after a successful action on the previous day. The garrison had made a most gallant defence, and the civil population had shown admirable fortitude. In the rejoicings which followed, however, all sense of scale was hopelessly lost. Messages well calculated to concentrate attention upon Mafeking and its commander had arrived at sufficiently short intervals, and the British public, thus stimulated, indulged in unexampled demonstrations. Military history records successful defences in circumstances far more difficult than those of Mafeking, and while high praise was due to all ranks, and especially to Colonel Baden-Powell, the exaggeration of language which prevailed was an unwholesome symptom. The defenders of Kimberley and their commander, Lieut.-Colonel Kekewich, whose task was quite as onerous and quite as well discharged, were alike forgotten; and there was no recognition of the months of exposure and fighting endured by Colonel Plumer's force, which suffered greater hardships than the defenders of Mafeking.

The Boers at one time apparently contemplated a strong resistance to the advance on the Vaal, but in the open country north of Bloemfontein the threat of being outflanked sufficed to cause the hasty abandonment of successive positions. Advancing on a broad front, with a large mounted force on each flank, Lord Roberts reached Kroonstad on May 12, and halted to repair railway-bridges and to bring up supplies. On May 21 the forward movement was resumed, and the mounted force on the right flank was rapidly swung over to the left. The line of the Vaal was undefended, but the mounted troops were sharply engaged to the south-west of Johannesburg, which was occupied on the 31st. On June 4 some opposition was encountered, and on the following day Pretoria was surrendered. Thus in thirty-three days, including the halts at Kroonstad and Johannesburg, the army marched at least 270 miles, giving a fine proof of its mobility. In deciding upon this great movement Lord Roberts accepted certain inevitable risks and drawbacks. He left upon his right rear in the Free State a considerable force of the enemy which might be expected to make attempts upon his line of communications. His mounted force was certain to suffer heavily from the exhaustion of its horses, and another prolonged period of inactivity would necessarily follow. The advantage of an early occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria was, however, so great that the decision was amply justified. The grip thus established upon the railway system of the Transvaal

was exceedingly important, and if politically the effect proved disappointing, the strategic gain was undoubted. It was now necessary to open up railway communication with Natal, to gain possession of the line from Klerksdorp to Johannesburg, to bring up forces from the western frontier, and, above all, to guard the main line from Bloemfontein.

On May 13 Sir R. Buller, who was directed to keep the enemy occupied in the Biggarsberg,' had concentrated a force eighteen miles east of Ladysmith, and moving rapidly northwards he occupied Newcastle on the 18th. There was no serious opposition, and the Boers fell back on Laing's Nek, where they ostentatiously entrenched themselves. On June 6, after granting a three days' armistice to General Louis Botha, Sir R. Buller occupied Botha's Pass with little difficulty, and, driving back the enemy, succeeded in turning the Laing's Nek position, which was promptly abandoned. Natal was at length clear of the invaders, and the British troops, moving along the railway and repairing it behind them, joined hands at Vlakfontein on July 5 with a force from Heidelberg. By this time the KlerksdorpJohannesburg line had also been occupied, and the whole railway system was in the hands of Lord Roberts with the exception of the line to Lorenço Marques. On July 23 an advance in force along this line began, and Middelburg, about eighty-five miles east of Pretoria, was occupied on the 28th.

The rapid advance from Karee Siding to Pretoria was probably unexpected by the Boers, whose resistance was never serious and who showed great anxiety for their line of retreat. The menace of outflanking movements was most skilfully employed by Lord Roberts, and the four permanent forts which affected to defend the capital were incontinently abandoned, the Boers, more wise than the advisers of Napoleon III., being unwilling to incur the risks of a Sedan. Their leaders may have been inspired by the example of 1812; but, unlike the Russians, they were unwilling to sacrifice anything, and Pretoria became convenient headquarters for the British army.

The supervision of the line of communications at this period left much to be desired, and on May 30 at Lindley, and on June 6 at Roodeval, disasters occurred involving the loss of nearly 1,200 men. Lieut.-General Rundle, hold

ing the line Senekal-Ficksburg, was able, with the help of entrenchments, to prevent an incursion of the enemy

southwards, but could effect nothing more in this difficult country, and was hampered for want of supplies. Passive measures proving hopeless to prevent raiding, it soon became evident that the Boer forces in the Bethlehem district must be broken up. Remounts having reached Pretoria, a strong force was despatched southwards, and on July 1 Lieut.-General Hunter reached Frankfort to co-operate with Major-Generals Clements and Paget. The effect of this offensive movement was most important. Bethlehem was captured on the 7th, and after a series of operations, admirably directed, Lieut.-General Hunter obtained on the 29th the surrender of Commandant Prinsloo with more than 4,000 men and a large number of much-needed horses. This substantial success was gained with small loss, and Harrismith was almost immediately occupied, opening up railway communication with Natal. General De Wet, however, the most capable and enterprising of the Boer leaders, broke away on July 16, and, crossing the railway, established himself near Reitzburg, a few miles south of the Vaal. Here he remained for eleven days and was believed to be practically surrounded; but, suddenly crossing the river on August 6, he outwitted his numerous pursuers, joining General Delarey near Rustenburg, and, after various adventures, doubling back upon the Vaal with the loss of a great part of his baggage and most of his followers. The escapade of De Wet had no direct military results of importance, but it added to difficulties already existing in the country west of Pretoria, and it entailed large and complicated movements of British forces which must have interfered with the plans of Lord Roberts.

A recrudescence of hostility had manifested itself early in July in the Rustenburg district, which was supposed to have been pacified during the march of Major-General Baden-Powell from the frontier to Pretoria. On the 7th a small force' of the enemy attacked Rustenburg, and on the 11th a body of troops of all arms sent from Pretoria to Uitval's Nek on the preceding day was surprised and routed with a loss of two guns. A Boer investment of Rustenburg followed, demanding a relieving force, and later the withdrawal of the garrison. Further west, at Eland's River, a small detachment of colonial troops under Colonel Hore was believed to be lost, but most gallantly held its post for many days till relieved on August 16 by Lord Kitchener, who had abandoned the pursuit of De Wet in order to go to its assistance. Meanwhile Major-General Carrington's force,

which landed at Beira in April, had arrived from Bulawayo, and, being opposed on the way to Eland's River, retired with some precipitation to Zeerust and thence to Mafeking. It is at present impossible to unravel the tangled skein of events in this region; but it is clear that before the irruption of De Wet from the south the burghers in the south-western portion of the Transvaal had developed unexpected strength and hostility. The circumstances throw a strong light on the difficulties of Lord Roberts, who had not to do with organised forces but with sporadic outbreaks, the extent of which could not be fully gauged.

During this irritating and baffling interlude the main thread of the operations was not neglected, and Sir R. Buller was directed to make an important movement northwards from the railway which he had been occupied in guarding since the middle of June. Leaving Paardekop

on August 7, he reached a point about twenty miles south of Wonderfontein on the 15th. Some opposition was offered on the 23rd, and on the 25th Lord Roberts met Sir R. Buller and Lieut.-Generals Pole-Carew and French at Belfast, and combined action was arranged. On the 27th a strong position near Bergendal was stormed by two infantry battalions after an effective artillery preparation, and the Boer resistance in this quarter collapsed. On September 1, the day on which the Transvaal was formally annexed to the British Crown, Sir R. Buller began an advance on Lydenburg, one of several places where the enemy were reported to intend making a final stand. The advance was delayed by the Boers, who retired when their flank was threatened, withdrawing their guns and stores, and leaving the way open to Lydenburg, which was reached by the cavalry on the 6th and occupied in force on the following day. Moving slowly eastwards through a most difficult country and encountering opposition which quickly yielded to attack, Sir R. Buller reached Spitz Kop on the 12th, capturing stores and ammunition. On the 10th, Lieut.-General French began an advance on Barberton, which was occupied on the 13th. On this day, the Guards Brigade reached Godwaan on the railway. Resistance being evidently hopeless, since the burghers no longer responded to the calls made upon them, Mr. Kruger decided to abandon his country and reached Lorenço Marques on the 13th, after formally resigning office. At the same time General Louis Botha gave up the military command on the grounds of ill-health. On the 24th the

Guards Brigade reached Komati Poort and a large number of Boers crossed the frontier into Portuguese territory to be disarmed.

Meanwhile, minor raids on the railways occurred at various points, and a little garrison of 150 men at Ladybrand defended itself with trifling loss from the 2nd till relieved on the 5th. In the western portion of the theatre of war, mobile British columns were acting everywhere on the offensive, and capturing cattle and stores. The breakdown of the resistance in the Machadodorp and Lydenburg districts, where excellent defensive positions abound, indicated the military collapse of the Boers.

As Lord Roberts pointed out in an important proclamation on September 13, the war has degenerated into operations 'carried on in an irregular and irresponsible manner, and in very many cases by insignificant bodies of men.' Guerilla warfare of this description will break down as soon as it is clear that the game is not worth the candle. By holding firmly the important points on the railways, and by employing flying columns to patrol the disaffected districts, to pursue raiding parties, and to break up any concentration of commandos, hostility will be stamped out, and military operations can be replaced by police measures. We must, in any case, expect that a certain number of irreconcilables, believing that they have nothing to gain by peace, will continue to give trouble after the burghers have dispersed to their farms. It would be rash to attempt to forecast the future; but it is certain that the new colonies will require a garrison of at least 50,000 men for some years, even if the surrender of arms is much more complete than at present. Much will depend on the personal qualities of the military governor, who must soon be appointed, and having regard to past experience, there should be no mistake. A governor who combines firmness with sympathy, and who is a soldier and not a politician, will find less difficulty in restoring order than has been anticipated, and it may be that the real burgher population will prove more amenable to British rule than the cosmopolitan refugees now waiting to return to Johannesburg.

The Boer war will not rank among the great achievements of the British army. The immense disproportion between the numerical forces and the material resources of the combatants, the grave initial mistakes, and the too frequent 'regrettable incidents' combine to rob it of the glamour which attaches to military success. History will, however,