N. Car. 75; s. c., 35 Am. Rep. 564; Clay v. Currier, 17 Rep. (Iowa) 683; Hansen v. Dennison, 7 Ill. App. 73; Parker v. Webb, 3 S. Western Rep. (Ark.) 521; Hammock v. Creekmoore, 3 S. Western Repr. (Ark.) 180; Beard State, 43 Ark. 284; Jarratt v. McDaniel, 32 Ark. 598; Meadow v. Wise, 41 Ark. 285; Greer v. Turner, 47 Ark. 17; Kimball 7. Sattley, 55 Vt. 285; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 614; Fitch v. Burk, 38 Vt. 683; Sterling v. Baldwin, 42 Vt. 306; Cudworth v. Scott, 41 N. H. 456. A crop is a "growing" crop, so that it can be mortgaged, giving a legal title to the mortgagee from the time the seed is deposited in the ground. Wilkinson v. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435; Hansen v. Dennison, 7 Ill. App. 73. Compare Comstocks v. Scales. 7 Wis. 159. Unplanted Crops. It is even held that a crop to be planted on one's own land or on land to be let to him, as well as a crop planted and in process of cultivation, is the subject of a valid mortgage. Rawlings 2. Hunt, 90 N. Car. 270; Cotten v. Willoughby, 83 N. Car. 75; Harris v. Jones, 83 N. Car. 317; Robinson v. Ezzell, 72 N. Car. 231; Senter 7. Mitchell, 16 Fed. Rep. 206; Thrash v. Bennett, 57 Ala. 156; Hurst v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336; Watkins v. Wyatt, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 250; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 63. Compare Hutchinson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.), 318; Comstocks v. Scales, 7 Wis. 159; Milliman v. Neher, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 37. The lessee of land in possession executed a mortgage of the crops to be raised by him the coming season, and which were not yet planted. Held, that the mortgage was valid. Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 718; Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 404; Harris v. Jones, 83 N. Car. 317; Robinson v. Ezzell, 72 N. Car. 231; Sanborn v. Benedict, 78 Ill. 309; Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Maginnis, 32 Minn. 193; McCarty v. Blevins, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 195. A mortgage on crops yet to be planted is a good and enforceable lien where the mortgagee takes the property in his possession after it is acquired, and before the rights of others as creditors or purchasers have attached thereon. Moore . Byrum, 10 S. Car. 452; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 58; Wyatt . Watkins, 16 Alb. L. J. (Tenn.) 205; Cook v. Corthell, 11 R. I. 482; s. c., 23 Am. Rep. 518; Williams v. Briggs, 11 R. I. 176; s. c., 23 Am. Rep. 518; 22 Am. Rep. 653, note; Rees . Coats, 65 Ala. 258; Columbus Iron Works v. Renfro, 71 Ala. 577; Collier v. Faulk, 69 Ala. 58; Hurst v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336; Thompson v. Powell, 77 Ala. 391; Mayer v. Taylor, 69 Ala. 403; Cole v. Kerr, 19 Neb. 553; Lamson v. Moffatt, 61 Wis. 153. A cotton planter, cultivating land, for the purchase-price of which he had mortgaged his crop for the ensuing year, made two mortgages on the same crop, one before and one after it was sown, to other parties, to cover past and future advances from them. Advances were made thereafter, and the mortgagor continued in their debt. He sold part of his crop through a broker, and received the proceeds. In a suit against the broker by the second mortga gees for conversion, held, that the first mortgage of the plaintiffs, though not notice to third parties under the Alabama registration law, being made before the crop was planted, was a valid executory contract, conveying to the mortgagees an equity which, on their taking possession of the crop, would become a legal title. In such a case the mortgagor in possession, having a legal title against all but the prior mortgagee, could convey to the second mortgagees such a title as would enable them to maintain trover against any one but the prior mortgagee, or those claiming under him. Marks v. Robinson, 2 Southern Rep. (Ala.) 292. Where a mortgage is executed on an unplanted crop, a lien attaches in equity as soon as the subject of the mortgage comes into existence, and in a proceeding to foreclose will be enforced against the mortgagor and those holding under him with record notice. Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 170; Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 544; McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459; s. c., 22 Am. Rep. 644; Smith v. Atkins, 18 Vt. 465; Everman v. Robb, 52 Miss. 653; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 682; White v. Thomas, 52 Miss. 49; Sillers v. Lester, 48 Miss. 513; Booker v. Jones, 55 Ala. 266; Stewart . Fry, 3 Ala. 573; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426; Smith 2. Fields, 79 Ala. 335. In case of crops to be grown, a mortgage vests potentially from the time of the executory bargain, and actually as soon as the subject arises. Andrew 7. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417; Senter v. Mitchell, 16 Fed. Rep. 206. A mortgage executed by the owner or lessee of land on a crop which is not planted, but is to be planted in futuro, conveys to the mortgagee a mere equitable interest or title, which will not support an action of detinue, trover, or trespass; but this title attaches instantly on the planting, and is superior to a second mortgage executed prior to the planting, the second mortgagee having notice of the former mortgage. Mayer v. Taylor, 69 Ala. 403; s. c., 44 Am. Rep. 522, citing Grant v. Steiner, 65 Ala. 499; Rees v. Coats, 65 Ala. 256; Booker v. Jones, 55 Ala. 266; Abraham v. Carter, 53 Ala. 8; Moore v. Byrum, 10 S. Car. 452; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 58; Sillers v. Lester, 48 Miss. 513; Fonville v. Casey, Murph. (N. Car.) 389; s. c., 4 Am. Dec. 559. See also Collins v. Faulk, 69 Ala. 58; Seay v. McCormick, 68 Ala. 549; Wilkinson 7. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435. Compare Hutchinson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.), 318; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 711, where it was held that a mortgage of a crop to be raised on a farm during a certain term, but which is not yet sown, passes no title, and the mortgagee has no claim against a purchaser of the crop for it or its value. See also Cudworth v. Scott, 41 N. H. 456; Redd . Burrus, 58 Ga. 574. A chattel mortgage can have no valid operation upon a crop of grain given at or about the time of planting the same, and before it is up, or has any appearance of a growing crop. Comstock v. Scales, 7 Wis. 159. A mortgage may embrace a crop of which the seed is planted, and which is growing. Stephens v. Tucker, 55 Ga. 543. A mortgage of a crop thereafter to be raised is void as against a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagor, unless before such purchase the mortgagee took actual possession of the property. Lamson v. Moffat, 61 Wis. 153, citing Comstock v. Scales, 7 Wis. 159; Chynometh v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 397, 407; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Comm. Bank, 11 Wis. 207; Single v. Phelps, 20 Wis. 398; Mowry v. White, 21 Wis. 417; Hunter v. Bosworth, 43 Wis. 583; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Fisher, 17 Wis. 114; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Cary, 13 Wis. 110. A mortgage of crops to be sown is too indefinite and uncertain to be valid against third persons, unless at least designating the year or term in which they are to be grown. Pennington v. Jones, 57 Iowa, 37. A mortgage may be of part of a growing crop, if the part mortgaged is so described as to be identified by parol evidence; and whether so identified or not, is a question for the jury upon the proof. Stephens v. Tucker, 55 Ga. 543. The sale or mortgage of a crop to be planted, as well as one planted and in process of cultivation, is valid, provided the place where the crop is to be produced is designated with certainty sufficient to identify it. It seems parol testimony is competent to fit the description to the property, and show the agreement of the parties. A mortgage conveying "my entire crop of every description" is too vague to pass any title to the property mentioned. Rountree v. Britt, 94 N. Car. 104; Atkinson v. Graves, 91 N. Car. 99. A mortgage which conveys "all of the crops of corn, cotton, and cotton-seed, and crops of every other name and description, to be grown this year in said county," is not void for uncertainty, but is valid and opera tive to convey all the crops grown in said county by the grantor or mortgagor. Hamilton v. Maas, 77 Ala. 283. A chattel mortgage upon a growing crop, as against an attaching creditor, continues to be a lien upon the crop, in the possession of the mortgagor, after severance and removal from the land,- Rider v. Edgar, 54 Cal. 127,- and upon the proceeds of the crop after sale. Muse v. Lehman, 30 Kan. 514. Section 2972 of Civil Code keeps alive the lien of a mortgage upon a growing crop only so long as the same remains on the land of the mortgagor. Waterman v. Green, 59 Cal. 142; Goodyear v. Williston, 42 Cal. II. A mortgagee of a cotton crop, who, in order to gather and secure the crop, makes further advances to the mortgagor, does not thereby obtain a lien on the proceeds of the sale of the crop that takes precedence of a lien created by a second mortgage or deed of trust executed to a trustee to secure an indebtedness due from the mortgagor to his wife for moneys advanced to him. Weathersbee v. Farrar, 1 S. Eastern Repr. (N. Car.) 616. In 1879, N. conveyed to B. a farm for $5,610, payable in six equal annual instalments. B. then conveyed the land and ten bales of each annual crop of cotton to be produced on it for the six years, to a trustee to secure the payments, with power to take possession, and sell on default of payment. In 1881, N. took possession of ten bales, including three made by a tenant of B., to pay the instalment for that year. The tenant had mortgaged his whole crop of that year to D. for supplies. Held, that the first mortgage was void for uncertainty as against D., the second mortgagee, and he could maintain replevin against N. for the three bales. Dodds v. Neel, 41 Ark. 70. A mortgage describing the property as "all the cut and growing, and having grown," on the premises. Held insufficient to give third persons notice of a lien on the crops grown on the land. Cray v. Currier, 62 Iowa, 535. A mortgage which describes the crops intended to be conveyed as "my entire crop of corn, cotton, [cotton] seed, fodder, pease, potatoes, and cane that I may raise the present year on my place," is not void for uncertainty. While the description of the crops is very general and indefinite, it is capable of being rendered certain by showing the lands cultivated by the mortgagor during that year, and the quantity of the respective crops raised by him. Sea; o. McCormick, 68 Ala. 549; Ellis v. Martin, 60 Ala. 394. The description of the property in a mortgage was as follows: "All and the entire crop of flax and wheat, and other grain or produce, raised on the east half,” CROSS.1 CROSS-BILL. —A cross-bill is brought by a defendant in a suit against the plaintiff in the same suit, or against other defendants in the same suit, or against both, touching the matters in question in the original bill. It is brought either to obtain a discovery of facts in aid of the defence to the original bill, or to obtain full and complete relief to all parties, as to the matters charged in the original bill.2 A mortgage of "all of a crop of ten acres of cotton to be grown" by the mortgagor upon a field containing forty acres in cotton, is, as to strangers to the mortgage, void for uncertainty, and parol evidence to designate the particular ten acres intended is not admissible. Krone v. Phelps, 43 Ark. 350. on "One-half of all the crop growing certain described lands, means one undivided half of such crop; and, as a description (in a chattel mortgage) of the property mortgaged, is sufficiently definite. Melin v. Reynolds, 32 Minn. 52. A mortgage of land including "the rents, issues, and profits thereof," was held to be a lien on the crops growing on the premises. Montgomery v. Merrill, 165 Cal. 432. A mortgage which described the property mortgaged as "thirty bales of good lint cotton, the first picking of our crop of 1882, to average four hundred and fifty pounds each," describes the cotton with sufficient certainty. Senter v. Mitchell, 16 Fed. Rep. 206. A chattel mortgage on a growing crop executed after a transfer of the legal title to the land on which it grows, will pass no rights as against one claiming under the grantee in the conveyance of the land. Coman v. Thompson, 47 Mich. 22; Gibbons v. Dillingham, 10 Ark. 9; s. c., 50 Am. Dec. 233. One who takes a mortgage of growing crops during the pendency of an action of ejectment, is bound by the judgment against the mortgagor, and may be evicted under the writ issued on such judgment. As between him and the successful plaintiff such growing crops are part of the realty, and pass to the plaintiff, and the mortgagee is not entitled to possession of the premises for the purpose of harvesting such crops. Huerstal v. Muir, 64 Cal. 450. A railroad held to "cross a public highway," though they did not cross upon the same level. People v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 78. 66 Cross Street. Where a proviso is made as to the assessment of real estate fronting upon a "cross-street, or street fronting upon" another, its language does not contemplate the assessment of any street upon one side alone of that other. Schumacker v. Toberman, 56 Cal. 510. Cross the Lake.” Where an act provides that it shall not be law for a person to cross the lake within three miles of a certain bridge without paying toll, it applies also to a person crossing on ice, but not to one who does not enter the lake within three miles of the bridge. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Stout, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 33. 'Cross the Bar."- Where a boundary is described as "crossing the bar " between two islands, "crossing the bar " means passing clear across the entire width of the bar on the line of low water, and drawing the subsequent boundary-lme from the farther edge or limit of the bar on that line of low water. Bremen 7. Bristol, 66 Me. 357. 'Cross & Road." - The exemption from payment of toll of a passenger "crossing a road and not going one hundred yards thereon," applies only to persons actually crossing the road. Phillips v. Harper, 2 Chit. 412. But it was held to apply to a person going along the road and continuing thereon till he reached a lane turning off on the same side on which he entered. Major v. Oxenham, 5 Taunt. 340. 2. Ayres v. Čarver, 17 How. (U. S ) 595. "It should not introduce new and distinct matters not embraced in the original CROSSINGS. See also CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS; COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; NEGLIGENCE; RAILROADS. bill, as they cannot be properly examined in that suit, but constitute the subject-matter of an original, independent suit. The crossbill is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit, and a dependency upon it. It is said by Lord Hardwicke, that both the original and cross bill constitute but one suit, so intimately are they connected together." "A cross-bill is a mere auxiliary suit, and a dependency of the original. It may be brought by a defendant against the plaintiff in the same suit, or against other defendants, or against both; but it must be touching the matters in question in the bill, as where a discovery is necessary, or as where the original bill is brought for a specific performance of a contract, which the defendant at the same time insists ought to be delivered up and cancelled; or where the matter of defence arises after the cause is at issue, where in cases at law the defence is by plea puis darrein continuance." Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 14. "A cross-bill, ex vi terminorum, implies a bill brought by a defendant in a suit against the plaintiff in the same suit or against other defendants in the same suit, or against both, touching the matters in question in the original bill." Kemp v. Mitchell, 36 Ind. 256, quoting Story's Eq. Pl. sec. 389. "A cross-bill is a bill brought by a defendant against a plaintiff, or other parties in a former bill depending, touching the matter in question in that bill. . . . It is 15. Duty of Railroad Company when View obstructed, 919. 16. Temporary Obstruction of View, 920. 17. Warning - Signals at Crossings, 921. 18. Signals required by Statute, 921. (b) Duty to signal for Animals, 925. (d) Evidence as to Signals, 928. 19. Gates at Crossings, 928. 20. Flagmen at Crossings, 929. 21. Lookouts at Crossings, 931. 22. Speed of Trains at Crossings, 932. (a) Speed in Violation of Positive Law, 934. 23. Appliances, etc., for Control of Train, 935. (a) Lights on Cars and Engines, 935 treated as a mere auxiliary suit, or as a dependency upon the original suit. . . . A bill of this kind is usually brought either to obtain a necessary discovery of facts in aid of the defence to the original bill, or to obtain full relief to all parties in reference to the matters of the original bill." Kidder v. Barr, 35 N. H. Rep. 251. "In the very elementary nature of the thing, a cross-bill is a bill filed by a party, defendant to a suit." McDougald z. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 679. "A cross-bill is nothing more than an addition to the answer. It makes a part of the pleading which states the defence, the answer being the other part. . . . If a cross-bill is added to an answer, the answer is amended." Canant z. Mappin, 20 Ga. 731. 1. "A cross-complaint is allowed 'when a defendant has a cause of action against a co-defendant, or a person not a party to the action, and affecting the subject-matter of the action.' . . . 'The only real difference between a complaint and a cross-complaint,' says the author we have quoted, 'is, that the first is filed by the plaintiff, and the second by the defendant. Both contain a statement of the facts, and each demands affirmative relief upon the facts stated.'... And we may add, the difference between a counter-claim and a cross-complaint is this: in the former, the defendant's cause of action is against the plaintiff; and in the latter, against a co-defendant, or one not a party to the action." White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 289, 290 34. (d) Usually a Question for the Jury, 944. (e) But it may be a Matter of Law, Traveller's Duty to "Stop," Crossing in Front of a Moving Train, 948. 35. Children and Feeble Persons, 948. 36. Imputable Contributory Negli gence, 948. 37. Injury to Fellow-Servant, 949. 39. Peculiar Statutory Provisions, etc., 40. 41. Railroad liable over to Municipality, 950. Legislative Control over Crossings, 950. 42. Railroad-Railroad Collisions, 950. 43. Highway-Highway Collisions, 951. 44. Street-Cars, Collisions of, 951. 1. Preliminary. The term "crossing," as used in this article, cannot well be defined. It is rather a term of description. We here deal principally with the duties and rights of railroads, and of travellers at "crossings" created by the intersection at grade of public highways and railroad tracks; and consequently the greater part of this discussion relates to rights and liabilities arising from the injury of property and persons by accidents at such crossings. 2. Kinds of Crossings. A crossing, in the sense of the term as used in this article, is the intersection at grade of a railroad. track (a) by a public highway, or (b) by a private road, or (c) by another railroad. So, also, the intersection at grade of either a public or private street or way by another of either class, may be said to be "a crossing," within the scope of this discussion; but the litigation that has arisen from accidents at such crossings is so limited that they will only be treated of incidentally. Rights and liabilities of railroad companies for accidents at places where their tracks cross highways either above or below grade, may also properly be considered as incident to the general discussion. 3. What a Part of Crossing. The crossing itself is the portion of the highway and the railway that are used in common. But the embankment, which is constructed as a necessary approach to the railway tracks, is, in legal contemplation, a part of the crossing.1 4. Duty of Railroad to construct and maintain. It is generally the duty of a railroad company to construct, maintain, and repair the crossing where it intersects a public highway at grade. It 1. Beatty v. Cent., etc., R. Co., 58 Ia. 242; s. c., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 210; Farley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 42 Ia. 234. 2. Farley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 42 Ia. 2 234; Ferguson v. V. & T. R. Co., 13 Nev. 184; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn, 56 Pa. St. 280; Paducah, etc., R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 147; s. c., 10 Am. & Eng. |