tects' refusal of additional time is in bad faith. 3. Provision that building contractors shall not be liable for delay caused "by the unusual action of the elements or otherwise" does not require great and unexpected disturbances of the weather, but is satisfied where the delay is on account of events rendering the work inpracticable. 4. Interest is properly allowed, in suit to enforce mechanics' liens, from the time the amounts thereof became due under the building contract. Appeal from appellate court, Third district. Suit by J. W. Patterson & Co. and others against Robert D. McDonald. From a judgment of the appellate court affirming a decree for complainants (84 Ill. App. 326), defendant appeals. Affirmed. D. D. Evans, Kimbrough & Meeks, and Evans & McDowell, for appellant. W. J. Calhoun, H. M. Steely, C. M. Swallow, O. M. Jones, John H. Lewman, George F. Rearick, M. w. Thompson, and Love & Jewell, for appellees. CARTWRIGHT, J. J. W. Patterson & Co. entered into a contract in writing with appellant to furnish the material and erect for him a hotel and bank building in Danville. They agreed to complete the building by November 20, 1895, and finished it May 6, 1896. The final payment was to be made within 10 days after the contract was finished, upon the certificate of the architects. On May 7, 1896, said contractors filed their bill in chancery in the circuit court of Vermilion county to enforce a mechanic's lien against the premises, and several subcontractors intervened in that suit, also claiming liens. The bill was dismissed without prejudice as to complainants,-perhaps because it was prematurely filed,—but the suit remained in court for the benefit of the intervening subcontractors. Afterwards, J. W. Patterson & Co. filed another bill to enforce their claim of a mechanic's lien, and other subcontractors intervened. The cases were consolidated, and the complainants and intervening petitioners, 11 in number, are the appellees. Appellant answered both bills, admitting the contract, but denying that the building was erected according to its terms, alleging that the contractors failed to furnish the architects' certificate that the work had been done to their satisfaction, or evidence that the premises were free from liens, and setting up payments under the contracts and damages for defective work and material. The case was referred to the master in chancery to take the evidence, and he was ordered to repor the same, with his conclusions of law and fact. He took a great amount of testimony, and stated the accounts of the contractors and subcontractors, and reported the same, with his conclusions. He made a very careful and full report upon all the claims of the respective parties, allowing some of the damages claimed, and disallowing other claims, and found the lien of each contractor and subcontractor, and the total amount, with interest from the time the same became due. Appellant objected to the master's report, and upon an argument and hearing before the master he adhered to his report, and it was filed in court. Appellant excepted to the report, and there was a hearing before the chancellor, who came to the same conclusion as the master, overruled the exceptions, and entered a decree in conformity with the report. The defendant appealed to the appellate court for the Third district. The record was there reviewed, and upon consideration thereof the decree fixing the rights of appellant and the contractors and subcontractors was adjudged to be right, and was affirmed. The appellate court struck out an allowance of $300 to the master in chancery as costs for stating the account, but found against appellant on the merits, and he prosecuted this further appeal to this court. Counsel for appellant have bound together their original brief and argument in the appellate court, and a lengthy argument in reply to the appellees in that court, and have filed that volume here as their original brief and argument in this court. In this alleged brief and argument of questions pending in this court they are still assigning error and complaining of the allowance of $300 to the master, as to which the appellate court sustained their assignment of error and struck out the allowance, and other questions are discussed which are not in issue here. The brief is not a compliance with the rules of this court. One of the points argued is that the contractors were not entitled to any payment until they presented to defendant the certificate signed by the architects that the work had been done to the full satisfaction of such architects. The contract provided for certificates of that kind, and the rule is that the decision of architects acting as umpires in such cases is conclusive, unless in case of fraud or collusion with the owner. The procuring of the certificate was a condition which the defendant had a right to insist upon before he made payments, but it was a right which he could waive, and he could not insist upon the condition if the architects refused to act at all, or fraudulently withheld the certificate by collusive arrangement between him and them. Fowler v. Deakman, 84 Ill. 130; Church v. Brose, 104 Ill. 206; Arnold v. Bournique, 144 1. 132, 33 N. E. 530, 20 L. R. A. 493; Michaelis v. Wolf, 136 Ill. 68 26 N. E. 384. The architects lived in Chicago, and defendant had a superintendent on the building during the construction, and was about the building himself almost every day. He made payments from time to time without certificates, and, of course, as to those payments the requirement was waived. Just before the building was completed one of the architects examined it, and issued certificates amounting to $2,204 in the name of the cou tractors to the subcontractors, and also issued certificates amounting to $8,500 due to the contractors, and delivered them to the defendant. This architect had come from Chicago to Danville at defendant's request, to examine the building. The defendant did not pay the certificates, or disclose the fact that he had them, but kept them. They did not state that the work had been done to the full satisfaction of the architects, but did certify to the amounts due under the contract. After the contractors claimed that the building was finally completed, they requested payment, and the defendant, holding in his possession these certificates delivered to him by his architects, demanded certificates that the work was done to the satisfaction of the architects. The architects were in the employ of defendant, and they refused, on request of the contractors, to come to Danville and examine the building. The contractors repeatedly requested defendant to have them come and make such examination, but he never directed them to come, and the architects would not come without such direction. The evidence showed a wrongful refusal on the part of the defendant to carry out that part of the contract, and justified an inference of collusion between defendant and his architects, which obviated the necessity of obtaining the certificate. The principal single element of damage claimed by the defendant is $15 per day from November 20, 1895, to May 6, 1896, for delay in completing the building. The contract provided that the contractors would pay $15 per day as liquidated damages, except in case of delay caused by the neglect, delay, or default of any other contractor; or by any alteration which might be required; or by any damage by fire, or by the unusual action of the elements, or otherwise; or by the abandonment of the work by the employés through no default of the contractors,-in which case additional time was to be allowed. No such allowance was to be made unless an applica- | tion in writing was presented to the architects, who should award and certify the amount of additional time. The evidence showed that 18 days' additional time was required by reason of alterations and changes in the work required by the defendant, 16 days also caused by the defendant being compelled to tear down and rebuild the north and east foundation walls, and 35 days by the unusual action of the elements. One hundred days' delay was caused by the default of a subcontractor which was deemed to be not within the exception, and for this time the master and court allowed $1,500 as damages, which was charged against the subcontractor. Three applications were made to the architects, under the provisions of the contract, for additional time, but they refused to make any allowance of time upon any account. They refused to even allow the addi tional time which was required by what the defendant himself did, and from all the circumstances, taken in connection with what occurred as to the final certificates, we conclude that their action was not in good faith; and, if the conclusion that the delay of 35 days was within the terms of the contract is correct, the question of damages for delay should not be disturbed. It is insisted that no delay on account of weather is within the contract, except some great and unexpected disturbance of the elements; but the language of the contract is, "by the unusual action of the elements or otherwise." This language shows the obvious intention that the contractors were not to be liable for delay on account of events which would render the work impracticable, and which they could not control, and we think the evidence satisfactorily shows that the 35 days allowed came within that exception. Another alleged error is that the court allowed interest on the amount due from the time it was payable by the terms of the written contract. The contract called for the construction of the building according to the plans and specifications, with such alterations as should be required. The suit was upon the contract, and the entire amount of all the liens became due upon this instrument in writing. By the statute a creditor is entitled to interest upon money after it has so become due. In Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill. 57, 41 N. E. 750, which was a suit to recover a balance on a written contract to construct a dock, the court, speaking of the plaintiffs' right, said: "If they were entitled to that price under the contract, the statute gave them the right to interest from the time the money became due by the terms of the written agreement." The law gave to the subcontractors a right to portions of the amount due to the original contractors by the written instrument, but the disposition of the moneys as between the original contractors and subcontractors did not affect defendant. By the law and the decree the payment of the amount due a subcontractor is a satisfaction pro tanto of the amount due on the original contract, but the money is all due upon the contract and according to its terms. Claims for damages are very numerous, and relate to settling of part of the building where the foundation was built out of old rubblestone of a previous foundation, the kind and quality of material, and failure to put in certain anchors and rods, painting, glazing, and general bad character of the work and material. There are about 2,000 pages of testimony taken before the master, and it is contradictory. We have examined it, and are satisfied with the conclusions of the master, the chancellor, and the appellate court. To review it or go over the claims in detail would occupy a great deal of space, with no resulting benefit. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (186 Ill. 432) GAGE v. EDDY.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 21, 1900.) QUIETING TITLE-BURNT RECORDS ACT-PUBLISHING NOTICE-JUDGMENT-BAR OF CAUSE OF ACTION-TRIAL-OBJECTIONS ΤΟ EVI DENCE TAX DEEDS-REPAYMENT. 1. A petition to quiet title under the burnt records act described the land as the south 20 acres of a government subdivision, and the cross petition, asking that the title be quieted in defendant, described the land as the south half of the same subdivision, which contained more than 40 acres. Held, that the dismissal of the cross petition was not erroneous, there being no notice of its pendency to give the court jurisdiction with reference to the lands, if any, not embraced in the original petition, as required by Burnt Records Act, § 12, requiring the publication of notice of the filing of petitions for a decree confirming title. 2. A cross petition to quiet title is barred by a judgment in ejectment in favor of plaintiff against defendant relating to the same lands. 3. An objection to the reception in evidence of court records of a trial, verdict by jury, and entry of a judgment in ejectment, introduced to show a bar by res judicata, that they are "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial," will not cover an objection to their reception because the titles of the entries did not show the judgment to be against the same defendants. 4. The record in ejectment disclosed a trial by jury, and a verdict in a cause by E. against G., and in a later entry a judgment in ejectment on the verdict of a jury in a cause by E. against G. and other defendants, bearing the same docket number. Held, that the judg ment entry was sufficient to establish an adjudication of the title to the premises in an equitable action by E. against G. on cross petition of G. 5. Where suit was brought to quiet title in plaintiff, and defendant, holding under certain tax titles, filed a cross petition to quiet title in himself, and pending suit plaintiff recovered the land in ejectment, and the cross petition was dismissed on the merits, and original petition dismissed for want of prosecution, defendant was not entitled to repayment of sums paid for the tax deeds, as would be the case had a decree been given on the original petition. Appeal from superior court, Cook county; Philip Stein, Judge. Suit by Clara E. Eddy against Henry H. Gage to quiet title and cross petition by defendant. From a decree dismissing the cross petition on the merits and the original petition for want of prosecution, defendant appeals. Affirmed. October 29, 1891, one William H. Eddy filed a petition in the superior court of Cook county, under the provisions of the burnt records act, for a decree confirming and establishing title in him to a certain tract of land described as the S. 20 acres of the N. 11⁄2 of the E. 1⁄2 of the N. W. 4 of section 28, township 38 N., range 14, in Cook county, excepting railroad right of way, etc. January 16, 1892, the appellant, Gage, one of the defendants to the said petition, filed an answer thereto, asserting said tract of land was in his actual possession, and that he was the owner of the fee-simple title thereto. On the same day the appellant filed a cross petition, claiming to be the owner of the said tract by Rehearing denied October 5, 1900. title in fee simple (describing the tract differently, however, but including it, and perhaps about two acres of land, in addition), and prayed that a decree be entered establishing and confirming the title in him. The original petitioner, Eddy, filed a replication to the answer of Gage, and filed also an answer to the cross petition exhibited by Gage. October 17, 1892, Eddy, by leave of the court, filed an amended petition, to which Gage filed an answer, in which he adopted the answer first filed, and made further answer to the amended petition. It does not appear a replication was filed to this answer. The cause was continued from time to time, without further steps or order, until May 2, 1899, when an order was entered dismissing it for want of prosecution. On June 20, 1899, this order of dismissal was, on motion of appellant, set aside, and the cause reinstated; and it being suggested said William H. Eddy, the original petitioner, had departed this life, on motion the appellee, his sole heir at law, was substituted as petitioner. Appellee thereupon, by leave of the court, filed a supplemental answer to the cross petition of appellant, in which she represented to the court that on September 28, 1889 (about two years prior to the filing of the original petition herein), said William H. Eddy, deceased, instituted in the circuit court of Cook county an action in ejectment against the appellant to recover the title to the tract of land involved in the petition and cross petition; that said suit in ejectment was pending when said pe tition and cross petition were filed; that said William H. Eddy and the appellant voluntarily proceeded with the action of ejectment until the death of said Eddy, which occurred February 20, 1896; that appellee, being the sole heir of said Eddy, was substituted as plaintiff in said ejectment suit, and that the issues in ejectment between her and said appellant were voluntarily litigated and submitted to juries for trial on two separate occasions; that she prevailed and obtained a judgment in said circuit court in ejectment establishing title in fee in her to said tract of land; and that said judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. 53 N. E. 1008. Appellant filed a general replication to this supplemental answer to his cross petition. The cause being called for disposition, appellee, by her solicitors, stated in open court that she did not desire or intend to offer evidence in support of her petition, and did not desire any relief under the prayer thereof, but moved the court, in the alternative, to dismiss the original petition without prejudice, at her cost, or to dismiss the same for want of prosecution. The court did not rule on the motion. The appellee did not offer any evidence in support of the original petition, and appellant proceeded to introduce his proof in support of his cross petition. The court inquired whether there was a controversy between the parties relative to the alleged verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee in the action of ejectment and the affirm ance of such judgment by the supreme court. Counsel for appellant replied: "My impression is that there will not be any controversy, but we think it can hardly come in until after Mr. Gage has made his proof." The following colloquy then occurred between the court and counsel for appellant: "The Court: That is very likely; but the court would like to be advised by counsel what issues there are likely to be tried in this case with that verdict and judgment in the ejectment suit affirmed by the supreme court. Mr. Roby: I think that what is left to be tried will resolve itself into two propositions. One will be whether the party having come into equity and this court having jurisdiction of the matter-whether the judgment in ejectment will bind this court, so that this evidence which we shall put in will not entitle the cross complainant to a judgment of this court establishing his title. That is one head. The other head is this: That the cross complainant having purchased this land,-not only the patent title, but also these tax titles,-and having paid out a large amount of money in taxes, and these cases having gone pari passu, the complainant in this and the plaintiff in the ejectment case having prosecuted both cases, the plaintiff having come into this court to obtain such relief as a court of law could not give, and having then got the benefit of a judgment at law without doing equity, whether he can actually get a good title to the land, and leave Gage, without paying the taxes that a court of equity would require that he should pay. These are the two questions." The testimony in behalf of appellant was then introduced, whereupon appellee produced documentary evidence in support of the allegations of her amended answer to appellant's cross petition, that the title to the land had been adjudicated in said action of ejectment. The court found the issues under the cross petition adversely to appellant, and entered a final decree dismissing the cross petition on the merits so far as the premises claimed in the original petition were concerned, and without prejudice otherwise, and dismissing the original petition for want of prosecution. The appellant by this appeal seeks reversal of the decree. Edward Roby and Charles M. Hardy, for appellant. C. S. Darrow, H. S. Mecartney, and Morris St. P. Thomas, for appellee. BOGGS, C. J. (after stating the facts). Did the chancellor err in decreeing the cross petition of appellant should be dismissed? The adjudication in the action of ejectment did not, it is suggested, extend to all the lands embraced in the cross petition. The discrepancy, if any, in this respect grew out of the fact the petition and the judgments in ejectment describe the property as the south 20 acres of a government subdivision, while the cross petition described the south half of the same subdivision, and it is contended the subdivision of the section contained more than 40 acres. The decree dismissed the cross petition without prejudice as to the land, if any, not embraced in the description in the judgment in ejectment. This action was proper, for the reason that notice of the pendency of the cross petition was not published, as is required by section 12 of the burnt records act. Such notice was not essential so far as the land embraced in the original petition was concerned, but should have been given in order to invest the court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the title to other lands. It was not error to dismiss the cross petition on a hearing as to the land described in the original petition. The ejectment suit was pending when the petition and the cross petition were filed. The parties voluntarily allowed the chancery proceeding to remain in abeyance, and without objection joined in carrying the action of ejectment to a final conclusion. If such course resulted in an adjudication that the appellee was the owner of the title to the premises in fee, clearly the appellant could not again litigate that issue under his cross petition. Proof of the adjudication of that issue in the action at law would defeat the prayer of his cross petition. Appellant, however, urges that the court on the hearing, over his objection, permitted "incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant" evidence as to the alleged adjudication to be introduced by appellee. The deputy clerk of said Cook county cir cuit co irt, as a witness for appellee, produced in open court the files in the ejectment suit and the book in which the record of the pro ceedings in that cause in said court had been entered. The appellee also produced a certified transcript of the judgment entered in this court affirming the judgment of the circuit court. The said record of the circuit court, on page 330, disclosed a trial by jury and a verdict in an action of ejectment in a cause styled "Clara E. Eddy vs. Henry H. Gage," and on page 397 appeared the entry of a judgment in ejectment on the verdict of a jury in a cause styled "Clara E. Eddy vs. Henry H. Gage, Mary Sullivan, City of Chicago, and the Western Indiana Railroad Com. pany." It is urged the court erred in allowing the record of these proceedings in ejectment to be read in evidence. The declaration and the pleadings showed the appellant was made sole defendant in the original declaration, and the style of the cause was for a time "Eddy vs. Gage," and that issue was joined thereunder in that style, and that afterwards the other parties named as defendants in the record of the judgment in ejectment were by leave of the court brought into the case through the medium of an amendment to the declaration. The record of the trial by the jury, and of the verdict returned by it on the hearing, and the record of the entry of the judgment, were read to the court from the record book of the proceedings of the court. The entries were styled differently, as before explained, but bore the same docket number, and the style of the plaintiff is the same in both entries, and the name of the appellant appears as defendant in both entries, but as preserved in the bill of exceptions the date of neither of the entries is shown. Counsel for appellant insist it was error to allow these entries to be read in evidence, while counsel for appellee insist a reference to all the files and records of the cause will disclose that the court did not err in the matter. We do not feel called upon to enter into an investigation of these records and proofs to determine as to this objection, for two rea sons: First. The appellant declined in the trial court to make his objections to the introduction of these files and records more specific than that they were "incompetent, irrelevant. and immaterial." A general objection to the introduction of an instrument of evidence raises only questions of its relevancy. If obnoxious to special objection, the objection must be stated, unless the objection is intrinsic, and from its nature cannot be removed by proof. Buntain v. Bailey, 27 Ill. 409; Moser v. Kreigh, 49 Ill. 84. The objection that instruments, records, etc., are "incompetent," "improper," or "irrelevant" is too general to save a special objection not going to the relevancy or competency of the proposed proof. King v. Railroad Co., 98 Ill. 376. Under a general objection to the introduction of a decree or judgment, it cannot be urged in this court that the transcript does not contain a placita. Hyde v. Heath, 75 Ill. 381. That the statute did not authorize a sheriff's deed to be acknowledged before a notary public cannot be urged in this court under a general objection preferred in the trial court. Osgood v. Blackmoor, 59 Ill. 261. A general objection will be regarded as only going to the materiality of the evidence under the issue. Wilson v. King, 83 Ill. 232. That a transcript from a justice's docket did not contain a copy of the summons or return of service is not raised by a general objection to the introduction of the transcript. Johnson v. Holloway, 82 Ill. 334. 2. The entry on page 397 of the said common-law record of said circuit court constituted a complete, final judgment in ejectment that the appellee should have and recover of the appellant and the other defendant in this ejectment case the possession, in fee simple, of the identical tract of land described in the original petition in the cause at bar. This judgment recites that the appellant and the other defendants in the ejectment cause moved that court to set aside a verdict previously returned by a Jury in the court, and that the motion was argued by counsel and submitted to the court, and was by the court overruled, and thereupon the judgment was entered. It may be the trial by jury set out in the entry on page 330 of said record is not identified as the jury trial referred to in the entry of Judgment, but the judgment entry is within itself sufficiently full to establish an adjudication of the title to the premises. We therefore consider the files and records, including the certified copy of the judgment entered in this court, with reference to their pertinency to the question of the adjudication relied upon in the answer of appellee to the cross petition. It clearly appeared from those proofs the parties voluntarily submitted the issue as to the title to the premises for determination in the action of ejectment, that the circuit court in that action adjudged the appellee to be the owner in fee of the premises, and that such judgment was affirmed by this court. The contention of the parties as to the ownership of the land thereby became res judicata, and for that reason the chancellor did not err in dismissing the cross petition of appellant on the merits. That action being proper, the case then stood precisely as if no cross petition had been filed, and the court did not err in decreeing the original petition should be dismissed for want of prosecution. Ogle v. Koerner, 140 III. 170, 29 N. E. 563. Had a decree passed on the original petition vacating and canceling certain tax deeds which the appellant had obtained to the premises in controversy, the appellant would have been entitled to the benefit of the well-established equitable rule relative to the repayment of sums paid for taxes. That equitable rule is deduced from the fundamental maxim of equity that he who asks equity must do equity, and is applicable only when relief is granted to a complainant in the way of canceling liens or deeds as clouds on his title, and is not to be applied under an independent bill by the holder of a tax title asking that he be so reimbursed, nor to the appellant in this case under his cross petition, for to this extent a cross petition is in the nature of an original petition. Farwell v. Harding, 96 Ill. 32. One who purchases land at a tax sale, or becomes the owner of titles based upon tax liens, is engaged in a venture for the purpose of reaping profits and gains. There is no rule of law or maxim of equity which he may invoke to compel the owner of the property to reimburse him the amounts he has invested in the venture, except in the event the property owner asks the aid of a court of equity to cancel the tax purchases, liens, or deeds as clouds upon the title to the property. If the power of a court of chancery to that end is asked by a property holder, it will be exercised only on equitable terms and conditions, but an independent bill in equity cannot be maintained by the holder of a tax lien or tax title for a decree against the owner of the fee requiring repayment of the amount paid in discharging taxes against the lands. Having succeeded in establishing her title to the property in the action of ejectment in a court of law, it was competent for appellee to decline to further prosecute the original petition filed by her father under the burnt records act, and to avail herself of the adjudication in the action at law to |