is any such practice in Parliament. It follows, if Mr. Danckwerts' argument is right, that what might have been expressed in clear language has been intentionally expressed in such a way that it can only be inferred from a minute examination of the words of the section. I entirely agree with Wright J. that the form of ss. 10 and 11 would be a strange form to adopt if the intention were to impose a novel burden of this kind, especially when it is remembered that s. 133 of the Act of 1845 is not concerned with rating at all, and that whereas ss. 10 and 11 are entirely concerned with rating, s. 133 is concerned merely with the making up of the deficiency in the rate. I cannot believe that if the Legislature had intended to impose a novel burden on promoters of undertakings, and to alter their liability in this very strong manner, they would not have expressed their intention in clear terms. The appeal must be dismissed. ROMER L.J. I have come to the same conclusion. Certainly the Act of 1899 has not-nor has the Islington schemeexpressly cast upon the defendants such an additional burden as is suggested; nor ought it to be inferred that such an additional burden is cast upon them unless the inference is necessary having regard to the nature of the scheme. To my mind such an inference is not necessary. After the elaborate judgment of Wright J., with whose criticisms on the various enactments under consideration I in substance agree, I do not think it necessary to go through those enactments in detail. I can only say that I entirely concur in the concluding part of his judgment, where he says "that the true meaning of the enactments when read together is that the school board must make up the deficiency of that part of the general rate which represents the poor-rate, or represents anything chargeable on that rate." STIRLING L.J. I am of the same opinion. By the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, s. 133, the Legislature thought fit to impose on the promoters of an undertaking the liability to make good the deficiency in the poor-rate. Now, at the time of the passing of that Act other rates were known besides the poor-rate. It may be that that rate was a rate which was C. A. 1903 ISLINGTON COUNCIL ¡v. LONDON SCHOOL BOARD. Stirling L.J. levied in all parts of the country, whereas the others were local only; nevertheless the existence of such rates was well known, and the Legislature did not see fit to impose any BOROUGH liability in respect of rates other than the poor-rate. Prior to 1899 four rates were collected in the metropolis, namely, the sewers rate, the lighting rate, the general rate, and the poorrate. By the London Government Act, 1899, certain alterations were effected in that respect. By sub-s. 1 of s. 10 it is enacted that a scheme under the Act shall provide for the discontinuance of a separate sewers rate and separate lighting rate. So that there is an express direction that those rates shall be discontinued as separate rates. By sub-s. 2 it is enacted that "the general rate and the poor-rate shall be assessed, made, and levied together by the borough council as one rate, which shall be termed the general rate, and shall be assessed, made, collected, and levied as if it were the poor-rate." The language there is different from that of the preceding subsection. There is no provision for the discontinuance of either the general or the poor-rate. All that is provided is that they are to be assessed, made, and levied as one rate. But it is said that it is to be called the general rate. That is a mere name. Then it is said that this so-called general rate is to be assessed, made, collected, and levied as if it were the poor-rate. That does not make it the poor-rate which, up to this point, remains as part of it only. Then comes this clause: "And all enactments applying or referring to the poor-rate shall, subject to the provisions of this Act as to audit, be construed as applying or referring also to the general rate." The question on that clause is whether upon a fair construction of it the effect is to impose upon promoters of undertakings a liability to make up the deficiency in the general rate, as opposed to the poor-rate. In my opinion that is not a fair construction of this clause. If it were impossible to give effect to the language of the clause in any other way, it might be necessary for the Court so to hold; but it is obvious that the language in itself has a wide application quite apart from the construction contended for, and I do not think that it was intended to have the effect of enlarging the meaning of the words "poor-rate " in s. 133 of C. A. 1903 the Lands Clauses Act. There is no authority to the contrary. Farmer v. London and North Western Ry. Co. (1) is not one. I think that the decision of the learned judge was right, and ISLINGTON that this appeal ought to be dismissed. BOROUGH Appeal dismissed. V. LONDON SCHOOL Solicitors: A. M. Bramall; C. E. Mortimer. BOARD. H. B. H. [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] HOARE & CO. v. MORSHEAD. Practice-Application for Judgment under Order XIV.-Condition of Leave to Where under Order XIV., r. 6, leave to defend an action is given to the defendant on giving security for the amount claimed to the satisfaction of a master, there is no appeal from the decision of the master with regard to the sufficiency of the security tendered. APPEAL from an order of Walton J. at chambers as after mentioned. The action was brought for the recovery of a sum of money upon a writ specially indorsed under Order III., г. 6. The plaintiffs having applied under Order xiv., r. 1, for liberty to sign judgment for the amount indorsed on the writ, an order was made by a master granting the defendant leave to defend upon giving security for the amount claimed to the satisfaction of the master within a certain time. Upon appeal Phillimore J. affirmed that order, but extended the time specified for perfecting the security. The defendant having tendered certain security, the case came before the master upon the question whether the security so tendered was sufficient; and the master decided that it was insufficient, and directed that the plaintiffs should be at liberty to sign final judgment. The defendant appealed to Walton J. at chambers against the decision of the master (1) 20 Q. B. D. 788. C. A. 1903 July 2). C. A. 1903 that the security tendered was insufficient. The learned judge held that he had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the HOARE & Co. master with regard to the sufficiency of the security. He therefore made no order, but gave leave to appeal against his decision to the Court of Appeal. V. MORSHEAD. Witt, K.C., and Pollard, for the defendant. The principle laid down by the cases is that, where the master acts as the officer of the Court and by virtue of a delegation of its powers, there is an appeal from his decision; but where he does not act as such officer, but merely as a person designated by a statute to perform a certain function, there is no appeal: see Owen v. London and North Western. Ry. Co. (1); Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co. (2) It is submitted that in such a case as this the master acts as an officer of the Court. It is, under Order XIV., r. 6, for the judge to say on what terms leave to defend is to be given; and, where an order is made that security shall be given to the satisfaction of the master, he really acts, in deciding as to the sufficiency of the security, by virtue of a delegation of the power of the judge to him under Order LIV., r. 12, and his decision must be subject to review by the judge himself. It is provided by Order LIV., r. 21, that "any person affected by any order or decision of a master may appeal therefrom to a judge at chambers." Loehnis, for the plaintiffs. There is no appeal from the decision of the master as to the sufficiency of the security under an order such as was made in the present case. The judge has power under Order XIV., r. 6, to impose such terms as he thinks fit as a condition of giving leave to defend; and in this case he has imposed as a term that the defendant shall give security to the satisfaction of the master. The order makes the master the judge of the sufficiency of the security tendered. The master really acts in such cases as a person designated by the order to determine as to the sufficiency of the security. There is really no reason in point of law why the judge might not appoint any referee to determine that question under Order XIV., r. 6. Such orders have been repeatedly made ever since (1) (1867) L. R. 3 Q. B. 54. (2) (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 1. Order XIV., came into force, and till now no one has ever heard C. A. 1903 v. of such an appeal as this. If the defendant's contention is right, there may be a series of appeals, from the master to the HOARE & Co. judge, and from the judge to the Court of Appeal, and possibly MORSHEAD. from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords, in each of which the question of the sufficiency of the security must be investigated de novo. If a defendant could appeal against a decision of the master that the security tendered was insufficient, it would follow that a plaintiff also could maintain a succession of appeals against a decision by the master that it was sufficient. Witt, K.C., in reply. MATHEW L.J. In my opinion the contention of the defendant fails, and this appeal must be dismissed. The case appears to me to depend upon the terms of Order XIV., r. 6. That rule provides that " leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to giving security, or time and mode of trial (in cases which, under these rules, may be tried without a jury), or otherwise, as the judge may think fit." I think the effect of that provision is to give power to the judge to impose as a term that security shall be given, and to designate a person to ascertain whether the security tendered is sufficient. That was what was done by the order made in the present case. In such a case I think the master acts as a person designated by virtue of the power given to the judge of imposing any terms on giving leave to defend. Here an order was made at chambers that the defendant should have leave to defend on giving security to the satisfaction of the master. That order was affirmed by the judge, and there was no appeal against his order. The parties went back to the master, and the question as to the sufficiency of the security was gone into by him, and he decided that the security tendered was insufficient. The defendant seeks to appeal against that decision. The order made in this case is in a form which has long been common in such cases; but this appears to be the first time that it has ever been contended that, under such an order, the master's decision with regard |