1199, numerous decisions are cited to the effect that the adequacy of the price has been recognized as a circumstance to be considered in determining the question whether the transaction was a sale or a mortgage. Several decisions there are also cited to the effect that gross inadequacy of price is given great weight in determining the question whether the transaction was intended as a sale or a mortgage. (4) According to the testimony of Wimberly, himself, his land was worth $5,000, and he had been offered $4,000 for it a number of times. No attempt was made to contradict his testimony in this respect. The fact is undisputed that he went to the office of Terry, who had been in the habit of attending to his business for him, for the purpose of borrowing money to pay off the mortgage on his land, as well as to pay his other debts. He resided on the land, and it was not subject to the payment of any of his debts without his consent, except the debt of the mortgage company. His land could only have been sold for the purpose of paying that debt. It is true he wished to pay his other debts, but his land could not have been sold against his will for the purpose. Indeed, the whole amount of his debts was only about one-third of the value of his land. He readily entered into the agreement with Morgan without making any further attempt to borrow money. Therefore, under all the facts and circumstances introduced in evidence, we think, as above stated, the chancellor was right in holding the transaction to be a mortgage, and not an absolute sale of the land. (5) We think, however, the chancellor erred in not sustaining Wimberly's plea of usury. The total principal which Morgan agreed to lend Wimberly was $1,674.79. $835 of this was furnished in cash, and the balance was to be paid toward the satisfaction of the debt of the mortgage company. Wimberly executed to Morgan one note dated February 27, 1912, and payable December 1, 1912, with interest at 10 per cent. per annum from date until paid, and eleven notes for $270 each, dated on the same day, and one payable on the 1st of December of each year for eleven years, with interest from maturity. It is perfectly evident that this amounted to more than 10 per cent. interest on the amount of money which Morgan agreed to furnish Wimberly. According to the testimony of the witnesses for Wimberly, it was Morgan's intention to do this, and Morgan prepared the amount and number of notes which were recited in the contract. The notes and contract, being usurious, were void in the hands of Scoggin, as receiver. German Bank v. Deshon, 41 Ark. 331. Moreover, the notes which Wimberly executed to Morgan, referred to there being a series of notes mentioned in the contract of the same date. They thereby became a part of the contract itself, and inasmuch as we have held the transaction to be a mortgage, the notes would be subject to the same defenses in the hands of Scoggin that they would have been in the hands of Morgan. Morgan only advanced $835 on the transaction. The proof shows that $40 of this was paid to Terry's firm for legal services by agreement, and this left $795, which went into the hands of Wimberly. Wimberly paid to Morgan the $335 note with accrued interest when it was due, and two of the $270 notes about the time they became due. So that it will be seen that he paid back to Morgan more than he received from him with interest on the same. Having held that the transaction between Wimberly and Morgan was a mortgage, and not an absolute sale, it follows that the land did not belong to Morgan, and that Goodbar & Co. did not acquire any lien on the land by virtue of its attachment. It follows that the chancellor erred in not sustaining Wimberly's plea of usury, and in rendering judgment in favor of Scoggin, as receiver, against Wimberly. The decree, will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 1. ARKANSAS NATIONAL BANK v. STUCKEY. APPEAL AND ERROR-REVERSAL AND REMAND OF CAUSE WITH 2. APPEAL AND ERROR-REVERSAL AND REMAND-NEW ISSUES. - Where a decree is reversed and remanded with directions, the lower court cannot re-open the case for the consideration of a question which was, or should have been, considered on the first appeal. Appeal from Washington Chancery Court; Hugh A. Dinsmore, Special Chancellor; reversed. O. P. McDonald, for appellant. 1. The chancellor erred in declining to spread of record the appellant's judgment entry, and in reversing the whole case and destroying appellant's lien. 121 Ark. 302. This case on the first appeal settled the issues between appellant and Stuckey. 29 Ark. 83; 61 Id. 189; 67 Id. 339; 105 Id. 205. The case 54 Ark. 239, does not apply, but 100 Ark. 384, 394-5, is in point. 78 Ark. 208; 38 Id. 394. The question now is, what did this court intend to do in handing down its former opinion, and what can and should it do now? 148 U. S. 228-9, 230-1, 238, 240-1; 160 Id. 247; 148 Id. 247; 195 Id. 605. This court will construe its own mandate and opinion. 94 Ark. 333. 2. The court erred in allowing the $113.40 stenographer's fees. 51 Ark. 380, 384; 121 Ark. 302. It was error to re-open the case and determine new questions. 94 Ark. 330; 79 Id. 194; 60 Id. 50; 21 Id. 197. The decree ordered by the mandate of this court should be entered and appellant's lien be preserved and enforced as requested below. E. P. Watson and John Mayes, for appellee McIlroy Banking Company. 1. There is no error in the decree. The chancellor did not render a decree that is in violation of the mandate and opinion of this court on the former appeal. It is plain and unambiguous, and the chancellor did as this court directed. 139 Cal. 298; 223 III. 454; 114 Am. St. 336; 86 Pac. 15; 54 Ark. 239; 47 Id. 301; 86 Id. 90; 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 1076-7. In chancery cases, this court tries the case de novo and renders such judgment as it sees proper, or directs the court below to do so. This was done when the case was here before, and the court below followed the mandate. 2. The $113.40 stenographer's fee was allowed as costs. Plaintiff's lien was not destroyed. There are no errors in the decree. SMITH, J. The Arkansas National Bank sued W. L. Stuckey, and attached certain property belonging to him. The McIlroy Banking Company and a Doctor Welch, to whom Stuckey was also indebted, were made parties defendant, and there was a prayer, as against them, that they be required to sell the property against which they had liens, to secure their respective debts, and that any excess be impounded and applied to the payment of the debt due the plaintiff bank. Stuckey answered, admitting the indebtedness sued on, but claimed a credit for an attorney's fee, which the bank refused to pay, on the ground that it was excessive. Stuckey also denied the existence of grounds for attachment, and prayed judgment for damages which he claimed he had sustained from its issuance and levy on his property. The court below reserved its decision in the matter of requiring the McIlroy Banking Company to foreclose its lien, but ordered the foreclosure of the deed of trust held by Doctor Welch, with directions that, in satisfaction of the deed of trust, the portion of the land which did not include the homestead be first sold, and that the excess, if any, be brought into court for distribution under the orders of the court. The court allowed Stuckey the attorney's fee claimed by him, and assessed certain damages in his favor on account of the wrongful levy of the attachment, but credited the sums of money thus allowed against the debt due by Stuckey to the bank, and gave judgment against Stuckey for the balance. Both parties appealed to this court, and the opinion was rendered in the case on November 29, 1915, which is found in 121 Ark., at page 302. It was there said: "We have held that the decision of the chancellor dissolving the attachment is not against the weight of the evidence, and that his decree in that respect should not be reversed. Therefore, the property of the defendant Stuckey is released from any lien under the attachment. The chancellor rendered judgment against Stuckey for the amount due by him to the bank. His decision in this respect was correct, and under section 4438, of Kirby's Digest, the judgment was a lien on the lands of the defendant in Washington County from the date of the rendition of the decree. *** The result of our views is that the court correctly found the amount due the plaintiff bank and the amount due Doctor Welch. The defendant (Stuckey) was only entitled to recover $250 and the accrued interest as damages, and $150 and the accrued interest as attorney's fees for services rendered, as indicated in the opinion." The cause was reversed, with directions to the court below to enter a decree in accordance with the opinion, which, as appears from the above statement of facts, resulted in increasing the amount of the judgment in favor of the bank against Stuckey. A decree was rendered on this mandate, which was sent down to the court below on June 5, 1916. In the meantime, however, a judgment had been rendered in favor of the McIlroy Banking Company for the amount of the debt due it, and, proceeding under this decree, property upon which it had a lien was sold, together with other property upon which there was no lien except that fixed by the judgment in its favor. Independent litigation grew out of that judgment, which forms the sub |