Art. VI, § 15 years, except in the county of New York, where they shall continue to be fourteen years. Surrogates and Surrogates' Courts shall have the jurisdiction and powers which the Surrogates and existing Surrogates' Courts now possess, until otherwise provided by the Legislature. The County Judge shall be Surrogate of his county, except where a separate Surrogate has been or shall be elected. In counties having a population exceeding forty thousand, wherein there is no separate Surrogate, the Legislature may provide for the election of a separate officer to be Surrogate, whose term of office shall be six years. When the Surrogate shall be elected as a separate officer his salary shall be established by law, payable out of the county treasury. No County Judge or Surrogate shall hold office longer than until and including the last day of December next after he shall be seventy years of age. Vacancies occurring in the office of County Judge or Surrogate shall be filled in the same manner as like vacancies occurring in the Supreme Court. The compensation of any County Judge or Surrogate shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. For the relief of Surrogates' Courts the Legislature may confer upon the Supreme Court in any county having a population exceeding four hundred thousand, the powers and jurisdiction of Surrogates, with authority to try issues of fact by jury in probate cases. Const. 1846, Art. VI, § 14; amended, Judiciary Article, 1869, Art. VI, § 15; amended, Const. 1894, Art. VI, § 15. See also Const. 1777, Art. XXIV, and Const. 1821, Art. V, § 6. Powers of surrogate.- A Surrogate's Court has no authority, save that conferred on it by statute.`“Notwithstanding the fact that surrogates' courts are not now courts of record, it is to be emphasized that they are still courts which possess no jurisdiction except such as has been specially conferred by statute, together with such incidental powers as may be requisite to enable them to effectually exercise the jurisdiction actually granted." Runk v. Thomas, (1911) 200 N. Y. 447, 94 N. E. 363, reversing 138 App. Div. 789, 123 N. Y. S. 523; In re Bolton, (1899) 159 N. Y. 129, 53 N. E. 756, affirming 37 App. Div. 625, 56 N. Y. S. 1105. Thus, in the absence of a statute granting such power, a Surrogate's Court is not competent to direct a conversion of an infant's property from personalty into realty, by which the infant will be bound on attaining majority, or by which the devolution or disposition of the property will be bound in case of the infant's death under age. Matter of Bolton, supra. This section, however, in providing that surrogates and Surrogates' Courts shall have the jurisdiction and powers which the surrogates and existing Surrogates' Courts now possess, until otherwise provided by the legislature, excludes authority to add to the jurisdiction possessed by such courts. "The only power reserved in the legislature is to regulate, take away, cut down or limit the jurisdiction thus conferred; but no authority exists to add to it. If it did the constitution would not have imposed any limitation or be a bar to the conferring of the most ample jurisdiction, both legal and equitable, which could be provided by law. Manifestly such is not its construction. It may withhold power, but it cannot grant it beyond the limitation of its exercise existing at the time when the constitution was adopted." Runk v. Thomas, (1911). 200 N. Y. 447, 94 N. E. 363, reversing 138 App. Div. 789, 123 N. Y. S. 523; In re Bunting, (1904) 98 App. Div. 122, 90 N. Y. S. 786, appeal dismissed, 182 N. Y. 552, 95 N. E. 1128. Accordingly, assuming that the legislature intended, by section 7 of the Personal Property Law, to confer power on the Surrogate's Court to determine, on the application of a creditor of a decedent, the validity of an alleged fraudulent transfer made by the decedent in her lifetime, the section would be unconstitutional, the power attempted to be conferred never having been exercised by Surrogates' Courts. Matter of Bunting, supra. However, a different rule seems to have prevailed before the provision set out above was adopted. Prior to that time the legislature could confer on surrogates such jurisdiction as it listed. Matter of McPherson, (1877) 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685, 58 Am. Rep. 502. Relation of term of surrogate to that of county judge.- Apparently, the provision that the judge of a county wherein a separate surrogate has not been elected, shall be the surrogate thereof, requires that the terms of office of county judges and surrogates be identical. A statute effecting a change in the term of either office, therefore, effects also a corresponding change in the term of the other. People v. Townsend, (1886) 102 N. Y. 430, 7 N. E. 360, reversing 40 Hun 360. Term of office of surrogate elected to fill vacancy. Apparently, the provision that the successors to the surrogates holding office at the time of the adoption of this section shall be elected for a term of six years, prescribes the term of office not only of the immediate successors to the surrogates then holding office, but also of all surrogates subsequently elected. Accordingly, the term of a surrogate elected to fill a vacancy caused by death runs for six years and does not expire with the termination of the term for which his immediate predecessor was elected. People v. Townsend, (1886) 102 N. Y. 430, 7 N. E. 360, reversing 40 Hun 360. § 16. Special county judge and surrogate. The Legislature may, on application of the board of supervisors, provide for the election of local officers, not to exceed two in any county, to discharge the duties of County Judge and of Surrogate, in cases of their inability or of a vacancy, and in such other cases as may be provided by law, and to exercise such other powers in special cases as are or may be provided by law. Const. 1846, § 15; continued without change in Judiciary Article, 1869. Art. VI, 66 16. ४ Power of legislature under section.- Taking the recognizance of bail is a special case," within the meaning of this section of the Constitution, and that power may be conferred by the legislature upon a local officer appointed to discharge the duties of county judge, independent of any disability of the county judge or vacancy in his office. Furthermore, it seems that the legislature would have the right to confer that power upon the local officer, even though it could not be considered a special case. People v. Main, (1859) 20 N. Y. 434. In that case the court said: "Let us suppose that . . the duty of letting to bail upon an indictment could not be considered a special That duty and all the other official acts which a county judge may be called upon to perform out of court are things necessary to be done, and it is within the discretion of the legislature to provide agencies for their performance. Concede now that they do not necessarily belong to the functions case. of the local officer as defined by the constitution, what is the objection to the selection by the legislature of that officer as one of the official persons who are to perform them? The provision that he shall exercise such powers in special cases as the legislature shall provide, does not imply a prohibition against charging him with other duties which do not fall within the description of special cases. If the duties which it is designed to impose upon him are not exclusively attached by the constitution to another office, they may be distributed among any of the existing offices in such manner as the legislature may determine." § 17. Justices of the peace; election, term, etc. Removal of inferior judicial officers and their clerks. The electors of the several towns shall, at their annual town meetings, or at such other time and in such manner as the Legislature may direct, elect Justices of the Peace, whose term of office shall be four years. In case of an election to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term, they shall hold for the residue of the unexpired term. Their number and classification may be regulated by law. Justices of the Peace and judges or justices of inferior courts not of record, and their clerks, may be removed for cause, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard by such courts as are or may be prescribed by law. Justices of the Peace and District Court Justices may be elected in the different cities of this State in such manner and with such powers, and for such terms, respectively, as are or shall be prescribed by law; all other judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof. Const. 1821, Art. IV, § 7; amended in 1826; amended, Const. 1846, Art. VI, § 17; amended, Judiciary Article, 1869, Art. VI, § 18; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. VI, § 17. See also Const. 1777, Art. XXIV. I. Election and appointment of officers, 446. II. Term of office, 448. III. Removal from office, 448. IV. Status and jurisdictional rights of justices o, peace, 450 I. ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS. Election or appointment as alternatives.— Under the provision that “ judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in this article, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities, or appointed by some local authorities thereof ", the legislature can provide but one method of selecting a particular class of officers in the same territorial or civil division. Such officers must either be elected or appointed one or the other, not both. Thus, the legislature cannot provide that the magistrates in the borough of Brooklyn shall be elected and that those in the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx shall be appointed. "The mandate of the constitution is that judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for, shall be chosen by the electors of such cities or appointed by some local authorities thereof. This language is plain and unequivocal. It presents two distinct alternatives. Either may be chosen. It must be one or the other. If the office is to be filled by appointment, the agency by which that is to be accomplished is broadly, yet clearly designated. If the officer is to be elected, the power of appointment is as plainly excluded. ... If judicial officers of the same grade, performing the same duties in the same local division, may be appointed in part and elected in part at the same time, we shall not have long to wait for such use of the power as will serve the selfish ends of the designing few at the expense of the public weal. If magistrates may at the same time be appointed in the borough of Manhattan and elected in the borough of Brooklyn, why may they not be elected in one part of a borough and appointed in another? And if this may be done what becomes of the system by which two boards of magistrates are created in the two divisions of the Greater New York, designed to promote unity and cohesion in the administration of criminal justice in the city at large?" People v. Dooley, (1902) 171 N. Y. 74, 63 N. E. 815, affirming 69 App. Div. 512, 75 N. Y. S. 350. Justices of the peace in cities and District Court judges as elective officers.Under this section of the constitution electors of towns are required to elect justices of the peace at their annual town meetings, or at such other time and in such manner as the legislature may direct, but " justices of the peace and district court justices may be elected in the different cities of this state in such manner and with such powers and for such terms respectively as are or shall be prescribed by law." Accordingly, "while the legislature may determine whether cities shall or shall not have justices of the peace or district court justices, if they determine in favor of the existence of these officers, the offices must be filled by election." Markland v. Scully, (1911) 146 App. Div. 350, 131 N. Y. S. 364, affirmed 203 N. Y. 158, 96 N. E. 427. Municipal Court justice as District justice.—The justices of the Municipal Court of the city of New York are District Court justices within the meaning of this section of the constitution. Markland v. Scully, (1911) 203 N. Y. 158, 96 N. E. 427, affirming 146 App. Div. 350, 131 N. Y. S. 364; People v. Dooley, (1902) 171 N. Y. 74, 63 N. E. 815, affirming 69 App. Div. 512, 75 N. Y. S. 350. See also Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102 (opinion of Haight, J.). Compare Matter of Schultes, (1898) 33 App. Div. 524, 54 N. Y. S. 34. Therefore, that office is elective, and is controlled by the provision of article 10, section 5, which places a limitation on the tenure of a person appointed to fill a vacancy in an elective office. Markland v. Scully, (1911) 203 N. Y. 158, 96 N. E. 427, affirming 146 App. Div. 350, 131 N. Y. S. 364. Compare Matter of Schultes, (1898) 33 App. Div. 524, 54 N. Y. S. 34. Police justices in the city of New York are not included within this constitutional provision, declaring that "justices of the peace and district court justices shall be elected in the different cities in this state," etc. Accordingly, these officers may be appointed as provided by the Act of 1873 (ch. 538) entitled "An act to secure better administration in the police courts of the city of New York." Wenzler v. State, (1814) 58 N. Y. 516; People v. Morgan, (1874) 5 Daly 161, affirmed, 58 N. Y. 679. In Wenzler v. State, supra, this was said: "No confusion of terms, no interchangeable use of names in respect to these officers, has ever prevailed. The justice of the peace has been a definite legal entity, and has not been confounded with police justices nor district justices nor assistant justices. Each has been referred to in legislation by the appropriate title, and the name of neither has been used to designate the other." Art. VI, § 17 Justices of Peace, Etc. II. TERM OF OFFICE. Extension of term of office. The legislature would seem to be incompetent to extend the term of a judicial officer elected by the electors of the city or appointed by a local authority in pursuance of this section. People v. Bull, (1891) 46 N. Y. 47. See further as to this point, Art. 10, § 2. Power of legislature to shorten term. It is unquestionable that the legislature cannot abrogate or shorten the term of office prescribed for a justice of the peace by this section. People v. Howland, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838, affirming 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347; In re Gertum, (1888) 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328; Garey v. People, (1827) 9 Cow. 640; People v. Treacy, (1899) 46 App. Div. 216, 61 N. Y. S. 288. Also, apparently, that body has not the power to direct that the office of justice of the peace shall be filled at a date earlier than that of the election which next precedes the expiration of the term of an existing incumbent. People v. Treacy, (1899) 46 App. Div. 216, 61 N. Y. S. 288. Recorders and city judges are not within the protection of this section, "and, therefore, their terms of office are within the control of the legislature.” People v. Kent, (1903) 83 App. Div. 554, 82 N. Y. S. 172. 66 Officers within provision for filling vacancy in unexpired term. It seems that the provision of this section relative to filling a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term applies to justices of the peace in cities and District Court justices as well as to justices of the peace in towns. Markland v. Scully, (1911) 203 N. Y. 158, 96 N. E. 427, affirming 46 App. Div. 158, 131 N. Y. S. 364. The court said: Following the provision with reference to the election of justices of the peace in towns is the provision that in case of election to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of a full term they shall hold for the residue of the unexpired term. It is claimed that this clause has reference to filling vacancies of justices of the peace in towns, and not to justices of the peace and district court justices in cities. But it will at once be seen, on referring to the election of judicial officers in section 3, article 12, that if the vacancy is filled for a full term, it will in every case, where the vacancy occurs in an odd numbered year, violate the provisions of that section. It consequently appears to me that the provision with reference to filling vacancies for the unexpired term must also apply to the election of judicial officers to fill vacancies in cities, at least in so far as the cities embraced in that section are concerned, which are those of the first and second class, excluding those of the third class." Right of justice of peace to immediate entrance in office.- A justice of the peace elected to fill a vacancy created otherwise than by the expiration of a regular term, is by the express provision of this section entitled to enter upon his office immediately after the election. Therefore, the term of a justice of the peace appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy terminates at once upon the election of a person to fill the residue of the unexpired term. "This is not at all inconsistent with the powers implied in the fifth section of the tenth article authorizing such appointments to extend to the commencement of the ensuing year. The two provisions, when construed together, as they must be, show that although appointments extending beyond the election may be made in many cases, the office of justice of the peace presents an exception." People v. Keeler, (1858) 17 N. Y. 370, reversing 25 Barb. 421. III. REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. Removal of inferior court justices. In pursuance of the provision that justices of the peace and justices of courts not of record and their clerks shall be removed for cause by such courts as may be designated by la that power has been cast directly upon the Appellate Division of the Supremat |