The traveller, however, is rigidly required to do all that care and prudence would dictate to avoid injury; and the greater the danger, the greater the care that must be exercised to avoid it.1 And where, because of physical infirmities, darkness, snow, fog, the inclemency of the weather, buildings, or other obstructions and hindrances, it is more than usually difficult to see or hear, greater precautions must be taken to avoid injury than would otherwise be necessary; and, under such circumstances, there can be no excuse for a failure to adopt such reasonable precautions as would probably have prevented the injury. Nor will a failure upon the part of the railway company to give warnings or take precautions required by statute, excuse a want of ordinary care, upon the part of a traveller at a highway crossing, which directly contributes to his injury. But if the company be guilty of conduct that would render the statutory warnings unavailing, and a traveller be injured in consequence, when he would otherwise have escaped injury, the misconduct of the company is the sole proximate cause of the injury. So a person injured upon a highway railway crossing.

3

Ohio St. 631; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 633; Petty v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1886), 28 Ám. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 618; Hathaway . East Tenn., etc., R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 489; Greauy v. Long Island R. Co., 101 N. Y. 419; s. c., 24 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 473; Penna. R. Co. v. Garvey, 108 Pa. St. 369; Drain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 574; Lincoln v. Gillilan, 18 Neb. 114; Johnson v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 18 Neb. 690; Palmer v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 56 Mich. 1; Ferguson v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co., 63 Wis. 145; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 285; Orange, etc., H. R. Co. v. Ward, 47 N. J. L. 560; Leavitt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Wis. 228; Tyler v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 137 Mass. 238; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 276; Hutchinson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 398; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280; Copley v. New Haven, etc, R. Co., 136 Mass. 6; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 372; Scott v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (N. Car. 1887), 2 S. E. Rep. 151; Loucks v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 31 Minn. 526; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 305; Nehrbas v. Central Pacific R. Co., 62 Čal. 320; s. c., 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 670; Funston v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 61 Iowa, 452; s. c., 14 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 640; Stackus v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. Co., 79 N. Y. 464; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99; Beisiegel v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 34 N. Y. 622.

1. The greater the Danger, the greater the Care. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627.

2. Unusual Difficulties require Unusual Precautions. Nicholson v. Erie R. Co., 41 N. Y. 525; Hanover R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 396; Rothe v. Milwaukee, etc., R.

2

Co., 21 Wis. 256; Butterfield v. Western R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.), 532; Elkins v.. Boston, etc., R. Co., 115 Mass. 190; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Still, 19 Ill. 499; Steves . Oswego, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 422; Ill. etc., R. Co. v. Ebert, 74 Ill. 399; Penna. R. Co. v. Werner, 89 Pa. St. 59; Roithe v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21 Wis. 258; Sheffield v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 339; Penna. R. Co. v. Maryland, 61 Md. 108; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 326.

3. Failure of Company to give Statutory Signals. — Stepp v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. 225; Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Wis. I ; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 274, where it is held that although "the whistle is not blown, nor the bell rung, on the locomotive before crossing the highway, as required by statute, the railroad company is not liable for an injury resulting from a collision at such a crossing if the negligence of the person injured contributed thereto." Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 110 Ill. 114; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 359; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Nixon, 52 Tex. 19; Cleveland & Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340; Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616; s. c., 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 111; Hinckley . Cape Cod R. Co., 120 Mass. 257.

4. Statutory Warnings rendered Unavailing." It is negligence in a railroad company to run trains so near together at a highway crossing as to make the statutory signals unavailing to warn travellers on the highway;" and where an injury follows, that would probably have been avoided had not the train been so run, - that is, when it appears that the plaintiff exercised such care

2

can recover, in spite of his own negligence, if the injury was inflicted upon him wilfully. And notwithstanding negligence upon the part of the person injured, he may recover if the railway company, after such negligence occurred, could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have discovered it in time to have avoided inflicting the injury. So if a railway company, by its servants, invites or directs a traveller to cross, he has a right to presume that the company's agent knows what the company's conduct will be, and is not guilty of contributory negligence in obeying, even though a train be approaching.3 Yet this presumption will not avail him when it would have been apparent to an ordinarily prudent manthat an injury would certainly follow an attempt to cross; and if, with full knowledge of the near approach of a train, a traveller attempts to cross in advance of it, and merely miscalculates his ability to do so in safety, there can be no recovery for a resulting injury. But there are cases where it is not negligence, as a matter of law, to attempt to cross in front of an advancing train.

5

as could have avoided the injury, had the signals availed to warn him of danger, -a recovery may be sustained. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Boggs, 101 Ind. 522; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 282, 51 Am. Rep. 761. See also N. Y., etc., R. Čo. v. Randel, 47 N. J. L. 144; S. C., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 308; Shaber v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 28 Minn. 103; s. c, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 185; Leonard v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. 225; Powell . N. Y., etc., R. Co., 22 Hun (N. Y.), 56; Beisiegel v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 622; Casey v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 78 N. Y. 518; N. J., etc., R. Co. . West, 32 N. J. L. 91. See Penna. R. Co. 7. Fortney, 90 Pa. St. 323; s. c., I Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 128.

1. Injury wilful. — Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286; s. c., 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 77; Carter v. Louisville, etc, R. Co., 98 Ind. 552; s. c., 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 360; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73; Penna. R. Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301.

2. Plaintiff's Negligence remote. "Counsel indulge in a criticism of the cases in which this court has held that, if negligence of the defendant which contributed directly to cause the injury occurred after the danger in which the injured party had placed himself by his own negligence, was or by the exercise of reasonable care might have been discovered by the defendant in time to have averted the injury, then the defendant is liable, however gross the negligence of the injured party may have been in placing himself in such a position of danger. Such is the well-established doctrine of this court." Donohue v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1886), 28 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 673; Werner v. Citizen's R. Co., 81 Mo. 374; Kelly v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 75

6

Mo. 138; s. c., 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 638; Frick v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 75 Mo. 595; s. c., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 280; Keim v. Union R. (Mo. 1887), 2 S. W. Rep. 427; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Cavanesey (Ark. 1886), 2 S. W. Rep. 505; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Monday (Ark. 1887), 4 S. W. Rep. 782; Maher v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 267; Harlan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 22; Adams v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 74 Mo. 553; s. c., 7 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 414; Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 29; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hogarth, 38 Ill. 370.

3. Invitation to Cross. - Sweeney v. Old Colony R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.), 368; Peck v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (Mich. 1885), 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 257; Phila., etc., R. Co. v. Killips, 88 Pa. St. 405; Wheelock v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 195 Mass. 203; Ernst v. Hudson River R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9; s. c., 39 N. Y. 61; Dolan 7. Delaware, etc., Co., 71 N. Y. 285; Sharpe v. Glushing, 96 N. Y. 676; s. c., 19 Am. &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 372; Bayley. Eastern R. Co., 125 Mass. 62; Borst v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co, 4 Hun (N. Y.), 346.

4. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Spring, 13 Ill. (app.) 174.

5. Crossing in Front of Approaching Train. Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; s. c., 5 Am. Rep. 201; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fears, 53 Ill. 115; Schwartz v. Hudson River, etc., R. Co., 4 Robt. (N. Y.) 347.

6. It is not always Negligent to do so. Detroit & Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99; Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 19 Wis. 489; Aaron v. Second Ave. R. Co., 2 Daley (N. Y.), 127; Baxter v. Second Ave. R. Co., 30 Howard's Pr. (N. Y.) 219; s. c., 3 Robt. (N. Y.) 510.

1

It has been held that negligence upon the part of the person injured will be presumed from the mere fact of injury at a railway crossing; and it has been held, that, in the absence of evidence of his negligence, the presumption that the injured person exercised care will prevail. This conflict seems to arise from the different rules prevailing as to the burden of proof being upon plaintiff or defendant in cases where contributory negligence is an issue. But the true rule is, that there is no presumption either

3

1. Presumption of Negligence. In a re- Pennsylvania, where the "Stop, look, and cent case in Indiana this doctrine was car- listen," doctrine is applied most rigidly, it ried to the extent of holding that where a is held that it is not incumbent on the person was killed upon a railway crossing, plaintiff to show affirmatively that the and it was not affirmatively shown that decedent, killed upon a railway crossing, he had been free from negligence, the stopped, looked, and listened, before atpresumption would be, that he had been tempting to cross the track. In a recent guilty of contributory negligence, and con- case of this character, the Supreme Court sequently that no recovery could be had, of Pennsylvania says, "The common-law even though there was evidence of negli- presumption is that every one does his duty, gence upon the part of the railroad com- until the contrary is proved; and in the pany, and no evidence of negligence on the absence of all evidence on the subject, the part of the deceased. In the course of presumption is, that the decedent observed the opinion Mitchell, J., said, “It will not the precautions which the law prescribed. do to say, however, as the instruction in In the case at bar no witness was called effect does, that if the plaintiff can show who saw the occurrence; there is no evithe defendant's negligence and his injury, dence whatever, whether, in fact, the decehe may leave his own conduct to conjec- dent did stop and look and listen; the preture, and recover. He must show the facts, sumption is that he did; proof of that fact -as well those which relate to his share was no part of plaintiff's case. The prein the transaction as those which relate to sumption is of fact merely, and may be the defendant's; and if, upon the whole case, rebutted; but we are without evidence on an inference of negligence arises against the subject. All that we have is, that, as the defendant, and of due care on his part, he came upon the railroad, he was struck he may recover. The fact that a person down by the locomotive." And it was held travelling on a highway comes in collision that a recovery could be sustained. Schum with a train on a railway crossing, is of 7. Penna., etc., R. Co., 107 Pa. St. 8; s. c., itself sufficient to suggest a presumption 52 Am. Rep. 468; Penna., etc., R. Co. v. of contributory negligence against him in Weber, 76 Pa. St. 157; s. c., 18 Am. Rep. a suit for compensation." And in accord- 407. See also Buesching v. Gas Co., 73 ance with this doctrine an instruction was Mo. 219; s. c., 39 Am. Rep. 503; Petty 7. held erroneous that stated the law to be, Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1886), 28 Am. that if negligence of the defendant was & Eng. R. R. Cas. 618, 626. proved, and no contributory negligence, or ground for inferring it, shown by the evidence, that plaintiff had sufficiently shown the deceased free from fault, and that "in the absence of circumstances to show or suggest it, there is no presumption of contributory negligence." Ind., etc., R. Co. v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279; s. c., 25 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322, 55 Am. Rep. 736.

So it has been held in Maine: "In an action for the death of a traveller on a highway at a railway crossing, there is no presumption that he used due care, and evidence as to his character and habits of carefulness is incompetent." Chase v. Maine, etc., R. Co., 77 Me. 62; s. c., 19 Am. &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 356, 52 Am. Rep. 744; State v. Maine, etc., R. Co., 76 Me. 357; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 312, 49 Am. Rep. 622.

2. Presumption of Due Care.

- Thus, in

And it has been held that a jury may infer due care, and the absence of contribu tory negligence, on the part of a deceased person, from the general and well-known disposition of mankind to take care of themselves, and keep out of danger. Northern Cent. R. Co. v. State, 31 Md. 357; Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; Gay . Winter, 34 Cal. 153; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Hall, 61 Pa. St. 361.

3. Whence this Conflict. Buesching v. Gas Co., 73 Mo. 219; s. c., 39 Am. Rep. 503; Petty v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1886), 28 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 618, 626; Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322, 55 Am. Rep. 736; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Ubanks (Ark.), 3 S. W. Rep. 808; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262. And

way; and when negligence on the part of the railway company sufficient to account for the injury has been shown, and there is no evidence of contributory fault, the burden of the issue should shift, and plaintiff be entitled to recover, unless contributory negligence be affirmatively proved, the principle being that a sufficient cause having been shown, and no intervening efficient cause appearing, the negligence of the company should be held the sole proximate cause of the injury. As the mere fact of the injury

raises no presumption that the railway company was negligent, it certainly should not raise one that the injured person was. The rules here laid down, like most other doctrines of the law of negligence, are founded upon the care to be expected of a careful and prudent man under such circumstances, and, in accord with principies already stated, they are somewhat modified in their application to children of tender years; or, rather, the railway company is charged with notice of the fact that children, as well as adults, may be upon the highway, and must exercise greater care to avoid injuring them than an adult is entitled to demand.

34. Intoxication as an Element of Contributory Negligence. The fact that a person when injured was intoxicated, does not constitute contributory negligence per se,3 but it is a circumstance that

644; Phila., etc., R. Co. v. Stebbing, 62 Md. 504; s. c., 19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 36; Jones v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 28 Hun (N. Y.), 364; Smedis v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co., 23 Hun (N. Y.), 279.

"If the plaintiff's evidence shows an injury by defendant's negligence, and does not raise the implication that his own contributed, the burden of proof of such contributory negligence as will defeat the recovery, rests upon the defendant." Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627, 630; Ill., etc., R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177; Penna. R. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. St. 239. It may be thought that these principles are only applicable in jurisdictions where the burden of proof of contributory negligence is upon the defendant, but a little reflection will show that this is not true. Even where the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence is on the plaintiff, it is quite sufficient, on principle, to show that the defendant's negligence was adequate to have caused the injury, and that there is no evidence of any other sufficient cause that is, no evidence of fault on the plaintiff's part, or that of the deceased. In such case the law must ascribe the injury to the only cause found.

-

1. Why No Presumption should arise. "Indeed, the presumption of law is that neither party was guilty of negligence, and such presumption must prevail until overcome by proof. As a general rule, the existence of negligence, on either side, is a fact to be ascertained by the jury under proper instructions from the court." Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 633; Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla. 669; s. c., 29 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 274, 58 Am. Rep. 697.

"In actions for injury by negligence, where there is nothing in plaintiff's evidence tending to show contributory negligence, the presumption will be that there is no contributory negligence, and this presumption remains until the contrary is

shown." Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, etc., R.
Co. v. Fleming, 30 Ohio St. 480, 485.
2. Modification of Doctrine when Persons
non sui juris. "Contributory Negligence
of Children," ante, § 22. It is held that more
care is required towards children of tender
years at crossings than toward adults. Thur-
ber v. Harlem, etc., R. Co., 60 N. Y. 326;
O'Mara v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 N. Y.
445; McGovern v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 67
N. Y. 421; Elkins v. Boston, etc., R. Co.,
115 Mass. 190; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Becker, 84 Ill. 483; Costello 7. Syracuse,
etc., R. Co., 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 92; Haas v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Wis. 44; Padu-
cah, etc., R. Co. v. Hoche, 12 Bush (Ky.),
41; Boland v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 36 Mo.
484; Isabel v. Hannibal, etc., R. Čo., 60
Mo. 475; Chicago, etc, R. Co. v. Murray,
71 Ill. 601; Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Ř.
Co., 49 Wis. 529; s. c., I Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas., and note collecting many cases on
this and related topics; Mobile, etc., R.
Co. v. Crenshaw, 65 Ala. 567; s. c., 8 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 340; Schwier v. N. Y.
Cent. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 558; s. c., 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 656; Wendall v. N. Y.
Cent. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 420; s. c., 14 Am.
& Eng. R. R. Cas. 663; Nehrbras v. Cent.
Pac. R. Co., 62 Cal. 320; s. c., 14 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 670.

3. Intoxication not Negligence per se. Lower . Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431; s. c., 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 658; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 1174, § 22; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 1203, $50; Stuart 2. Machias Port, 48 Me. 477; Weymire . Wolf, 52 Iowa, 533; Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 545; Alger 7. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.), 403; Robinson 7. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460; Ditchett v. Spuytendyval, etc., R. Co., 5 Hun (N. Y.), 165; Thorpe v. Brookfield, 36 Conn. 320; Shearman & Redf. on Neg. § 487; Beach on Cont. Neg. $ 66 and 146; Houston, etc., R. Co. Reason, 61 Tex. 613; Fitzgerald v. Weston, 52 Wis. 354; Baker . Portland, 58 Me. 199; s. c., 4 Am. Rep. 274.

.