were made to learn from gladiators the ufe of a fword: and the antagonists of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal were, by the account of this writer, ftill in need of inftruction in the first rudiments of their trade. They had already, by the order and choice of their incampments, impreffed the Grecian invader with awe and respect; they had already, not by their victories, but by their national vigour and firmness, under repeated defeats, induced him to fue for peace. But the haughty Roman, perhaps, knew the advantage of order and of union, without having been broke to the inferior arts of the mercenarý foldier; and had the courage to face the enemies of his country, without having practised the use of his weapon under the fear of being whipped. He could ill be perfuaded, that a time might come, when refined and intelligent nations would make the art of war to confift in a few technical forms; that citizens and foldiers might come to be diftinguished as much as women and men; that the citizen would become poffeffed of a property which he would not be able, or required, to defend; that the foldier would be appointed to keep for another what he would be taught to defire, and what he alone would be enabled to feize and to keep for himfelf; that, in fhort, one fet of men were to have an intereft in the prefervation of civil establishments, without the power to defend them; that the other were to have this power, without either the inclination or the intereft.

THIS people, however, by degrees came to put their military force on the very footing to which this defcription

2

355 tion alludes. Marius made a capital change in the manner of levying foldiers at Rome: He filled his legions with the mean and the indigent, who depended on military pay for fubfiftence; he created a force which rested on mere difcipline alone, and the fkill of the gladiator; he taught his troops to employ their swords against the constitution of their country, and fet the example of a practice which was foon adopted and improved by his fucceffors.

THE Romans only meant by their armies to incroach on the freedom of other nations, while they preserved their own. They forgot, that in affembling foldiers of fortune, and in fuffering any leader to be master of a difciplined army, they actually refigned their political rights, and suffered a master to arise for the state. This people, in short, whose ruling paffion was depredation and conqueft, perished by the recoil of an engine which they themselves had erected against mankind.

THE boafted refinements, then, of the polished age, are not divefted of danger. They open a door, perhaps, to difafter, as wide and acceffible as any of those they have fhut. If they build walls and ramparts, they enervate the minds of those who are placed to defend them if they form difciplined armies, they reduce the military spirit of entire nations; and by placing the fword where they have given a distaste to civil establishments, they prepare for mankind the government of force.

Ir is happy for the nations of Europe, that the disparity between the foldier and the pacific citizen can never be fo great as it became among the Greeks and the Romans. In the use of modern arms, the novice is made to learn, and to practise with ease, all that the veteran knows; and if to teach him were a matter of real difficulty, happy are they who are not deterred by fuch difficulties, and who can discover the arts which tend to fortify and preserve, not to enervate and ruin their country.

SECT.

T

SECT. V.

Of National Wafte.

HE ftrength of nations confifts in the wealth, the numbers, and the character, of their people. The history of their progress from a ftate of rudeness, iş, for the most part, a detail of the ftruggles they have maintained, and of the arts they have practifed, to ftrengthen, or to fecure themfelves. Their conquefts, their popula-tion, and their commerce, their civil and military arrangements, their skill in the conftruction of weapons, and in the methods of attack and defence; the very distribution of tasks, whether in private business or in public affairs, either tend to bestow, or. promife to employ with advantage, the conftituents of a national force, and the refources of war.

IF we fuppofe, that together with these advantages, the military character of a people remains, or is impro-ved, it must follow, that what is gained in civilization, is a real increase of ftrength; and that the ruin of nations could never take its rife from themselves. Where ftates have stopped fhort in their progress, or have actually gone to

decay,

decay, we may suspect, that however difpofed to advance, they have found a limit, beyond which they could not proceed; or from a remiffion of the national fpirit, and a weakness of character, were unable to make the most of their refources, and natural advantages. On this fupposition, from being stationary, they may begin to relapse, and by a retrograde motion, in a fucceffion of ages, arrive at a state of greater weakness, than that which they quitted in the beginning of their progrefs; and with the appearance of better arts, and fuperior conduct, expose themselves to become a prey to barbarians, whọm, in the attainment, or the height of their glory, they had easily baffled or defpifed.

WHATEVER may be the natural wealth of a people, or whatever may be the limits beyond which they cannot improve on their ftock, it is probable, that no nation has ever reached thofe limits, or has been able to poftpone its misfortunes, and the effects of mifconduct, until its fund of materials, and the fertility of its foil, were exhausted, or the number of its people were greatly reduced. The fame errors in policy, and weakness of manners, which prevent the proper ufe of refources, likewife check their increase or improvement.

THE wealth of the ftate confifts in the fortune of its members. The actual revenue of the ftate is that share of every private fortune, which the public has been accuftomed to demand for national purposes. This revenue cannot be always proportioned to what may be fuppofed

redundant