Under s. 92 the general duty of making an inspection of the district falls upon the local authority. Then s. 102 contains a complete code dealing with the right of the local authority to enter upon private premises for the purpose of making an inspection. The section does not contain any express provision applicable to a case, such as this, where permission to enter was neither asked for nor refused. If permission is refused, whether with the authority of the occupier or not, the proper course is to apply to a magistrate for an order requiring the person having the custody of the premises to admit the local authority. The occupier in this case had no opportunity of refusing permission, because he was not present when the members of the council arrived at his premises. The question is, How does s. 102, reasonably construed, apply to the circumstances of this case? Now, the refusal by the occupier of permission to enter does not of itself constitute an offence, because it is expressly provided that in that case the proper course is to apply to a magistrate for an order of admission, which is not granted as a matter of course and against which cause may be shewn by the occupier, and it would be very strange if an occupier should be in a worse position where he has had no opportunity of refusing. I think, therefore, that the intention was that there should be an opportunity given to the occupier of refusing admission, and that permission to enter must, therefore, first be asked for. The section expressly provides for a case where the occupier cannot be found, and, therefore, no difficulty arises on that score. I think that the fallacy underlying Mr. Russell's argument, that the necessity of applying for permission is a mere matter of procedure, is that he is confusing circumstances which are necessary to entitle a person acting in the supposed execution of a public duty to notice of action with circumstances which would afford such a person the defence of a legal justification for his conduct. I think that, if the persons making the inspection had had the right to enter the respondent's premises without first obtaining his permission, there would clearly have been in the circumstances of this case an obstruction within the meaning 1903 CONSETT v. CRAWFORD. Wills J. 1903 CONSETT URBAN COUNCIL v. CRAWFORD. of the Act. An occupier who exposes the members of a local authority even to a well-grounded apprehension of personal detention by way of retaliation for their act of entry most certainly, in my opinion, obstructs them within the meaning of s. 306. CHANNELL J. I agree. The language of s. 102 shews quite clearly that the Legislature has stopped short of giving a local authority the right to enter private premises of their own motion. The section says that they "shall be admitted"; but in the present case the members of the council were not "admitted": they entered of their own motion without asking for permission. They were, therefore, in the position of trespassers on the respondent's land, and, however improperly the respondent may have acted towards them, he has not committed an offence under s. 306. I agree that, if the members of the appellant council had been on the premises in the execution of their duty, the facts of this case clearly amount to obstruction on the part of the respondent. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for appellants: Pritchard & Sons, for Welford, Consett. Solicitors for respondent: Belfrage & Co., for Aynsley, Consett. F. O. R. THE KING v. HIGH BAILIFF OF WESTMINSTER. Where in a proceeding to take and purchase lands under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the promoters have given notice under s. 38 of their intention to summon a jury, and have therein stated the sum which they are willing to give as and for purchase-money and compensation, and, the offer not having been accepted, a jury is summoned, the claimant is entitled at any time before the verdict of the jury is given to accept the offer of the promoters, and the jury should in such a case be directed to return a verdict for the amount of the offer. RULE NISI for a mandamus. On March 4, 1902, the London County Council, under the powers conferred on them by the London County Council (Improvements) Act, 1899 (which Act incorporated the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845), served notice to treat in respect of certain premises, and by the notice the council also claimed under s. 20 of the Act (1) that the premises were in (1) London County Council (Improvements) Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. cclxvi.), s. 20: "The council may with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Home Department claim in any notice to treat for the purchase of any lands intended to be taken for the purpose of this Act— "That the lands to which the notice refers are or comprise any houses, courts or alleys unfit for human occupation; "That the narrowness, closeness, and bad arrangement or the bad condition of the streets and houses or groups of houses upon any such lands, or the want of light, air, ventilation or proper conveniences, or any other sanitary defects, or one or more of such causes renders any such lands or any buildings thereon prejudicial to the health of the inhabitants either "And in the event of any such "(1st.) That the rental of any house or premises was enhanced by reason of the same being used for illegal purposes or being so over 1903 May 20. 1903 REX v. an insanitary condition by reason of certain specified causes, which rendered the premises prejudicial to the health of the inhabitants thereof or of the neighbouring buildings. The persons served with the notice to treat duly made a claim, and on November 5, 1902, the council gave notice to the claimants of their intention to summon a jury, and in the notice stated Ex parte. the sum of money which they were willing to pay for the land HIGH BAILIFF LONDON to be taken. The offer was not accepted, and on November 22, 1902, the council issued their warrant to the high bailiff of Westminster, requiring him to summon a special jury to determine whether the premises were insanitary, and what compensation should be paid by the council to the claimants. The case was heard before the deputy high bailiff of Westminster and a special jury on December 12, 1902. The question whether the premises were insanitary was first tried, and, after hearing evidence on behalf of the council and of the claimants, the jury found that the property was insanitary. Counsel for the claimants thereupon stated that his client would accept the offer of the council. This was objected to on behalf of the council on the grounds that the case was in the hands of the jury, and that the amount of compensation to be paid must be determined by their verdict. The deputy high bailiff held that the claimants were entitled to accept the offer, and withdrew the case from the jury and discharged them. No judgment was recorded. A rule nisi was obtained on the motion of the London County Council calling upon the high bailiff to shew cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue directed to him, commanding him to summon a special jury to settle and determine the amount of purchase-money and compensation to be paid to the claimants. 1903 REX V. OF WEST- . LONDON Danckwerts, K.C., and R. C. Glen, for the claimants, shewed cause against the rule. The question is as to the stage of the proceedings at which the claimant is no longer entitled to HIGH BAILIFF accept the statutory offer made by the promoters of the undertaking. The offer has to be made under s. 38 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (1), and can only be made in the notice given by the promoters of their intention to cause a jury to be summoned: Reg. v. Manley Smith, In re Church and London School Board (2); Reg. v. Smith, In re Westfield and Metropolitan Ry. Cos. (3) There is no provision in the Act that the offer must be accepted within a definite period, nor can it be withdrawn; it therefore remains open as a binding offer, and may be accepted at any time before the jury have returned their verdict. It may be that the jury ought to have been directed to find a verdict for the amount of the offer, but the promoters did not ask that that should be done, and, if the claimants were within their rights in accepting the offer when they did, the Court will not send the case before another jury merely to obtain a formal verdict. Dickens, K.C., and Corrie Grant, for the London County Council, in support of the rule. (1) The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18), s. 38: "Before the promoters of the undertaking shall issue their warrant for summoning a jury for settling any case of disputed compensation, they shall give not less than ten days' notice to the other party of their intention to cause such jury to be summoned, and in such notice the promoters of the undertaking shall state what sum of money they are willing to give for the interest in such lands sought to be purchased by them from such party, and for the damage to be sustained by him by the execution of the works." Under s. 38 there is an promoters of the undertaking, all the (2) (1892) 40 W. R. 333. |