duced to great poverty, and forced to write for bread, Bülow was obliged to write for effect also, and unfortunately overshot the mark. His military and political history of the year 1805 excited too much attention; it aroused the wrath of emperors and kings, who caused the unfortunate author to be thrown into prison, in which he soon afterwards ended his unhappy career. His fate casts a dark blot on the fame of the Emperor Alexander, who was his principal persecutor. Most of the officers who acquired any reputation during the war of 1813 were looked upon as disciples of Bülow; among the most distinguished was his own brother, the victor of Dennewitz, the same who was the first to join the British on the plains of Waterloo. On the other hand, mark, the hero of Ulm was his bitter enemy. The Duke of Brunswick also, who fell at Jena, hated him on account of his reputation for talents, and refused to employ him. When applied to in his favour, his Grace declared that he had never read a single line of his works thus the enmity of dunces becomes in the end a proof of merit. The fate of these authors proves how impossible it was for military science, which, like others, could only advance by the aid of letters, to make any progress on the continent of Europe: what greater latitude it enjoyed in England may be judged from the fact, that we have not a single work on military science in the language. And in this case the want of a book speaks volumes; it shows that no interest is taken in military subjects, and that military merit is not encouraged by the military administration; for if preferment and distinction were to be gained by professional knowledge, study, and application, plenty would read and study, even as plenty study law, medicine, chemistry, and mechanics; and where there are readers and students, books, whether good, bad, or indifferent, will always be found in abundance.

X

IX.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

THE great influence exercised by the French army on the events of modern times, renders a full and sufficient account of its rise and progress interesting to the general reader. But there are evident difficulties in the way of such a work ; and if the many voluminous histories written on the subject have met with only moderate success, though adorned in some instances with beautiful and highly-finished illustrations, it may be well believed that the short sketch our narrow limits permit us to furnish must be imperfect indeed. This results not merely from our want of space, but from the nature of the subject itself, which in a great measure confines our delineation to externals, to mere form and appearance. The peculiar spirit which influenced the troops and levies at different periods we have no means of tracing beyond such as are imperfectly furnished by the actions of war. What the country gained by victory, or lost by defeat, history tells us; but what beyond the influence of particular leaders led to victory or caused defeat, rendered the same army formidable at one time and indifferent at others, we have no means of tracing. Still less do we know what political station, if any, was in earlier times held by an army whose political opinions have un

fortunately tended in our own days to unseat dynasties and overturn established thrones. We make use of the word "unfortunately" here as applied to the exercise of political power by armed bodies; whether the results have been fortunate or unfortunate is a question that a thousand volumes of controversy have left undecided, and which events will yet perhaps have to determine.

The Franks who issued from the forests of Germany and conquered Gaul seem generally to have fought on foot. And as the victories achieved over their Gallic adversaries, who were mostly horsemen, tended to strengthen their belief in the superiority of infantry, their armies long continued to be mainly composed of that favourite force. The introduction of the feudal system effected a change. Peers, princes, and nobles took the field on horseback, and their pride induced them to bring as many mounted and gorgeously-armed followers in their train as they had the means of equipping. The heavy-armed horsemen, glittering in helm and haubert, had, of course, the most decided superiority over the infantry soldier, who, in his slight jacque, or simple peasant's frock, was exposed almost defencelessly to the telling blows of warmace or battle-axe: cavalry thus came to form the strength of armies.

These feudal bands had, however, the great disadvantage of rendering the sovereign too dependent on the goodwill of his peaceful vassals, and in France some of these were nearly as powerful as the king himself. The latter was naturally anxious, therefore, to shake off the trammels, and Louis le Gros having, in the early part of the twelfth century, acquired considerable control over his principal barons, availed himself of the advantage to enfranchise the towns and boroughs, authorising them, at the same time, to raise soldiers for their own defence. These troops, when called upon to attend the King at a distance from their own hearths, were supported at the expense of the state,

and formed the main strength of the French infantry in the great battles of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. During the long wars between France and England, these bands became very numerous; but in an age when discipline was as slack as the punishments were atrocious, and when, in the absence of regular pay and supplies, the troops were too often obliged to live by pillage, these bands became frequently more formidable to the country they were to protect than to the enemies against whom they were to fight. During every interval of truce, they ravaged the lands far and wide, and, joined by adventurers of all nations, they waged war on their own account, and committed, wherever they appeared, the most frightful excesses. Louis the Younger sent an army against them, and failing to subdue them, took 20,000 of them into pay. Philip-Augustus acted in a similar manner, and with no better success; and it was only Bertrand du Guesclin who cleared the kingdom of these hordes of brigands, écorcheurs, malandrins, brabançons, and whatever else they were called, by leading them into Spain, when he assisted Henry of Trestamar against Peter the Cruel, King of Castile.

It was under Philip-Augustus that chivalry-which it has been so much the fashion to deride, and to which civilisation is yet so deeply indebted-began to extend and to assume that brilliant appearance which it displayed at its zenith. Its influence extended rapidly among the nobles of France; but highly honoured and respected as the knights were, it does not seem that chivalry itself effected any change in the military institutions of the country. As nobles had before led their vassals to the field, so they now led their knights; but it does not seem that the dignity itself ever gave any authority, though we sometimes find knights-bannerets assuming, by right of that rank, authority over others. But even this rule was by no means general.

Of the tactics and mode of fighting of the troops of this early period it is difficult to give any account. Though at sieges heavy machines were used for throwing darts and stones, we rarely find projectiles employed in the battlefield; and if we believe P. Daniel and others, PhilipAugustus was the first who introduced the crossbow into France. The arms of the infantry, as well as of the cavalry, were mainly calculated for close combat, and consisted principally of swords, spears, war-maces, and battleaxes, with here and there a few slings and javelins; but that there was any system of organisation sufficiently perfect to enable commanders even of small divisions to bring compact bodies of these soldiers to a simultaneous onset, may be very much doubted. And at the great battle of Bovines, gained by Philip-Augustus against Otto, Emperor of Germany, the infantry seem to have acted altogether a very inferior part; for the Count of Boulogne, who held an important command under the Emperor, is mentioned as having formed his infantry into a hollow circle within which he took shelter to recover strength, when exhausted by his exertions in fighting. Notwithstanding this great victory of Bovines and the many conquests of Philip-Augustus, it is still evident that the kings of France did not look upon their own troops as equal to the necessities of the state; for we already find Philip le Bel entering into treaties with John Baliol, King of Scotland, Eric, King of Norway, and Albert, Duke of Austria, for the purpose of obtaining auxiliary soldiers. In the battle of Cressy, a corps of Bohemians, led by their adventurous king, John of Luxemburg, who was slain in the action, fought in the French ranks; and fought, it seems, most bravely, for historians give us the names of a long list of nobles who fell in defending their blind sovereign. Their Prince, afterwards Emperor under the title of Charles IV., was also wounded in the battle. Besides these, were the well-known Genoese archers,