satisfactory so as to be substantially beyond doubt. We think this rule has been fully met in the present case and the testimony is altogether convincing that Sanders Williams entered into such an agreement with the plaintiff, his nephew, and that the latter performed the agreement. There is indeed some doubt whether the agreement was that the old man was to convey the land to plaintiff during his lifetime or was to convey it by last will. We do not think it is necessary that the testimony should be free from conflict or variance on that issue, since it is fully established that the property was to be conveyed by some mode, and it is immaterial whether it was to be done by conveyance during the lifetime of the grantor or by last will and testament. The basis of the plaintiff's claim is that there was a contract whereby he was to get the property in consideration of his services rend dered to his uncle, and it is entirely unimportant as to the particular method in which the property was to be conveyed. The proof having established the contract and a performance of its terms by the plaintiff, it follows that a court of equity should grant him relief. We need go no further than our own decisions in finding authority on this question. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 55 Ark. 583; Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30; Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494. The law stated in the syllabus of the last case is peculiarly applicable to the facts of the present case and reads as follows: "Where intestate verbally agreed that, if plaintiffs would give up their employment, change their residence and take care of him for the rest of his life, he would leave them all of his property, real and personal, at his death, and plaintiffs complied therewith, their conduct was such a performance as would take the contract out of the statute of frauds."

In that case the elements forming the consideration were about the same as in the present case, except that one of the contracting parties removed to Arkansas from the State of Indiana for the purpose of performing the contract. It is urged that that element does not enter into the present case, and that the change of residence in the present case was not a substantial one in that he did not remove from his State or county. The proof does show, however, in the present case that the plaintiff was enjoying lucrative employment, and was held in high esteem by his employer when he gave up his work in DeValls Bluff, and he did so with reluctance in order to go to live with his uncle and take care of him. In order to assume the obligations imposed upon him by the contract, he made an entire change of his surroundings and changed his occupation and place of residence. He gave his services to his uncle for more than two years before the latter's death, and continued in the performance of his contract until his obligation was fully discharged. The evidence shows, therefore, that the contract was made and that the plaintiff has earned the enjoyment of its fruits. His rights are not to be defeated because there may be some doubt as to the mode in which he was finally to secure the enjoyment, and we are of the opinion that the chancellor was justified from the evidence in decreeing the performance of the contract and in quieting the title of the plaintiff. The decree is, therefore, affirmed.

1.

WALDEN V. WILLIAMS.

Opinion delivered March 5, 1917.

TITLE-PRESUMPTION FROM POSSESSION. -Possession is presumed to follow the true title, and those who deal with the owner of the record title are warranted in treating him as being the exclusive owner. In order that actual occupancy be constructive notice of ownership it must be apparently exclusive.

2.

TITLE-JOINT POSSESSION. - Possession to be notice must be not only open and visible, but exclusive; a possession held jointly with another person is not an exclusive possession, nor such as to operate as notice, or to excite inquiry.

3.

MORTGAGES-UNRECORDED DEED.-A. held the record title to land, and deeded a portion to B., but this deed was not recorded. A. then mortgaged the property to C. at the time occupying the property jointly with B. Held, C.'s mortgage was paramount, he having neither actual or constructive notice of B.'s deed.

Appeal from White Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor; reversed.

John E. Miller, for appellant.

1. Walker had no interest in the land at the time of the mortgage. Williams and Walker doubtless were cotenants, but their agreement was verbal until long after the rights of appellant accrued. Their agreement was void. Kirby's Digest, § 3654; 41 Ark. 169; 44 Id. 79; Am. Ann. Cas., 1913 E. 655. Walker's possession was not open, adverse nor exclusive and hence not notice.

2. Appellant was an innocent purchaser. 49 Ark. 217; 71 Id. 31; 27 Сус. 1187; Burdick on Real Prop., § 201.

Brundidge & Neelly, for appellees.

1. Walker had an interest in the land but was not a cotenant. At the time of his purchase he was a stranger and purchased under a parol agreement and was placed in possession. 44 Ark. 79; 21 Id. 137; 42 Id. 246.

2. Appellant was not an innocent purchaser. Actual possession with visible indications of occupancy and ownership is notice to the world. 33 Ark. 465; 96 Id. 609; 49 Id. 217; 71 Id. 31; 27 Cyc. 1187.

The chancellor's findings are sustained by the evidence.

MCCULLOCH, C. J. This was an action in the chancery court of White County to quiet title to a small tract of land thirty-five yards wide and 150 yards deep, situated at a village or country store and postoffice in White County, known as "Walker's Store."

The tract of land was originally owned by P. G. Williams, who had the record title and who on February 20, 1908, mortgaged it to appellant, J. M. Walden, to secure a debt in the sum of $550 for borrowed money, evidenced by promissory note. The debt was not paid and appellant foreclosed the mortgage under the power therein contained, and purchased the land at the mortgage sale, which was made on May 8, 1915. On February 25, 1915, P. G. Williams executed to appellee, John T. Walker, a warranty deed purporting to convey an undivided onehalf interest in a portion of said tract, being 100 feet square, beginning at the southeast corner, and the present controversy is between appellant and appellee Walker, concerning the priority of their respective titles acquired under said conveyances from Williams. The deed from Williams to Walker recites a consideration of the payment of the sum of $12.50 on April 1, 1901, and also the construction of a storehouse on the lot in question. Walker claims to have purchased an undivided onehalf interest in the land from Williams in April, 1901, and paid in consideration the sum of $12.50 and built a storehouse which cost from $250 to $300, and that the deed was not executed until February 25, 1915, but he claims that he was in possession of the lot in the meantime, and that appellant had actual as well as constructive notice of the conveyance at the time Williams executed the mortgage. The case was heard by the chancellor on the evidence adduced and the court found in favor of appellee Walker, sustaining the priority of his title to the undivided one-half interest conveyed to him by Williams, and an appeal is prosecuted in this court by appellant Walden.

It appears from the testimony that Williams and Walker formed a partnership to conduct a mercantile business at the place in question in the year 1901, and built a small frame storehouse in which they did business for several years. They both testified that an agreement was entered into whereby Williams sold to Walker an undivided one-half interest in the portion of land hereinbefore described and the consideration of $12.50 was paid, and Walker built the storehouse, which probably cost $250. Another small building already on the lot was moved up to the new house and joined to it. Those parties conducted the mercantile business in the store for several years, and thereafter rented out the property to tenants from time to time and collected the rent.

The evidence is sufficient to warrant the finding of the chancellor that there was in fact a sale of said interest made by Williams to Walker upon the terms stated above, and that said parties jointly occupied the premises thereafter. There was no deed executed, however, and at the time that Williams mortgaged the land to appellant he held the record title. Appellee attempted to prove that appellant had actual notice of Walker's interest in the lot at the time the mortgage was executed, but, this was disputed by appellant, and there is a sharp conflict in the testimony on that issue. Williams testified that at the time he mortgaged the property to appellant he told the latter that Walker had an interest in the property, but that he (Williams) had never executed a deed to Walker. Appellant testified in the case and denied that Williams gave him any information concerning the alleged interest of Walker, or that he had received any information on the subject from any other source, and he testified positively that he had heard nothing of Walker having any interest in the property until after his foreclosure sale. Williams was contradicted by two witnesses, relatives of appellant, who both testified that they approached Williams on the subject of a sale of the property and asked him to sell it to them, but he declined to do so, and stated that Walker had tried to buy the property and he refused to sell it. The testimony of Williams to the effect that he gave appellant notice of Walker's interest in the property is entirely uncorroborated, and after carefully considering it as it appears in the record, it does not appear to us as being at all convincing. In fact, his own statement is wholly at variance with his conduct in executing to appellant a mortgage conveying the entire tract. Appellant was a farmer, living several miles away, and he testified that he had no reason to believe that Walker had any interest in the property and he was not so informed at the time he accepted the mortgage.

Upon consideration of the inherent weakness of the testimony of Williams and its contradiction by the testi