XXXIII. 109. of Constan tine. CHAP. sented a magnificent spectacle to the French soldiers. The Cirtha of the Numidians and Romans, it recalled, 1836. at a distance, from the multitude of its domes and Description minarets, the aspect of Toledo, or the Moorish cities in Andalusia; but its substantial means of defence were much more formidable than those of any of these cities. Surrounded by a ravine 100 feet deep and 150 broad, with precipices on either side, it was provided by nature with a natural fosse, impossible to pass, save on two bridges of great elevation, which entered the town through strong iron gates, powerfully defended by artillery and loopholed walls. The houses were, for the most part, handsomely built, with flat roofs, after the Eastern fashion, and the environs adorned by the cemeteries and cypresses which give such a picturesque air to oriental cities. The French troops established themselves on the opposite plateau of Mansoura, from whence they gazed with the utmost anxiety on the splendid spectacle, which was illuminated by a passing gleam of sunshine, when the red flag of defiance was hoisted by the Arabs, 180, 181. and several shots from pieces of heavy calibre issued from the ramparts.1 1 Cap. ix. 193, 195; Ann. Hist. xix. 275; L. Blanc, v. 110. the French. Nov. 23. It was now evident that a surprise was not to be looked Repulse of for; and as they had neither supplies nor siege artillery for regular approaches, nothing remained but to try a coup-de-main. A desultory attack of the Arabs, who hovered in the vicinity, having been easily repulsed by the troops on the plateau of Mansoura, the few fieldpieces which were with the army were brought forward to the front, and began to fire against the defences of the two gates at the end of the bridges, but they were speedily dismounted by the 24-pounders on the ramparts; and an attempt to run mines under the gates to blow them up failed from the hardness of the rock on which they stood. In despair of being able to effect the reduction of the place by any other means, Clausel ordered an assault on each of the gates. 2 Two regiments accord Cap. ix. 196, 197; Ann. Hist. xix. 275, 277; L. Blanc, v. 182, 183. ingly were formed in close column, and advanced over the bridges with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the strength of the inner gates, cased in iron, that they resisted all the efforts of the sappers to force them open, and after sustaining a heavy loss from the fire of the place, which was still wholly unsubdued, the troops, in deep dejection, were obliged to retire. to see. CHAP. XXXIII. 1836. 111. retreat of Nov. 23 to Nothing remained now but to retire; but how to conduct a retreat during eight days, in the face of a cloud of Disastrous pursuing Arabs, at that inclement season, it was not easy the French. In those elevated regions, several thousand feet Dec. 1. above the sea, and among the first ridges of the Atlas, the ground was covered with snow, and the march back, from the very outset, exhibited on a small scale the horrors of the Moscow retreat. The retrograde march was covered by a rear-guard under the orders of GENERAL CHANGARNIER, who, like his immortal predecessor, Marshal Ney, amidst the Russian snows, exhibited alternately the capacity of a general and the courage of a private soldier. On one occasion, when a cloud of Arabs was preparing to charge his little band, formed in square, he said, "My friends! look at those people there; they are 6000, you are 300 the sides are equal." Immediately after, the thundering charge was met by a volley within pistol-shot, which speedily sent the assailants to the right-about. But notwithstanding all the efforts of the officers, discipline was relaxed, and disorder appeared in the column; the severity of their hardships, as is always the case in similar circumstances, broke through all rules. The casks of wine were forced open by the starving multitude, and numbers sank on the snow, and perished in the midst of the howling wilderness. On the 28th the army reached Ghelma, when the sick and wounded were left under the charge of a strong garrison; and at length, on December 1, xix. 277, the long wished-for minarets of Bona appeared, and the ix. 195, 196; troops enjoyed the sweets of cover and repose after 185, 186. their excessive hardships.1 They brought back with them L. Blanc, v. XXXIII. CHAP, their guns and part of their caissons, but they had to lament the loss of 472 killed, or dead of cold and fatigue, and 288 wounded. 1836. 112. Mistrust and bitter tions in France. The war of the sabre and musket over, that of recrimination in France commenced, and it was so violent as for recrimina a time to drown every thought of the real nature of the disaster in the anxiety to discover to whom it was to be ascribed. The Liberals, headed by M. Dupin, were clear that it was all owing to the attempt to retain Algiers, that fatal bequest of the Restoration, and loudly demanded that it should be instantly evacuated. The Ministerialists laid the whole blame on Marshal Clausel, a favourite Republican chief, who had, they alleged, commenced the operation in the most tempestuous season of the year, without any information of the enemy he was going to attack, and no heavy artillery to subdue his defences. In the midst of this general recrimination, all felt, but few ventured to say, that the real fault lay with the Chamber of Deputies, and the constituencies which had returned them, who had v. 185, 186; starved the national forces in Africa, till they were renCap. ix. 197, dered incapable of effecting anything decisive, and, gov erned by little and economical considerations, rendered the nation incapable of achieving anything great.1 1 L. Blanc, 198; Ann. Hist. xix. 278. 113. Noble con duct of the King and Amidst this tumult of passion and selfish recriminations, when every party was striving to turn a public disaster to their private advantage, the King and the Ministers. Cabinet acted a noble part, and showed the world that, to governments not less than individuals, "sweet are the uses of adversity." Instead of being discouraged by misfortune, they took council of it only to shun error: they followed the advice given to Æneas, not to yield to evils, but resist them the more vigorously. In opening the Chamber, the King said: "While I regret with you the losses of the army, I have the consolation of thinking that my second son has shared its dangers; and if success Dec. 27, 1836. * "Tu ne cedes malis, sed contra audentior ito." -VIRG. Æneid. XXXIII. 1837. has not crowned its efforts, at least its heroism, patience, CHAP. and perseverance, have sustained its ancient reputation; and I doubt not that the Chamber will take such steps as will secure in Africa preponderance of our arms, and put our possessions in that quarter in a state of entire security." These gallant words produced the greater impression, that a few minutes before they were uttered intelligence had been received in the Chamber that an attempt had been made to assassinate the King in pass- 1 Moniteur, ing through the archway of the Tuileries to come to the Dec. 28, Chamber, by the murderer Meunier, and that the Prince- Hist. xx. 3, Royal had been slightly wounded in the face by the splin- 204. ters from the shot.1 1836; Ann. 4; Cap. xi. Oran. This intrepid conduct electrified the country, and over- 114. powered the selfish by the national feelings. The Cham- Affairs of ber voted larger supplies, and the force put at the disposal Feb. 1837. of the generals was made more considerable, amounting to 30,000 effective men. Marshal Clausel was recalled, and the command of the province given to General Damremont, an able and intrepid officer, thoroughly abreast of the times, and whose honour and sincerity had been evinced by his fidelity to the fallen dynasty, to which he had been attached. General Bugeaud commanded in the province of Oran, where he was opposed to Abd-el-Kader; and he had so long been accustomed to a separate command, and was at such a distance from headquarters, that he was in a manner the chief of a separate principality, and little inclined to receive orders from his superiors. The consequence was, that an unfortunate rivalry got up between the two commanders ; and General Bugeaud, fearful that General Damremont might forestall him in effecting the pacification of the western province, and the submission of the redoubted 2 Ann. Hist. Emir, was induced to go into measures attended in the 341, 342; end with disastrous effects to the French interests in 341, 343. Algiers.2 The force in the western province had been consider Cap. ix. XXXIII. 115. views of Damremont and Bu geaud on them. CHAP. ably augmented since the calamitous expedition to Constantine had opened the eyes of France to the abso1837. lute necessity of voting large forces for the war, and they Diverging amounted now to 10,000 men, occupying the strong Generals posts of Tlemson, La Tafna, Arzew, and Mortanegem. The Arabs under Abd-el-Kader were posted in the open country, and, without pretending formally to invest these places, contented themselves with simply blockading them at a distance, and interrupting all the convoys destined for their supply. Such a state of things could not be prolonged without hazard to the interests and discredit to the honour of France; and both General Damremont and General Bugeaud were very anxious to bring it to a termination. The former had written in the strongest terms to the latter, however, that no pacification was to be entered into but on the basis that the Emir was not to pass the river Cheliff, and that a ten years' war in Africa would be preferable to such an alternative.* Bugeaud, however, fearful that his commander would take the matter into his own hands, and get the credit of pacifying the west, hastened his preparations, and in the beginning 1 Ann. Hist. of May, having formed his army into three divisions, set xx. 343, out from Oran at the head of 8000 men, with which he ix.343,344; moved towards Tlemson, with the view of re-victualling that fortress, and driving the Emir, sword in hand, into the wilds of the interior of Africa.1 344; Cap. L. Blanc, v. 253,254. Alarmed at the approach of forces so considerable, which he was in no condition at the moment to oppose, Abd-el-Kader had recourse to the usual Asiatic resource of dissimulation. He professed an anxious desire for peace, and for that purpose proposed an interview with "Il faut que Abd-el-Kader s'engage à ne jamais dépasser le Cheliff, et qu'il contribue à établir à Titleri une puissance régulière indépendante de lui, et soumise à la France. Nous ne devons consentir pour rien au monde à ce que Abd-el-Kader établisse sa domination dans le province de Titleri, d'où il peut sans cesse menacer celle d'Alger et prêter son appui à Achmet Bey. Une guerre de dix ans serait préférable dans l'intérêt de nos établissemens en Afrique, à une paix qui mettrait Abd-el-Kader dans Médeah."-Gen. DamreMONT au GEN. BUGEAUD, April 8, 1837; CAPEFIGUE, ix. 342, 343. |