had paid the taxes on said lands for seven years under the act of March 18, 1899, and that the lands have always been wild and unoccupied and have never been in the actual possession of any one. The court held that the plaintiff was barred of relief by reason of the payment of taxes by the defendant for more than seven years under color of title and a decree was entered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for want of equity. The plaintiff has appealed. HART, J., (after stating the facts). The correctness of the decision of the chancellor depends upon whether or not the lands in controversy in this case were subject to taxation for county and State taxes after they were purchased by the levee district at its own sale for levee taxes. Article 16, section 5, of the Constitution of 1874, provides, that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, provided that the following property shall be exempt from taxation; public property used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries used exclusively as such; school buildings |