Opinion of the Court. than any business man has a right to do, to provide against future misfortune when he is abundantly able to do so." Further, as negativing any fraud in intent, a year after this guaranty, and when undoubtedly there must have been developing some probability of liability therefrom, Schreyer purchased other real estate and took the title in his own name. Still, again, not only did he continue in his regular business of stair-building after these transactions, but it is evident from his bank-books, produced in evidence, that his business was of considerable magnitude, for between August 26, 1869, and September 6, 1876, a period of about seven years, and including the time of these transactions, his deposits amounted to $391,296.44. We have thus far considered the case as to these transfers from Schreyer to his wife, as if they were purely voluntary; but according to his testimony, and there is none contradicting it, they were far from voluntary, but rather the passing of the legal title to his wife, of property of which she was, prior thereto, the equitable owner, or in which she had at least a large equitable interest. She had between twenty-five hundred and three thousand dollars in money when they were married, in April, 1854. She purchased the leasehold interest in the lots on 39th Street, paying therefor out of her own moneys, $500 each. They lived on one of the lots, and the building on the other was rented. Unquestionably, therefore, the rents belonged to her. She also kept boarders for a number of years, two of them living with her for at least ten years, paying $5.00 per week each. The balance of the money she had when married she passed over to him from time to time for improvements on the property, or use in his business. It is true that afterwards buildings of considerable value were put upon these lots; and we do not wish to be understood as affirming that the entire cost of the property was the proceeds of her investment, or her earnings. All that the testimony fairly discloses is, that at the time of her marriage she was possessed of separate property, which was the foundation and largely the source of these subsequent accumulations. So that the conveyances in 1871 were not purely vol Opinion of the Court. untary, but meritorious and upon good consideration. The same may be said as to the bonds and mortgages placed in her name in 1874. It is objected by the appellees that Schreyer's testimony is not to be depended upon, because contradictory, confused and uncertain; that there is no definiteness in it as to amounts and dates; and that wrong in the transactions is evident, because the moneys received for rent after the conveyances, were deposited by Schreyer in his own name in bank, and were obviously managed and handled by him as his own, as no accounts were kept between husband and wife of their separate moneys, but all were mingled in one fund, in his hands. But does all this indicate fraud? If his testimony is worthless and to be rejected, then there is practically no testimony interpreting those transactions, and the court never presumes fraud. The very confusion and carelessness in the dealings between husband and wife make against rather than in favor of the claim of fraud. There is no evidence that he was in debt at the time of these conveyances, at least beyond a trifling amount, which was subsequently paid; and if the parties had intended fraud and wrong, unquestionably their accounts would have been kept carefully and accurately, and books would now be presented showing such accounts. Husband and wife evidently saw no necessity of dealing with each other at arm's length; the title to the property was placed in her name when there was no legal or equitable reason why it should not be done; and the rents and other cash receipts were not unnaturally kept in one account and handled as one fund. The lack of substantial indebtedness and the record of the transfer being established, the carelessness of their dealings tends to prove honesty rather than to establish fraud. Again, it is objected that the conduct of Schreyer, in respect to the bankrupt proceedings, is suspicious; that the bankrupt proceedings, though nominally at the instance of a creditor, were really at his instance; that the bankrupt and the creditor found their counsel in the same office; and that the other claims proved against him were in some suspicious way fixed up and adjusted, leaving only Vanderbilt's claim unpaid. Opinion of the Court. Conceding all that is claimed by counsel in reference to these bankrupt proceedings in 1878, it is difficult to deduce therefrom any evidence of wrong in the transactions in 1871 and 1874. It may be that Schreyer did not want to pay Vanderbilt's claim; and it may be, as claimed by counsel, that he improperly sought the assistance of the bankrupt court to be relieved from liability therefrom; but it would be a very unjust conclusion from such facts, that in 1871, when he made the conveyances to his wife, and in 1874, when he made the arrangement for the execution of the bonds and mortgages to his wife, anterior to any known or expected liability to Vanderbilt, he was acting with a view of subsequently going through bankruptcy, or defrauding Vanderbilt or any other creditor. Recapitulating, the conveyances in 1871 were meritorious, upon good consideration, made by one in debt in only a trifling sum, and retaining an abundance of property for the discharge of those debts, and who in fact subsequently, and as they became due, paid them— made by one continuing and expecting to continue in the same profitable and not hazardous business in which he had been engaged for nearly a score of years, with no thought of entering upon any new or hazardous business, and more than three years before any liability to Vanderbilt was incurred or even thought of. And the placing of the notes, bonds and mortgages in 1874 in Mrs. Schreyer's name was in pursuance of an arrangement entered into when the husband was not in debt, and when no obligation, fixed or contingent, to Vanderbilt had been entered into or thought of. Under these circumstances it is error to hold that the transactions were fraudulent and void as against Vanderbilt. The decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. VOL. CXXXIV-27 Statement of the Case. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY v. MINNESOTA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA. No. 762. Argued January 13, 14, 1890. - Decided March 24, 1890. The act of the legislature of Minnesota, approved March 7, 1887, Generel Laws of 1887, c. 10, establishing a railroad and warehouse commission, being interpreted by the Supreme Court of that State as providing that the rates of charges for the transportation of property, recommended and published by the commission shall be final and conclusive as to what are equal and reasonable charges, and that there can be no judicial inquiry as to the reasonableness of such rates, and a railroad company, in answer to an application for a mandamus, contending that such rates, in regard to it, are unreasonable, and not being allowed by the state court to put in testimony on the question of the reasonableness of such rates; Held, that the act is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as depriving the company of its property without due process of law, and depriving it of the equal protection of the laws. The State had made no irrepealable contract with the company that it should have the right for all future time to prescribe its rates of toll, free from all control by the legislature of the State. THIS was a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, awarding a writ of mandamus against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. The case arose on proceedings taken by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota, under an act of the legislature of that State, approved March 7, 1887, General Laws of 1887, c. 10, entitled "An act to regulate common carriers, and creating the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota, and defining the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers." The act is set forth in full in the margin.' 1 CHAPTER 10. AN ACT TO REGULATE COMMON CARRIERS, AND CREATING THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AND DEFINING THE DUTIES OF SUCH COMMISSION IN RELATION TO COMMON CARRIERS. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota: SECTION 1. (a) That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common Statement of the Case. The ninth section of that act creates a commission to be known as the "Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, when both are used under a common control, management or arrangement, for a carriage or shipment from one place or station to another, both being within the State of Minnesota : Provided, That nothing in this act shall apply to street railways or to the carriage, storage or handling by any common carrier of property, free, or at reduced rates for the United States, or for the State of Minnesota, or for any municipal government or corporation within the State, or for any charitable purpose, or to or from fairs, and expositions for exhibition thereat, (or stock for breeding purposes,) or to the issuance of mileage, excursion or commutation passenger tickets, at rates made equal to all, or to transportation to stock shippers with cars, and nothing in the provisions of this act shall be construed to prevent common carriers, subject to the provisions of this act, from issuing passes for the free transportation of passengers. (b) The term "railroad" as used in this act shall include all bridges or ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement or lease; and the term "transportation" shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage. SEC. 2. (a) That all charges made by any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage or handling of such property shall be equal and reasonable; and every unequal and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. Provided, That one car-load of freight of any kind or class shall be transported at as low a rate per ton, and per ton per mile, as any greater number of car-loads of the same kind and class from and to the same points of origination or destination. (b) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, to make or give any unequal or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic to any unequal or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. SEC. 3. (a) That all common carriers, subject to the provisions of this act, shall, according to their respective powers, provide, at the point of connection, crossing or intersection, ample facilities for transferring cars, and for accommodating and transferring passengers, and traffic of all kinds and classes, from their lines or tracks, to those of any other common car |