him, 35; his opinion of Calvinism,
36; the influence of Raymond
Lully, 37; his visit to England,
ib. et seq.; friendship with Sir
Philip Sidney and Fulke Greville,
38; intimacy with Florio, 39;
Carew's indebtedness to Bruno,
ib.; his manifesto to the Uni-
versity of Oxford, 40; his be-
trayal by a pupil, 41; seven years
imprisonment, 43; his philosophy
a form of Naturalism, 44.
Caird, Dr Edward, ii. 14.
Carew, Thomas, his Coelum Britan-
nicum, borrowed from Bruno's
'Triumphant Beast,' ii. 39.
Castelnau, Michel de, Bruno's con-
nexion with, ii. 37.
Categories, nature and deduction of
the Kantian, 183 et seq.; criti-
cism of the Kantian categories,
ii. 292 et seq.
Causation, Hume's analysis of, 141;
the Kantian doctrine, 317; funda-
mental representation of causation,
ib.; change and generalisation,
318; intelligibility of nature a
relative conception, 319; the
empirical doctrine, 320; criticism
of Hume's view, 321; Lotze's
analysis, ib. et seq.; Lotze's and
Berkeley's theories, 325; Kant
and Hume on causal connexion,
326; space and time components
of the content apprehended as
causally connected, 328; meaning
of unity of the objective world,'
329; causal connexion as con-
stant order or type of process,
332; criticism of the Kantian
view, ib. et seq.; the identity
of cause and effect,' 335; the
generalisation expressed in 'force,'
336; causal connexion one
fact not of reason, 357.
Chalmers, Dr Thomas, on the dis-
tinction between abstract and
concrete, ii. 309.
Change, the foundation of any rep-
resentation of time, 301; does
the nature of reality exclude
change? 302; Herbart's view,
ib., 303; the Kantian doctrine,
305; the illegitimate distinction
this theory involves, 308; no
contradiction in the completed
notion of change, 309; Lotze's
account of the supposed contra-
diction, 310.
Christie, Mr R. C., opinion of, on
the authenticity of Schoppe's
letter on Bruno, ii. 24.
Clauberg, his view that the soul can
direct movement, 42.
Comte, Auguste, his limitation of
knowledge to coexistences and
sequences, ii. 308; his distinction
between abstract and concrete,
ib.; his classification of the
sciences, 309; his method of
approaching sociology, ib.
Condillac, his theory of psychology,
ii. 228.
Condorcet, his analysis of social
inequalities, ii. 90.
Consciousness, the method of deter-
mining the content of, ii. 195 et
seq.; distinguishable features in
immediate experience, 198 et seq.;
qualitative differences in this con-
tent, ib.; two criteria employed
in distinguishing sensations, 200;
distinction between sense - pres-
entations and feelings derivative,
201; feelings, as pleasure-pain ex-
periences, of independent nature,
203; Wundt's theory of feeling,
ib.; teleological theory of feeling,
205; theory connecting pleasure
and pain with physiological pro-
cesses, 208; formal feelings, 211;
feeling and activity, ib., 212;
Wundt's analysis of voluntary
action, ib. et seq.; the factors
involved in willing, 216; sensa-
tions involved in movement, ib. ;
movement not prefigured in the
antecedent sense - impulse, 217;
the regular series in the changes
of experience, ib.; gradual growth
of the process of willing, 220;
the feeling of activity, 221.
Cordemoy, as an originator of Oc-
casionalism, 42.
Descartes, his chief writings, 7;
insistence on the excellence of
mathematical demonstration, 8;
characteristics of his method, 9;
'cogito ergo sum,' 11, 15; the
lumen naturale and its axioms,
13; importance of the fifth axiom
connecting idea and reality, 14;
absolute and relative ideas, 15;
the ontological argument for the
existence of God, 16; the anthro-
pological argument, 17; the ver-
acity of God, 19; the origin of
error, 20; Understanding and
Will as passive and active, 21;
the priority of Will, 23; God
the only Absolute, 25; conscious-
ness and extension, 27; the four
divisions of philosophy, ib.; the
Cartesian Physics, 28 et seq.;
extension and extended substance,
29; his view of conservation, ib.;
theory of space, 30; mechanical
conception of nature, 32; animals
as automata, ib.; the antinomy
of the Cartesian Physics, 33; the
Cartesian Psychology and Psycho-
physics, ib. et seq.; antithesis of
idea and sensation, 34; their mode
of operation in apprehension, 35;
'sensation' and 'image,' 36;
consciousness and corporeality
not causally connected, 37; class-
ification of ideas forming Under-
standing, ib.; explanation of ideas
as innate, 38; the process of
sense-perception, 39; approxima-
tion to the doctrine of Occasional-
ism, ib.; theory of the pineal
gland, 42; lines of development
of the Cartesian doctrine, 43;
Leibniz's and Spinoza's ground of
dissatisfaction with his system,
68; Leibniz's criticism of the
Cartesian Physics, 75; Leibniz's
view of the Cartesian theory of
knowledge, 96; the Cartesian
view of facts of mind, ii. 53, 61.
Determinism, Leibniz's view of,
107; difficulty caused by, in
Spinoza's system, ib.
Development, psychology considered
as the tracing of mental develop-
ment, ii. 185 et seq.; the trans-
cendental view of End, 186; the
empirical conception of end, 188;
the laws of development merely
descriptive, 189; they exclude
the notion of ultimate end, ib.;
notion of implicit existence un-
justifiable in region of conscious-
ness, 191; the notion of develop-
ment free from implication of end
or purpose, 192; the Hegelian
and Aristotelian conception of
development as the unfolding of
a content, 302; contradictoriness
of this view both on the practical
and theoretical side, 304; special
difficulty in the notion of devel-
opment due to the fusion of
identity and difference, 305;
different notions of development
probably necessary for different
forms of existence, 306; the
mechanism of nature itself ade-
quate for the notion of develop-
ment, 307; misconception of the
nature of development in Idealist
philosophy, 317.
Dewey, Professor, on the distinction
between psychology and epistem-
ology, ii. 48, 59.
Enlightenment,' a degenerate form
of Leibnizian rationalism, ii. 144;
character of the doctrine, 145.
Epistemology, its distinction from
psychology, ii. 46 et seq.; recog-
nition of this distinction in the
Stoic and pre-Kantian theories,
49; ignoring of it by Locke, ib.;
inadequacy of Kant's account of
the distinction, 60; account of
the Cartesian view, 61, 62; sub-
jective and trans-subjective one
act or process, 65.
Evolution, Hegel's view of, ii. 303.
pain experiences, independent in
nature, 203; Wundt's theory, ib.;
the teleological theory of feeling,
205; Dr Stout's view of pleasure
and pain, 206; Mr Bradley's, ib.;
pleasure and pain as connected
with the expansion and repression
of self, 207; pleasure and pain
as connected with physiological
processes, 208; formal feelings,
211; feeling and activity, ib.,
Fichte, his insight into the want of
unity in the Kantian system, 255;
unity of consciousness the central
fact in experience, 256; difference
an absolute condition of self-
consciousness, 257; cause of ap-
parent artificiality of his system,
ib.; the evolution of self-con-
sciousness a development from
within, 259; thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis, ib., 260; the ab-
solute ego and the personal self,
260; speculation and life, ib.;
the reality of the Non-Ego, 261;
difficulty of reconciling finite self
and the absolute, 263; relation
to Schelling, 264, 265; his
enthusiasm for the unification of
Germany, ii. 119; suppression of
his Reden, 122; significance of
his Reden, 129, 131, 132; his
single-hearted devotion to truth,
Fischer, Kuno, his interpretation
of Spinoza's notion of attribute,
62.
Florio, John, Bruno's intimacy with,
ii. 39.
Francke, August, influence on
education in Germany, ii. 125.
Frederick the Great, his interest
in educational reform, ii. 125.
Frederick William I., his interest in
educational reforms in Germany,
ii. 125.
Frederick William II., his reversal
of the policy of Frederick the
Great, ii. 128.
Frederick William III., his patron-
age of the Prussian Universities,
ii. 129.
French Revolution, its significance
in modern political history, ii.
146.
Freytag, Gustav, on the political
indifference accompanying the
literary renascence in Germany,
ii. 140.
Frith, Miss I., Life of Bruno by,
ii. 25.
Galileo, importance of, in modern
philosophy, 5, 29.
Germany, the starting-point of the
regeneration of Germany, ii. 119;
Stein's conception for unification
of the separate States, ib.;
political and economical reform,
121; rise of a spirit of patriotism,
ib.; efforts at political reform
frustrated, 124; state of educa-
tion in North Germany in the
eighteenth century, 125; educa-
tion and clerical opposition, 127;
the policy of Frederick William
III., 129; Fichte's Reden, and
their significance, 131, 132; the
founding of the University of
Berlin, 134; W. von Humboldt's
place in the history of Prussia,
136, 137; influence of her in-
tellectual tradition on the modern
history of Germany, 138; liter-
ary enthusiasm and political in-
difference, 140; effect of the
Reformation in Germany, 142;
Leibnizian rationalism and the
Enlightenment, 144.
Harmony, Pre-established, Leibniz's
Hecker, J. J., his educational re-
forms in Germany, ii. 125.
Hegel, his criticism of Schelling's
absolute ground, 269; his in-
sistence on the historical character
of mind, 273; absolute think-
ing,' ib.; his system the most
perfect expression of idealism,
274; its affinity to that of
Aristotle, ib.; system of abstract
thoughts an organic whole, 275;
nature of understanding, ib.; the
Dialectic, 276; understanding
subordinate to speculation, 277;
his relation to Kant, 278; the
dialectic and the principle of
Contradiction, 279; self-con-
sciousness the highest form of
reality, 280; nature and mind,
ib.; three divisions of the specu-
lative view of reality, 281; im-
portance of the notion of develop-
ment, ib.; his explanation of the
transition from essence to notion,
340; criticism of his philosophy
of nature, ii. 12; his indifference
to current political events, 140;
his view of development, 302; of
evolution, 303.
Herbart, criticism of his theory of
change, 302 et seq.; the meta-
physical basis of his psychology,
ii. 168; his explanation of mental
process, 169; Dr Ward's criti-
cism of 'Presentationism,' 172.
Herder, his recognition of historical
development, 272, 273.
tending the dual significance of
idea, 134, 146; impressions and
ideas, 134; modes of having and
of grouping ideas, 135; the ele-
ment of belief, ib.; isolation of
ideas, 136; treatment of mathe-
matical propositions, 137; theory
irreconcilable with his funda-
mental principles, 138; view as
to arithmetic, 139; memory and
reasoning, 140; causation (real
dependence) and reasoning, 141;
analysis of causation, ib.; analysis
of reasoning, 142; nature of an
inference, 143; no synthetic func-
tion in mind, ib. ; necessity only
subjective, 144; analysis of be-
lief, ib.; reality only clusters of
perceptions, 145; difficulty of the
principle as applying to personal
identity, 146; criticism of his
theory of causation, 321; com-
parison of above with Kant's,
326; belief' as the difference
between idea and judgment, ii.
269; Kant's inadequate answer
to Hume regarding causality, 297.
Idea, the Cartesian antithesis be-
tween idea and sensation, 34;
Descartes' classification of ideas
as forming Understanding, 37;
his view as to innate ideas, 38;
significance of the term in the
philosophy of Malebranche, 50,
53; Leibniz's position with regard
to innate ideas, 96; conflicting
senses of idea in Locke's Essay,
113; in Hume, 134.
Hospitals, their maintenance by the Idealism, Subjective, criticism of
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, his with-
drawal from politics, ii. 123;
share in founding Berlin Univer-
sity, 130, 134; his character and
genius, ib.; his earlier career,
135; his intercourse with Wolf,
Schiller, and Goethe, 136; his
place in Prussian history, ib. et
seq.
Hume, his position regarding Leib-
niz and Kant, 105; connexion
with Locke, 133; difficulty at-
the theory of, 233 et seq.;
its fundamental principle, 283;
Kant's relation to, ib. et seq.;
main cause of its perplexities,
288.
Innate ideas, Descartes' conception
of, 38; Leibniz's criticism of
Locke, 96.
Judgment, the disjunctive judg-
ment, ii. 260 et seq.; the hypo-
thetical judgment, 262; the
categorical judgment, 264; uni-
versal and individual judgments,
ib.; distinction between idea
and judgment, 268; Brentano's
view, ib.; judgment based on the
simplést consciousness of the ob-
jective, 272; this consciousness
derived from the distinction be-
tween sensuous perceptions and
ideas, 273; nature of the rudi-
mentary judgment thence made
possible, 275.
Kant, relation to Locke, 112, 123;
relation to preceding systems,
147; the fundamental note of his
system, 148; his view of the
Leibnizian theory of space, 149
et seq.; 'incongruent counter-
parts,' 151; mathematical pro-
cedure not purely analytic, 153;
'Dissertation on the Form and
Principles of the Sensible and
Intelligible World' marking a
transition stage in his thinking,
155; comparison of this work
with the Critique, 156 et seq.;
phenomenon and noumenon, 157,
210; the a priori character of
Space determined relatively to
the Leibnizian theory, 158; re-
jection of Newton's theory, 159;
definition of Critical Method, 165;
confusion in his application of
the method, 167; 'how are syn-
thetic a priori propositions pos-
sible?' a needlessly limited ques-
tion, 170; his failure to harmonise
mind and reality, 172; the char-
acteristics of a priori propositions,
173; transcendental knowledge,
174; threefold division of trans-
cendental doctrine, ib.; the forms
of sense, 176; their metaphysical
exposition, ib.; space and time
as forms of intuition, 178; their
transcendental exposition, 179;
definition of synthesis, ib. ; 'real'
and 'ideal' as applied to space
and time, 180, 181; the Cate-
gories, 183; their justification,
185 et seq. ;
the function of
understanding, 190; the Trans-
cendental Schema, 192; the
Principles of Pure Understanding,
193, 194; axioms of intuition,
ib.; anticipations of perception,
195; analogies of experience,
196; objective permanence, 198;
objective succession and causality,
199; simultaneity or coexistence,
200; reciprocity, 201; postulates
of empirical thought, 202; the
function of reason, 206; ideas of
reason, 208; the Paralogisms of
Pure Reason, 211; the Antin-
omies, 213; the ideas of pure
reason, 217; the ontological
argument for the existence of
God, 219; the regulative func-
tion of ideas of reason, 222;
things-in-themselves, 223 et seq.;
three ways of determining the
realm of things-in-themselves, 226
et seq.; critical analysis of the
notion, thing-in-itself, 230 et seq.;
Subjective Idealism, 233 et seq.;
critical analysis of the doctrine
of Inner Sense, 240 et seq.; a
fundamental error in Kant's
analysis, 242; the meaning of
a priori, 244 et seq.; the anti-
thesis between mechanism and
freedom, 247 et seq.; the final
conception compared with Berke-
ley's idealism, 250; Hegel's rela-
tion to Kant, 278; his partial
acceptance of Subjective Idealism,
283 et seq.; his inversion of the
order of experience, 288; criti-
cism of his theory of space, 292
et seq.; criticism of his theory of
time, 305 et seq.; his doctrine of
causation, 317; his causal theory
compared with Hume's, 326; the
Subjective Idealism in his system,
348; general criticism of Kant's
system, ii. 13 et seq.; the dis-
tinction between psychology and
epistemology, 46; meaning of
facts of mind, 53; his conception
of psychology and its difficulties,
54 et seq.; inadequacy of his dis-
tinction between psychology and
epistemology, 60; his influence
on psychology, 66; his general
conception of it, 67; empirical
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