this section of the constitution was intended to apply to the annual recur. ring taxes known at the time of the adoption of the constitution and imposed generally upon the entire property of the state. The legislature would know definitely the objects for which such taxes were imposed, and could anticipate, with some certainty, the amount which they would produce; and in their imposition it was deemed important by the framers of the Constitution that the object of the tax should be stated." Per Earl, J., in In re McPherson, (1877) 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685, 58 A. S. R. 502. See also Matter of Stickney, (1905) 110 App. Div. 294, 97 N. Y. S. 336, affirmed, (1906) 185 N. Y. 107, 77 N. E. 993; writ of error dismissed, 209 U. S. 419, 28 S. Ct. 508, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 863; Guest v. Brooklyn, (1876) 8 Hun 97. And in People v. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n, (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380, affirmed 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct.. 108, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 342, it was said that the tax covered by this section “is one general in its provisions and co-extensive with the state."

Permanent tax. This section, relating only to general taxes recurring annually, has no application to a permanent tax. Thus an act (ch. 483, Laws of 1885) imposing a tax on "gifts, legacies and collateral inheritances ' is not subject to the requirements here made. "The tax imposed by this act is a permanent one. It is always uncertain upon whom it will fall and how much revenue it will produce. It would have been impossible for the legislature, perhaps years in advance, to specify the particular objects to which the tax should be applied." In re McPherson, (1877) 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685, 58 A. S. R. 502. See also Matter of Stickney, (1905) 110 App. Div. 294, 97 N. Y. S. 336, affirmed, (1906) 185 N. Y. 107, 77 N. E. 993; writ of error dismissed, 209 U. S. 419, 28 S. Ct. 508, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 863.

Tax in nature of a license fee. A tax in the nature of a license fee or condition is not within the requirements of this section. Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome, (1883) 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217, affirming 29 Hun 391; People v. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n, (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380, affirmed 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct. 108, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 342. “We are of opinion,” said the court in People v. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n, supra, “ that this provision does not relate to a tax imposed as a condition upon a foreign insurance company, and, therefore, in fact in the nature of a license fee, and that the tax covered by the constitutional provision is one general in its provisions and coextensive with the state." And in Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome, supra, is was held that an act (ch. 89, Laws of 1879) requiring the agents of foreign fire insurance companies, doing business in the city of New York, to pay a tax on the gross premiums received by them for insurance upon property in that city cannot be objected to because it does not "distinctly state the tax" nor "the object to which it is to be applied."

Guest v.

Local assessment.— This section has no application to an act (ch. 383, Laws of 1869) authorizing an assessment for local purposes. Brooklyn, (1876) 8 Hun 97.

Thus

Disposition of proceeds of existing tax as imposition or continuation thereof. A law that specifies what may be done with a tax that has already been properly imposed, does not fall within the purview of this section. chapter 907, Laws of 1869, providing for the application of the taxes assessed on any railroad in a municipality toward the redemption of bonds issued by the municipality in aid of the railroad cannot be attacked as obnoxious to these provisions. In re Clark, (1887) 106 N. Y. 104, 12 N. E. 341.

Modification of manner of collection.- A statute which amounts to a mere modification "in the process of collecting a tax already imposed" does not come within this provision. Accordingly, chapter 382 of Laws of 1879, chapter 402 of Laws of 1881, and chapter 516 of Laws of 1883, which are only a modification of the general system of taxation placing the duty of selling lands for unpaid taxes on the county instead of the state and charging the

county with the unpaid tax instead of having it assumed by the state, are constitutional. These statutes are not the imposition or the continuance or the revival of a tax, but a mere modification in the process of collecting a tax already imposed. People v. Ulster County, (1885) 36 Hun 491.

Statement of maximum tax with provision for reduction as sufficient statement of tax. The specification in a law imposing a tax of the maximum tax to be levied with a provision for the levy of a less tax in case the maximum should not be necessary is not a sufficiently distinct statement of the tax imposed. Thus, chapter 734, Laws of 1872, offends in this respect in imposing a tax of three and a half mills on the dollar, or so much thereof as may be necessary to provide for the payment of certain obligations. "The law imposes a tax of three and a half mills per dollar, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to provide for the payment, etc. This is not a specific and distinct statement of the tax to be levied. It is simply a statement of the maximum tax to be levied, leaving it to the discretion of the administrative officers of the state to levy such a tax as they shall find necessary up to the limit named. The legislature cannot, under the Constitution, thus delegate the power of taxation. They must determine the amount necessary and adequate, and declare the amount to be levied absolutely. If this form of enactment is allowable, a law authorizing a tax of fifty per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property of the state, or so much thereof as might be necessary, would be valid, and the whole legislative taxing power delegated to the other departments of the state government. The law is invalid as not stating the tax imposed." People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 556. Compare People v. Flagg, (1871) 46 N. Y. 401. A statute imposing a definite tax is not rendered invalid, however, by the failure of the legislature subsequently to appropriate all the money which will probably be received thereunder. In such a case no implied power is granted the executive authorities to lower the tax prescribed or to fix it at a figure that will yield an amount sufficient to meet the legislative appropriations. No other tax than that specified can be imposed and the statute therefore satisfies the requirements of this section. Matter of Attorney-General, (1890) 58 Hun 218, 12 N. Y. S. 754.

Provision for payment of tax to legally recognized fund of state as sufficient statement of object.-The requirement of this section that every law for the imposition of a tax shall distinctly state the object thereof is met, apparently, by the direction that the proceeds of the tax shall be paid to one of the legally recognized funds of the state. Thus, a direction to pay the proceeds of a tax into the treasury to the credit of the general fund is a sufficiently distinct statement of the object of the tax, although such fund is applicable to practically any object which the legislature may deem proper. People v. Home Ins. Co., (1883) 92 N. Y. 328, affirmed, 134 U. S. 594, 10 S. Ct. 593, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1025; People v. Orange County, 1858) 17 N. Y. 235, affirming 27 Barb. 575; Matter of Attorney-General, (1890) 58 Hun 218, 12 N. Y. S. 754; People v. National Fire Ins. Co., (1882) 27 Hun 188. See also In re McPherson, (1877) 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685, 58 A. S. R. 502. That holding was made in People v. Orange County, (1858) 17 N. Y. 235, affirming 27 Barb. 575, wherein the court, after first alluding to the custom of distributing the total revenues of the state into several distinct funds according to the source from which they are derived and the purpose to which they are to be devoted, made these remarks: "Had the legislature instead of raising money by tax to defray the necessary and incidental expenses of government, as by the law in question it is proposed to do, determined to increase the revenue and efficiency of any other one of the funds devoted to the expenditures of government, as for example the common school or literature fund, I suppose no one would have been found to insist that an act constructed after the pattern of that now under consideration would not have satisfied the requirement of the constitution, in respect to the mode of stating the

object of the tax. It would have been quite sufficient for the legislature, in stating the object of the tax, to say that the money to be raised when collected should be paid into the treasury of the state to the credit of the common school fund or the literature fund. The only distinction that I can perceive between such a law and one designed to increase the revenues of the general fund is, that in the latter case, the money when collected and paid into the treasury may be applied to a greater variety of expenditures than in the former case. In neither case can it be paid out except in pursuance of an appropriation act, distinctly specifying both the amount appropriated and the object to which the appropriation is to be applied. If the construction which has been adopted by the legislature, in this and every other tax law enacted under the present constitution is to be rejected, I can see no other rule of interpretation short of a complete embodiment of the appro

priation act in the law imposing the tax. It would be necessary for the legislature after having stated the tax, and the fund to which, when collected and paid into the treasury it is to be credited, to proceed and specify the persons to whom, and the purposes for which, it shall be disbursed. Every tax bill would then be an appropriation bill also. It is obvious that such a requirement would be productive of infinite embarrassment to the governThe argument, ab inconvenienti, against such an interpretation of the provision in question, seems to me to be very strong. Indeed, I think it would operate, practically, to deprive the legislature of all power to raise money by taxation."

ment.

Provision for application to tax to "ordinary and current expenses" of state. Since the specification of the replenishment of a legally recognized fund of the state is a sufficiently distinct statement of the object of a tax, it follows that the designation of one or more of the several classes of expenditures lawfully chargeable to that fund is equally sufficient and distinct. Thus, the general fund being devoted both to the ordinary and current expenses of the state and to any appropriation not payable from any other fund, an act (ch. 542, Laws of 1880) imposing a tax to be applied "to the payment of the ordinary and current expenses of the state," sufficiently complies with the requirements of this section. People v. Home Ins. Co., (1883) 92 N. Y. 328, affirmed 134 U. S. 594, 10 S. Ct. 593, 33 U. S. (L. ed.) 1025; People v. National Fire Ins. Co., (1882) 27 Hun 188; People v. Davenport, (1881) 25 Hun 630, affirmed (1883) 91 N. Y. 574.

Provision for payment "for the use of the state." - Apparently a direction that a tax shall be paid "for the use of the state" is not a sufficient indication of the object thereof. In re McPherson, (1877) 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685, 58 A. S. R. 502. Judge Earl, speaking for the court in that case, criticised the rule above noted to the effect that a provision that a tax shall be paid to the general fund is a sufficient indication of its object. In the course of his opinion, Judge Earl made these remarks: "The decision which first announced this doctrine greatly impaired the value of the constitutional provision, because when the tax has once been paid into the general fund it may be appropriated by the legislature to any of the innumerable objects, ordinary and extraordinary, for which the state may need money; and thus any information given to members of the legislature or to taxpayers, by such a statement of the object of the tax, is more illusory than real. But it must be assumed that the constitutional provision still has some value, and it should not be entirely nullified by judicial construction, as it would be if we should hold that this act sufficiently states the object of the tax within the meaning of the constitution." The case was decided on other grounds, however.

Reference to comptroller's report to fix object of tax.- Reference may not be made to the comptroller's report for the purpose of stating the object of tax and a statute relying on such a reference to fix the object of a tax which

it imposes is void under this section. People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 556.

Reference to statute.- Chapter 734, Laws of 1872, is invalid under this section inasmuch as the object of the tax imposed by that statute can be ascertained only by reference to chapter 700, Laws of 1872, and by reference therefrom to certain other acts therein mentioned. People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 556.

§ 25. Quorum of three-fifths necessary for passing certain bills. On the final passage in either house of the Legislature, of any act which imposes, continues or revives a tax, or creates a debt or charge, or makes, continues or revives any appropriation of public or trust money or property, or releases, discharges or commutes any claim or demand of the State, the question shall be taken by yeas and nays, which shall be duly entered upon the journals, and three-fifths of all the members elected to either house shall, in all such cases, be necessary to constitute a quorum therein.

Const. 1846, Art. VII, § 14; continued without change in the amendments of 1874, Art. III, § 21, and in Const. 1894, Art. III, § 25.

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Tax. It has been said that the tax contemplated by this section is one general in its operation and coextensive with the state." People v. Chenango, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317. See also Matter of Weeks, (1905) 109 App. Div. 859, 96 N. Y. S. 876, affirmed, (1906) 185 N. Y. 541, 77 N. E. 1197. Accordingly, the Act of April 16, 1851, imposing a militia commutation tax, is not a tax law within the meaning of this provision. “It would do violence to the section, to suppose that it had reference to the commutation tax, so called in the military law, which operates only upon a small class of persons, and which is a mere substitute of money for military duty." People v. Chenango, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317. Also, this provision contemplates only those acts which in themselves impose a tax. Thus, the Act of 1855, chapter 428, providing for compensating persons whose property may be destroyed, in consequence of mobs or riots, is not a tax law within this section, though a recovery under it may result in the necessity of a tax. "This act of 1855 does not impose a tax of any kind, either state or municipal. Its provisions may, and no doubt will, lead to the necessity of local taxation; and the same thing may be said of every act of legislation under which an expenditure for general or local purposes may, in any contingency, be required. If a local tax in a city or village is within the scope of the section, it will be sufficient to have the requisite quorum present, when the tax shall come to be voted." Darlington v. New York, (1865) 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248, affirming 2 Robt. 274. Furthermore, this section has no application to an act imposing, reviving or continuing a tax in the nature of a license fee or condition. Thus, the presence of three-fifths of each branch of the legislature is not required to constitute a quorum on the final passage of an act (ch. 89, Laws of 1879), requiring the agents of foreign insurance companies to pay over to public purposes a fixed percentage on the business done by them in the city of New York. Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome, (1883) 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217, affirming 29 Hun 391.

Debt or claim.- This provision "relates to legislative acts, which of themselves, or by their immediate and necessary consequence, create a debt or claim." Thus, the Act of 1855, chapter 428, providing for compensating persons whose property may be injured in consequence of mobs or riots does not constitute a debt or claim. "If no person should suffer damage by a riot

or mob, no money would be required, and no debt or charge would ever be created; and until such an event shall occur, no debt or claim will be called into existence. The legal principle, which imputes the act of an authorized agent to his principal, does not apply to the rioters contemplated by the statute, whose wrongful act might lead to the incurring of a debt. They would not be, in any sense, the agents of the legislature." Darlington v. New York, (1865) 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248, affirming 2 Robt. 274. Appropriation. An act (ch. 428, Laws of 1855) which provides for the compensation of persons whose property may be injured or destroyed by a mob is not an appropriation bill in the sense of this constitutional provision. "No public or trust moneys were disposed of or set apart for the purpose of being expended; it could not be known when, if ever, any payment of money would be required to be made, nor in what county or city it would be required; and none of the public moneys of the state were to be expended in consequence of any of the provisions of the act." Darlington v. New York, (1875) 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248, affirming 2 Robt. 274. Likewise, a militia commutation tax (Laws of 1851) which "substitutes the payment of fifty cents, by all able-bodied white male citizens, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, subject to military duty in this state, and not doing duty in the uniformed militia, for the services on parade formerly required, and in lieu of the fines for nonperformance of military duty formerly exacted," does not amount to an "appropriation of public or trust money within the meaning of the constitution." People v. Chenango, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317. In that case the court said: "To commute for military services by the payment of a sum of money, is analogous to the practice which has long prevailed in this state, of commuting for highway labor. An appropriation of fines and commutation money, under our acts relative to highways, for the improvement of the roads in the town or road district, and of military fines and commutations for the benefit of the militia, has long been a part of the policy of our laws. It existed, without complaint, at the adoption of the last constitution, and for forty years before, and there is no reason to believe, that any abuses in the system were known to the convention, or led to the adoption of the 14th section of the 7th article, article 3, section 25. That section was framed to guard against a class of abuses of an entirely different character."

Change in disposition of existing appropriation. The requirements of this section do not extend to acts effecting changes in the disposition of a valid existing appropriation. Such acts neither make nor continue appropriations. Thus, the presence of three-fifths of each branch of the legislature is not required to constitute a quorum on the final passage of a bill making a corporation that had formerly received only a portion of a certain appropriation the sole payee thereof. Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome, (1883) 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217, affirming 29 Hun 391.

"Yeas and nays requirement.—The requirement of this section that the "yeas and nays "shall be called and entered upon the journal does not apply to a vote on receding from amendments which have been disagreed to by the other house. Furthermore, this requirement "is only directory to the legislature; there is no clause declaring the act to be void, if this direction be not followed." People v. Chenango, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317.

Evidence of passage.- When an act within this section is passed, "but the certificates of the presiding officers of both houses attached to the original bill are defective in failing to show that the requisite number of members were present or voted therefor, recourse may be had to the journals of the two houses to support the validity of the enactment." In re Stickney's, (1906) 185 N. Y. 107, affirming 110 App. Div. 294, 97 N. Y. S. 336; Matter of Weeks, (1905) 109 App. Div. 859, 96 N. Y. S. 876, affirmed (1906) 185 N. Y. 541, 77 N. E. 1197. See also People v. Chenango, (1853) 8 N. Y. 317. And see Art. 3, § 20.