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the coupon-holder in the assertion of his claims; but that is not a sufficient reason for denying to the state the right to prosecute her demands for taxes in her own courts. If the obstacles to the maintenance of the claims of the coupon-holder, presented by the state legislation, are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, we cannot assume in advance that they will be sustained by the courts of Virginia when the coupons tendered are produced in the suits mentioned, and for that reason deny to her a hearing there upon her own demands. If they should be sustained, a remedy may be found in this tribunal, where decisions in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States may be reviewed and corrected.

There are many cases-indeed, they are of frequent occurrence-where officers of the state, acting under legislation in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, may be restrained by the federal courts, as where those officers attempt, by virtue of such legislation, to take private property for public use without offering compensation, or in other ways to deprive one of the use and enjoyment of his property. I do not understand that the opinion of the court is against this doctrine; but, on the contrary, that it is recognized and approved. There is a wide difference between restraining officers of the state from interfering in such cases with the property of the citizen, and restraining them from prosecuting a suit in the name of the state in her own courts to collect an alleged claim. Her courts are at all times as open to her for the prosecution of her demands as they are open to her citizens for the prosecution of their claims.

I, however, make this special concurrence in the opinion of the majority because of language in it expressing approval of the positions taken by the court in Louisiana v. Jumel, from which I dissented,-not agreeing with the majority either in the statement of the object of that case, or in the law applicable to it. 107 U. S. 728, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128. I considered that case as brought to compel the officers of the state to do what she had by her laws and former constitution consented they might by the judicial tribunals be required to do. I expressed, at the time, against the majority of the court, my conviction of the invalidity and unconstitutionality of the ordinance of repudiation embodied in the new constitution of Louisiana. At the same time I also expressed, in Antoni v. Greenhow, my opinion of the equally invalid legislation of Virginia. 107 U. S. 784, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91. I adhere to my dissenting opinions in those cases, and in concurring in the judgment in this case I do not in any respect depart from or qualify what I there said.

HARLAN, J., (dissenting.) As I adhere to the views expressed by me in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 746, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 801, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; and Cunningham v. Macon, 109 U. S. 458, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609; and as I concurred in the judgments in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 273, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, and Allen v. Railroad Co., 114 U. S. 311, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 925,-I feel obliged to dissent from the opinion and judgment in these cases.

In Cooper v. Marye, etc., the jurisdiction of the circuit court cannot be questioned, so far as it depends upon the citizenship of the parties; for the plaintiffs are subjects or citizens of Great Britain, and the defendants are citizens of Virginia. Whether the plaintiffs merely as holders of Virginia coupons, and not tax-payers in that commonwealth, have any legal ground of complaint, by reason of the refusal of her officers to accept, when tendered, like coupons which the plaintiffs sold or transferred to tax-payers to be used in meeting their taxes; whether the statutes under which those officers proceeded, or intend to proceed, are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and therefore void; whether the preliminary injunction in question should or should not have been refused upon the ground that such tax-payers have a complete and adequate remedy at law; whether the necessity of avoiding

conflicts between the courts of the United States and the officers of a state, acting in obedience to her statutes, was not ample reason for refusing to grant such injunction; or whether an officer ought to be enjoined from merely bringing a suit in behalf of the public,-the suit itself not necessarily, or before judgment therein, involving an invasion of the property rights of the defendant therein,—are all matters which the circuit court, sitting in equity, was competent to determine upon the final hearing in Cooper v. Marye, etc. Those questions are not open for consideration here, except upon the appeal from the final decree in that case; consequently I am not at liberty now to express an opinion as to any of them.

The only inquiry now to be made is whether Cooper v. Marye is a suit against Virginia, within the meaning of the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States. If it be, I agree that the prisoners must be discharged; for the judicial power of the United States does not extend to suits against a state by citizens of another state, or by subjects of foreign countries. But I am of opinion that it is not a suit of that character. I stand upon what was adjudged in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 857. Chief Justice MARSHALL, speaking for the court in that case, said: "It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named on the record. Consequently, the eleventh amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution over suits against states, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a state is a party on the record. The amendment has its full effect, if the constitution be construed as it would have been construed had the jurisdiction of the court never been extended to suits brought against a state by the citizen of another state, or by aliens. The state not being a party on the record, and the court having jurisdiction over those who are parties on the record, the true question is not one of jurisdiction, but whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being only nominal parties."

These principles have been recognized in several decisions of this court, notably in U. S. v. Lee, and Kaufman v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 213, 215, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240. That was an action to recover a body of land in Alexandria county, Virginia, 200 acres of which constituted Arlington Cemetery, previously established by the United States as a military station and as a national cemetery for the soldiers and sailors of the Union. When the action was brought that cemetery was in the actual possession of the United States by the defendants, as their officers. Those officers certainly had no personal interest in the result of the suit. They simply represented the United States, who were the real parties in interest. As the United States were not parties to the record, and because they could not be made parties, the court proceeded to a determination of the case between the parties before it. The result was a judgment determining that Lee had a legal right to the possession of Arlington Cemetery, as against the officers of the United States having it under their control. The authority and duty of the court to proceed in the case, notwithstanding the United States were not before the court, was rested mainly upon the decision in Osborn v. Bank, from which was quoted, with emphatic approval, the following language:

"If the state of Ohio could have been made a party defendant, it can scarcely be denied that this would be a strong case for an injunction. The objection is that, as the real party cannot be brought before the court, a suit cannot be sustained against the agents of that party; and cases have been cited to show that a court of chancery will not make a decree unless all those who are substantially interested be made parties to the suit. This is certainly true where it is in the power of the plaintiff to make them parties; but if the person who is the real principal, the person who is the true source of the mis

chief, by whose power and for whose advantage it is done, be himself above the law, be exempt from all judicial process, it would be subversive of the best established principles to say that the laws could not afford the same remedies against the agent employed in doing the wrong which they would afford against him could his principal be joined in the suit."

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And in order that no one might suppose that Osborn v. Bank, had been modified or overruled by subsequent decisions, the court in the Lee Case, after referring to several decisions, said: "These decisions have never been overruled. On the contrary, as late as the case of Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, the case of Osborn v. Bank is cited with approval, as establishing these among other propositions: Where the state is concerned, the state should be made a party, if it can be done. That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may proceed to decree against the officers of the state in all respects as if the state were a party to the record. In deciding who are parties to the suit, the court will not look beyond the record. Making a state officer a party does not make the state a party, although her law may have prompted his action, and the state may stand behind him as a real party in interest. A state can be made a party only by shaping the bill expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations are intended to be put in that relation to the case.' Though not prepared to say now that the court can proceed against the officer in all respects' as if the state were a party, this may be taken as intimating, in a general way, the views of the court at that time."

In Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, we sustained a suit by a private individual against a treasurer, charged with the duty of collecting taxes, to recover certain personal property which the defendant had seized for the non-payment of taxes due Virginia from the plaintiff in that suit. In seizing the property the officer disregarded the tender, previously made, of the state's coupons. It was earnestly contended that, as the officer only did what the state by her statutes had commanded him to do, and had himself no personal interest in the matter, the suit against him was, in legal effect, one against the state; that a suit to recover property seized for the nonpayment of taxes, in conformity with the statutes of Virginia, had the same result as a direct suit against the state to compel her performance of her contract with the coupon-holder, or to enjoin her officer from carrying those statutes into effect. But this view was overruled, mainly upon the authority of Osborn v. Bank, from which the court quoted, with approval, the same passages as are to be found in the opinion in Lee's Case, and in reference thereto observed: "This language, it may be observed, was quoted with approval in U. S. v. Lee. The principle which it enunciates constitutes the very foundation upon which the decision in that case rested." In Poindexter's Case we said that the immunity from suit secured to the states by the constitution, "does not exempt the state from the operation of the constitutional provision that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; for it has long been settled that contracts between a state and an individual are as fully protected by the constitution as contracts between two individuals. It is true that no remedy for a breach of its contract by a state, by way of damages as compensation, or by means of process to compel its performance, is open, under the constitution, in the courts of the United States, by a direct suit against the state itself, on the part of the injured party, being a citizen of another state, or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. But it is equally true that whenever, in a controversy between parties to a suit, of which these courts have jurisdiction, the question arises upon the validity of a law by a state impairing the obligation of its contract, the jurisdiction is not thereby ousted, but must be exercised, with whatever legal consequences to the rights of the litigants may be the result of the determination."

Upon identically the same grounds rests our decision in Allen v. Railroad

Co., 114 U. S. 311, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 925, in which we maintained the right of that company to an injunction to prevent the collection of taxes by distraint upon its property after a tender of the state's tax-receivable coupons in payment of such taxes. That suit was against the auditor of public accounts and the treasurer of Virginia. They certainly had no personal interest in the collection of the taxes, but were only obeying the statutes of the state which they assumed to be constitutional and binding upon them. But the effect of that suit was to say to the state of Virginia that she should not collect her revenue in the mode proposed by the statute, and thereby violate rights secured by the constitution of the United States. In vain was it urged by the officers of the state that Virginia was the real party in interest; that, as the state could only act by her officers, to enjoin them was to enjoin the state, and that consequently the suit was one against the state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment. This court overruled that contention, holding, in substance, that, the state of Virginia not being named as a party, and it being impossible to make her a party, her officers could be prevented from touching the property of the railroad under a statute void under the constitution of the United States.

The result, then, of former decisions is that a suit against officers of the United States to recover property not legally in their possession is not a suit against the United States; and that neither a suit against officers of the state to recover property illegally taken by them, in obedience to the statutes of the state, nor a suit brought against state officers to enjoin them from taking, under the command of the state, the property of a tax-payer who has tendered coupons for taxes due to her, were suits against the state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment of the constitution. And now it is adjudged, in the cases before us, that a suit merely against state officers, to enjoin them from bringing actions against tax-payers who have previously tendered tax-receivable coupons, is a suit against the state. There is, I grant, a difference between the cases heretofore decided and the case of Cooper v. Marye; but the difference is not such as to involve the jurisdiction of the circuit court, but, rather, to use the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, "the exercise of its jurisdiction."

The commonwealth of Virginia has no more authority to enact statutes impairing the obligation of her contracts than statutes impairing the obligation of contracts exclusively between individuals. State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, 166; Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 560; Green v. Biddle, 8. Wheat. 1, 84; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 207; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 367; Gas Co. v. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 673, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. A statute which is void, as impairing the obligation of the state's contract, affords no justification to any one, and confers no authority. If an officer proposes to enforce such a statute against a party, the obligation of whose contract is sought to be impaired, the latter, in my judgment, may proceed by suit against such officer, and thereby obtain protection in his rights of contract, as against the proposed action of that officer. A contrary view enables the state to use her immunity from suit to effect what the constitution of the United States forbids her from doing, namely, to enact statutes impairing the obligation of her contract. If an officer of the state can take shelter behind such immunity, while he proceeds with the execution of a void enactment to the injury of the citizen's rights of contract, it would look as if that provision which declares that the constitution of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of a state to the contrary notwithstanding, had lost most, if not all, of its value in respect to contracts which a state makes with individuals.

I repeat, that the difference between a suit against officers of the state, enjoining them from seizing the property of the citizen, in obedience to a void statute of the state, and a suit enjoining such officers from bringing, under the order of the state, and in her name, an action which, it is alleged, will re

sult in injury to the rights of the complainant, is not a difference that affects the jurisdiction of the court, but only its exercise of jurisdiction. If the former is not a suit against the state, the latter should not be deemed of that class.

UNITED STATES v. DE MORANT and others.
(November 21, 1887.)

1. GRANTS-SPANISH GRANTS-PERFECTION OF TITLE.

The acts required to perfect the titles to two land grants from the king of Spain were performed prior to May, 1818. The treaty by which Florida was ceded to the United States was signed February 22, 1819, and the United States act of June 22, 1860, made the date of cession the point from which to test the validity of titles to land grants in Florida. Held, that the titles in question were completed within the time required by the act of 1860.

2. SAME-RELIEF OF CLAIMANTS-PART OWNERS.

Petitioners' ancestor owned a quarter interest in lands granted by the king of Spain. They petitioned to have their title confirmed, not only for themselves, but also for and on behalf of the other part owners. Held, that under the act of June 22, 1860, for the relief of parties claiming under such grants, a part owner and the heirs of a part owner could have relief.

3. SAME-VALIDITY-COMMISSIONERS-REJECTION.

The commissioners appointed to determine the validity of titles to two land grants in West Florida rejected the titles of plaintiffs' grantor on the grounds that there was no evidence of the required cultivation, nor that the lands had been surveyed prior to January 24, 1818, nor that they had emanated from the king of Spain prior to that date. Held, that such grounds were not included in the act of June 22, 1860, 23, which provides that the commissioners shall not recommend any claim previously rejected as being fraudulent, or any claim which had been twice rejected. 4. SAME-SURVEYS-CERTIFICATION.

Plaintiffs petitioned for the confirmation of their titles to two Spanish land grants in Florida, and put in evidence, without objection, a plat of the two grants, laid down in connection with the sections and subsections of the government surveys, certified as correct by a civil engineer and surveyor. Held, that it was unnecessary to annex a sworn copy of the government surveys to the petition.

5. SAME TESTIMONIOS-PROOF OF GENUINENESS.

In an action to confirm the titles to certain land grants from the king of Spain, the original testimonios were given in evidence, the signatures were identified, the translations were certified, and the genuineness of the titles was not disputed before the commissioners of 1824, appointed to try the titles to lands in West Florida, nor in the court below. Held, that this was sufficient evidence of their genuineness. 6. SAME-SURVEY-DATE OF.

The land grants in question were surveyed in the spring of 1818. The treaty by which Florida was ceded fixed January 22, 1818, as the date by which to test the acts of surveying necessary to the validity of grants from the king of Spain. But the United States act of June 22, 1860, fixed the date of cession, February 22, 1819, as the proper date. Held, that these grants were not void because not surveyed before January 22, 1818.

7. SAME-APPROPRIATION BY GOVERNMENT-INDEMNITY.

Petitioners were entitled to certain lands in Florida, owned by them under a Spanish land grant. Held, that if the United States government had sold the lands, in whole or in part, petitioners would be entitled to scrip for other public lands of equal extent to those sold.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida.

Sol. Gen. Jenks, for appellant. Wayne Mac Veigh, R. B. Lines, and Abram H. Wintersteen, (by special leave of court,) for appellees.

BRADLEY, J. The petition in this case was filed in the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Florida, for the confirmation of a Spanish grant, under the eleventh section of the act of June 22, 1860, entitled "An act for the final adjustment of private land claims in the states of Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and for other purposes," (12 St. 85;) and the

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