It was further said that here was no point in issue, or, in the language of the law, nothing in debate, between these parties. So far as regards a formal issue, this is true; and that will apply to every oath collateral to the question at issue. But here the real question between the parties was, shall, or shall not, this debtor be liberated from his imprisonment, unless the creditor will support him? A question of deep interest to one party, and of some importance to the other; a question which the forms of proceeding cannot conceal. The court, therefore, are of opinion, and advise the superior court, that the offense charged in this information is perjury, and that there is no error in the judgment of the county court. REGINA v. TYSON. (Court for Crown Cases Reserved, 1867. L. R. 1 C. C. 107.) At a session of the Central Criminal Court, held on the 10th of June, 1867, and following days, Thomas Tyson was tried before me on an indictment for perjury. It was alleged in the indictment, and appeared in evidence, that at the May session of the Central Criminal Court one Owen Sullivan was tried for a robbery, and that upon that trial Tyson was called as a witness on behalf of Sullivan. The indictment went on to allege that upon the trial of Sullivan it was material to ascertain whether Sullivan was or was not at a house, No. 20, in Mint street, in the borough of Southwark, on the evening of the 13th of April, 1867, between the hours of 8 o'clock and 10 o'clock, and whether Sullivan had lived at the same house for two years then last past, or from March, 1865, to March, 1866; and that Tyson falsely swore as such witness, first, that on the 13th day of April, 1867, Sullivan came to 20 Mint street at half-past 8 in the evening, and did not go out again that evening; second, that Sullivan had lived in the said house for two years then last past; and, third, that during the whole of that time Sullivan had never been absent from the same house for more than three nights together. Perjury was assigned upon each of the above allegations, and the prisoner was convicted on the last two. I reserved the question for the consideration of the court whether the two last allegations of Tyson, upon which perjury was assigned, were sufficiently material on the trial of Sullivan to support the indictment for perjury in respect of them. KELLY, C. B. The real question is whether, on this indictment, these two statements were material. We all agree that they were, as they tended to render more probable the truth of the first allegation. When it had been sworn by the witness that at the time of the robbery Sullivan was in Mint street, it tended to render that statement infinitely more credible to add, "I, as deputy, know that he lodged there for nearly two years. and never was absent more than a night or two all that time." Under the circumstances, without giving any opinion as to whether the conviction could have been supported if the evidence had affected the witness' credit only, we affirm the conviction.1 1 Bramwell, B., and Lush, J., delivered concurring opinions. Willes and Byles, JJ., concurred. distinction between principal and. Kelley, 279. direct communication between principal and, not necessary. Cooper, 279. for what acts of principal liable. Saunders, 281. in manslaughter. Bibith, 282. by counseling death of unborn child. Coke, 330. ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, who is. Robert, 283; Davis, 283; Butterfield, 286. distinction between receiver of stolen property and. East, 537; Dyer, ADULTERER, as a receiver of stolen goods. Kenny, 405. ADULTERY, what constitutes. Roberts, 8. jurisdiction of. Grisham, 10 n. as provocation to homicide. Mawgridge, 367; Grugin, 376; Yanz, 382. AFFRAY, what is. 22 n. AGENT, see Principal. responsibility for act done for principal. 290 n.; 17 n. ANIMALS, maliciously injuring. Cramer, 23. killing. Sutton, 187. subject of larceny, see Larceny. APPEAL, of rape. Reginald, 320. APPROVING, Britton, 56. ARREST, homicide in effecting. Leonin, 225; Rice, 225; Storey, 234. ARSON, [The figures refer to pages.] what constitutes crime of. Britton, 568. punishment for. Britton, 568. intent in. Mirror, 568; Hale, 568. the place burnt. Hale, 568. what interest in, prevents. Harris, 568; Gowen, 570. the burning in, what is sufficient. Russell, 571. ASSAULT, what constitutes crime of. Hawkins, 291; Daniel, 294; Chambless, 298 n.; whether intent to harm necessary in. Tuberville v. Savage, 291; Myers, by stripping patient. Bartell, 39. by pointing unloaded gun. Chapman, 296. by communication of disease. Clarence, 299. whether words justify. Grugin, 376. as provocation in homicide. Mawgridge, 367. ASPORTATION, in larceny, what constitutes. Cherry, 409; Simpson, 409; Wallis, 412; necessity for, abolished. 414 n. by innocent agent. Manley, 262; Cummins, 415. АТТЕМРТ, distinction between preparation and. Murray, 192; Hurley, 193. when full crime impossible. Clark, 196; Jaffe, 198; Foster, 204 n.; larceny by. Reeves, 426; Meeres, 441; Leigh, 442; Evans, 413: Carrier, larceny by owner from. Anon., 402; Henry, 402. BARRATRY, what is crime of. Hawkins, 17 n. BATTERY, what is. Hawkins, 291; Cotesworth, 309. by striking wife. Bradley, 229; Oliver, 229; Richards, 230 n. by striking pupil. Boyd, 231. by negligent act. Gill, 309. by malpractice. Bartell, 39. by indirect application of force. Davis, 309. by use of excessive force. Boyd, 231; Floyd, 239. consent as a defense in. Beck, 36; Champer, 37; Coney, 37; Bartell, 39. as provocation in homicide. Mawgridge, 367. what is. Langley v. Bradshaw, 446; Madox, 446; Brazier, 449. |