otherwise, intrust the execution of pro- | this clause, the sheriff is not bound to cess to a person named merely for the enter the franchise; though if he do occasion, who is called a special bailiff. enter it, the execution will not be invalid: The bailiff derives his authority from a but if a sheriff's bailiff, in executing warrant under the hand and seal of the such a writ within a franchise, is resisted sheriff: and he cannot lawfully arrest a by the party to be taken, and is killed, it party till he receives such warrant. It is is not murder; for the bailiff is commita contempt of the court from which pro- ting a trespass in consequence of the cess issues, to hinder the bailiff in exe- clause of non omittas not being inserted cuting it; and when a party is taken by in the writ. the bailiff, he is legally in the custody of the sheriff. An arrest may be made by the bailiff's follower; but the bailiff must in such case be at hand and acting in the arrest. The bailiff is forbidden by the Lord's Day Act, 29 Car. II. c. 7, to execute process on Sunday; and he is not authorized to break open an outer door to make an arrest under civil process, or to seize goods; but if the outer door is open, he may, in general, break open inner doors in execution of the process. If a bailiff misdemean himself grossly in the execution of process, as if he use unnecessary violence or force, or extort money from prisoners, or embezzle money levied, he will be punished by attachment from the court from whence the process issues. 2. The bailiff of a franchise or liberty is one who has the same authority granted to him by the lord of a liberty as the sheriff's bailiff anciently had by the sheriff. These liberties are exclusive jurisdictions, which still exist in some parts of the kingdom (as the honour of Pontefract, in Yorkshire, the liberty of Gower in Gloucestershire and adjoining counties), in which the King's writ could not formerly be executed by the sheriff, but only by the lord of the franchise or his bailiff. These districts proving inconvenient, the statute of Westminster the 2nd., c. 29, provided, that if the bailiff, when commanded to execute a writ within the franchise, gave no answer, a writ, with a clause of non omittas, should issue, authorizing and commanding the sheriff himself to enter the franchise and execute the writ; and it is now the practice in every case to insert this clause in the writ in the first instance, which enables the sheriff at once to execute it in the franchise. If, however, the party who sues out the writ neglects to insert 3. Bailiffs of manors are stewards or agents appointed by the lord (generally by an authority under seal) to superintend the manor; collect fines and quitrents; inspect the buildings ; order repairs, cut down trees; impound cattle trespassing; take an account of wastes, spoils, and misdemeanors in the woods and demesne lands; and do other acts for the lord's interest. Such a bailiff can bind his lord by acts which are for his benefit, but not by such as are to his prejudice, without the lord's special authority. An act was passed in 1844 for regulating the bailiffs of inferior courts (7 & 8 Vict. c. 19), the preamble of which states that "whereas courts are holden in and for sundry counties, hundreds and wapentakes, honours, manors, and other lordships, liberties and franchises, having, by custom or charter, jurisdiction for the recovery of debts and damages in personal actions, and in many places great extortion is practised under colour of the process of such courts:" and it is then enacted that bailiffs are to be appointed by the judge of the court; and remedies are adopted to prevent misconduct on the part of such bailiffs. (Bacon's Abridgment, tit. “Bailiff," 7th ed.; Tomline's Law Dictionary, same title.) BÁILIWICK, from the French bailli, and the Saxon wic, the dwellingplace, or district of the bailiff, signifies either a county which is the bailiwick of the sheriff, as bailiff of the king, and within which his jurisdiction and his authority to execute process extend; or it signifies the particular liberty or franchise of some lord who has an exclusive authority within its limits to act as the sheriff does within the county. The corresponding French word is Bailliage. [BAILIFF; SHERIFF.] BAILLIAGE, a French term equivalent with bailiwick, a district or portion of territory under the jurisdiction of an officer called a bailiff. This term was more especially appropriated to certain sub-governments of Switzerland, which at the time Coxe wrote his travels were of two sorts: the one consisting of certain districts into which all the aristocratical cantons were divided, and over which a particular officer called a bailiff was appointed by the government, to which he was accountable for his administration; the other composed of territories which did not belong to the cantons, but were subject to two or more of them, who by turns appointed a bailiff. The officer of this last sort of bailliage, when not restrained by the peculiar privileges of certain districts, had the care of the police, and under certain limitations the jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes. He also enjoyed a stated revenue, arising in different places from various duties and taxes. In case of exaction or maladministration an appeal lay to the cantons to which the particular bailliage belonged. (Coxe's Trav. in Switz. 4to. Lond. 1774, vol. i. p. 30.) These latter bailliages anciently formed part of the Milanese. Their names were-) Mendrisio, Balerna, Locarno, Lugano, and ValMaggia. Uri, Schweitz, and Underwalden possessed the three bailliages, Bellinzona, Riviera, and Val-Brenna, all which had also been dismembered from the Milanese. The chief of these bailliages were ceded to the cantons, in 1512, by Maximilian Sforza, who was raised to the ducal throne by the Swiss, after they had expelled the troops of Louis XII. and taken possession of the duchy. Francis I., successor of Louis, having recovered the Milanese, and secured his conquest by the victory of Marignano, purchased the friendship of the cantons by confirming their right to the ceded territory; a right which the subsequent dukes of Milan were too prudent to dispute. They were finally confirmed by the house of Austria. (Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 170, 418.) In 1727 the Italian bailiwicks were surrendered, with the cantons of Switzerland, to the French. (Planta's Hist. of the Helvet. Confederacy, 6vo. edit. vol. iii. p. 380.) In 1802, when Bonaparte, as First Consul of France, remodelled the constitution of Switzerland, and increased the ancient number of its cantons to eighteen, that of Tessin was formed out of the Italian bailiwicks; an arrangement which was afterwards confirmed by the treaty of Paris, 30th of May, 1814, and recognised in the Helvetic Diet of 19th of March, 1815. (See the Moniteur for the 20th of February, 1803, and 22nd of May, 1815.) BALANCE OF POWER. The notion upon which this phrase is founded appears to be the following:-When a number of separate and sovereign states have grown up beside each other, the entire system which they constitute may be conceived to be evenly balanced, so long as no single state is in a condition to interfere with the independence of any of the rest. But as in such a system of states there are generally a few which may be considered as leading powers, it is by these being made to counterpoise each other that the balance is principally maintained. It is in this way only that the safety of the smaller states can be secured. Thus, in the ancient world, after the destruction of Carthage, there was no power strong enough to cope with Rome; and the consequence was, that the countries that yet remained sovereign powers successively fell under her dominion. The subjugation of nearly the whole of India by Great Britain, and the establishment of the late widely-extended empire of France on the continent of Europe, may be quoted as other examples of the effect that results from the destruction of what is termed the balance of power. On the contrary, so long as the power of one great state (however far surpassing in extent of territory, or other resources of strength and influence, many of those in its neighbourhood) can be kept in check, or, in other words, balanced by that of another, the independence of the smaller states is secured against both. Neither will be disposed to allow its rival to add to its power by the conquest or absorption of any of these minor and otherwise defenceless members of the system. And in this way it happens | thaginians, during the war of the auxiliathat each state, whether great or small, has an interest and a motive to exert itself in the preservation of the balance. This policy is so obvious, that it must have been acted upon in all ages, by every assemblage of states, so connected or situated as to influence one another. There may have been less or more of skill or wisdom in the manner of acting upon it, or the attempt to act upon it may have been more or less successful, in different cases; but to suppose that its importance had been overlooked by any states that ever existed in the circumstances described, would be to suppose such states to have been destitute of the instinct of self-preservation. ries, "esteeming it requisite, both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without contest or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence; for that is never on any account to be overlooked; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one land as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it." "Here," remarks Mr. Hume, "is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms." It must be confessed, however, that the preservation of the balance of power was never so distinctly recognized and adopted as a principle of general policy in ancient as it has been in modern times. The systematic observance of the principle of the balance, subsequently to the subver traced in the conduct of the several Italian republics. It appears clearly to have formed part of what may be called the public law of these rival states from about the commencement of the fifteenth century. From the commencement of the next century it became an active principle in the general policy of Europe. Mr. Hume (Essays, part ii. essay 7th) has shown conclusively, in opposition to the opinion sometimes expressed, that ancient politicians were well acquainted with the principle of the balance of power, although, as far as appears, they did not designate it by that name. "Insion of the Roman empire, may be first all the politics of Greece," he observes, "the anxiety with regard to the balance of power is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us even by the ancient historians. Thucydides (lib. i.) represents the league which was formed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle; and after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedæmonians disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra: after which they immediately went over to the conquered-from generosity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealousy of the conquerors." "Whoever," he adds, "will read Demosthenes' oration for the Megalopolitans, may see the utmost refinements on this principle that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist." He afterwards quotes a passage from Polybius (i. c. 83), in which that writer states that Hiero, king of Syracuse, though the ally of Rome, yet sent assistance to the Car The leading rule by which it has ever since then been attempted to maintain the balance of power, may be stated to be the opposing of every new arrangement which threatens either materially to augment the strength of one of the greater powers, or to diminish that of another. Thus, first Austria, and afterwards France, have been the great objects of the jealousy and vigilance of the other states of Europe. While the power of the Germanic Empire was united in the person of Charles V. to the kingdom of Spain, that prince was naturally regarded as formidable both by France and England. If he could have effected a permanent alliance with either of these powers, or could have even induced one of them to stand aside and acquiesce, there can be little doubt that he would have taken that occasion to attempt to crush the other. The vast possessions of Philip II. appeared to call for the same watchfulness and opposition, in regard to his projects, from all other states that valued their independence. In later times, the ambition of Louis XIV. of France, and the scheme concerted under his management to unite in one family the crowns of France and Spain, drew upon him, in like manner, the general hostility of Europe. There can be no doubt that, if the designs of this king had not been thus resisted, France would have become, a century earlier than it did, the mistress of the continent, and the independence of all other nations would, for a time at least, have been extinguished. The liberties of England, as founded upon the Revolution of 1688, could, in such circumstances, certainly not have been maintained. It is nothing to the purpose to argue that the maintenance of the balance of power has often involved the nations of Europe in contests with each other, which, if they had disregarded that principle, would not have taken place; at least, not at the time. It may be better that all nations should be subject to one, than that each should preserve its independence; but that is not the question here: if nations will be sovereign and independent, they must fight for their sovereignty, as men must do for any other possession, when it is attacked. But some persons appear to think that we in Great Britain have nothing to do with the maintenance of the so-called balance of power in Europe, because we live not on the continent, but in an island by ourselves. If the whole continent were reduced under subjection to a single despot, we certainly should not long remain independent. The protection which we now possess from the sea with which we are surrounded would, in the case supposed, certainly become insufficient. The maintenance of the principle of the balance of power, however, although it has no doubt given occasion to some wars, has probably prevented more. Its general recognition has, to a certain extent, united all the states of Europe into one great confederacy, and habituated each of the leading powers to the expectation of a most formidable resistance in case of its making any attempt to encroach upon its neighbours. It is no sufficient objection to say that such attempts have been actually made. They would have been made much oftener had there been no such general understanding as we have spoken of. It must have operated as a great discouragement and check to the schemes of ambitious potentates to know that, from the first consolidation of the modern European system down to the partition of Poland in 1772-a period, we may say, of three centuries-not the smallest independent state had suffered extinction, or had been even very seriously curtailed of power or territory, notwithstanding all the wars for the purpose of conquest and aggrandizement that had been waged during that long interval. BALANCE OF TRADE. In a tract published in 1677, called England's Great Happiness,' which is quoted by Mr. M'Culloch in the introductory discourse to his edition of Smith's Wealth of Nations,' is the following dialogue be→ tween "Complaint" and "Content:" "Complaint. What think you of the French trade, which draws away our money by wholesale? Mr. Fortrey gives an account that they get 1,600,000l. a year from us. "Content. "Tis a great sum; but, perhaps, were it put to a vote in a wise council, whether for that reason the trade should be left off, 'twould go in the negative. I must confess I had rather they'd use our goods than our money; but if not, I would not lose the getting of ten pounds because I can't get an hundred. . I'll suppose John-a-Nokes to be a butcher, Dick-aStyles to be an exchange man, yourself a lawyer, will you buy no meat or ribands, or your wife a fine Indian gown or fan, because they will not truck with you for indentures which they have need of? I suppose no; but if you get money enough of others, you care not though you give it away in specie for these things. I think 'tis the same case." The year after this sensible and conclusive passage was written, an act was passed "to prohibit the importation of French goods, as highly detrimental to this kingdom." This act was to continue in force to the end of the then next session 66 of Parliament; and no session having been held during the remainder of the reign of Charles II., the prohibition continued until the accession of James II., who procured the repeal of the act in 1685; but the renewal of the prohibition was one of the first consequences of the revolution of 1688. From 1685 to 1688, says Anderson, this country was nearly beggared" by an inundation of French commodities. In the reign of William III. the legislature voted the French trade a nuisance, and made the prohibition perpetual. This was to enforce what was called a favourable balance of trade. The notion, we thus see, was not a vague theory, but a mischievous rule of practice, which even now some people regard with admiration, aud would make a part of our commercial code. They would have the nation to be the lawyer who wants to truck his indentures with the wine-merchant; but because the wine-merchant will not have the indentures, the lawyer ought, according to this, to go without the wine, although he might sell the indentures to the exchange-man, who would thus furnish him with the specie for buying the wine. The balance of trade, as understood by those who adopt the theory, is the difference between the aggregate amount of a nation's exports and imports, or the balance of the particular account of the nation's trade with another nation. If the account shows that the imports (valued in money) exceed the exports (valued also in money), the balance is said to be against the nation; if the exports exceed the imports, the balance is said to be in the nation's favour. This mode of estimating the so-called balance is evidently founded on the assumption that the precious metals constitute the wealth of a country;-when the imports from any country, as valued in money, exceed the exports to the same, also valued in money, the exporting country must part with some of its precious metals in payment; and, according to the doctrine, must so far lose by the trade. A nation, such for instance as our own, has not the means of keeping very clear accounts of these matters, for we have an arbitrary standard of value, called official, which has been in use for about a century and a half, and which official value is an ingenious device for perplexing many otherwise simple questions, and for keeping up many absurd prejudices. Now, taking these official or unreal values in connexion with the device of the balance of trade, we find that during the year 1843 the United Kingdom gained some fortyeight millions sterling by a favourable balance; for its imports, or the goods which it received from foreigners, amounted to sixty-five millions, whilst its exports, or the goods it sent to foreigners, amounted to one hundred and thirteen millions, official valuation. In 1842 the same sort of excess amounted to fifty-two millions, and in 1841 to forty-nine millions. If the favourable balance of these three years were anything but a fiction, it is manifest that the nation would, in these three years only, have accumulated specie to the extent of the favourable balance, and this would amount to the sum of eightyeight millions sterling. But, further, the same favourable balance has been going on for the last half-century, or longer; and the result would be, that all the specie in the world would at the present time be locked up in this island, and that the balance of forty-eight millions in 1843 would only be a small addition to the heap. Such a result is impossible, for bullion is as much a commodity for sale as corn, and is consequently as generally exchanged. [BULLION.] But if this result were possible, and a nation resolving to sell only for specie, as the Chinese affect to do with regard to tea, could have the power of selling only for specie, this power of turning all its goods to gold, like the same power bestowed upon the wise king Midas, would confer the privilege of being without food, and clothes, and every worldly comfort upon the unhappy inhabitants of such a nation. The truth is, that no commerce is of any value to a country except as it supplies the people of that country with foreign productions, which they either cannot produce at home, or which are produced cheaper and better abroad. The exchanging of the surplus produce of one |