XXXII. 1841. CHAP. seemed to be renewed: men beheld with joy that a peace of twenty-five years' duration had neither lessened the energies or weakened the courage of our troops by sea and land; and that Great Britain, victorious in every quarter of the globe, was enabled to take the same lead in European diplomacy which she had done when the British standards waved in triumph over the walls of Paris. Nor did it lessen the general exultation that the theatre of the greatest triumph of this glorious period had witnessed a signal defeat of the French arms; that Stopford had conquered where Napoleon had failed; and 184, 273, 1 Ann. Reg. that Acre, the scene of the chivalrous exploits of Richard Coeur-de-Lion, again saw the standards of St George conquering and to conquer.1 284. 78. tages of the treaty were rent than real. These feelings were natural and excusable; and unThe advan- questionably the triumph of Acre shed as much lustre on the British arms as the treaties of 15th July more appa- 1840, and 13th March 1841, did on the talents and influence of her diplomatists. Yet were the successes of this memorable period in a great degree deceptive; the advantages gained were more apparent than real-the seeds of greater jealousies were sown-the foundation of a more terrible struggle laid than that which had just been appeased. The alliance was concluded, and the chances of war were hazarded, in order to counteract the growing influence of France on the banks of the Nile, and obviate the dangers of the Ottoman Empire on those of the Bosphorus. And unquestionably one set of dangers was obviated by its successful issue, for the authority of the Sultan over Egypt was re-established, and the imminent risk the Ottoman Empire ran after the battle of Konieh removed. But is that the greatest danger which Turkey really ran? is it from the South or the North that its independence is most seriously menaced? Has it nothing to fear from the northern colossus, to whom, by this treaty, the Euxine became an inland inaccessible lake? Undertaken to XXXII. 1841. rescue Constantinople from the perilous exclusive guar- CHAP. dianship of Russia, the war left the Sultan tête-à-tête with the Czar in the Black Sea; intended to secure British influence in the Isthmus of Suez, the high-road to India, it left the Pacha bound by strong ties both of interest and gratitude to the French Government! * The terrible war of 1854, intended to open the Euxine to foreign vessels, and terminate the fatal supremacy of Russia in its waters, was the direct consequence of the treaty of 1841, purchased by the victories of Beyrout and Acre! 79. of succour in 1833 was These consequences, however, are not to be ascribed so much as a fault to the British Government in 1841, as to The refusal the infatuation of counsels or prostration of national to the Turks strength which led to its refusing succour to the Ottoman the fatal Government when the Sultan applied for it in the last step. extremity after the battle of Konieh in 1833. In 1840 the crisis was imminent-Turkey could be rescued from destruction only by the forcible interposition and close union of the allied Powers, and Lord Palmerston * "Je remercie la France de n'avoir pas signé le traité de Londres, c'est une consolation et une force pour moi. Je suis profondément touché du service qu'elle m'a rendu en faisant valoir mes droits, et je ne l'oublierai jamais. S'il lui convenait aujourd'hui de s'opposer aux projets des Puissances, je serais fier de combattre à ses côtés ; je mettrais à ses ordres ma flotte, mon armée, et mon fils. Si elle ne le fait pas, je comprends sa réserve. Nos positions ne sont pas les mêmes; nos mouvemens doivent peut-être rester indépendans. Que la France agisse comme elle l'entendra; pour moi, je garderai toute ma liberté d'action. On a fait contre moi un traité inique et violent je n'attaquerai pas ceux qui l'ont signé ; je serai patient et modéré ; mais je verserai la dernière goutte de mon sang, pour conserver l'empire que j'ai fondé. Si les Puissances se bornent à bloquer les côtes de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, j'ai les moyens d'attendre, et j'attendrai sans tirer l'epée; mais que l'on attaque Saint Jean d'Acre ou Alexandrie, que l'on cherche à allumer l'insurrection du Liban, et sur-le-champ je donnerai l'ordre à mon fils de passer le Taurus. On veut faire une Vendée en Syrie, sur les derrières de mon armée ; j'en ferai une dans l'Asie Mineure, où déjà les populations se lèvent à ma voix. Je suis le représentant de l'Ismalisme; je proclamerai la guerre sainte, et tout bon Musulman viendra se ranger derrière moi. On croit m'effrayer par une coalition des quatre Puissances; je saurai bien la dissoudre en marchant sur Constantinople. J'allumerai un tel incendie que l'Europe aura bien assez de ses propres affaires, et l'Empire Ottoman sera sauvé. Quoi qu'il arrive, j'aurai fait mon devoir: je me soumets à la volonté de Dieu."-MEHEMET ALI à M. WALEWSKI Aug. 15, 1840; Capefigue, Dix Ans de Louis Philippe, x. 227, 228, note. XXXII. 1841. CHAP. evinced his vigour and address in the manner in which he reunited them to England for the attainment of that important object. But it was otherwise when succour was refused to the Sultan by the British Government eight years before. That was, perhaps, the most fatal and inexplicable omission ever made by the Cabinet of Great Britain. The much wished-for opportunity had arrived. Turkey, in the agonies of dissolution at the hands of its rebellious vassal, had flown to England for protection; a few sail of the line would have placed the capital in safety, and the prestige of Muscovite supremacy would have been at once destroyed by the most important of its protected States having voluntarily placed itself under the ægis of another and a rival power. Instead of this, what did England do? She refused succour; threw the Ottomans into the arms of Russia, who extorted, as the price of her protection, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which converted the Euxine into a Russian lake; and left the forts of the Bosphorus vis-à-vis to the bastions of Sebastopol, with a few sail of the line, ill-manned, to combat eighteen line-of-battle ships, the skill of whose gunners England afterwards so fatally experienced on the ramparts of the Malakoff and the Redan! Thus are nations led to destruction by the want of foresight in the national councils. 80. But this want of foresight, especially in relation to Which arose foreign affairs, was of a very recent origin in the British Reform Bill Councils. Mr Pitt, in 1789, had put a bridle in the and the con- mouth of the Czar, and in conjunction with Prussia from the traction of the cur rency. arrested the march of the united Muscovite and Austrian armies when on the high-road to Constantinople. But the England of 1789 was not the England of 1833. The Reform Bill had banished foresight from the national councils, preparation from the national armaments. So vehement had the passion for economy become in consequence of the ascendancy of the class of shopkeepers in the constituency, and the straitened state of XXXII. 1841. the finances from the contraction of the currency, that CHAP. the House of Commons was unable to furnish supplies to Government adequate to upholding the national influence in the affairs of the world. Thence the loss of the longdesired opportunity of supplanting Russia at Constantinople in 1833. The British Government openly avowed, when applied to by the Turkish for succour, that they had neither ships nor men to send. The whole subsequent difficulties of the Eastern Question, and the dreadful and costly war which afterwards became necessary to repair the consequences of this omission, arose from that inconsiderate and ill-timed reduction of the national armaments, which rendered it impossible to take advantage of this golden opportunity. 81. the nation from the mania for The high position which the English occupied in the world, in consequence of the victories of Beyrout and Dangers of Acre, and the peace which followed them, must not ren- in 1841 der us blind to the magnitude of the dangers which the country incurred in entering upon that hazardous conflict. reduction. The whole regular forces of Great Britain at that time. were under 100,000 men, of whom three-fourths were absorbed in Ireland and the colonies. Not more than 25,000 men and 40 guns could have been collected to defend the coasts of the Channel from the invasion of a power which had 300,000 men and 300 pieces of cannon at its disposal. Even in the navy, the right arm of England's strength, we had become, from blind reduction, inferior to our ancient rivals. France had fifteen ships of the line in the Mediterranean when the conflict was imminent in 1841, and England only nine. The whole line-of-battle ships in commission in that year were only 16, instead of 100, which during the war were constantly at sea. Sir Charles Adam, a Lord of the Admiralty, had said in his place in Parliament two years before, that it was a mistake to say England was wholly defenceless, for she had three ships of the line and three frigates to guard the coasts of the Channel-being just half the force pos XXXII. 1841. CHAP sessed by Denmark when assailed by Great Britain in 1807! Yet, with all this deplorable prostration of strength, the Government of England held its head as high, and assumed as dictatorial a tone in foreign diplomacy, as when she possessed 200 ships of the line, and 1000 vessels of war bore the royal flag! Great Britain escaped the enormous peril of this inconsistent line of conduct at this period, not from the wisdom of her own councils, but the strength of her allies; war was averted, not because she was irresistible in the Mediterranean, but because the German Confederacy had 300,000 men ready to appear on the Rhine. But she was not equally fortunate on every other occasion; and the sequel of this History will show what lamentable consequences it induced, and what tears of blood her people shed for a conduct which was now pursued amidst the loud applause of the unthinking multitude, invested by existing institutions with the irresponsible government of the country. England never incurred such danger as she did at this period, from the senseless combination of arrogance of conduct with impotence in preparation; and it is no exaggeration, but the simple historical truth, to assert that she was brought nearer to ruin within ten years by the consequences of the Reform Bill than she had been either by the ambition of Louis XIV. or the genius of Napoleon. |