his arms lifted up, his hands clenched, and his features distorted, his whole frame having stiffened in one dreadful expression of agony !

The general plan of this campaign has by some been objected to as involving too great risks; but, by universal concession, during the whole of it, Wellesley's skill, promptitude, and unhesitating self-reliance, were conspicuously manifested. The position he took up against the French at the battle, was admirably selected; and his manœuvres during it, were those of a great general who perceives and is resolved to improve the advantages he has gained. In short, the whole could only have been planned by a most energetic and vigor. ous mind.

The glorious victory of Talavera, though it added a fresh triumph to the many which the British army had gained, yet in certain respects did not improve the prospects of our troops. So far from having it in his power to follow it up, Sir Arthur Wellesley could scarcely procure assistance and support for his wounded men. Cuesta refused to send one of his divisions to attack a French convoy of provisions which might have fallen an easy prey; he also withdrew his troops from Talavera, leaving the British hospitals unprotected. By great exer tions and many sacrifices Sir Arthur collected forty cars, and with these brought off 2,000 of the wounded, though he was obliged to leave 1,500 of the worst cases in the hands of the French. Victor, to his honour, treated them with humanity.

Since the Spanish chiefs had not followed up the share allotted them in the arrangements of the campaign; since they had sustained several decisive defeats; and since the English army, deprived of the hearty aid and co-operation of the authorities,

found it impossible to procure support, it was quite evident that Sir Arthur Wellesley had done all that was in his power, and that "it was necessary he should withdraw into Portugal, as the locality particularly pointed out in his instructions." But his military chest was nearly empty, and it seemed as if the Spaniards were determined to leave their allies to starve. Lavish in promises, they were slow, and indeed unwilling in performance, and this too, when timely and abundant supplies might have enabled the English army to march straight upon the capital. From the period, when a junction had been formed with the Spanish forces, the British could never obtain more than half, sometimes not even the third of a full ration, and that composed of meat without salt, and flour, or grain instead of bread. The cavalry had to forage at a distance, and pick up subsistence wherever they could; so that more than 1,000 horses were deficient, and the cattle had scarcely strength enough to drag the artillery. Great numbers of the officers and men fell sick, and from the bad quality of their food, and the want of any drink but water, dysentery was very prevalent. Sir Arthur accordingly left his position on the 20th August. "In communicating this step to the ministers at home, he stated that he had never been able to procure means of transport since his arrival in Spain; that he was obliged to employ the largest proportion of carts in the army, whether they carried money or ammunition, to convey the wounded soldiers to the hospital at Elvas: that he was obliged to lay down a quantity of ammunition at Meza d'Ibor and Deleytosa, which was delivered to the Spanish general; and that if he had waited longer, he could not have moved at all without leaving his sick behind: but he observed, that from the disper

sed state of the French armies, and the losses they had sustained, the Spanish troops were not likely to suffer any inconvenience from the absence of the allies; and that upon the frontier of Portugal he hoped to supply his distressed soldiers with every thing they might want." The French on their part resolved upon no offensive operations, but determined during the autumn and winter to employ their disposable force in subjugating the south of Spain.

The central junta now expressed their sense of Sir A. Wellesley's services, by nominating him a captain-general in the Spanish service, and presenting him with six Andalusian horses, in the name of King Ferdinand. These honours he accepted, (submitting his acceptance of them to the pleasure of his sovereign) but disinterestedly refused to take the pay attached to the rank conferred on him. Higher honours awaited him at home: as soon as news of his victory arrived, he was raised to the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and Wellington in Somersetshire.

Shortly after the battle of Talavera, Marquis Wellesley superseded Mr. Frere as British ambassador. Though warmly greeted by the Spaniards, he also, like other discerning men, speedily perceived the ignorant incapacity and intriguing spirit of the junta. Indeed it is not too much to say that had not their evil influence been over-ruled, the Spanish cause would have been ruined. One thing was plain, that it would never do for the British to act in unison with the disorderly and unsteady levies of Spain.

On the march to Badajos, Lord Wellington was so much indisposed that for two days he had to tra

vel in a carriage. In their cantonments, the British army now had food and rest; but ague with intermittent fever was very prevalent among them. The number of deaths in one month was 700, in another 1300. This fever always prevails in that quarter during the autumn, and unfortunately the hospitals were not sufficiently supplied with bark, and other medicines, and the medical attendants deficient in number. Lord Wellington himself was attacked with it, but fortunately it soon left him.

About this time the Spanish contest began to assume a new feature, that of the guerilla warfare, which afterwards was such a scourge to the French. It soon became almost universal, for the people had now found their real strength. The invaders had hitherto defeated easily the Spanish armies; they had now another enemy to struggle with. Assassinations and desperate skirmishes thinned their ranks; each rock, each clump of trees, each ruin, furnished shelter to the marksman. As the peasant ploughed the soil his long gun lay in a furrow near him, he was ready to join any contest going on in his neighbourhood, or cut off any straggler that came near. The mountain passes were lined by these brave men. To lead and join these bands, "the priest girded up his black robe, and stuck pistols in his belt, the student threw aside his books, and grasped a sword,-the shepherd forsook his flock-the husbandman his home."

To the guerilla or partizan warfare, the genius of the Spanish people, and the character of their country, were peculiarly suited; and the resistance thus given to the French by scattered bands was more formidable, because far more difficult to keep down, than that of regular armies, which by a general action might be crushed. The Spaniard, calm, tem

perate, hardy, veiling under a cold demeanour an ardent and fiery character, is capable of waiting long to gain an advantage, and is little discouraged by difficulty or defeat. In general a good shot, and able to handle skilfully the lance, sword, or dagger, the guerilla was formidable in ambush, and unencumbered with heavy accoutrements, and accustomed to the free air of the mountains, was more than a match even for veteran soldiers. Proof alike against promises and threats, the severities practised against them in fulfilment of menaces, only inflamed the spirit of public hostility, by that of private revenge, to which they are prone. These guerillas were led by various officers all well qualified for the task ;-some, men of high birth and education, others smugglers and peasants. All displayed the greatest gallantry: possessing perfect knowledge of the passes, fastnesses, woods, mountains, and wildernesses of the country, and receiving exact intelligence from the peasantry, they harassed they French incessantly, watched every movement, and cut off every weak detachment; so that a courier was obliged to be attended by a large escort, "nor could the intrusive King take the amusement of hunting, however near to his capital, unless, like Earl Percy in the ballad, attended by a guard of 1,500 men." The numbers of these warriors varied; some chief led little armies of 2,000 or more, while others, or the same under a reverse of fortune, headed only ten or twenty men. They seemed to baffle all pursuit; when apparently surrounded they dispersed, and cut their way through in various quarters, or were traced only by the havoc they had caused. "To chase them was to pursue the wind, and to circumvent them was to detain water with a sieve."