XXXII. 1840. CHAP. next ten days. The annual tribute to be paid by the Pacha was to be proportioned to the territory of which he obtained the administration, according as he acceded to the first or second ultimatum. In any event, the Pacha was to engage to deliver up the Turkish fleet, with its entire crews and equipages, to the person empowered to Hist. xxiii. receive it on the part of the Turkish Government, and the commanders of the allied squadrons were to be a party to this delivery.1 1 Traité, July 15, 1840; Ann. 147 (Doc. Hist.) 58. terms, and rangements to enforce it. July 15, 1840. When this treaty was intimated to the Pacha, he The Pacha broke out into the most violent fury. "Vallah-billahrefuses the billah!" (by the Almighty God), exclaimed he, "I will military ar- not surrender a foot of land which I possess; and should of the Allies they declare war against me, I will overturn the empire, and bury myself beneath its ruins." But very different preparations from a mere ebullition of Oriental wrath were requisite to withstand the forces of the Allies, whose arrangements were alike complete and effective. By a supplementary treaty signed the same day between Turkey and the four allied Powers, it was stipulated, that if the Pacha should refuse the proposed terms, the allied Powers were, on the requisition of the Sultan, to concert measures for interrupting the communication between Egypt and Syria; and for that purpose Great Britain and Austria agreed to unite their naval forces, and give the requisite orders to their respective commanders. In the event of the Pacha directing his forces by sea or land against Constantinople, the high contracting parties agreed to put adequate forces at the disposal of the Sublime Porte, and in particular to put the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in a sufficient state of defence. It was expressly stipulated, however, "that those steps shall in no way derogate from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all ages been forbidden to ships of Hist. xxiii. war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus ; 2 and the Sultan, by the present act, declares that, with the exception above mentioned, 2 Traité, July 15, 1840; Ann. 145 (Doc. Hist.) XXXII. 1840. he is firmly resolved to maintain in future the principle CHAP. invariably established as the ancient rule of the empire, as long as the Porte remains at peace, to admit no foreign vessel of war within the straits of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles." 59. towards France was no party to any of these treaties; so that she was now, as in the latter years of the wars of Napo- Concilialeon, in a manner isolated from Europe, and the alliance the allied which had grown up since the Revolution of 1830 seemed Powers threatened with dissolution. The allied Governments, how- France. ever, were careful to do everything in their power to prevent a rupture with her; and in a joint note addressed to the Cabinet of the Tuileries by their ambassadors it was stated: "The French Government has received, during the whole course of the negotiations which have commenced in the autumn of last year, the clearest and most incontestible proofs of the desire of the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to arrive at a good understanding regarding the measures to be pursued in the East with the French Government. From these efforts, the Cabinet of Paris may judge of the importance which the four great Powers attach to the moral influence which the entire union of the five Powers would have in a matter so grave and so important to the peace of Europe. The four Powers have perceived with regret that all their efforts to attain this end have been unsuccessful; and though lately they have proposed to France to unite itself to them, in order to complete an arrangement based upon what the French ambassador in London himself proposed in the close of the last year, the French Government has not thought fit to accede to the arrangement. It made its co-operation depend on conditions which the allied Powers deemed incompatible with 1 Note, July the dignity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and 16, 1840, the future peace of Europe.1 The four Powers, however, to France; indulge the hope that their separation from France on 205. this subject will not be of long duration; and they now four Powers Cap. x. 203, 1840. CHAP. address themselves in the most earnest manner in order XXXII. to obtain the moral co-operation of the French Government, in employing its great influence with Mehemet Ali to induce the Pacha to accept the terms offered to him; an interposition which, if effectual, will secure for France fresh claims to the gratitude of the world." 60. irritation in France. The French Government, however, was by no means Extreme inclined to adopt these pacific views; on the contrary, the irritation in Paris at the adjustment of this treaty apart from them was such, that France and England were on the verge of a war. M. Thiers had never anticipated such rapid and decisive measures on the part of the English Government; on the contrary, he expected to have himself arranged a treaty between the Porte and the Pacha without the interposition of the four Powers, and thereby secured the influence of France in an effectual manner both at Constantinople and Alexandria. Great, accordingly, was the consternation of the French Cabinet, and especially of M. Thiers, when they received intelligence of the signature of the treaty of 15th July. It was communicated with studied courtesy, accompanied by an entire copy of all the documents connected with it, on the 19th July; but so far from the feelings of the French Government being mollified by this courtesy, they were only the more exasperated by it. A burst of warlike enthusiasm immediately broke forth both in the Government and the people. The public indignation knew no bounds. The national honour was thought to be outraged a slight put upon the people which could be washed out only in blood. On all sides there was a universal cry for arms. Not a single journal in Paris failed to call out loudly for war. The allied Powers, and England in particular, were the objects of the most impassioned invective. The entente cordiale was forgotten; the envenomed feelings of the revolutionary war sprung up again with fearful energy. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm, M. Thiers proposed that the Cabinet should declare its sittings per XXXII. 1840. manent; that the army should forthwith be raised to CHAP. 500,000 men; extensive fortifications be erected round Paris and the frontier fortresses; the fleet in the Mediterranean be largely augmented; and in fine, to meet these extraordinary expenses, a credit of 100,000,000 francs (£4,000,000) should be given to the Ministers by a simple ordonnance of the King, without awaiting the assembling of the Chambers. To all these proposals the King gave a ready and unqualified assent, and they were adopted by the Council. The idea of encircling Paris with a series of detached forts had long been a favourite one with Louis Philippe, and frequently discussed in the Council, and he was too happy to take advantage of the present moment of excitement and consternation to get it carried into effect with the general concurrence of the 457. nation.1 1 Cap. x. Ann. Hist. 210, 214; xxii. 456, 61. danger of between Matters had now come to such a pass between England and France, that a rupture between them seemed not Imminent only imminent, but inevitable. Already, in the spring of a rupture the year, the magnitude of the French naval force in the England Mediterranean, which amounted to eighteen sail of the and France. line, had excited the anxiety of Lord Palmerston ;* and it was little allayed by the assurance of M. Thiers that it amounted only to fifteen. Such was the pitiable state of weakness to which the British naval force had been reduced by the ceaseless reductions of previous years, that the English fleet in the Mediterranean consisted only of nine line-of-battle ships, of which the largest bore 110 *“J'ai à faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique a été informé qu'en addition aux dix-sept vaisseaux de ligne qui sont déjà équipés ou en armement, pour le service de la Méditerranée, l'Inflexible de 90 canons va prendre la mer à Rochefort, et que la France aura bientôt dix-huit vaisseaux de ligne, dont plusieurs à trois ponts, dans la Méditerranée. Si ces renseignemens sont exacts, il y a là matière à l'attention la plus sérieuse du Gouvernement Britannique."-" M. Thiers m'a assuré que le Gouvernement Français n'avait pas équipé, et ne se proposait pas d'équiper, plus de quinze vaisseaux de ligne, dont neuf devaient stationner dans le Levant, et six rester à Toulon."-LORD PALMERSTON à LORD GRANVILLE, March 5, 1840; and LORd Granville à LORD PALMERSTON, March 9, 1840; CAPEFIGUE, x. 212, 213. XXXII. 1840. CHAP guns; and the Turkish fleet was ranged with the Egyptian on the other side. The crisis, therefore, was imminent, and the risk extreme; and the two fleets lay side by side during the whole summer, in the bay of Besika, at the mouth of the Dardanelles, hourly expecting the order to commence hostilities. The British were inferior in numbers, but they were confident of the result, and anxiously awaited the signal in the night, double watches were kept, the decks were kept cleared for action, and the guns double-shotted. The French sailors were equally zealous and enthusiastic, and the consciousness of their superiority of force made them sanguine of success. In France, the revolutionary passions were let loose with the utmost fury, and nothing short of a war of propagandism against Europe seemed capable of satisfying the popular desires ; * while Russia eagerly promised an army of 40,000 men to operate in Asia Minor, and Austria agreed to furnish 50,000 men to protect the northern provinces of Turkey from injury or insult. It was evident, from the readiness with which the great Powers proffered their aid for the defence Ann. Hist. of the Sultan, that each conceived that in so doing it was advancing its own interests. Men are never so liberal 1 Cap. X. 219, 231; xxiii. 297, 301. but from selfish motives.1 The plan of the Allies was to strike a decisive blow in the Levant with such rapidity that the contest might be terminated there, before any efficient steps could be taken by France to prevent it. For this purpose the * "Nous retournons vers 1831, vers l'esprit révolutionnaire exploitant l'entraînement national, et poussant à la guerre sans motif légitime, sans chance raisonnable de succès, dans le seul espoir des révolutions. L'intérêt de la France ne conseille pas de faire de la question de Syrie un cas de guerre. Nous avons hautement dit que la distribution des territoires entre le Sultan et le Pacha nous importait peu. Nous l'avons constamment dit, aucun des intérêts supérieurs de la France n'est attaqué; ce qu'on tente en Orient peut amener autre chose sur ce qu'on tente. Des évènemens peuvent surgir auxquels la France ne saurait rester étrangère. Ce n'est pas une raison d'élever soi-même des évènemens et des questions plus graves encore, et qui ne naitront point naturellement. On n'a voulu ni insulter, ni défier, ni triompher de la France par le traité du 15 Juillet. On lui a demandé son concours, et elle l'a refusé.”—M. Guizor à M. le DUC DE BROGLIE, July 28, 1841; CAPEFIGUE, X. 215, note. |