(39 Nev. 375, 158 Pao. 876.) is the westerly end line of the West End claim finds support in both reason and authority. Walrath v. Champion Min. Co. 171 U. S. 293, 43 L. ed. 170, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 909. 2. We come now to a consideration of the question whether extralateral rights exist upon a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold. It is the contention of counsel for appellant that such rights do not exist, for the reason, among others alleged, that the Federal statute does not contemplate extralateral rights in opposite directions. It is the contention that only veins dipping in the same direction as the discovery vein may be followed extralaterally; that where, within the same location, a secondary vein is found dipping in the opposite direction as that of the discovery vein, extralateral rights thereon cannot be enjoyed. Same-extralateral rights tions. We think the statute is opposite direc- not susceptible of this construction. The statute given to the locators "the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations." late to but one direction, that of the dip of the discovery vein. We are unable to see the force of this contention. The direction of an end line depends upon which end of the line it is viewed from. The courses given in a patent of the two end lines of a claim usually, and doubtless invariably, are in opposite directions. It would be a strained construction, and one, we think, not within the letter or spirit of the statute, to hold that end lines may be considered as having but one direction. If a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold may be said to have an apex, we think there is nothing in the statute which militates against extralateral rights upon such vein in opposite directions, the same as though it were two veins with separate apices, instead of one vein. 3. The most serious question presented in this case is whether the vein in question may be said to have an apex. The vein is in the form of a single anticlinal fold, and the precise question presented by a vein in such form appears never, heretofore, to have been determined. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, say: "The definition of the term 'apex,' as employed in the mining statute, involves the elements of terminal edge of a vein and downward course extending therefrom. According to this definition, the horizontal sheet 'a' on figure 3 here inserted and the anticlinal fold 'b' have no apices, while the synclinal fold 'c' has two apices. [See page 412.] It is apparent that no extralateral rights could attach to a horizontal vein, as represented in sheet "a," because such vein has no "course downward," as prescribed in the statute. Such a vein has a top, if not an apex, in the strict sense of that word, and will support a valid location. Why a synclinal fold should be said to have two apices and an anticlinal fold have none is not so easy to find a reason for, unless we accept as conclusive appellant's contention that a terminal edge is essential to a true definition of the word "apex," as used in the statute. The words "terminal edge" are not used in the statute, nor have they been of universal use in defin ing an apex. The great majority of veins have terminal edges, and in all such cases the apex of the vein is its terminal edge. If veins in the form of a single anticlinal roll were the rule rather than the rare exception, we are of the opinion that a contention that a terminal edge was essential to an apex would be as rare as the character of the vein now in question. It has been repeatedly said by courts and textwriters that the words "top" and "apex" were not a part of the miner's terminology, prior to the adoption of the Federal Mining Statutes. They were words used by legislators to convey the intent of the framers of the statute. There is no contro versy regarding the general purpose and intent of the Mining Statutes. The government, as a matter of public policy, was interested in the development of the mining re sources of the nation. It offered to the prospector and miner the most liberal reward for his enterprise in discovering and developing the hidden treasures of the earth. It gave him the exclusive possession of the surface of every valid location made, placed no limit upon the number of such locations, gave him all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which were within his surface lines. It exacted no price for the land as a condition precedent to mining operations, and placed no restrictions upon him that were not consistent with the public purpose, such as requiring a minimum of annual labor as an evidence of good faith. To say that a miner, fortunate enough to discover a valuable vein in the form of a single anticline, shall not have extralateral rights upon each limb of his vein because, forsooth, the summit or crest of the anticlinal fold does not present a terminal edge, as is the case of the ordinary form of a fissure vein, in our opinion, would do violence to the spirit if not the very letter of the statute. The well-settled policy of the courts is to construe the statutes liberally, in the interest of the miner. It has been determined that if the locator, by inadvertence, places his location crosswise instead of lengthwise of his vein, he does not lose his extralateral rights, but his side lines will be regarded as end lines, and vice versa. So, too, if his vein crosses an end and a side line, he will be given a new side line for purposes of determining the extent of his extralateral rights. So, too, in the matter of discovery, the first essential to a valid location, the extreme liberality of the courts has been manifested in hundreds of cases. If a locator finds his surface boundaries embrace the apices of two or more valuable veins, he is simply fortunate, the same as the locator whose single ledge is more valuable than the one of his neighbor. The statute makes no distinction between rights of locators, (39 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876.) based upon the value of the discoveries. Such distinctions are not within the policy of the statute. The only difference between a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold, and the ordinary fissure vein, is that the former has a crest, the limbs of which dip in opposite directions, while the latter has a terminal edge and a dip in but one direction. But this distinction presents no difference such as would violate the purpose of the statute, if the crest of the former, like the terminal edge of the latter, should be held to constitute an apex. The distinguished counsel for appellant, in his great work on Mines, says: "In the light of the rules announced in the previous articles, if a given mineral deposit is in place, it is a-lode. The law assumes that the lode has a top, or apex, and provides for the acquisition of title by location upon this apex. A lode without an apex is not contemplated, and no provision is made for locating it. It cannot be located under the Placer Laws, because these laws apply only to deposits not in place, and, before it can be legally located as a lode, the apex, or top, must be found. If a location is made on the side or on the dip, whoever discovers and properly locates the apex will be entitled to enjoy the full rights accorded to regular valid lode locations, and the rights of those who have located on the side edge, or dip, must yield. The most serious difficulty in defining the apex has arisen in connection with certain flat or 'blanket' deposits, which have been judicially determined to be lodes, within the meaning of the statutes. It is often quite impracticable to fix upon any exposure of such a deposit, which properly constitutes the apex. It is true that, after a lode patent is issued, the existence of an apex within the patented ground will be conclusively presumed, but not necessarily the apex of the vein in dispute. Nor will it be conclusively presumed that any particular exposure of the vein is that apex. It must still remain a question of proof." 1 Lindley, Mines, 3d ed. § 305. Can it be said with reason that a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold was not intended to be the subject of a location, within the meaning of the Mining Statutes, because it does not possess a terminal edge? It is conceded that it is a vein or lode, and it is well settled that it is one. "All valuable mineral deposits are free and open to exploration and purchase" is the language of the statute. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2319, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 4614. The Federal statutes clearly contemplated that the vein in question was subject to location, for it made no exclusions of veins of any particular character. If a vein without an apex is not contemplated, and no provisions made for locating it, as the distinguished author says, then it follows, as a necessary conclusion, that the vein in controversy has an apex. If it has an apex, there is no other possible place for it to be than at the crest of the anticlinal fold. It is contended, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States is committed to the view that a terminal edge is essential to an apex of a vein or lode, and the recent case of Stewart Min. Co. v. Ontario Min. Co. 237 U. S. 350, 59 L. ed. 989, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610, is cited in support of this contention. In that case, Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the court, said: "An apex is, on cited authority, defined to be 'all that portion of the terminal edge of a vein from which the vein has extension downward in the direcsaid that the definition has been aption of the dip.' And it is further proved in Lindley on Mines, because, as therein expressed, it 'involves the elements of terminal edge and downward course therefrom.' We may accept the definition. In its application, however, it immediately encounters a question of fact the locality of the terminal edge; and in this case the state courts did not find it to be where plaintiff asserted it to be." See The court in the Stewart-Ontario Case did "accept the definition" of apex to be the terminal edge of the vein. The vein in controversy in that case had a terminal edge, and there was no occasion to consider whether the definition given was comprehensive. The Idaho court, from which the case was reviewed, on error, had determined that that which the Stewart company claimed was an apex was only the side of the vein where the vein, on its strike, was cut off by a fault. The Idaho court was sustained. same case, 23 Idaho, 724, 132 Pac. 787, and Stewart Min. Co. v. Bourne, 134 C. C. A. 123, 218 Fed. 327. As said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the celebrated case of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, at page 399, 5 L. ed. 290: "It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated." This maxim has been reiterated times almost without number. It is applicable to the Stewart-Ontario decision. The definition was sufficient for the question involved in that case; otherwise, we may assume the question would have been given more consideration than the laconic sentence: "We may accept the definition. Judge Hawley, in Book v. Justice Min. Co. 58 Fed. (C. C.) at page 121, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 617, in reference to the definition of a vein or lode, said: "Various courts have at different times, given a definition of what constitutes a vein, or lode, within the meaning of the act of Congress; but the definitions that have been given, as a general rule, apply to the peculiar character and formation of the ore deposits, or vein matter," etc. The Idaho court, in the StewartOntario Case, supra, at page 737 of 23 Idaho, 132 Pac. 792, speaks of the definition of the word "apex,” as follows: "The definitions of the word 'apex,' as used in the statute (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2322, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 4618), all reach the one inevitable conclusion that it is the highest point in the vein (Flagstaff Silver Min. Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 469, 25 L. ed. 253, 9 Mor. Min. Rep. 607; Lindley, Mines, 2d ed. §§ 305, 309; Costigan, Min. Laws, p. 137, § 35; Duggan v. Davey, 4 Dak. 110, 26 N. W. 887, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 59; Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 55, 43 L. ed. 72, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 370); but this is only a general definition, and its application to any particular vein or peculiar location may and often will call for further particularity of description. It must be the top or terminal edge of the vein on the surface, or the nearest point to the surface, and it must be the top of the vein proper, rather than of a spur or feeder, just as the highest point in the roof of a house would be taken to be the apex of the house, and not the chimney or flagstaff. Again, an apex is a point from which the vein has a dip, as well as strike, or course, else it confers no extralateral right." Where a vein has a terminal edge, its apex is a point from which, or a line along which, is its strike, and from which it has a dip; but this is equally true of the crest of a vein in the form of a single anticlinal fold. Counsel for appellant quote the following definitions from textwriters in support of the terminal edge theory: "Conceiving a vein or lode to be an intrusive sheet of mineralized matter, of varying thickness, found (39 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876.) in the mass of the mountain, the apex of a vein is thus seen to be that edge of the sheet which shows on the surface of the location, or is nearest to the surface. It is not a point, though apex naturally suggests point. It is not a line, though it has the full extension of the upper edge of the lode. It is the whole surface of the upper edge of the vein, with all the width and length which that edge has." Costigan, Min. Law, 139, 140. "The mere fact of proximity to the surface is insufficient to establish the apex, without the evidence that it is the upper edge, or end, of the vein." Barringer & A. Mines & Mining, p. 442. "In the mathematical sense, an apex means the highest point; but it is not used in this sense in the statute. As used therein, it means the edge or termination of the vein which comes to the surface of the earth, forming an outcrop which comes nearest to the surface of the earth when the vein terminates before it reaches the surface. It may not be the highest point of a vein, as such highest point may be found in a swell of the vein." Shamel, Mining, Mineral & Geological Law, 93, 197. "The top or apex of a vein or lode is the highest point thereof, and may be at the surface of the ground, or at any point below the surface; the end or edge of a vein nearest the surface." Mines and Minerals, 27 Cyc. 537. "The end or edge of a vein nearest the surface." Raymond, Glossary of Mining & Metallurgical Terms. Trans. Am. Inst. M. E. vol. 9, p. 102. It is quite manifest, we think, that all the definitions quoted are considering the ordinary form of vein. Definitions given by textwriters are usually based on court decisions, and, like such decisions, are to be considered with reference to the facts upon which they are based. From § 306 of Lindley on Mines, we quote: "Webster defines an apex to be 'the top, point, or sum mit of anything.' Compilers of dictionaries which have made their appearance since the act under consideration was passed have not been particularly lucid in their definitions. For instance: Standard Dictionary: (1) The pointed or angular end, or highest point, as of a pyramid, spire, or mountain; extreme point; tip; top. (2) The vertex of a plane or solid angle. (3) The highest point of a stratum; as a coal seam.' Century Dictionary: (1) The tip, point, or summit of anything. In geometry, the angular point of a cone or conic section. The angular point of a triangle opposite the base. (2) In geology, the top of an anticlinal fold of strata. This term, as used in United States Revised Statutes, has been the occasion of much litigation. It is supposed to mean something nearly equivalent to outcrop; but precisely in what it differs from outcrop has not been, neither does it seem capable of being, distinctly made out.' Evidently the courts, even now, can receive but little assistance from the lexicographers." It appears, however, that the Century Dictionary, in an effort to give a comprehensive definition, regards "the top of an anticlinal fold of strata" as an apex. Counsel for appellant, in their brief, say: "Probably the most interesting and instructive of all the adjudicated cases is the pioneer case of Duggan v. Davey, 4 Dak. 110, 26 N. W. 887, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 59. The decision of the supreme court of Dakota follows, in the main, the opinion given by the trial court. It is a lucid and masterly presentation of the law; and, while an anticlinal roll was not there involved, several expressions of the court are well worth quoting in support of our contention that a terminal end, or edge, of a vein, is an essential element of apex definition. "The definition of the top or apex of a vein usually given is "the end, or edge, of a vein nearest the surface." Justice Goddard, a jurist of experience in mining law, in his charge to the jury in the case |