(227 Pa. 648)

In re GILBERT'S ESTATE.

Appeal of FOREMAN.

ture may say how and to whom and in what proportions estates shall descend,

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 28, al Law, Cent. Dig. § 129; Dec. Dig. § 70.*]

1910.)

1. STATUTES (§ 115*)-SUBJECTS AND TITLES.

Act April 1, 1909 (P. L. 87), entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act relating to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates," approved April 8, 1833 (P. L. 315), defining and declaring the interest that shall descend to and vest in the surviving husband or wife for such intestate, which regulates the descent and distribution of estates of intestates, is not violative of Const. art. 3, § 3, providing that no bill except general appropriation bills shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 150; Dec. Dig. § 115.*] 2. STATUTES (§ 141*)-AMENDMENT.

The act in its title reciting totidem verbis the title of the amended act, and indicating in general language the subject and nature of the amendment, is not violative of Const, art. 3, § 6, providing that no law shall be amended by reference to its title only, but that so much thereof as is amended shall be re-enacted and published again.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 209; Dec. Dig. § 141.*] 3. STATUTES (§ 82*)-LOCAL OR SPECIAL ACTS. The act is not a local or special law, but a general law applicable to a general class relating to all members of that class, and therefore not within the inhibition of Const. art. 3, 87, prohibiting the General Assembly from passing any local or special law relating to certain specified subjects.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 91; Dec. Dig. § 82.*]

4. STATUTES (§ 109*)-TITLES.

Appeal from Orphans' Court, Franklin County.

Proceedings for settlement of the estate of Henry C. Gilbert. From a decree dismissing exceptions to the widow's appraisement, Anna B. Foreman appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

J. A. Strite, for appellant. Sharpe & Elder and W. T. Omwake, for appellee.

ELKIN, J. In the court below and here it was and is attempted to be shown that the act of 1909, relating to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates, is unconstitutional. It is contended that the act offends against sections 3, 6, and 7 of article 3 of the Constitution. If the act was passed in disregard of any one of these constitutional requirements, it must fall, but the learned court below was of opinion that these provisions of the organic law were not contravened, and that the act was a valid exercise of legislative power. We concur in this conclusion for the following reasons: Section 3 of article 3 relates to the title of a bill, and provides that no bill except general appropriation bills shall be passed containing more than one subject, and that the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. It is The title of a statute need not be a gendifficult to understand upon what theory the eral index to the contents of the act, but it is contention can be sustained that the act of sufficient if it relates to one general subject no 1909 is in contravention of this constitutionmatter how the details may be multiplied, pro-al provision. This act amends section 1 of vided they are subordinate to the general purthe act of 1833 (P. L. 315), and the title of pose of the act and germane to its provisions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, the later act recites totidem verbis the title Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139, 196; Dec. Dig. § 109.*] of the amended act, and indicates in general 5. STATUTES ( 141*)-NECESSITY FOR REPUB-language the subject and nature of the amendment. This would seem to be a strict compliance with every requirement, and there is no decided case in which there is even a suggestion that anything more is necessary to make a valid title to an act. It has been decided over and over again that the title need not be a general index to the contents of an act, but that it is sufficient if it relates to one general subject, no matter how the details may be multiplied, provided they are subordinate to the general purpose of the act and germane to its provisions. The title to the act of 1909 fully meets these requirements. It relates to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates, and everything contained in the act is germane to this general purpose.

LICATION.

An act complete in itself which applies an established method of procedure, whether by common law or statute or both, to a new class by general reference only, does not violate the constitutional provision as to republication, though it may operate to some extent as an extension of a previous statute.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 209; Dec. Dig. § 141.*] 6. EXEMPTIONS (§ 4*) STATUTE.

CONSTRUCTION OF

Act April 1, 1909 (P. L. 87), being an act to amend an act relating to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates, is not an exemption law simply because it amends the former act relating to the descent and distribution of intestates' estates so as to give the widow of an intestate, without issue, a larger share of his estate.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, Dec. Dig. § 4.*]

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 70*)-NATUre of QUESTION.

The descent and distribution of estates is primarily a legislative question, and the Legisla

The second contention is no more tenable than the first. No attempt is made in the act of 1909 to amend or extend the provisions of the act of 1833 by reference to its title only, but section 1 of that act is set out

and recited in full and then republished at | portions, estates shall descend, and this powlength in the act as amended. This is the er having been properly exercised in the act uniform practice and the proper method of amending an old law. It is argued, however, that the provision of the act as amended which relates to the procedure for setting aside the $5,000 in value of property in the same manner as the widow's exemption is set aside under the act of 1851, is not set out and republished as the Constitution requires. This argument is predicated upon the theory that the act of 1909 is an exemption law, and that in no proper sense can it be construed as an act relating to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates. The difficulty with this contention is that it is right in the face of the express provisions of the act itself. The act of 1833 relates to the descent and distribution of the estates of intestates, and, while it has been on the statute books for more than three-quarters of a century, no one has ever called it an exemption law. We do not see how it can change its character because in 1909 the Legislature amended the old law so as to give the widow of a husband dying intestate and without issue a larger share of his estate. The title to the act of 1909 declares that it is an act relating to descent and distribution, and we do not see how the courts can say that the Legislature was mistaken and did not intend it to mean what it says. It is not an exemption law, and was not intended as such. It is true that the setting aside of the property which passes to the widow under this act is according to the method provided by the act of 1851, but this has only to do with the procedure, and does not affect the right of inheritance which is conferred by other portions of the act as amended. We think this clearly comes within the rule recognized in many cases that an act complete in itself, which applies an established method of procedure, whether it be by common law, or statute, or joint operation of both, to a new class by general reference only, does not violate the constitutional provision as to republication, though it may operate to some extent as an extension of a previous statute. In re Greenfield Ave., 191 Pa. 290, 43 Atl. 225; Pinkerton v. Traction Co., 193 Pa. 229, 44 Atl. 284; Woolen Machinery Company v. Browne, 206 Pa. 543, 56 Atl. 43.

of 1909, we can see no reason why its provisions should not be enforced in accordance with the legislative direction. That it is not an exemption act, and was not intended so to be, clearly appears in the express provisions of the act which at the very outset provides that "the real and personal estate of a decedent, whether male or female, remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges, which shall not have been sold, or disposed of by will, or otherwise limited by marriage settlement, shall be divided and enjoyed as follows." It is only the real and personal estate remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges that is made the subject of descent and distribution under the subsequent clauses relating to the widow. The widow takes nothing under this act until the debts and legal charges have been provided for. Hence in no proper sense can it be said that it is such an exemption as is provided for by the act of 1851. The debts of the intestate must first be paid out of his estate, and, when this is done, descent and distribution follow according to the provisions of the act of 1909. It is argued that, if the widow's share is set aside by the appraisement, the rights of creditors may be defeated, but this argument is without merit because the rights of creditors must always be protected by the courts, and the personal representatives must see to it that the debts are paid before any distribution is attempted to be made. Ordinarily the personal representatives have a year in which to settle an estate, and, as a general rule, it would be the part of wisdom to delay the distribution of the share of the widow until this period has arrived. However, if there are no debts, or if all debts and charges are paid, there does not seem to be any good reason why the distribution should not be made within the one-year period. Again, the debts of a decedent are a lien upon his property for a period of two years after his death, and, if the widow should take any property before a final distribution of the estate, she would take it subject to these liens which could be asserted against the estate even after the share of the widow had been set apart.

Assignments of error overruled, and decree affirmed, at costs of appellant.

(228 Pa. 20)

NORTHUP et al. v. HALL et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. April 18, 1910.)

The third contention is without merit. The act of 1909 is not a local or special law, and therefore not within the inhibition of section 7 of article 3 of the Constitution. It is a general law applicable to a general class, and relates to all members of that class. It is a classification based upon natural and proper distinctions, and one that has been recognized from the beginning of our state government. The descent and distribution A woman 79 years of age executed a deed of estates is primarily a legislative question. of real estate six months before her death to two of her nieces, retaining control during her The Legislature has the power to say in lifetime, in consideration of support in the old what manner, and to whom, and in what pro- | homestead, which homestead was owned by the For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes

DEEDS (§ 211*)—EVIDENCE.

two nieces and their sister. The evidence showed that the purpose of the grantor was to secure her home in such homestead and the enjoyment of her property by her nieces after her death. There was no evidence of duress or misrepresentations on the part of the grantees. Held, that the deed would not be cancelled.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 637-647, 649; Dec. Dig. § 211.*]

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County.

Bill by E. J. Northup and others against Lephe A. Hall and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal. Reversed. The court below found the following conclusions of law:

termed an "exchange deed," by which, in consideration of the assurance to her of a home and support for the remainder of her life in the old homestead, where she was born and reared, and in which she had at the time been living for many years, but which was owned by her nieces, she conveyed to two of them, Lephe Hall and Jessie Hall, the defendants herein, some 22 acres of land adjoining the homestead, and a piece of land in Wayne county, Pa., and certain personal property, retaining, however, to herself the control and use of all the property during her natural life. The plaintiffs who are the the remaining heirs of Mary A. Hall, filed this bill in equity, praying for the cancellation of the said deed of exchange, alleging that its execution had been procured by the defendants by means of deception and undue influence exercised upon the said Mary

"(2) But the fact that Mr. Davidson believed the receipt did not have that effect, coupled with the knowledge that the grantor claimed it was not at the time so intended by her, goes to the good faith of the trans-A. Hall. The question for consideration here action, and is pertinent as showing that the ostensible consideration moving to the grantor was assumed for the benefit of the defendants and to the grantor's prejudice. As such it was an apparent, rather than a real consideration."

“(6) The evidence is insufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court either that the grantor got, or was by defendants intended to get, any real consideration for the deed; or that in other respects the transaction is free from suspicion that unfair advantage was taken of her.

"(7) On the contrary, the evidence warrants the conclusion that her credulity was imposed upon in respect to the alleged impending sale of the homestead, and that she conveyed her property because she had been adroitly deceived into the false apprehension that it was inevitable as the only means of saving her home.

"(8) This is decisive of the issue against

the defendants.

"(9) The plaintiffs are, accordingly, entitled to a decree to the effect that defendants hold title under the deed in question as trustees ex maleficio to the use of the gran

tor's heirs at law.

"(10) In order that complete relief be had, it should be decreed that the deed be surrendered for cancellation.

"(11) The defendants should pay the costs." The court entered a decree canceling the deed.

Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

H. A. Knapp and C. B. Little, for appellants. George Morrow and W. N. Leach, for appellees.

POTTER, J. Mary A. Hall of Glenburn, Lackawanna county, Pa., died on November 26, 1906, at the age of 79. Some six months prior to her death she executed what was

is whether the testimony warrants the conclusion that Mary A. Hall was induced to make the deed by deception on the part of the defendants, or whether the influence exexercised over her by them was sufficient to

destroy her free agency in the making of the deed, so that in its execution she was dominated by the will of the defendants, and was not giving expression to her own will and judgment.

The defendants are daughters of William C. Hall, a brother of the grantor. The homestead in question, consisting of an old mansion and some 25 acres of land, was devised

to William C. Hall by his father, who died in 1865. The devise was subject to a provision that Mary A. Hall should have rooms and a home in the homestead, so long as she remained single. She lived there until the year 1870, when she was about 43 years of age. She then, for some reason which does not appear, left the homestead, and signed a receipt in full of all claims against the estate of her father. For some 22 years she made her

home elsewhere.

She

Upon the brother's death in 1892, she returned to the homestead, which had then passed into the ownership of her brother's three daughters, Lephe. Jessie, and Harriet. From that time until her death, it appears that Mary A. Hall made her home with the defendants most of the time. was very much attached to them, and especially to Lephe Hall, who seems to have been her favorite niece, and was happy in her care and companionship. She was much attached to the old homestead, and cherished the hope of spending her declining years there, undisturbed. Her niece Lephe enjoyed the full confidence of her aunt, and was intrusted with the care of such of her correspondence and business as required attention. She was consulted by the aunt in her money matters, and was familiar with her property, and its final disposition was often discussed between them. It appears from the

was owned by and in the possession of the heirs of William C. Hall. And it further sets forth that Mary A. Hall desired that said property should be her home during the balance of her life; and further states that: "Whereas, a sale of said property is contem

evidence that during the summer of 1905, tion, we find that it recites the fact that the two defendants, Lephe and Jessie Hall, Mary A. Hall was then residing with her and their sister Harriet, then Mrs. Shoemak- | niece Lephe Hall, in the old homestead, which er, and the aunt, Mary A. Hall, were all at the home place together. The defendants desired the aunt to make a will, but she was averse to doing so. She, however, intimated plainly her intention of giving to these nieces the most of her estate. At times during the latter years of her life the old lady was giv-plated by the heirs of William C. Hall, to en to understand that the needs of the own- prevent the sale and retain the said homeers of the homestead property would require stead as her home, during the term of her them to dispose of it. Any suggestion of a natural life, Mary A. Hall desires to have sale of the property grieved the aunt, and the said homestead conveyed to her by the called forth her protests. During the year heirs of William C. Hall." It is further set 1905, when the nieces and the aunt were forth that, "In consideration of retaining her together, it was suggested that the old home- home and support at the old Hall homestead stead be sold, and a smaller place bought, and all expenses and repairs being paid for where the aunt could have her home with one her, the said Mary A. Hall agrees to convey or both of the defendants. The suitability to Lephe A. Hall and Jessie Hall, two of the of several houses for that purpose was dis- heirs of William C. Hall, all of the real escussed, and finally Lephe Hall said: "Aunt tate and property of the said Mary A. Hall, Mary, why don't you buy the old homestead? the possession and control, however, of the You can afford to own it, and we can't." property of Mary A. Hall to continue during And the aunt replied, "I would if I could sell her natural life, but the possession and con my real estate." Lephe Hall further testifies trol of the old homestead shall at once vest that some efforts were made to sell the in Mary A. Hall and continue during her aunt's real estate, without avail, and after- lifetime." And to carry out this arrangement wards she said: "Aunt Mary, if you can't Lephe Hall, Jessie Hall, and Harriet Shoesell the real estate, why not exchange? You maker, joined by her husband, conveyed to *ake ours, and we will take yours." And that Mary A. Hall for the term of her natural seemed to impress her very favorably. In life the whole of the old homestead, compristhe spring of 1906 Lephe Hall and her aunting about 25 acres of land, with the house, were at home together. Jessie Hall was in barn, and outbuildings. New York, and Mrs. Shoemaker was in Chicago. There is evidence tending to show that at that time all the owners felt that a sale of the homestead was very desirable, and the married sister, Mrs. Shoemaker, and her husband, were particularly insistent upon a sale of the property.

The trial judge found that the mental capacity of Mary A. Hall was not impaired; but he reached the conclusion that she was induced to execute the deed by a misrepresentation made by Miss Lephe Hall as to the imminence of a sale of the homestead. He placed much stress upon the reported prospect of a sale to one particular person, George Hall, which did not materialize. We are at a loss to see why so much emphasis should have been placed upon this one instance; for, without question, the owners of the property had the right to sell it at public or private sale, or in any way that suited them, without regard to any possible right which Mary A. Hall may have had to retain rooms in the property during the remainder of her life. Whether or not she had such a right is doubtful, but evidently she did not want to remain there without the care and attention which had been bestowed upon her by her favorite niece. We have carefully examined the testimony in this respect, and we do not see that it justifies in the slightest degree any imputation of bad faith upon the part of Lephe Hall, in her dealings with her aunt, Mary A. Hall. Turning to the deed in ques

It will be noted that all expenses and repairs were to be paid for Mary A. Hall, and she was to be supported in the home thus provided for her. No slight burden was assumed in thus agreeing to provide the care and attention necessary for an old lady, as she then was, but with a reasonable prospect of life for some years to come. By agreement of counsel at the hearings, much testimony that would otherwise have been incompetent, was admitted. Thus Lephe Hall was permitted to testify to conversations which she had with her aunt. She states frankly that she told her aunt of the desire and need of herself and sisters to make sale of the homestead property. The subject was discussed between them many times. The efforts that were made to obtain a purchaser were made known to the aunt. Lephe Hall gave in detail the circumstances which led her to believe and report to her aunt that a cousin, George Hall, would buy the place. But nothing came of that expectation. We see nothing, however, in the testimony as to this transaction, to indicate that Lephe Hall was not honestly under the impression that George Hall was a prospective purchaser. But there was no reason for laying special stress or emphasis upon his connection with the affair. He was only one of several possible purchasers of whom mention was made. Certainly the owners of the property had the right to sell it upon terms satisfactory to themselves. And if they testified to their intention of selling

The deed of which complaint is made was The decree of the court below is reversed, prepared by a member of the bar, Mr. George and it is ordered that the bill of plaintiffs be Davidson, a nephew of Mary A. Hall. He dismissed; the costs in the court below, and had been her legal adviser for many years, | upon this appeal, to be borne by the appellees.