XXXII. occasion, maintained their ancient and deserved fame; the CHAP. conquerors lost 512 killed and 1429 wounded in that single assault. 1832. 10. Homs. Secured by this important conquest in a base of operations and easy communication with his fleet, the Egyptian Battle of general proceeded to commence the important operations July 6. he meditated in the field. Still retaining a considerable corps in the important strategetical position of Balbek, he himself advanced, at the head of 18,000 men, to Kosseir, where 35,000 Turks were assembled. Finding the enemy so strong, he brought up his whole disposable forces, and drew up his troops, now raised to 25,000 men, in three lines, ready for the attack. Instead of remaining in their position, the Turks advanced to meet the Egyptians, and the two armies met in an open plain in front of HoмS. The Ottomans were drawn up in two lines, and presented a very formidable appearance, though, to a practised eye, their unsteadiness in movement was apparent. Ibrahim's order of battle, which was very peculiar, was admirably calculated to take advantage of that deficiency. The first line, which was deployed, consisted of twelve battalions; the second, which was in column, consisted of the like number of battalions; the third also in column of four. The cavalry was stationed on the flanks of the three lines, also in line and columu like the foot-soldiers, the artillery in front of the first line. When the two armies approached each other, and the firing began, the four battalions on the right of the second line moved to the right, and deployed, taking a position oblique to the first line on its extreme right. At the same time, the four battalions of the first line nearest to the right moved forward, and came into line with the four come up from the second, forming thus eight battalions on the Turkish left flank; while the battalions thus moved aside were replaced by the like number, who deployed, and advanced up from the second line. The same movement was made by the cavalry on the XXXII. 1832. CHAP. right in both lines, while that on the left moved forward and threatened the Turkish right, to prevent their sending succours to their left, where the real attack was to be made at the same time the artillery kept up an incessant fire along the whole front. The effect of these movements was to compel the Turks to throw back their left wing, to avoid being outflanked; but this operation, performed by unsteady troops under fire, soon led to general confusion. Attacked vigorously in front and 1 Ragusa, ii. flank while executing their retrograde movement, they Ann. Hist. speedily fell into confusion, and fled, leaving 2000 slain on the field, and 3000 prisoners, with twelve guns, in the hands of the victors.1 356, 358; xv. 397, 398. 11. tians enter Aleppo. July 8. So completely was this victory the result of the superior The Egyp- generalship and discipline on the part of the Egyptians that they sustained very little loss. Next day they were in a condition to pursue their advantages, and entered Homs, which the Ottomans evacuated at their approach, leaving 1500 men, chiefly wounded, and twelve more guns, in the hands of the victors. The Turkish army upon this retired to Aleppo, and formed a junction with the corps commanded by Hussein Pacha. The united force attempted a stand in front of that city, but it was a show only. No sooner had Ibrahim brought up his reserve than they retired in two columns-that on the right by Kliss, that on the left by Antioch; while the Egyptian army took possession of Aleppo, where they found re2 Ragusa, ii. pose, and the stores and provisions necessary to recruit Ann. Hist. them after their fatigues, but unfortunately with them the cholera, whieh soon made alarming ravages in their wearied ranks.2 358, 359; xv. 359, 360. 12. Battle of Beylau. July 29. When his soldiers had in some degree recovered from their fatigue, Ibrahim again took the field, and moved against the Turkish army, which was by this time concentrated in the neighbourhood of BEYLAU, while detachments of light troops were sent out, some towards the sources of the Euphrates, some towards Antioch, in order XXXII. 1832. to ascertain what forces of the enemy were to be found CHAP. in that direction. The Turkish forces, however, 36,000 strong, were concentrated in front of Beylau, on the southern slope of one of the branches of the Taurus, and covered in front by rude intrenchments, hastily thrown up, after the Ottoman fashion. Behind them the heights rose rapidly, and as they were not occupied by the Ottoman forces, the Egyptian general ordered a select corps, by a detour, to gain the eminence, so as to threaten the rear of the Turkish force. As soon as their standards were seen crowning the heights, the signal to attack was given. Finding themselves attacked in front and menaced in rear, the Osmanlis made scarcely any resistance, but instantly began to retreat, those on the right by the road to Beylau, those on the left by the mountains. The first having to retire under the fire of four Egyptian battalions, posted on heights which commanded the road, suffered severely, and ere long fell into confusion, the troops disbanding, and seeking safety in isolated flight. The last, having no road to retire by, were in disorder from the first, and fled in utter confusion over the mountains towards Alexandretta, leaving behind them 25 pieces of cannon and 74 caissons. The Turks next day abandoned Alexandretta in utter confusion, abandoning 14 more pieces of cannon, and immense magazines of ammunition and provisions; and, notwithstanding the rapidity of their flight, the Egyptian light-horse brought in 1900 prisoners. This battle was fought close to the spot where Alexander encountered and defeated Ragusa, ii. the army of Darius on the Issus: so uniformly does the Ann. Hist. conformation of the country in Asia Minor bring con- 400. tending armies into the same field of conflict.1 By these successive victories Ibrahim had gained the command of the whole sea-coast of Syria, from Egypt to the foot of the Taurus: Acre, Tripoli, and Aleppo had successively fallen into his hands; he had taken eighty pieces of cannon, killed or made prisoners 13,000 men, 1 340, 342; xv. 399, XXXII. 13. the cam CHAP. dispersed two armies, and driven the remains of them into the defiles of the Taurus. These great successes at 1832. length roused the Divan from their apathy, and made Results of them sensible of the necessity of making a vigorous effort paign, and to avert the approaching dismemberment of their empire. great pre- The command-in-chief was taken from Hussein Pacha parations of the Porte. and given to the Grand Vizier, Redschid Pacha, already celebrated by his victories in Albania and Bosnia, and the subjugation of the rebels in those provinces. His character was noble and lofty, and he possessed all the personal and mental qualities which in all armies, but especially the oriental, are so important an element in success. A fresh army of above 50,000 men, for the most part regular soldiers, with a numerous artillery, was intrusted to his orders.1 1 Ragusa, ii. 343, 345; Ann. Hist. xv. 399. 14. Ibrahim to Oct. 13. Informed of the approach of such formidable forces, the Advance of Egyptian army was concentrated at Adana, still, however, Konieh. holding Aleppo, and keeping up the communication by sea with Egypt, while six battalions, with a corps of irregular cavalry, took post at Orfah, in order to secure the pass by the Diarbekir, over Mount Taurus, to Sivaz and Erzeroum. There it remained, recovering from its fatigues, and receiving reinforcements, till the 13th October, when it moved forward in two columns towards the passes of the Taurus. The main body marched on Nimroud, in the front of the Turkish position, while the irregular troops were moved on Tcheskau, to turn the position. These movements had the effect of compelling the Ottomans to abandon their ground in the mountains, and the Egyptian vanguard took possession of Erekli, without opposition, on the 22d October. The troops remained there, being excessively fatigued, till the 11th November, when, being provided with bread for six days, they moved direct upon KONIEH, where the Turkish army was concentrated; while a body of irregulars, by a circuit through the mountains, threatened to gain their rear by the route of Karaman. This march was made by Ibra Nov. 11. XXXII. 1832. him with every precaution, and he was prepared, at a CHAP. moment's warning, to form order of battle. The troops moved in five columns. The artillery was in the centre, then a column of infantry on the right and left,—the cavalry on either flank. This was as nearly as possible Cæsar's order of march when near the enemy, and very 344, 345: 1 Ragusa, ii. different from that of Korsakoff from Zurich in 1799, Ann. Hist. who put the artillery in the rear of the column, and 403; Caesar, thereby lost the whole, and occasioned the total defeat of Gall. his army.1 xv. 402, de Bell. tions for a battle. The Ottomans, however, did not await Ibrahim's ap- 15. proach, but, after a slight skirmish of cavalry, evacuated PreparaKonieh, leaving behind them immense magazines of am- decisive munition and provisions. The rudeness of the season now compelled inactivity to both armies, during which the Egyptian general was indefatigable in his endeavours to reinforce and strengthen his position. He selected a field for battle in front of Konieh, which he studied with the utmost care, and on which he frequently exercised his troops in the manoeuvres which he anticipated in the approaching conflict. Several cavalry combats took place during this period, in which the superior generalship and discipline of the Egyptians prevailed, and in one of which they took five hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. Everything conspired in favour of Ibrahim: the discipline and equipment of his troops were obviously superior to that of the enemy; they had been victorious in every encounter, and the religious spirit of the Mussulmans, which had been severely depressed by their long train of disasters, rapidly revived under a chief who led the Arabs out of their deserts to victories almost recalling those of the early days of Islamism. He seemed an instrument in the hand of Providence to reinstate the true faith, and punish the degenerate Turks, who had Ann. Hist. departed from the precepts of the Prophet. xv. 401, How far 403; Ragu sa, ii. 346, will you advance? |