(the debts of two of them not having matured and no execution hav-
ing been issued on that of the third,) and having assented to the
appointment of a receiver under that bill, and having for nine months
lain inactive while the receiver was managing the property and assum-
ing liabilities in reducing it to possession, cannot at the expiration of
that time, when the great majority of its creditors have become parties
to the suit, and its property is about to be ratably distributed by the
court among all its creditors, interpose the objection of want of juris-
diction on the ground that a court of equity could not obtain jurisdic-
tion when the plaintiff's creditors had plain, adequate and complete
remedies at the common law, or that their debts had not been con-
verted into judgments, or that no execution had issued and been re-
turned nulla bona — whatever weight might have been given to those
defences if interposed in the first instance. Brown v. Lake Superior
Iron Co., 530.

8. The maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity" is applicable to
the defendant as well as to the complainant. Ib.

9. Good faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the part of
a defendant in equity as they are on the part of the complainant. Ib.
10. When a mortgagee of real estate asserts in equity his rights as against
a tax-sale of the estate alleged by him to have been made collusively
in conjunction with the mortgagor for the purpose of getting rid of
the mortgage for the benefit of the mortgagor, he may either proceed
against the purchaser alone, or against the purchaser and the mort-
gagor and in any event it is not necessary for him to make tender of
the payment of the amount of the tax for which the estate was sold.
Mendenhall v. Hall, 559.

11. In Illinois, a decree against a minor is subject to attack, by an original
bill, for error apparent on the record, for want of jurisdiction, or for
fraud. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.

12. In Illinois, the rule is that a decree against an infant is absolute in the
first instance, subject to the right to attack it by original bill, but until
so attacked, and set aside or reversed, on error or appeal, it is binding
to the same extent as any other decree or judgment. The right to so
attack it may be exercised at any time before the infant attains his
majority, or at any time afterwards within the period in which he
may prosecute a writ of error for the reversal of such decree. Ib.
13. A decree is subject to attack by original bill for fraud, even after
judgment in the appellate court; but a party, whether an infant or
adult, against whom a decree is rendered by direction of the appellate
court, cannot impeach it, by bill filed in the court of first instance,
merely for errors apparent on the record, that do not involve the juris-
diction of either court. Ib.

14. In Illinois, a cross-bill is regarded as an adjunct or part of the original
suit, the whole together constituting one case; and process against the
plaintiff is not necessary upon a cross-bill, even where he is an infant.

Ib.

15. The plaintiff, by his bill, claimed to own certain real estate, by inheri-
tance from his father, to whom the defendants had conveyed it by deed,
absolute in form, and prayed for a decree confirming and establishing
his title. The defendants, by cross-bill, alleged that the deed was made
and accepted for the purpose of placing the title in trust for the bene-
fit of one of the defendants, and asked a decree to that effect; Held.
That the subject matter of the cross-bill was germane to that of the
original bill. Ib.

1. In the trial before a jury of an issue made up in a Probate Court as to
the incompetency of a deceased person, from unsoundness of mind or
undue influence, to make a will, declarations made by the deceased to
a witness that he received the bulk of his estate by breaking the will
of his grandfather, who was also the ancestor of the caveators, and
that his estate consisted in a great degree of that property and its
accumulations; and also declarations of one of the legatees, made
about, or after the date of the execution of the alleged will, that she
had knowledge at that time of the execution of the will and of its pro-
visions, should be excluded from the jury. Ormsby v. Webb, 47.
2. On the trial of that issue it was proper for the jury to consider whether
the undue influence alleged to have been exercised by a particular lega-
tee in respect to other matters extended to or controlled the execution
of the will, and give it such weight as they might deem proper. Ib.
3. An instruction to the jury, at such trial, that if they should believe the
evidence of a witness named, they must find for the will, while appar-
ently objectionable, as giving undue prominence to the testimony of
that witness, was held, in view of the scope of her evidence, not to
have been erroneous. Ib.

See RAILROAD, 5.

EX POST FACTO LAW.

1. A state statute, (enacted after the commission of a murder in the
State,) which adds to the punishment of death, (that being the punish-
ment when the murder was committed,) the further punishment of
imprisonment by solitary confinement until the execution, is, when
attempted to be enforced against the person convicted of that murder,
an ex post facto law, and a sentence inflicting both punishments upon
him is void; and the same is the case with a statute which confers
upon the warden of the penitentiary the power to fix the day of exe-
cution, and compels him to withhold the knowledge of it from the
offender, when neither of those provisions formed part of the law of
the State when the offence was committed. Medley, Petitioner, 160.
2. Any law passed after the commission of the offence for which a person

accused of crime is being tried which inflicts a greater punishment on
the crime than the law annexed to it at the time when it was committed,
or which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage, is an
ex post facto law within the meaning of that term as used in the Con-
stitution of the United States. Ib.

3. No one can be criminally punished in this country except according to
a law prescribed for his government by the sovereign authority before
the imputed offence was committed, or by some law passed afterwards
by which the punishment is not increased. Ib.

4. There being no error in the proceedings of the court below on the trial
and the verdict by which the party was convicted, and the error com-
mencing only when the sentence or judgment of the court on the
verdict is entered, the court, after deliberation, determines that the
Attorney General of the State shall be notified by the warden of the
penitentiary, of the precise time when he will release the prisoner from
his custody, at least ten days beforehand, and after doing this, and at
that time, he shall discharge the prisoner. Ib.

FEES.

See COMMISSIONERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS.

GUARDIAN AD LITEM.

Various charges of fraud and collusion upon the part of a guardian ad
litem examined and held not to be outlawed. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.

See INFANT, 1, 3;
JURISDICTION, D, 3.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error to inquire
into all the errors committed by the court below. In re Wight, 136.
2. In a proceeding for a habeas corpus to release from confinement a letter
carrier charged with embezzling letters delivered to him for carriage,
this court will not inquire into the motives with which the letter was
put into the mail, even though the object was to detect or entrap the
party into criminal practices. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. The rule obtains in New York, and is recognized by this court, that
even a voluntary conveyance from husband to wife is good as against
subsequent creditors, unless it was made with the intent to defraud
such subsequent creditors; or, unless there was secrecy in the trans-
action, by which knowledge of it was withheld from such creditors
who dealt with the grantor, upon the faith of his owning the property
transferred; or, unless the transfer was made with a view of entering
into some new and hazardous business, the risk of which the grantor

intended should be cast upon the parties having dealings with him in
the new business. Schreyer v. Scott, 405.

2. When real estate is acquired by a husband in his own name by the
use of the separate property of his wife, a subsequent conveyance of it
by him to her is not a voluntary conveyance, but the transfer of the
legal title to the equitable owner.

lb.

3. Case stated in which a husband is held not to be an incompetent wit-
ness, under the statutes of Illinois, in support of his wife's claim to
property. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.

See LOCAL LAW, 2.

INDICTMENT.

1. An indictment against a letter carrier of the United States Postal Ser-
vice, charging that "he did wrongfully secrete and embezzle a letter
which came into his possession in the regular course of his official
duties, and which was intended to be carried by a letter carrier, which
letter then and there contained five pecuniary obligations and securi-
ties of the government of the United States," is a sufficient charge that
the letter embezzled was intended to be carried by a letter carrier of
the United States. In re Wight, 136.

2. In an indictment against a letter carrier for the embezzlement of a let-
ter received by him in his official character to carry and deliver, it is
not necessary to aver that "the letter has not been delivered" if an
embezzlement of it is charged. Ib.

INFANT.

1. An infant, by his prochein amy, having elected to prosecute an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Illinois from the decree rendered in the original
suit brought by him, and having appeared by guardian ad litem to the
appeal of the cross-plaintiffs in the same suit, is as much bound by
the action of that court in respect to mere errors of law, not involving
jurisdiction, as if he had been an adult when the appeal was taken.
Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.

2. The statutes of Illinois, relating to suits by infants, are not to be inter-
preted to mean that no suit in the name of an infant, by next friend,
can be entertained, unless such next friend is selected by the infant.
Nor does the right to bring such a suit depend upon the execution by
the next friend of a bond for costs; though he may be required to
give such bond before the suit proceeds to final judgment and execu-
tion. Ib.

3. While a guardian ad litem or prochein amy of an infant cannot, by ad-
missions or stipulations in a suit in equity, surrender substantial rights
of the infant, he may, by stipulation, assent to arrangements which
will facilitate the trial and determination of the cause in which such
rights are involved, and the infant will be bound thereby. Ib.

See EQUITY, 11, 12, 14;

JURISDICTION, D, 3.

INSURANCE.

A policy of insurance on a building and its contents against fire, contain-
ing a printed condition by which "kerosene or carbon oils of any
description are not to be stored, used, kept, or allowed on the above
premises, temporarily or permanently, for sale or otherwise, unless
with written permission endorsed on this policy, excepting the use of
refined coal, kerosene, or other carbon oil for lights, if the same is
drawn and the lamps filled by daylight; otherwise this policy shall be
null and void," is avoided if kerosene or other carbon oil is drawn
upon the premises near a lighted lamp by any person acting by direc-
tion or under authority of the assured's lessee; although there was
attached to the policy at the time of its issue a printed slip, signed by
the insurer, "privileged to use kerosene oil for lights, lamps to be
filled and trimmed by daylight only;" and although the insurer has
since written in the margin of the policy, "privileged to keep not
exceeding five barrels of oil on said premises." Gunther v. Liverpool
and London and Globe Ins. Co., 110.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 8, 9.

JURISDICTION.

A. OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. An order remanding a cause from a Circuit Court of the United States
to the state court from which it was removed is not a final judgment
or decree, and this court has no jurisdiction to review it. Richmond
& Danville Railroad Co. v. Thouron, 45.

2. An order in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at special
term, admitting a writing to probate and record as the will of a
deceased person, in conformity with the findings of the jury empanelled,
in the same court, to try the issue of will or no will, is one involving
the merits of the proceeding, and may be reviewed by the same court
in general term, and such review will bring before the general term
all the questions arising upon bills of exceptions taken at the trial
before the jury and if the value of the matter in dispute be sufficient,
this court has jurisdiction to reexamine a final order of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia affirming the order of the Probate
Court, and to pass upon the questions of law raised by such bills of
exceptions. Ormsby v. Webb, 47.

3. The value of the property in litigation determines the jurisdiction of
this court. Kenaday v. Edwards, 117.

4. In an appeal from a decree removing a trustee of real estate, and deny-
ing him commissions, the jurisdiction of this court is to be determined,

not by the amount of the commissions only, but by the value of the
real estate as well.

Ib.