contrary, hold that, though the burden is on the defendant to introduce some evidence to rebut the presumption or sanity, yet, if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to whether he was sane, he is entitled to an acquittal. The cases cited will show how the courts of the different states stand on this question.

33

30 S. C. 74, 8 S. E. 440, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241; People v. Dillon, 8 Utah, 92, 30 Pac. 150; Com. v. Wheeler, 246 Pa. 528, 92 Atl. 718; State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 Atl. 905, 67 L. R. A. 322, 3 Ann. Cas. 920; State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98, 101 Am. St. Rep. 1006. In a recent case in Delaware the jury were instructed that, insanity being matter of defense, the burden of showing it is upon the defendant, and it must be proved as a fact to the satisfaction of the jury. State v. Jack, 4 Pennewill, 470, 58 Atl. 833.

33 Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353, 40 L. Ed. 499; U. S. v. Faulkner (D. C.) 35 Fed. 730; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. 162; State v. Reidell, 9 Houst. (Del.) 470, 14 Atl. 550; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224, 80 Am. Dec. 154; Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159; Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81; State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 Pac. 159; Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382, 24 N. E. 874; Grubb v. State, 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. 257, 725; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273, 16 Am. St. Rep. 408; Revoir v. State, 82 Wis. 295, 52 N. W. 84; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. St. Rep. 689; King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S. W. 169; Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 South. 593; Faulkner v. Territory, 6 N. M. 464, 30 Pac. 905; Adair v. State, 6 Okl. Cr. 284, 118 Pac. 416, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 119. In the absence of any evidence to raise a reasonable doubt, the prosecution is not obliged to prove sanity. Montag v. People, 141 Ill. 75, 30 N. E. 337; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 South. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484; People v. Spencer, 179 N. Y. 408, 72 N. E. 461.

DRUNKENNESS

28. Voluntary drunkenness furnishes no ground of exemption from criminal responsibility, exceptEXCEPTIONS-(a) Where the act is committed while laboring under settled insanity, or delirium tremens, resulting from intoxication.

(b) Where a specific intent is essential to constitute the crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its ex

istence.

(c) The fact of intoxication may be material, where provocation for the act is shown.

29. No criminal responsibility attaches for acts committed while in a state of involuntary drunkenness, destroying the reason and will.

Voluntary Drunkenness No Excuse

When a person drinks voluntarily, and becomes intoxicated, and while in such condition does an act which would be a crime if he were sober, he is nevertheless responsible; the settled rule being that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse.34

84 Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 144; U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28, Fed. Cas. No. 14,993; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.) 463; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. 162; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484; Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 Am. Rep. 556; State v. John, 30 N. C. 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396; Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663; McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169; People v. Lewis, 36 Cal. 531; People v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 Pac. 88; Willis v. Com., 32 Grat. (Va.) 929; Fonville v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 South. 688; Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100, 7 South. 154; Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 889; State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282. No defense on voting twice at election. State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22. Contra, People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 679. The fact that liquor was furnished by person killed no defense. State v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 494, 30 N. W. 917.

According to the old law, voluntary drunkenness was regarded as an aggravation of the offense,35 but this is no longer the law. Drunkenness may be punishable as a substantive crime, even at common law, if it is so open and notorious as to offend the sense of public decency and constitute a public nuisance; but a specific crime is never aggravated by the fact that the accused was drunk when he committed it.36

A person may be so drunk when he commits an act that he is incapable, at the time, of knowing what he is doing, yet if the intoxication be voluntary he is not the less responsible. A drunken man, equally with a sober man, is presumed to intend his acts, and the natural and ordinary consequences thereof, and is responsible for the reasonable exercise of his understanding, memory, and will.

Insanity-Delirium Tremens

We have seen that an insane man is not responsible for acts to which his insanity drives him. This is true when the insanity was caused by voluntary drinking, for the law does not go back of the fact of insanity to ascertain the cause. Hence one is not responsible for acts done by him while he is suffering from delirium tremens.87 This does not mean that if a man drinks to excess, and thereby tem

85 4 Bl. Comm. 25, 26; 1 Inst. 247.

36 McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514.

87 Regina v. Davis, 14 Cox Cr. Cas. 563; U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28, Fed. Cas. No. 14,993; U. S. v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1, 13, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484; Maconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657; Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435; Wagner v. State, 116 Ind. 181, 18 N. E. 833; Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149, 20 Am. Rep. 292; State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799; Kelley v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 216, 20 S. W. 357; Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. 243; French v. State, 93 Wis. 325, 67 N. W. 706.

porarily destroys his mental soundness to such an extent that he does not know right from wrong, he is excused for an act done while in this condition, for in this case the unsoundness of mind is the immediate product of drinking.35

The insanity or delirium, to serve as an excuse, must be a fixed condition of insanity, caused, not by the effects of a single debauch, but by a habit of drinking."

Same-Where Specific Intent Required

An important exception to the rule that voluntary drunkenness furnishes no exemption from criminal responsibility is found in cases where the law requires a specific intent to render an act a particular crime or degree of crime. The mere intent to become intoxicated, actual, or implied from the fact of drinking, can only supply a general wrongful intent. Where a person is too drunk when he commits an act to entertain the specific intent, essential in order that the act may constitute a particular crime, and did not first form such intent, and then become intoxicated, he is not responsible for that particular crime. If, however, one makes up his. mind to do an act, entertaining the necessary specific intent, and then becomes intoxicated, and commits it, he is responsible. At common law one may commit murder although the homicide is not premeditated, and even without actual intention to kill; and upon an indictment for murder voluntary drunkeness is no excuse. But where, by statute, murder is divided into two degrees, and, to constitute murder in the first degree, a premeditated design or deliberate premeditation to kill is required, a person who, when he kills another, is too drunk to be capable of such design or

38 STATE v. HAAB, 105 La. 230, 29 South. 725, Mikell Illus. Cas. Criminal Law, 46.

89 STATE v. HAAB, 105 La. 230, 29 South. 725, Mikell Illus. Cas. Criminal Law, 46; Bishop, New Cr. L. (8th Ed.) § 406.

premeditation, and who had not such design when he drank, cannot be held responsible for murder in the first degree.*° But if one makes up his mind to kill another, and then becomes drunk, and kills him, he is guilty of that degree of murder. This is so also in case of larceny or robbery, in which the specific intent to steal the goods taken is necessary; 42 and in many other crimes, such as perjury, assaults with intent to murder or to do great bodily harm,*

41

43

44

40 Tucker v. U. S., 151 U. S. 164, 14 Sup. Ct. 299, 38 L. Ed. 112; Hopt v. Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. Ed. 873; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Id., 41 Conn. 584; Keenan v. Com., 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414; Jones v. Com., 75 Pa. 403; Willis v. Com., 32 Grat. (Va.) 929; Haile v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 154; Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663; Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 227, 12 S. W. 601, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 33; Bernhardt v. State, 82 Wis. 23, 51 N. W. 1009; King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 South. 856; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 Pac. 581; People v. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, 38 N. E. 372; People v. Corey, 148 N. Y. 476, 42 N. E. 1066; HILL v. STATE, 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W. 916, Mikell Illus. Cas. Criminal Law, 195.

41 State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799. And see State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341 (Gil. 315); State v. Douglass (Kan.) 24 Pac. 1118; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 South. 835, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232; Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 South. 250, 38 Am. St. Rep. 85.

42 Loza v. State, 1 Tex. App. 488, 28 Am. Rep. 416; People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334, 11 N. W. 184, 186; People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341, 36 Am. Rep. 13; State v. Schingen, 20 Wis. 74; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785; Keeton v. Com., 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422; Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543. But see, contra, Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428, 79 Am. Dec. 439. See dictum in Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 605, 44 Am. Rep. 97. Taking property for fun while intoxicated, People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 507, 21 N. W. 905. Voting twice at election, People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 679. Contra, State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22. Intent to do bodily harm, State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154 (Gil. 95).

48 Lyle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 19 S. W. 903.

44 Lancaster v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 575; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St.