COCKBURN, C. J. I think the first count, charging larceny, will not hold. It is clear that the prisoner took the warrants from the bailiff, thinking that his authority depended on his possession of the warrants, and that by taking them away he would put an end to the authority. But this was not done animo furandi. It was not done lucri causa. It was no more stealing than it would be to take a stick out of a man's hand to beat him with it. Under the second count, the question is whether what was done was done with a fraudulent purpose. I think it was so. The purpose was to deprive the officer of the power to execute process, and so to defeat the execution. MARTIN and CHANNELL, BB., and KEATING, J., concurred. LUSH, J. I quite concur, on consideration, in the judgment of the court. I thought at first that what the statute meant was an intention to use the documents for a fraudulent purpose. Conviction affirmed. SECTION 6.-AGGRAVATED LARCENY. I. GRAND LARCENY. Although that by some opinions the value of twelvepence make grand larceny (22 Assiz. 39, per Thorp), yet the law is settled that it must exceed twelvepence to make grand larceny (West. 1, c. 15; 8 E. 2, Coron. 404). If two or more be indicted of stealing goods above the value of twelvepence, though in law the felonies are several, yet it is grand larceny in both. 8 E. 2, Coron. 404. But if upon the evidence it appears that A. stole twelvepence at one time, and B. twelvepence at another time, so that the acts themselves were several at several times, though they were the goods of the same person, this is petit larceny in each, and not grand larceny in either. If A. be indicted of larceny of goods to the value of five shillings, yet the petit jury may upon the trial find it to be but of the value of twelvepence, or under, and so petit larceny. 41 E. 3, Coron. 451; 18 Assiz. 14 Stamf. P. C. p. 24b. If A. steal goods of B. to the value of sixpence, and at another time to the value of eightpence, so that all put together exceed the value of twelvepence, though none apart amount to twelvepence, yet this is held grand larceny, if he be indicted of them altogether. Stamf. P. C. p. 24, collected from the books of 8 E. 2, Coron. 415; Dalt. p. 259, c. 101. But if the goods be stolen at several times from several persons, and each apart under value, as from A. fourpence, from B. sixpence, from C. tenpence, these are several petit larcenies, and though contained in the same indictment make not grand larceny. But it seems to me that if at the same time he steals goods of A. of the value of sixpence, goods of B. of the value of sixpence, and goods of C. to the value of sixpence, being perchance in one bundle, or upon a table, or in one shop, this is grand larceny, because it was one entire felony done at the same time, though the persons had several properties, and therefore, if in one indictment, they make grand larceny. 1 Hale, P. C. 530. In these prosecutions the valuation ought to be reasonable; for when St. Westm. II, c. 25, was made, silver was but 20d. an ounce, and at the time Lord COKE wrote it was worth 5s., and it is now higher.1 At common law the judgment for grand larceny is of death; but the party may pray the benefit of his clergy, and he shall also lose his goods. 2 East, P. C. 736. REX v. JONES. (Berkshire Assizes, 1830. 4 Car. & P. 217.) The prisoner was charged with stealing in a dwelling house 68 yards of lace of the value of £13, the property of George Shepherd. It appeared that the prisoner, on the 18th of October, 1829, sent the lace (which was in several distinct pieces), from Abingdon to London in a parcel by the coach; and it was also proved that he was the shopman of Mr. Shepherd, and that no one piece of lace was worth £5. Talfour, for the prisoner, suggested that, in favorem vitæ, the learned Baron would take it that the pieces of lace might have been stolen at different times. 1 "As a general rule the market value of goods stolen, or that for which similar goods are, at the time and place of the theft, commonly in the markets bought and sold, is the standard of value. But when things stolen have no marketable value-for instance, a secondhand coffin, State v. Doepke, 68 Mo. 208, 30 Am. Rep. 785; or secondhand clothing, Pratt v. State, 35 Ohio St. 514, 35 Am. Rep. 617; Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144, 3 N. W. 306, 36 Am. Rep. 437; or brood sows, State v. Walker, 119 Mo. 467, 24 S. W. 1011-the owner may testify to the actual value of the property regardless of any market value for it." Burgess, J., in State v. Maggard, 160 Mo. 469, 61 S. W. 184, 83 Am. St. Rep. 484 (1901). In State v. Hathaway, 100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W. 449 (1896), where the articles stolen consisted of wearing apparel that had been used, it was held that in determining the market value of the articles the jury was not confined to the price at which dealers in secondhand clothing would buy or sell them, but that the testimony of the owner as to their "reasonable market value" was competent. In State v. Brown, 55 Kan. 611, 40 Pac. 1001 (1895), it was adjudged that, "as the thief is stealing the property from the time he takes it up until he lays it down," he has no cause to complain if the value is estimated by the market value at the place to which it was taken by him and sold. MIK.CR.L.-32 BOLLAND, B. I cannot assume that to have been so. We find that the lace is all sent in one parcel, and all brought out of the prosecutor's house at once, and unless you can give some evidence to show that it was stolen at different times you do not raise your point1; but, even if you did, I should think it would be of no avail, for on the last winter circuit it appeared that a person at Brighton stole goods in the same way that you wish me to suppose that this prisoner did, for it was shown that he stole the articles one or two at a time, and under value, but that he carried them out of his master's house all together, the articles amounting in all to more than £5 value, and Mr. Baron Garrow, after much consideration, held that, as the articles were all brought out of the prosecutor's house together, it was a capital offense. Verdict-Guilty." REX v. BIRDSEYE. (Bedford Assizes, 1830. 4 Car. & P. 386.) Indictment for stealing pickled pork, a bowl, some knives, and a loaf of bread. It appeared that the prisoner entered the shop of the prosecutor and ran away with the pork. In about two minutes he returned, replaced the pork in a bowl, which contained the knives, and took away the whole together, threatening destruction to any one who followed him. In about half an hour after, he came back to the prosecutor's shop and took away the loaf. Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE. This taking away the loaf cannot be given in evidence upon this indictment. I think that the prisoner's taking the pork, and returning in two minutes, and then running off with the bowl, must be taken to be one continuing transaction; but I think that half an hour is too long a period to admit of that construction. The taking of the loaf, therefore, is a distinct offense. The prisoner was acquitted; the learned judge telling the jury that the felonious intent was not sufficiently made out. 1 Accord: Ackerman v. State, 7 Wyo. 504, 54 Pac. 228 (1898). 2 Accord: State v. Mandich, 24 Nev. 336, 54 Pac. 516 (1898). Cf. Scarver v. State, 53 Miss. 407 (1876); Cody v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 183, 20 S. W. 398 (1892). 3 See. also, State v. Maggard, 160 Mo. 469, 61 S. W. 184, 83 Am. St. Rep. 484 (1900). II. LARCENY FROM PARTicular Places. Larceny from the house is not distinguished at common law from simple larceny, unless where it is accompanied with the circumstance of breaking the house at night, when it falls under another description, that of burglary. * * Now by various acts of Parliament the benefit of clergy is taken away from larcenies committed in a house in almost every instance.1 2 East, P. C. 623. REX v. OWEN. (Court for Crown Cases Reserved, 1792. 2 Leach, C. C. [4th Ed.] 572.) Edward Owen was indicted for stealing 105 guineas, the property of James Foreman, in the dwelling house of Patrick Brady. Brady kept a public house in Holborn, into which Foreman was seduced by the prisoner, under pretense of dividing the value of a cross which the prisoner picked up and pretended to have found in the street, and then the prisoner obtained the 105 guineas from the prosecutor, under exactly the same circumstances as have been repeatedly given in evidence in the ring dropping cases.2 The jury found the prisoner guilty; but the judgment was respited, and the case reserved for the opinion of the twelve judges, on a question whether, as this was a taking from the person of Foreman, though in the dwelling house of Brady, the prisoner was ousted of his clergy under St. 12 Anne, c. 7. Mr. Justice ASHURST, in February Session, 1793, said that the judges were of opinion that the prisoner was not, under the circumstances of this case, deprived of his clergy by St. 12 Anne, c. 7, and that this opinion was founded on the authority of the case of Rex v. Campbell, in January Session, 1792; for that, to bring a case within this statute, the property stolen must be under the protection of the house, and deposited therein for safe custody, as the furniture, plate, money kept in the house, and not things immediately under the eye or personal care of some one who happens to be in the house." 1 By statutes in England and in most of our states larceny from certain enumerated places has been made a substantive crime-as from a dwelling, a house, a building, a shop, a warehouse, an office, a vessel, etc. 2 The statement of the case is printed from 2 East, P. C. 645. 3 Accord: Commonwealth v. Lester, 129 Mass. 101 (1880); State v. Patterson 98 Mo. 283, 11 S. W. 728 (1889). Contra: 609, 54 Am. Rep. 885 (1884). See, also, Henry v. Martinez v. State, 41 Tex. 126 (1874). Simmons v. State, 73 Ga. REX v. TAYLOR. (Court for Crown Cases Reserved, 1820. Russ. & R. 418.) The prisoner was tried and convicted before Mr. Justice Park, in the year 1820, of stealing a watch in the dwelling house of John Wakefield, to the value of 40 shillings. The prisoner lodged in the house of John Wakefield, and the prosecutor, who was an old acquaintance of the prisoner, and who could not get a bed in the public house where they met, accepted an invitation to take part of the prisoner's bed. They went home together, and neither John Wakefield nor any of his family knew of the prosecutor's being there, so that he was the guest of the prisoner. The prisoner stole the prosecutor's watch from the bed head. It having been held that the statute of 12 Anne (St. 1, c. 7) does not extend to a man stealing in his own house, the learned judge doubted whether the prisoner was not to be considered as the owner of the house with respect to the prosecutor. The statute was made for the protection of property deposited in the house, and not on the person of the party; and the prosecutor was neither the occupier nor a settled inhabitant of the house in which the watch was taken. The learned judge respited the judgment, to take the opinion of the judges on this conviction. In Easter Term, 1820, ten of the judges met and considered this case. The majority, viz., BURROUGH, J., HOLROYD, J., WOOD, B., BAYley, J., GRAHAM, B., RICHARDS, C. B., and ABBOTT, Lord C. J., held the conviction right.1 RICHARDSON, J.,. BEST, J., and GARROW, B., contra. III. ROBBERY. There is also a kind of theft, rapine, which is the same with us as robbery, and it is another kind of handling against the will of the owner, and a like punishment follows each offense, and hence a robber is called a hardened thief, for who handles anything more against the will of the owner, than he who carries off by violence? Bracton, f. 150, b. 1 Accord: Rex v. Hamilton, 8 Car. & P. 49 (1837). |