XXIX. 1832. and alarm During the night, however, the insurrection made very CHAP. great progress on both sides of the Seine. Several posts were stormed, and the arms they contained distributed to 65. the people; and in some encounters between detached Progress parties of the military and the insurgents, the latter had ing aspect proved victorious. Before ten at night the Republicans of the in were masters of the Arsenal, of the posts of the Galiote, and the Chateau d'Eau; they were in entire possession · of the Marais and the eighth arrondissement; the manufactory of arms in the Rue Popincourt had fallen into their hands, with twelve hundred muskets; they had advanced to the Place des Victoires, and were preparing to assault the Bank, the Post-office, and the Barrack des Petits Frères. But the great centre of their strength was in the Rue St Martin and the adjoining streets, which were all strongly fortified with barricades, and where the headquarters of the insurgents had been established. The dragoons had been defeated by the people, in attempting to retake that post, and it remained in their hands; the Halle aux Vins had been passed, and all the southern bank of the river as far as the Pantheon 1 had fallen into their hands. But the great points du Mare of the Tuileries, the Louvre, the Hôtel de Ville, the chal du Camp DarPost-office, and the other public offices, were still in the riule; Ann. hands of the Government, which remained in possession of the entire city to the westward of the Place de Grève.1 Hist. xv. 192, 193; L. Blanc, iii. 504, 505. 66. While the advantages of position were thus, after the first day's encounter, so nearly balanced between the con- Moral tending parties, a similar equality prevailed in the moral either side. influences by which the struggle was still more likely in the end to be determined. The insurgents had committed what turned out to be a grievous mistake in the outset, by hoisting the drapeau rouge and displaying several chapeaux rouges in the crowd when the disturbance first began. The fatal ensign stamped its character upon the insurrection, and in most places deterred the middle ranks XXIX. 1832. CHAP. and national guard from joining it. On the other hand, the working classes, especially in the centre and eastern quarters of the city, were in such extreme misery, from the effects of the Revolution of July, that it might reasonably be expected that they would, if the contest was prolonged, nearly all join the insurgents; the national guard in many quarters were notoriously disaffected, and not a few of their uniforms were to be seen in the opposite ranks; and the regular troops, shaken by the events of July, and the rewards then bestowed on those who had violated their oaths, were in a very vacillating state, and some of them, particularly the sappers and miners in the Rue Sainte Catherine, had openly joined the insurrection. Even where they did obey the générale, which beat in every quarter of Paris, the national guards turned out in very small numbers, and with evident reluctance; the horrors of civil warfare were present to every mind; wives, mothers, and sisters were indefatigable in their efforts to keep them at home; and such as did appear at their rallyingpoints came with downcast looks and anxious visages, rather like martyrs going to the stake than the defenders of their country marching to victory.1 1 L. Blanc, 216; Ann. Hist. xv. 193. 67. Measures and forces ernment. June 6. The measures taken at the Tuileries in this crisis were characterised by vigour, tempered by prudence. of the Gov- The King and Ministers sat in council all night, and at six on the morning of the 6th, when accounts had been received on all sides of the rapid progress of the insurgents, the question was proposed by the King, whether the capital should be declared in a state of siege? Many members of the council thought it should; but the King, who was always averse to decisive measures, declared that, in his opinion, so extreme a step should be reserved for the last extremity, that they should await the course of events, and in the mean time measures of repression only should be attempted. As it was known also what had taken place the preceding night at Lafitte's, several mem XXIX. 1832. bers of the council strongly urged the arrest of Lafayette CHAP. and Lafitte; but this too the King opposed as too bold a measure a sort of coup d'état, which was unnecessary, as the former was a vain garrulous old man, incapable of taking a vigorous resolution, and the latter was, he knew, in secret attached to himself. Orders were, however, given for the arrest of M. Garnier Pagès, M. Corbet, and M. Laboissière; and three important decrees were agreed to, which immediately appeared in the columns of the Moniteur. By the first, the artillery of the national guard of Paris was disbanded; by the second, the military Veterinary School of Alfort was disbanded; by the third, the Polytechnic School was dissolved, the scholars ordered to be sent to their homes, and the few who had remained faithful directed to form the nucleus of a new establishment. Orders had pre 1 Moniteur, viously been given to the police to enter the printingoffices of the Tribune, the Quotidienne, the Courrier de l'Europe, the National, the Courrier Français, the Journal du Commerce, and the Corsaire, and break their presses to pieces, lest they should be used to throw off proclamations addressed to the workmen; and this was June 7, accordingly done. This was the very thing most com- donnance plained of on the part of the Polignac Administration, du 6 Juin; and which had brought on the Revolution of July; but 212; Ann. Louis Philippe was doomed in every stage of his career 194, 195. to be the author of the justification of Charles X.1 1832, or Hist. xv. Soult's measures. It was not, however, by decrees on paper that the 68. formidable insurrection which had broken out in Paris Marshal was to be put down; and in devising measures for this military purpose, Marshal Soult displayed all his wonted vigour and capacity. His plan was to act as they had done at Lyons-destroy all the barricades at once, and crush the insurrection in its centre by a vast and converging attack of military force. Probably all will agree that this is the proper way to act when you have such a force : the difficulty is, what to do when you have it not, or it XXIX. 1832. CHAP. proves traitor in your hands. To carry out this plan, every preparation was made as for a pitched battle, as with the whole military strength of Prussia or Austria, and the force employed was equal to that which conquered at Jena or Austerlitz. The whole national guard of Paris, except the artillery, which had been disbanded, was summoned; that of the banlieue, for a circuit fifteen miles round the capital, was marched in with the utmost expedition; and all the troops within twenty miles received their orders over-night, and came rapidly in on the morning and forenoon of the 6th. But the national guard of Paris, as usual, failed at the decisive moment; many of its battalions never made their appearance at all; of those which did come, nearly two-thirds were absent. Not so the national guard of the banlieue; they presented themselves early at the place of rendezvous in the Carrousel in great and unexpected strength. Not 6000, but 10,000 had obeyed the summons of the generals, and their determined looks, serried ranks, and loud cheers, as they marched past the King at the gate of the Tuileries, proved that there were men in France who could be relied on in the hour of danger. Living in the country, and engaged in agricultural pursuits, they were strangers to the passions and changes of the capital, and the opinion was universal amongst them, that Paris was in the hands of a set of assassins and plunderers, who, after sacking it, and destroying the market for their produce, would end by imposing a maximum on the price of agricultural productions, as Cap, vi: their predecessors had done in 1793. Altogether, Moniteur, Marshal Soult found himself, at ten o'clock on the 6th, 1832; L. at the head of 60,000 regular troops, of whom 6000 were 506, 507; cavalry, with 120 guns, besides 20,000 national guards, xv. 195, 197. more than half of whom might safely be relied on in the approaching conflict.1 1 212, 215; June 7, Blanc, iii. Ann. Hist. Great as these forces were, they were by no means incommensurate to the danger which threatened, for XXIX. 1832. 69. cesses of the and conster chiefs. the progress of the insurgents during the night and early CHAP. in the morning had been immense. Before nightfall they had forced one of the bridges, and opened up the communications between the southern and northern quarters of Great sucthe city; they had carried with great slaughter the posts insurgents, of the Bastile, the Marché St Martin, and the Blancs nation of Manteaux; and at seven in the morning they had erected the military a strong barricade across the entrance of the Petit Pont de l'Hôtel Dieu, defeated a part of the 25th regiment sent to destroy it, and surrounded on all sides the prefecture of police, which was hourly expected to fall into their hands. Steadily advancing from the eastern parts and centre of the city, and fortifying every street they carried with barricades, they were rapidly approaching the Hôtel de Ville and Post-Office, and might soon be expected in the Place des Victoires around the Palais Royal, and in front of the Louvre. The intelligence of these events excited the utmost alarm at the Tuileries; consternation was painted in every visage; the throne of the Citizen King seemed to be crumbling before the very forces which had created it. The palace no longer presented its wonted crowded aspect; there was no throng in the ante-chamber; numbers were slipping away. The persons in office were already secreting their most valuable effects: it was openly proposed in the council that the Tuileries should be abandoned. Were they to remain there till a sudden panic seized the troops, or the defection of a single regiment gave them an entrance, as on the 29th July 1830? What was most dreaded was that General Lafayette or Marshal Clausel should join the movement, and give it the weight of their military and political influence. Certain it is that Armand Carrel had a mysterious interview during the night with Marshal Clausel; but he found him undetermined, and unwilling to 1 L. Blanc, commit himself till some of the troops had revolted. 1 iii. 306,309; Cap. vi. 215, Strange to say, the advice to abandon the Tuileries came 216. from Marshal Soult himself, and was opposed by M. |