cised by the Attorney General, notwithstanding the fact that he did not actually put his signature on each and every one. That issue is under consideration by the Supreme Court and, hopefully, we will have a ruling before the end of the term.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. On that question, has the practice changed because of the challenge?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes it has. The Attorney General now, as a matter of practice, signs every one unless he is unavailable and then under a specific delegation to me, and another Assistant Attorney General on a standby basis we have the authority to approve in an emergency. And that emergency ought to be distinguished from the emergency provisions of the statute. We exercise our authority only when the Attorney General is unavailable. The emergency provisions of the statute have never been actually utilized, and only in one instance was the emergency provision invoked, and that just very recently in connection with some ongoing extortion scheme where the lives of alleged hostages were threatened. And it was on a weekend and we authorized the Bureau, with the concurrence, telephone concurrence of the Attorney General, to proceed without formal submission of the affidavits and papers. Fortunately, the law enforcement authorities raided the premises where the hostages were alleged to have been held, and there were indeed no hostages and so, we have never had to utilize that emergency authorization. Had it been protracted we would have applied again, I think it is a classic example of the discretion that is employed in the Department of Justice and how carefully, and in a limited fashion, we are exercising those powers that have been granted to us by the Congress.

Perhaps a more controversial issue involves the issue of electronic. surveillance in the area of internal security. The phrase, itself, is ambiguous. In the Keith case, recently decided, it made the distinction between foreign intelligence and foreign relations matters and domestic security matters, and, obviously, we have followed that case and do not authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in domestic security matters. And the procedure in foreign intelligence and foreign relations matters is now more stringent. The applications are walked over by Bureau agents to the office of the Attorney General. They are hand-delivered from the Attorney General's office and they are brought down to me for my recommendation, and if for any reason I am unavailable Mr. Maroney sees them. They are than hand-carried back with our recommendation to the Attorney General, who personally approves, and approval is done under the specific authority of the President and has been sanctioned by history and custom, at least going back as far as President Roosevelt. The standards we use have recently been supported by the Third Circuit en banc decision in the Ivanov case, and basically those standards are reasonable suspicion and need.

The applications themselves are directed to intelligence and counterintelligence, espionage activities and activities relating to development of intelligence information for assistance to the President in the conduct of foreign relations of the United States.

Whether or not it would ultimately be practical to require submission of those applications to the court is, I suppose, to some

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degree an open question. We, in the Department of Justice, think it is rather impractical, if only because it requires a large degree of background in intelligence and the information that constitutes the intelligence to make an informed judgment with respect to whether or not the suspicion is realistic. Whether or not there is a need involves dissemination of a great deal of confidential, secret and top secret information. We think that that is best left to the executive branch and, for that reason, we would oppose a warrant requirement and we think that we are rather firmly supported in that by the Ivanov decision.

We have thought about other things in terms of this complex, so-called English system, which I cannot speak of in a wholly authritative fashion, but I am told that they over there have a commission which serves this purpose. In any event, there are people who devote their careers to this sort of thing, and a counterpart proposal here would be to establish a commission with one member appointed by the Congress, one by the Executive and perhaps from the intelligence community.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Petersen, excuse me just a minute. You are talking now about internal security matters?

Mr. PETERSEN. We are talking about, yes, if that phrase means foreign intelligence, foreign intelligence espionage, counterespionage activities, yes.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. My understanding is you are talking about all warrantless wire taps?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Electronic surveillance which involves either internal security or foreign intelligence?

Mr. PETERSEN. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. This is as opposed to internal problems like organized crime and so forth?

Mr. PETERSEN. That is correct, which are covered by the warrant procedure and which we support and would like to suggest that the Congress not change.

I think that the critical area is in this area of internal security and I think that is where, frankly, I think we need some help. We welcome help from the Congress. We do not want to shoulder this responsibility wholly ourselves. We do not want to say it is not for you. We think it is too important a responsibility and our problem is not to exclude you, but our problem is to bring you in in such a fashion that we are not abdicating Executive functions, that we are not violating the separation of powers, that we are not thrusting our responsibility on you. But, we are performing our obligation in such a fashion that we can recognize, with some degree of confidence, what we are doing and that it is done properly, and the judgments are properly exercised, and that there is not calculated abuse, you know, which we do not condone, but there can be mistakes, and there is a possibility of mistakes.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Petersen, you were talking about the British system, where there was a commission. It is my understanding that you are saying, in effect, that the commission members had a background in internal security and counterespionage work, so that they

knew the sort of background that you imply is necessary to make an informed judgment?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, that is true. But, I do not mean to import parochialism into that concept. I do not mean to suggest that no one from without the intelligence community should be appointed. Indeed, I would think to the contrary, that we would like some fresh thinking in there.

Mr. SMITH. But you would think that there should be some experts on that?

Mr. PETERSEN. That is right. But, there are people who could rapidly develop this factual development and insight into the foreign relations and intelligence problems so far as they affect a major power in the world, so that we could function in that fashion.

The other alternative, which we told to the chairman before, we have no objection to the oversight committee. But we do think, at least I think from my position in the Department of Justice, that an oversight committee by the House or an oversight committee by the Senate is really not the answer. Frankly, there is too much jealously between the bodies or maybe a lack of confidence. I do not know what you call it, but at least there is, one can discern from without the legislative branch, a certain degree of jealousy with respect to what committee even within the House or the Senate does this or that. So, we would like to suggest if that is going to be done it be a joint committee. And I would think it would be advisable, too, that it not be of such broad range that its impact is dissipated. I would like to think that perhaps we could have an oversight committee with respect to internal security problems, or internal security problems as they relate to surveillance, whether it be electronic or other surveillance, so the Congress could be assured that what we are trying to do is in the best interest of the United States.

We are distressed, you know, I am distressed, my colleagues are distressed. I think the individuals in the Federal Bureau of Investigation are distressed, that so often what we think is necessary, and what we feel conscience-bound to do is being misunderstood. We are distressed by abuse by people who are not a part of the intelligence community because of the damage they do to what we consider to be absolutely necessary and an indispensable function of the executive branch.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Do you concede, Mr. Petersen, that there is abuse by the Federal Government in connection with this?

Mr. PETERSEN. I think-well, I have to concede that there has been at least one abuse, one abusive action. But, I think your statement is too general. Frankly, I am impressed by the lack of abuse in the areas so far as I can see. I do not mean to say, Mr. Chairman, that you and I might share the same judgments, you know, on particular instances. There are instances where Mr. Maroney and I disagree or the Attorney General and I disagree. And ultimately he has made the decision. But, they are not irrational disagreements. They are not circumstances which are so marked that either one of us could say that the other is categorically wrong or being abusive of authority or irresponsible. I do not see that sort of thing.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Without cataloging them, we are all aware that there have been in the past 2 or 3 years a number of cases of electronic surveillance made public by one means or another, which appear to be abuses to many people.

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, you know

Mr. KASTENMEIER. I do not want to make it any more specific than that. I do not want to go down the litany of cases, but that is one of the reasons I think both the Senate and the House are presently involved in this inquiry.

Mr. PETERSEN. You see I am not sure whether they are, indeed, abusive. For example, one of the bills here suggested a certain category of persons, justices, judges, Members of Congress, somebody else ought to be excluded. I do not agree with that. You know, I think you are no better or no worse than the rest of us. I think today's paper classifies and illustrates better still the problem. You know, Willy Brandt's chief aide turns out to be a spy. I mean those things do happen. We ought not to exclude categories, newsmen or what have you. Indeed, in the temper of the times, if I were a Russian agent the first thing I would do would be to get myself a newspaperman's job because I can tell you it is much more difficult for us either under an internal security approach or a pure criminal approach to investigate a newspaperman. I think it is wholly unwarranted. It is more difficult for us to investigate a Congressman. It is difficult to conduct an investigation with political connotations, you know. To the extent that you proceed cautiously you may be criticized as I was in connection with the Watergate

case.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. I might say, Mr. Petersen, that it is difficult for our parent committee to conduct an investigation with political implications.

Mr. PETERSEN. Maybe that is a great safeguard for both of us, is it not?

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Yes. I yield to the gentleman from Massachu

setts.

Mr. DRINAN. I appreciate your concern and the concern of your colleagues with this. But, I wonder if you can enable us to make some evaluation on the basis of information other your own statement, by giving to us the evidence that the chairman has requested. I am particularly interested in the number of warrantless wiretaps. I have the previously released statements of Senator Scott and Gerald Ford on the number of warrantless wiretaps prior to 1973; but, I wonder if you could give us now, or hereafter, the number of warrantless wiretaps that have been authorized?

Mr. PETERSEN. Mr. Drinan, I am not prepared to do so.

Mr. DRINAN. We asked for this information in a letter, dated April 11, and we asked for compliance by April 18, and we agreed to a deferrence of that. But, it seems to me that if you are not prepared, then you ought to give us a date when you are prepared.

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, I would like to be able to do it, but I cannot. That is going to have to come from the Attorney General of the United States.

Mr. DRINAN. We wrote to the Attorney General of the United States on April 11, and I have here hearings of the Senate, held 2 years ago, on warrantless wiretaps.

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, you know, all I can say, Mr. Drinan, is I can misconstrue him at times, but I cannot overrule him.

Mr. DRINAN. Are you telling us that Mr. Saxbe has denied our request?

Mr. PETERSEN. I am telling you that at least as of this morning he still has it under consideration, and I have no satisfactory answer for you or myself.

Mr. DRINAN. How do you expect us to say then you feel there has been some abuse, but no grave abuse, when we do not even know the number of warrantless taps?

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, I do not know that I can do other than ask you to accept my representations. I can tell you that and if you want to swear me, I will still say it. But, other than that, I just offer my testimony as a public official.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. If the gentleman from Masachusetts will yield, I think it appropriate that this subject should be pursued. For the record, the letter that was sent to the Attorney General on April 11 contained four questions, and none of those questions have been answered in the testimony this morning. Is that correct, Mr. Petersen?

Mr. PETERSEN. We discussed the procedures.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. You discussed the procedures?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. The reason I have asked this is so that we can delineate which of the questions are answered in your testimony and which are not. The questions which are not, as you correctly point out, we will have to take up with the Attorney General. Possibly we can resolve this at some future time, but not this morning. Therefore, I think for the record that the Chair will pose each question asked in the April 11 letter and you will indicate whether or not it is still under consideration by the Attorney General, or whether or not your testimony considers it, and if it does, what answer your testimony gives.

Mr. PETERSEN. Okay.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. We asked the Attorney General of the United States, by letter of April 11, for each calendar year from 1969 through 1973, how many requests for permission to conduct warrantless wiretaps or electronic surveillance were granted by the Attorney General. That is the first question.

Mr. PETERSEN. That has not been answered, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. The second question is for each of these years, how many approved requests for permission to conduct warrantless wiretapping or electronic surveillance involved a United States citizen as the chief subject of the surveillance?

Mr. PETERSEN. That has not been answered.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. That third question is: Is a standard procedure used for processing requests for warrantless wiretapping or electronic surveillance, and, if so, what is the procedure?