any abuse. Penalties are provided for violation of this section.

Another outcome of the recent revelations of railroad abuses is in section 9 of the anti-trust act, which declares that an officer or director of a common carrier who " embezzles, steals, abstracts or wilfully misapplies or wilfully permits to be misapplied " its money, securities or property is guilty of a felony. Such acts are, in general, already made crimes under the laws of the individual states, but it will perhaps be possible for the federal government to enforce them more effectively in the case of interstate carriers.

IV. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

By all odds the most important feature of the new trust legislation is the creation of a federal trade commission. The commission is composed of five members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three may be of the same political party - a provision which is of doubtful merit, as it really recognizes party lines in the administration of that which should be looked upon as wholly outside of those lines. The term of office is seven. years and the salary $10,000. The commission is in fact to be a body of similar dignity with the interstate commerce commission, tho the latter has seven members.

The commission is to take over the bureau of corporations and it is expected that the head of that bureau, Honorable Joseph E. Davies, will be a member of the commission. The expert employees of the bureau will be a useful nucleus for the force of the commission. It may be noted that the special experts and examiners which the commission is authorized to employ are

exempted from the classified civil service. It is a long step from a bureau of corporations headed by a single commissioner at a salary of $5000 to a board of five members, each paid twice that salary. Useful as have been the investigations of the bureau, the public has a right to expect from this great new commission results of a far more important character.

The new act contains full provisions as to the investigatory powers of the trade commission. In substance it gives the commission complete power to investigate the affairs of all corporations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, except common carriers and banks. The commission and its agents have access to the books and records of corporations and may require by subpoena the production of any or all of their papers. Witnesses may also be required to appear and testify. There are the usual provisions regarding testimony tending to incriminate its giver; he may not refuse to testify on that account, but is thereafter immune from prosecution.

The investigatory powers of the commission thus far mentioned are not materially greater than those heretofore possessed by the bureau of corporations. But the law creating that bureau made no definite provision for annual or special reports from corporations, and the general powers of investigation conferred on it have never been assumed to empower the bureau to demand such reports. The new law, however, explicitly authorizes the trade commission to require annual or special reports from any corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce except banks and common carriers. The commission is not compelled to call for reports from every corporation; it can determine what classes of corporations or what particular corporations must report and also determine the scope and character

of the information to be furnished. The commission may require the reports to be under oath.

These powers of the commission with respect to reports from corporations are approximately the same as those given to the interstate commerce commission with respect to railroads. The trade commission, however, lacks the power possessed by the latter to prescribe systems of accounts for corporations and to prevent them from keeping other accounts. It would doubtless be premature to give the trade commission that power. To devise satisfactory accounting systems for the multiplicity of corporations in different lines of business would take years. Obviously the accounts cannot be uniform to any such degree as those of railroads. For this reason the reports to be required from corporations will necessarily at first be less detailed than those made by railroads, and will probably not be so reliable, even tho made in entire good faith.

The new act prescribes penalties for failure to make reports required by the commission or for making false reports. But it goes much further. Any person who wilfully makes or causes to be made any false entry in any account or record kept by a corporation is declared guilty of a misdemeanor. So too is any one who neglects or fails to make full and correct entries in such accounts and records of all facts and transactions appertaining to the business of the corporation. certainly is a drastic provision and will have to be interpreted with reasonable liberality. Finally, penalties are prescribed for altering or falsifying any documentary evidence of a corporation or for removing it out of the jurisdiction of the United States. The salutary character of these provisions is obvious.

This

The information secured from the reports of corporations to the trade commission will not merely be of

great aid to that commission itself in the exercise of its other powers, but if the more important data are published they will serve other most useful purposes. It has been a common contention that publicity alone will go far toward preventing excessive charges and other corporate abuses. The benefits of publicity in this direction have sometimes been exaggerated, but they are important. If the reports show that corporations in a given line of business are making unusually large profits competition will be the more likely to enter the field and bring down prices.

Under the new act the trade commission itself decides what information obtained by it- by whatever means obtained shall be made public, save only that the law prohibits the commission from publishing trade secrets and names of customers. The term "trade secrets" will undoubtedly be taken to mean merely secrets as to processes of production and the like. The general language of the law seems to imply the expectation that a great deal of information secured by the commission will be made public. It is sincerely to be hoped that the trade commission will see fit to make public all the important information it secures through the system of reports or in other ways, just as the interstate commerce commission does. It will be recalled that under the law creating the bureau of corporations that bureau itself has no power to determine what information secured by it shall be made public, the determination resting with the President. As a matter of fact the President, presumably at the instance of the bureau, has withheld much information regarding individual corporations which would have been of material value to the public. A few years ago sentiment in the business world was scarcely ripe for such a measure of publicity as may properly be de

manded today. In fact great corporations are more and more on their own initiative adopting the policy of making full reports to the public. The injury to a business concern from the disclosure of its affairs is seldom serious, and any concern whose business is so great as to affect materially the welfare of masses of people has no right to consider itself a private institution.

Reference has already been made to the important powers of the interstate trade commission as to the enforcement of the new provisions of the anti-trust legislation. The general prohibition of unfair competitive methods, that of price discrimination and that of restrictive sales and leases are enforceable only through the commission. The same is true of the prohibitions with regard to intercorporate stock ownership and interlocking directorates, except as they relate to banks and common carriers, where other federal boards have jurisdiction. This is clearly as it should be, at least for the time being. The commission through its expert investigation will be able soon to amass a great body of information regarding competitive methods and methods of combination. Such information is largely lacking at the present time. On the basis of such information the commission should develop a sounder judgment regarding these matters than could be expected of prosecuting officers or judges.

In addition to its special powers in the enforcement of the provisions mentioned, the commission is required to aid in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws generally (§ 6). On the direction of the President or either house of Congress it has the power and duty to investigate and report the facts relating to alleged violation of the anti-trust acts by any corporation. Upon the application of the attorney general it must investigate and make recommendations in order that a corporation