Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Appendices D-GThe Commission, 1976 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
administration advisers agencies airgrams analysis analytical appraisal behavior beliefs Bundy Bundy's bureaucratic Chapter choice coded cognitive cognitive restructuring complex consistency-striving coping course of action crises crisis critical Cuban missile crisis deal deci decision makers defensive Department developed devil's advocate discussion documents economic effective Eisenhower evaluation executive forecasting foreign policy foreign policy-making foreign service reporting formal options function Groupthink important individual information processing interviews Irving Janis Janis Kissinger Korea Korean War leaders McGeorge Bundy ments multiple advocacy national interest National Security officers operational organization organizational planners policy issues policy makers policy planning policy-making groups policy-making system political possible President President's procedures producers psychological relevant responsibility risk Robert Jervis role Secretary sion situation small group sources South Korea Soviet Soviet Union Special Assistant strategy stress task theory tion tional tive Truman uncertainty users value conflict Washington West Berlin White House
Populære avsnitt
Side 20 - I can't make a damn thing out of this tax problem. I listen to one side and they seem right, and then — God! — I talk to the other side and they seem just as right, and here I am where I started. I know somewhere there is a book that will give me the truth, but, hell, I couldn't read the book.
Side 20 - I know somewhere there is a book that would give me the truth, but hell, I couldn't read the book. I know somewhere there is an economist who knows the truth, but I don't know where to find him and haven't the sense to know him and trust him when I did find him. God, what a job.
Side 87 - ... 9. After reaching a preliminary consensus about what seems to be the best policy, the group should hold a "secondchance...
Side 41 - James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958...
Side 55 - I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is all about.
Side 58 - Staff) was subordinate commander, he had "leaned over backwards" since returning to the government shortly before these events took place not to meddle with the work of his successors in their jobs. He had also leaned over backwards not to revive the old Army feud between him and MacArthur. What Acheson and Bradley were not ready to initiate, Marshall evidently felt he could not take upon himself . . . The President, meanwhile, had little thought of over-riding, on his own, the tactical decisions...
Side 11 - When adivsers and policy advocates take different positions and debate them before the executive, but their disagreements do not cover the full range of relevant hypotheses and alternative options. 3. When there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option. 4. When...
Side 20 - Coolidge was fond of observing that "if you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you and you have to battle with only one of them.
Side 31 - ... the like. On the contrary, it has been their system that is on the point of collapsing.31 Hence he was initially quite optimistic concerning the Soviet shift toward the use of economic tactics in foreign policy. His first reaction was that Soviet offers of aid to underdeveloped areas were a bluff to force the United States into bidding against the Soviet Union and, in the end, into spending itself into bankruptcy. He characterized that economic offensive as an admission of weakness rather than...
Side 38 - On the contrary, a group whose members have properly defined roles, with traditions and standard operating procedures that facilitate critical inquiry, is probably capable of making better decisions than any individual in the group who works on the problem alone. And yet the advantages of having decisions made by groups are often lost because of psychological pressures that arise when the members work closely together, share the same values, and above all face a crisis situation in which everyone...