one of the purposes of the combination is to compel the unionization of all manufacturing carpenter shops; third, that the object is to restrain competition between open shops and union shops, and, fourth, that this object is to be accomplished principally by an agreement to refuse to work on any job where non-union trim is used. It further appears that an agreement exists between the Master Carpenters' Association, composed of the principal employers of carpenters in Greater New York and the Joint District Council whereby the builders agree to use only union trim, which I think the builders were coerced into making by. the unions. The effect of it is that non-union trim, except of negligible size, cannot be sold throughout almost the whole of that territory.

UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS.

It is said that workmen have a right to refuse to work for any reason they choose, good or bad, which is satisfactory to themselves. This is true, but it does not follow that they have a right to combine to do so some 200,000 strong over the whole country. Doubtless the purpose of the combination is to advance their own inter

without actual malice against manufacturers who do not wish to operate their mills in accordance with the requirements of the unions. This, however, is true of almost every combination in restraint of trade. The combination in this case results all the same in directly restraining competition between manufacturers.

The precise question of law to be determined is whether this feature of the combination, there being no right of action at common law, is made unlawful by and may be enjoined under any statute.

I think it is shown to be unlawful under the Sherman law by the decision of the Supreme Court in Loewe vs. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274. In that case the United Hatters of North America, composed of some 9,000 members associated with other labor unions as the American Federation of Labor, aggregating more than a million members, combined to unionize all factories

in which the United Hatters worked. The particular party proceeded against was Loewe & Company, not for the purpose of restraining interstate commerce, nor out of any hostility to that particular concern, but entirely for the purpose of benefiting the United Hatters. Yet the method of enforcing the combination was held unlawful under the Sherman law because it resulted directly in restraining interstate commerce.

I think the mere agreement of the local unions throughout the United States in this case not to work on non-union trim necessarily and directly restrains interstate commerce in the same way and is, therefore, unlawful. But because the Sherman law prescribes the remedies, both criminal and civil, at law and in equity, it is held in this circuit that only the prescribed remedies can be pursued. From this it follows that the injunctive relief can only be had at the instance of the government, and therefore that the complainants cannot recover, Fireproofing Co. vs. Mason Builders' Assn., 169 F. R. 259.

National

Section 340 of the general business law of this state makes any combination whereby competition in the supply or the price of any article in common use in the state is restrained, a misdemeanor. Interior trim such as the complainants manufacture is such an article, but as the law confers the remedy by injunction on the state and elaborately prescribes the procedure, I am bound to follow the suggestion made in the National Fireproofing case, supra, that under this act also injunctive relief can be had only at the suit of the state.

Section 580 of the penal law of this state, subd. 6, makes it a misdemeanor for two or more persons to conspire to commit any act "injurious to trade or commerce". Without discussing the multitude of decisions cited by counsel, the reasoning in the case of Loewe vs. Lawlor, supra, seems to me enough to show that the combination in this case is such an act. See also People vs. McFarlin, 43 Misc. 591. As the act says nothing whatever about

civil remedies, I think any appropriate remedy is available to one especially injured by violations of it.

This was the view of the Court of Appeals in Cranford vs. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y., 341, 344, an action to restrain defendant from keeping a house of ill fame, made a misdemeanor by Sec. 322 of the penal code. So far as this was a common nuisance it was for the public authorities to suppress it and the defendant contended that the plaintiff could not maintain a civil action. Judge Gray said:

"If the business complained of is a lawful one, the legal question presented in a civil action for private damage is whether the business is reasonably conducted, and whether, as conducted, it is one which is obnoxious and hurtful to adjoining property. If the business is unlawful, the complainant in a private action must show special damage, by which the legitimate use of his adjoining property has been interfered with, or its occupation rendered unfit, or uncomfortable. That the perpetrator of the nuisance is amenable to the provisions and penalties of the criminal law is not an answer to an action against him by a private person to recover for injury sustained, and for an injunction against the continued use of his premises in such a manner. The principle has been long settled that the objection that the nuisance was a common one is not available, if it be shown that special damage was suffered. (Rose vs. Miles, 4 M. & S., 101; Rose vs. Groves, 5 Man & G. 613; Francis vs. Schoelkopf, supra; Lansing vs. Smith, 4 Wend. 9.) * * *

"In the present case the indecent conduct of the occupants of the defendant's house and the noise therefrom, inasmuch as they rendered the plaintiffs' house unfit for comfortable or respectable occupaand unfit for the purposes it was intended for, were facts which constituted a nuisance, and were sufficient grounds for the maintenance of the action. If it was a nuisance which affected the general neighborhood and was the subject of an indictment for its unlawful and immoral features, the plaintiffs were none the less entitled to their action for any injury sustained and to their equitable right to have its continuance restrained."

This case was cited with approval in Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, Mr. Justice Brewer saying at p. 593:

"Again, it is objected that it is outof the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin the commission of crimes. This, as a general proposition, is unquestioned.

.

A chancellor has no criminal jurisdiction.

Something more than the threatened com

mission of an offense against the laas of the land is necessary to call into exercise the injunctive power of the court. There must be some interferences, actual or threatened, with property or rights of a pecuniary nature, but when such interferences appear the jurisdiction of a court of equity arises. and is not destroyed by the fact that they are accom panied by or are themselves violations of the criminal law. Thus, in Cranford vs. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y. 341, an injunction to restrain the defendant from keeping a house of ill-fame was sustained, the court saying in page 344: That the perpetrator of the nuisance is amenable to the provisions and penalties of the criminal law is not an answer to an action against him by a private person to recover for injury sustained, and for an injunction against the continued use of his premises in such a manner. And in Mobile vs. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 84 Alabama, 115, 126, is a similar declaration in these words: The mere fact that an act is criminal does not divest the jurisdiction of equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also a violation of property rights, and the party aggrieved has no other adequate remedy for the prevention of the irreparable injury which will result from the failure or inability of a court of law to redress such rights.

"The law is full of instances in which the same act may give rise to a civil action and a criminal prosecution. An assault with intent to kill may be punished criminally, under an indictment therefor. or will support a civil action for damages, and the same is true of all other offenses which cause injury to person or property. In such cases the jurisdiction of the civil court is invoked, not to enforce the criminal law and punish the wrongdoer, but to compensate the injured party for the damages which he or his property has suffered, and it is no defense to the civil action that the same act by the defendant exposes him also to indictment and punishment in a court of criminal jurisdiction."

"A mean trick, I say."
"What's the matter?"

"Dobbs slipped into Biffels' room while he was out and sandpapered his favorite phonograph record."-Birmingham Age-Herald.

Olive and Gerald while out walking met a vicious bulldog, and Gerald's conduct in the next few moments left much to be desired. When they had safely passed, Olive turned to Gerald and said reproachfully: "Why, Gerald! And you said you would face death for me."

"I know I did," answered Gerald, "but that bulldog wasn't dead."-The Spokesman.

'Rastus had lost his girl. She had "gone with a handsomer man." Meeting her on the street one day, he accosted her thus: "Look here, Liza, does that other fellow give you any bettah presents than I used to give you?"

"Don't know as he does," replied Eliza, calmly.

"Does he buy you any bettah dinners than I used to buy you?"

"Dinners!" exclaimed Liza, "Why, that man found appetite on me I didn't even know I had!"-Every body's.

Two traveling men reached a small place late one evening and found that there was no room to be had at the hotel. The proprietor did not want to disappoint them, as they were reg ular patrons, so he told them that he would send some bedding over to an old church he had just bought and make them as comfortable as possible there. About midnight the whole town was startled by the furious ringing of the church bell. An old colored man was sent by the proprietor to see what was the matter. Soon he came shambling back.

"Massa Boss!" he exclaimed. "Massa Boss! Jes' cam' yo'self. 'Twan't nothin' but de gemmen in pew twenty-six ringin' fo' a drink?"-The Garment Worker.