Under these long-established standards which are well designed to govern this determination, we have no alternative but to conclude that the evidence adduced herein is insufficient to demonstrate that the proposed area is a part of the Chicago commercial zone. The petitioners and parties in support of the petition have presented little concrete evidence to support their position. The supporting parties state the number of employees at their steel plants but fail to specify how many employees residing in the municipality of Chicago are employed in the proposed area or how many residents of the proposed area work in Chicago. Compare Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, supra, 117 M.C.C. at 801, and Seattle-Tacoma, Wash., Commercial Zone, 111 M.C.C. 718 (1970). The proposed area is wholly independent of Chicago in regard to such factors as police and fire protection, sanitation, telephone, water, gas and electric services, and school systems. Information on such factors as news and communications media and shopping, recreational and entertainment patterns is not presented. Additionally, we are unable to ascertain with clarity the uses or economic characteristics of the approximately 2.5-mile stretch between the present zone limit boundary and the industrial facilities for which some evidence was adduced. This land apparently consists of parkland and a residential community, and there is no evidence whatsoever presented showing that this section is part of the Chicago commercial ambit. Of the evidence presented tending to show a connection between the various facilities contained within the proposed area and Chicago, the overwhelming thrust of that evidence adduced concerns the relationship of those facilities to points within the Chicago commercial zone and not to the base municipality itself.

These various considerations, and the absence of specific data linking the commerce of the proposed area with that of the base municipality, lead us to conclude that redefinition of the commercial zone of Chicago is not justified. The petition will be denied.

FINDINGS

We find that the proposed redefinition and enlargement of the zone adjacent to and commercially a part of Chicago, Ill., contemplated by section 203(b)(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act, has not been shown to be warranted; that this decision is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; and that the petition should be denied. An appropriate order will be entered.

125 M.C.C.

No. MC-C-8973

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER-NEWARK, DEL., SUPERHIGHWAY OPERATIONS

Decided October 15, 1976

Upon petition, certain regular-route motor common carrier operations between Philadephia, Pa., and the District of Columbia, involving intermediate point service over Interstate Highway 95 utilizing vehicles which are stationed at a terminal at Newark, Del., and which do not depart from and return to a pertinent underlying regular service route when performing such service, found not to be within the purview of, and not permitted to be conducted under, this Commission's Superhighway Rules-Motor Common Carriers of Property, 49 CFR 1042.3. Petition seeking a contrary determination denied.

William O. Turney for petitioner.

Thomas M. Auchincloss, Jr., Thomas G. Sloan, Phineas Stevens, and C. H. Swanson for parties in support of the petition.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 1, Commissioners Murphy, GRESHAM, and Corber

BY THE DIVISION:

By petition filed February 5, 1976, Roadway Express, Inc., requests this Commission to issue a declaratory order determining affirmatively that petitioner's contemplated operations (which will be described in detail later in this report) at Newark, Del., are permitted under the Superhighway Rules-Motor Common Carriers of Property, 49 CFR 1042.3,' which are reproduced in appendix A to this report. Briefly, these rules allow a certificated regular-route motor carrier of general commodities, with or without exceptions, to operate over superhighways (including highways connecting such superhighways with a carrier's authorized regular service route or routes) between the point of departure from and the point of return to the carrier's authorized regular service route, provided that the 'These regulations were promulgated in Motor Service on Interstate Highways-Passengers, 110 M.C.C. 514 (1969).

operation is conducted within the guidelines specified either in the "25-mile" rule (section 1042.3(a)(1)) or the "80-percent" provision (section 1042.3(a)(2)).

The "25-mile" rule specifies that the superhighway route (including connecting highways) between the point of departure and return to the carrier's authorized regular service route must (1) extend in the same general direction as the carrier's authorized regular service route, and (2) be wholly within 25 airline miles of the carrier's authorized regular service route. The "80-percent" provision provides that the distance over the superhighway route (including connecting highways) between the points of departure from and return to the carrier's authorized regular service route must be not less than 80 percent of the distance between such points over the carrier's authorized regular service route. The "intermediate-point service" provision (section 1042.3(b)) of the Superhighway Rules allows a carrier conducting superhighway operations under the above-described "25-mile" rule, which carrier is authorized to serve all intermediate points (without regard to nominal exceptions) on its underlying certificated regular service route between the points of departure from and return to the said service route, to serve intermediate points on and within 1 airline mile of the said superhighway route (and connecting highways) in the same manner and subject to corresponding service limitations as described in the pertinent certificate or certificates of public convenience and necessity.

2

As here pertinent, petitioner asserts that it holds certificated regular-route, general-commodities authority to operate between Philadephia, Pa., and the District of Columbia, over U.S. Highway 1 and also over U.S. Highway 40, serving all intermediate points on both described underlying regular service routes. The involved superhighway route (including connecting nonsuperhighways) extends from Philadelphia, Pa., over unspecified nonsuperhighways to junction Interstate Highway 95, thence over Interstate Highway 95 to Baltimore, Md., thence over Interstate Highway 95 to junction unspecified connecting highways near the District of Columbia, thence over unspecified highways to the District of Columbia, and return over the same route." Petitioner believes that under the

Inasmuch as U.S. Highway 40 does not, in fact, pass through, or even near, Philadelphia or the District of Columbia, petitioner's authority to operate over and serve points on this highway is not relevant to the issues herein and will not be further discussed.

Petitioner's pertinent authorized regular service routes and the considered superhighway route are depicted schematically in the map appearing in appendix B to this report which map is limited in scope to operations between Philadelphia and Baltimore for ease of discussion and as this is the crucial segment of the questioned operations.

"intermediate-point service" provision [section 1042.3(b)] of the Superhighway Rules it may serve intermediate points on and within 1 airline mile of the above-described superhighway route (and connecting nonsuperhighways). In connection with its provision of service at points on the above-described superhighway route petitioner would prefer to establish a terminal at or near Newark, Del., which petitioner asserts is an intermediate point on the considered superhighway route.

The operations the lawfulness of which petitioner seeks to have determined involve the pickup and delivery of freight at points on the above-described superhighway route by a vehicle operating between such points on said superhighway route and petitioner's proposed terminal facilities at or near Newark, at which terminal facilities such freight would be transferred to or from a different vehicle which would perform the line-haul movement of freight between petitioner's terminal at Newark and points on petitioner's authorized underlying regular service route. Petitioner believes that. the above-described operations may not be within the permissible scope of the Superhighway Rules, inasmuch as the vehicle operating between points on the said superhighway route and the terminal at Newark (also a point on the superhighway route) would not, in fact, "depart from" or "return to" a point on petitioner's authorized underlying regular service route as petitioner has been informed is required by the provisions of section 1042.3(a) of the Superhighway Rules.

Petitioner requests a formal ruling to the effect that the abovedescribed operations are within the scope of the Superhighway Rules. Notice of the filing of the petition was published in the Federal Register on March 18, 1976. Pursuant to this notice which provided that any interested person desiring to participate in the proceeding might file representations, views, and arguments in the matter, Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., and Gordons Transports, Inc., jointly, and Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., Overnite Transportation Company, and Southern Maryland Transportation Co., Inc., individually, filed representations in support of the petition. Petitioner filed no further representations.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PARTIES

Inasmuch as the arguments of the parties filing representations in support of the petition are virtually identical in all major respects, a single summary of their position will be sufficient to indicate their