Orst surrender their vitality and submit to a dissolution. This being done, eo instanti, the new corporation came into existence." the first company but for such sale and con veyance.' It was held, following in this particular Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217 [23: 860], that the words "franchises, rights, and privileges" did not necessarily embrace a grant of an exemption or immunity. See also Pickard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 130 U. S. 637 [32: 1051]. Upon the other hand, it was held in Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. [312 139 [29: 833], that the right to have shares in its capital stock exempted from taxation within the state is conferred upon a railroad corporation by state statutes granting to it "all the rights, powers, and privileges" conferred upon another corporation named, if the latter corporation possesses by law such right of ex * number of prior cases. See also Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 297 [36: 972, 979]. It follows from this that, when the new corporation came into existence, it came precisely as if it had been organized under a charter granted at the date of the consolidation, and subject to the constitutional provisions then existing, which required (art. 11, § 16) that no property, real or personal, should be exempted from taxation, except such as was used exclusively for public purposes; in other words, that the exemption from taxation contained in section 9 of the original charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railway Company did not pass to the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Company. As was said of an Arkansas cor-emption, citing in support of this principle a poration in St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 475 [28: 1055, 1058], "it came into existence as a corporation of the state of Arkansas, in pursuance of its constitution and laws, and subject in all respects to their restrictions and limitations. Among these was that one which declared that 'the property of of corporations, now existing, or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation the same as property of individuals.' This rendered it impossible for the consolidated corporation to receive by transfer from the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, or otherwise, the 311] exemption sought to be enforced *in this suit." See also Memphis & L. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 [28: 837]; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319 [24: 357]; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244 [27: 922]. Nor was the exemption saved by section 3 of article 11, providing that “all statute laws of this state now in force, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall continue in force until they shall expire by their own limitation, or be amended or repealed by the general assembly." This referred to statutes in force at the time the constitution was adopted, the operation of which is continued, notwithstanding the constitution. In this case, however, the exemption contained in section 9 of the charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railway Company ceased to exist, not by the operation of the constitution, but by the dissolution of the corporation to which it was attached. It is further insisted however that, under section 4 of the Act of March 2, 1869, there was a further provision that the consolidated company should be "subject to all the liabili ties, and bound by all the obligations of the company within this state," and "be entitled to the same franchises and privileges under the laws of this state, as if the consolidation had not taken place. Whether, under the name "franchises and privileges" an immunity from taxation would pass to the new company may admit of some doubt, in view of the decisions of this court, which, upon this point, are not easy to be reconciled. In the Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176 [29: 121], it was held that an immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Covington & Ohio Railway Company did not pass to a purchaser of such road under foreclosure of a mortgage, although the act provided that "said purchaser shall forthwith be a corporation," and "shall succeed to all such franchises, rights, and privileges.. as would have been had . by But the decisive answer to this objection is that the legislature had no power, in 1869, to extend to a new corporation created by the consolidation an exemption contained in an act passed in 1857, before the constitution was adopted, and hence that, under the terms of this act, we cannot hold that immunity from taxation passed as a franchise or privilege to the consolidated corporation. The construction claimed by the defendant would be directly in the teeth of the constitutional provision that no property shall be exempted from taxation. While, as heretofore observed, an exemption from taxation contained in a charter previously granted could not be taken away by this constitutional provision without the impairment of the obligation of a contract, it doubtless applies to all corporations thereafter formed either by original charter or by the consolidation of prior corporations under the act of 1869. (2) The question of estoppel remains to be considered. In 1873, the county of Scotland brought suit in the circuit court of Scotland county against the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company to recover the taxes of 1872 upon the property in question in this case, and was defeated, the court holding it to be exempt under section 9 of the charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railway Company. It was conceded in that case that the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company had succeeded to all the privileges and liabilities of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Company. It appeared that in the seventh section of a general act concerning corporations, which act antedated the charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railway Company, it had been declared that "the charter of every corporation that shall hereafter be grauted by the legisla ture, shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the [313 legislature;" and that on March 10, 1871, long subsequent to the charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield road, the legislature had passed an act providing for the uniform assessment and collection of taxes upon railroad companies. On appeal to the supreme court of Missouri, that court held that the object of the general corporation laws of 1845 and 1855 was to confer certain powers and privileges and impose certain duties and liabilities, in the absence of any stipulations or provisions inconsistent with those contained in special charters subsequent ly granted; that, if there were any inconsist encies in the charter of 1857 with such act, it must be understood that the restrictions of this act were intended to be removed, for reasons satisfactory to the legislature-in other words, that one legislature could not bind its success. ors, and if the legislature of 1857 thought proper to disregard the provisions of the general act concerning corporations, there was no principle upon which such power could be questioned. It followed from this that the exemption from taxation contained in the charter of 1857 was valid, and was a grant which could not be taken away by the act of 1871, subjecting all railways to the payment of taxes. The question upon which the case now under consideration was subsequently decided, namely, that the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company did not succeed to the exemption from taxation provided in the original charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Company, was not discussed in that case, since the exemption was conceded to inure to the latter company. To the argument that this judgment constitutes an estoppel there are two answers: First. There were no such privity of estate between the defendant in the suit, namely, the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Company, and the defendant in this suit as makes the judgment in that case res adjudicata in this. The mortgage of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company, under the foreclosure of which this defendant purchased this road, was executed June 1, 1870, and neither the trustee under that mortgage, the Farmers' Loan & Trust 314] Company, nor the *bondholders, whom this mortgage secured, were parties to that action, which was begun in 1873 to recover the taxes of 1872. While a mortgagee is privy in estate with a mortgagor as to actions begun before the mortgage was given, he is not bound by judgments or decrees against the mortgagor in suits begun by third parties subsequent to the execution of the mortgagor, unless he or some one authorized so represent him, like the trustee of a mortgage bondholder, is made a party to the litigation, although it would be otherwise if the mortgage were executed pending the suit or after the decree. A leading case on this point is Campbell v. Hall, 16 N. Y. 575, in which it was held that a second mortgagee of land was not estopped by a judginent in an action between his mortgagor and a prior mortgagee, rendered after the execution of the second mortgage, but might liti gate the amount due upon the first mortgage, notwithstanding the judgment. Speaking of the rule that a grantee is estopped by a judgment against his grantor, because he holds by a derivative title from his grantor, and cannot, therefore, be in a better situation than the party from whom he obtained his right, the court observed: "This being the reason for the rule, it follows that it can have no application except where the conveyance is made after the event out of which the estoppel arises. The principle in such cases is that the estoppel attaches itself to and runs with the land. The grantor can transfer no greater right than he himself has, and hence the title which he conveys must necessarily be subject, in the hands of the grantee, to all the burdens which rested upon it at the time of the transfer. On the other hand, nothing which the grantor can do or suffer to be done after such transfer can affect the rights previously vested in the grantee." See also Mathes v. Cover, 43 Iowa, 512; Bryan v. Malloy, 90 N. C. 508: Scates v. King, 110 Ill. 456; Dooley v. Potter, 140 Mass. 49; Coles v. Allen, 64 Ala. 98; Todd v. Flour noy, 56 Ala. 99, 28 Am. Rep. 758; Shay v. McNamara, 54 Cal. 169. Second. A suit for taxes for one year is no bar to a suit for taxes for another year. The two suits are for distinct and separate causes of action. If there were any distinct question litigated and settled in the prior suit, the decision of the court *upon that question might [315 raise an estoppel in another suit, upon the principle stated in Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351 [24: 195). But, as was held in that case, where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in a prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. This was an action upon certain bonds and coupons issued by the county of Sac. Defendant pleaded a judgment rendered in favor of the county in a prior action brought by one Smith upon earlier coupons upon the same bonds, accompanied by proof that the plaintiff Cromwell was at the time the owner of the coupons in that action, and that the suit was prosecuted for his sole use and benefit. The court held that there was a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. It was said that "it is not believed there are any cases going to the extent that because in the prior action a different question from that actually determined might have arisen and been litigated, therefore such possible question is to be considered as excluded from consideration in a second action between the same parties on a different demand, although loose remarks looking in that direction may be found in some opinions." The same principle was reaffirmed in Nesbit v. Independent Dist. of Riverside, 144 U. S. 610 [36: 562], and Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 302 [36: 972, 981]. In the case of Davenport v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 38 Iowa, 633, the supreme court of Iowa held that a decree in favor of a railway company in a suit for taxes for a prior year would not estop the state from collecting the taxes for a subsequent year, each year's taxes constitut ing a distinct and separate cause of action. "The cases," said the court, "are unlike those where two causes of action (as two promissory notes) forming the subject-matter of successive actions between the same parties, both growing out of the same transaction, in which a defense set up in the first suit, and held good, will *conclude the parties in the second.[316 Taxes of separate years do not in any just sense grow out of the same transaction. They are like distinct claims on two promissory notes made upon two distinct and sepa rate, though similar, transactions between the same parties. A judgment on one of such | The case of The Keokuk & Western Railroad Comnotes, it is quite clear, would not be of any pany v. Missouri, ante, p. 450, followed. force as an estoppel in an action on the other [No. 183.] note between the same parties. It could never Argued Dec. 21, 22, 1892. Decided March 12, be tolerated that the state should be forever barred in its collection of taxes by an erroneous decision." Nor did the judgment in that case establish a rule of property upon which the plaintiff was entitled to rely, and upon the faith of which it claims to have purchased the road, inas much as it appears that the point upon which this case turns, namely, the right of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company to the exemption in the original charter was conceded in that case, and the only rule of property established was that the Alexandria & Bloomfield Company was entitled to such exemption, notwithstanding the general act concerning corporations enacted prior thereto, which declared that the charter of every corporation should be subject to alteration or repeal, and the act of March 10, 1871, which provided a general law for the collection of taxes from railway companies. This, if anything. was the rule of property declared in that case; and as that rule is not relied upon in this case, and the tax is defended upon a ground not put in issue there, but conceded by counsel in favor of the company, it is difficult to see how that case can be regarded as establishing any rule of property of which the defendant can avail itself in this action. 1894. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis trict of Missouri, dismissing a suit in equity to enjoin the County Courts and Collectors of Revenue, for the Counties of Clarke, Scotland and Schuyler, in the State of Missouri, from levying and collecting taxes on the railway property owned by the plaintiff, in these counties. Affirmed. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: and collectors of revenue for the counties of This was a bill to enjoin the county courts Clarke, Scotland and Schuyler, in the state of the railway property owned by the plaintiff in Missouri, from levying and collecting taxes on these counties. lon and Thomas Dewitt Cuyler for appellant. Messrs. Felix T. Hughes, John F. Dil. T. L. Montgomery and John A. Whiteside for Messrs. J. C. Moore, F. L. Schofield, appellees. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court. *This case differs from the one just de-[318 cided only in the fact that this is a bill in equity, fild by the corporation whose property is sought to be taxed, to restrain the defendants from levying or collecting any taxes for the years 1883 to 1887, inclusive, upon the ground that the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in the Secor Case, 9 Fed. Rep. 809, and also the supreme court of the state, had held the property of the company not to be subject to taxation. (3) What is known as the Secor decree was obtained in a suit brought by Secor and other stockholders of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway against the company itself, and also against the county court and officers of certain counties to enjoin the collection of taxes for 1881, or any previous years. The case was decided upon the authority of the above case of Scotland County v. Missouri, I. & N. R. Co. 65 Mo. 123, and an injunction granted in pursuance of the prayer of the bill. In ad317]dition to the fact above stated *that a suit for taxes for one year is not an estoppel to a suit for taxes for a different year, there is the same absence of that privity of estate so indispensable to an effective estoppel, which we hold to be fatal in respect to the judgment in the state court. If the plaintiff herein, the Keokuk & Western Railroad Company, would not have THE been affected by an adverse decree in the Secor suit, it cannot take advantage of the same by As the questions involved in the two cases are precisely the same, the decree of the court below dismissing the bill was correct, and the same is therefore affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brew. er dissented. KEOKUK & WESTERN RAIL- v. way of estoppel. The operation of an estoppel THE COUNTY COURT OF SCOTLAND must be mutual. There was no error in the judgment of the supreme court of Missouri, and it is therefore affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brewer dissented. Decree, COUNTY ET AL. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 318-327.) when an estoppel-purchaser under mortgage-party to suit for taxes. 1. Where in a suit brought by stockholders of a railway company a decree was made enjoining NOTE. As to estoppel by judgment, see note to Aspden v. Nixon, 11: 1059. As to estoppel in pais, see note to Stowe v. United States, 22: 144. As to estoppel by recital in deed, or will, or other instrument, see note to Carver v. Astor, 7: 761. As to estoppel by recitals in negotiable bonds or securities, see note to Mercer County v. Hackett, 17: 548. As to estoppel as to contracts limiting the time the collection of taxes of the railway company until the expiration of the exemption limited in the charter of said company, a purchaser of the railroad deriving his title from the foreclosure of a mortgage given before such suit is not entitled to file a bill to revive that suit nor can he invoke that decree as an estoppel against other suits brought to enforce, as a lien upon such property, the taxes levied thereon for other years; neither the prior mortgagee nor his representative having been made a party to the suit in which such decree was made. 2. The purchaser under a mortgage is not entitled to the benefit of an estoppel under a decree obtained in a suit begun after the execution of the mortgage. Although the lien of the state for taxes ranks all other liens whether prior or subsequent, yet in a suit to enforce such lien, the holder of an incumbrance must be made a party, if it is desired railway company for the year 1879, and sev eral years prior thereto. Affirmed. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: This was a bill in equity filed by the Keo kuk & Western Railroad Company to revive a suit begun August 6, 1879, by Charles A. Secor and other stockholders of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company against the judges of the county courts of Scotland, Schuyler and Clarke counties, the object of which suit was to enjoin the collection of taxes *upon such railway company for the [319 year 1879 and several years prior thereto. The bill of revivor, which was filed February 17, 1890, set forth the commencement of the suit by Secor against the county courts above named, and the rendition of a decree May 10, 1882, by which the defendants were enjoined from levying or collecting taxes of Argued Dec. 21, 22, 1893. Decided March 12, the exemption limited in the charter of said the railway company "until the expiration of to divest him of his rights. [No. 414.] 1894. railway company, to wit, December 1, 1892," and that the same was in full force and effect. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court The bill further alleged the execution of a mort. of the United States for the Eastern Dis- gage in 1870 by the railway company to the trict of Missouri, dismissing a bill of revivor, Farmers' Loan & Trust Company of New filed by the Keokuk & Western Railroad Com York, the foreclosure of the same, the purpany, against the County Court of Scotland chase of the road in 1886 by Morris K. Jesup County et al., to revive a suit begun August and Henry C. Thatcher, a purchasing com6, 1879, by Charles A. Secor et al., stockhold-mittee of the bondholders, and the convey. ers of, the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Rail- ance of the same to the plaintiff, the Keokuk way Company, against the Judges of the & Western Railroad Company, in December, County Court of Scotland, Schuyler and 1886, whereby the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Clarke counties, the object of which suit was Railroad Company became dissolved, and Seto enjoin the collection of taxes upon such cor and the other stockholders ceased to have within which action must be brought, see note to actually made-is estopped to contest the right of Southern Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 22: 556. As to when vendee is estopped from disputing the title of his vendor, see note to Watkins v. Holman, 10: 873. As to estoppel; stranger not bound by, and cannot take advantage of; who are not privies; infants; husband and wife, see note to Deery v. Cray, 18: 653. Estoppel by declarations or conduct; by agreement; by representations; as to corporate existence or acts. One who has procured the enactment of a special law intended for his benefit cannot question its constitutionality. Brown County v. Martin, 29 Ohio L. J. 317. An abutting owner who assists in procuring the substitution of artificial for natural stone designated by the ordinance for use in street curbing cannot resist payment of his assessment on the ground that the ordinance was not followed. Brick & T. C. Co. v. Hull, 49 Mo. App. 433. Consent by a mortgagee to the conveyance by the mortgagor of a small strip of the mortgaged land, followed by the making and recording of a deed, delivery of possession, and the making of im provements, estops both him and bis vendees from asserting the superior claim of the mortgage. Haney v. Barney, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 142. the executor to make such payments. Re Turfler's Estate, 1 Misc. 58. The sale of a land to a railroad company to enable it to extend its tracks to another point does not estop the vendor from asserting ownership of the fee of a street in which the company had previously constructed its tracks, although the extension proposed would be useless unless such tracks could be used. Syracuse Solar Salt Co. v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. 67 Hun, 153. A purchaser at foreclosure sale who, upon the purchase of the property from the mortgagor, disclaims any interest, stating that she has been paid all that she paid out on the sale and has nothing more to do with the property, and advises the purchase, is estopped to assert title thereto, where her statements are relied upon. Moore v. Nye, 49 N. Y. S. R. 168. A bank which settles in a foreign country with one who has stolen money from it, and, to enable him to make such settlement, solicits a third person to purchase from him a draft which he had procured with part of the stolen money, cannot dispute the title of the purchaser thereto. Capital City Bank v. Parent, 18 L. R. A. 240, 134 N. Y. 527. A residuary legatee who for a valuable considerA tenant in common in a dam, ditch, and water ation signs an agreement placing a certain conright, who participated and assisted in maintain-struction upon a doubtful clause in the will thereby ing the dam and diverting water from a natural stream, is estopped from maintaining an action for the diversion of the water. Churchill v. Baumaun, 95 Cal. 541. A residuary legatee who, without qualification, gives her assent to the making by the executor of payments to equalize other legatees with herself and co-legatees, and makes no objection to such payments being made, though knowing that they are made or are about to be made, until they are authorizes the executor to act upon it in construing the will, and is estopped from claiming contrary to the agreement. Woodley v. Holley, 111 N. C. 380. An indorser of a note is by his indorsement es topped to deny its validity on the ground that it purports on its face to have been made on Sunday. Prescott Nat. Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 545, 8 Bkg. L. J. 145. A mortgagee who makes a parol agreement to any interest therein, and "that by virtue of caid mortgage, decree, and foreclosure sale all of the title in and to said property has become vested in your orator." The bill further alleged a change in the officers of the respective defendant counties, the beginning of three suits by the collector of revenue of Scotland county, to enforce, as a lien upon plaintiff's property, the taxes levied upon the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railroad Company for the years 1872 to 1878, 1880, 1881, 1882, and 1887, and that the same were in violation and contempt of the injunction issued in the Secor case. The bill prayed that such suit might be revived against the counties and their officers in the name of the plaintiff as the same was at the dissolution of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company, and that the collector of revenue of Scotland county be punished for contempt in instituting the suits for the collection of the taxes in violation of the decree upon the original bill. On March 3, 1890, defendants interposed a demurrer to the bill for the county of Scotland, which was sustained on March 25 upon the ground that the plaintiff did not occupy such 320] a *relation to the parties to the original suit as to entitle it to file a bill of revivor, and that the decree in such original suit could not be invoked as an estoppel between the Keokuk & Western Railroad Company and the several counties which were made defendants to the bill. The court put its decision upon the ground that the plaintiff acquired its title by the foreclosure of a mortgage executed in 1870, and that it did not appear that the mortgagee extend the time of payment limited in the bond and mortgage is estopped from foreclosing before the expiration of the period named, although such agreement is without consideration, where the party to whom the promise was made relied upon such promise in taking title to the mortgaged real estate. Van Syckle v. O'Heran, 50 N. J. Eq. 173. A corporation is estopped to set up its own irregularities relating to the mode of execution, to defeat a security that it participated in placing upon the market, and the proceeds of which it received, for the purpose of giving precedence to a claim of its own. Colorado Loan & T. Co. v. Grand Valley Canal Co. 3 Colo. App. 63. One who contracts with the owner of a patent for its use, agreeing to pay a compensation therefor, is estopped to assert its invalidity. Montgomery v. Waterbury, 2 Misc. 145. One who takes a license to make and sell a patented article is estopped, in an action for royalties for sales made after the expiration of the license, to assert the invalidity of the patent. Denise v. Swett, 68 Hun, 188. A promise not to use a process without the consent of the inventor, not knowing it was claimed as an invention, creates no estoppel against questioning the validity of a subsequent patent therefor which the inventor obtained to protect his rights, instead of relying on the promise. Leggett v. Standard Oil Co. 149 U. S. 287 (37: 737), 63 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1201. A mortgagor who holds out to a bank holding notes to secure indorsement upon which the mortgage was made the validity of the bond and mortgage is estopped, as against the bank, to assert their invalidity. First Nat. Bank of Sing Sing v. Knevals. 51 N. Y. 8. R. 22. e who, for the purpose of procuring a machine on credit, represents to the seller that his wife or any representative of the mortgagee was made a party to the suit of Secor et al. against the railway company and the several counties. Coupled with the order sustaining the demur rer was a general order granting plaintiff leave to amend its bill. Plaintiff thereupon, and on April 28, 1890, filed an amended bill, setting up that in September, 1880, the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railroad Company leased its road for a term of years to the Wabash Railway Company, the lease containing an agreement that the Mis souri, Iowa & Nebraska Company should execute a mortgage to the Mercantile Trust Company of New York to secure certain bonds which were to be guaranteed by the Wabash Company, and covenanting that it would cause the holders of the bonds of 1870 to accept the bonds so guaranteed by the Wabash Company in lieu of the prior bonds, and averring that the decree of foreclosure of the bonds of 1870 was not executed or the railroad property sold thereunder. That in pursuance of such lease the mortgage to the Mercantile Trust Company was executed March 1, 1881, and 2239 bonds were issued and guaranteed by the Wabash Company; that all of the 1870 bonds were exchanged for the guaranteed bonds, with the exception of 17; that the Wabash Company paid interest upon the same until June, 1884, the decree of foreclosure remaining unexecuted, when the Wabash Company became insolvent; that in 1886 the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company filed a supplemental bill of foreclosure against the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railroad Company, the Mercantile Trust owns certain real estate conveyed to them both and by him conveyed to her, and will give a mortgage thereon to secure the purchase price, is estopped, after the machine has been delivered to him in consideration of such mortgage and his wife has died, from asserting that the property was held by himself and wife by the entirety, and that the mortgage is invalid. Vellum v. Demerle, 65 Hun, 543. A married woman who signs a power of attorney in blank to transfer a certificate of stock held in her name, partly filled up by her husband and witnessed by him, cannot reclaim the stock from a bona fide holder who has advanced money on the faith of such power of attorney, on the ground that the use thereof was unauthorized by her. Souder v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 156 Pa. 374. A son baving the right as against his father to remove as chattels improvements affixed to land, the equitable title to which he had procured from the latter, is estopped by joining with him in a mortgage of the land in which the improvements are treated as part thereof, to assert that such im. provements are not fixtures as against the mortgagees having no notice of such right and those claiming under them. McFadden v. Allen, 19 L. R. A. 446, 134 N. Y. 489. A vendor of a village lot having a barn at the rear, to which there is no access for teams except across the rear of an adjoining lot retained by him, is estopped, by parol representations made at the time of the sale, that there was a right of way across the latter lot, to deny its existence, although no such right is mentioned in the deed. Mattes v. Frankel, 65 Hun, 203. An indorser of a note, who upon a purchaser thereof informing him that he has bought a note indorsed by him in a certain amount, tells him that he does not remember indorsing a note for |