Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

New Jersey Bell, however, as a matter of policy, informs a customer requesting a wiretap check that only the presence of an unauthorized device will be disclosed. Minnesota by statute similarly limits disclosure to unlawful devices. Should the customer inquire about the presence of a lawful device, he will usually be assured that applicable Federal and State laws require any judge authorizing or approving a court-ordered interception to notify the affected customer within 90 days after interception ceases (or at a later date, if disclosure is postponed upon a good cause showing by law enforcement).

All Bell System Companies report the existence of an unlawful device to the customer requesting the check, as well as to law enforcement, and the latter is provided an opportunity to investigate for a reasonable period (generally 24-48 hours) prior to removal of the wiretap.

We might point out that unless the wiretap effort is amateurish, a person whose line is being tapped will not hear anything unusual, because of the sophisticated devices employed. As we previously said, most of the complaints originate because the customer hears an odd noise, static, clicking, or other unusual manifestations. As far as our experience discloses, these usually turn out to be difficulties in transmission or other plant irregularities. From 1967 onward, for example, the total number of wiretap and eavesdrop devices of all types (including both lawful and unlawful) found by telephone employees on Bell System lines has averaged less than 21 per month-an average of less than one a month for each of the twenty-four operating companies of the Bell System. In our opinion, the criminal sanctions imposed by Title III (for the unauthorized interception or disclosure or use of wire or oral communications, or the manufacture, distribution, possession, or advertising of intercepting devices), coupled with vigorous law enforcement and attendant publicity, appear to have contributed significantly to safeguarding telephone privacy.

In the area of court-ordered wiretapping, it is the policy of the Bell System to cooperate with duly authorized law enforcement authorities in their execution of lawful interceptions by providing limited assistance as necessary for law enforcement to effectuate the particular wiretap. We wish to stress that the Bell System does not do the wiretapping. The assistance furnished generally takes the form of providing line access information, upon the presentation of a court order valid on its face, as to the cable and pair designations and multiple appearances of the terminals of the specific telephone lines approved for interception in the court order.

The term "cable and pair" denotes the pair of wires serving the telephone line in question, and the cable (carried on poles, or in conduit, or buried in the earth) in which the pair reposes. A "terminal" is the distribution point to which a number of individual pairs of wires from the cable are connected, to provide service in that immediate area. A terminal may in a residential area be on aerial cable suspended from telephone poles or on a low, above-ground pedestal, or be found in terminal boxes or connecting strips in the basement, hall, or room of an office building or apartment house. The pair of wires of each telephone serviced from a particular terminal are interconnected at that terminal with a specific pair of wires from the cable, so that a continuous path of communication is established between the customer's premises and the telephone company's central office. The terminals vary in size, depending upon the needs of the particular location. To provide optimum flexibility in usage of telephone equipment, the same pair of wires may appear in parallel in a number of terminals, so that the pair can be used to service a nearby location if its use is not required at a particular point. Thus, the term "multiple appearance" denotes the locations where the same pair of wires appears in more than one terminal on the electrical path between the central office and the customer's premises.

In the instance of law enforcement authorities of the Federal government (and of those States enacting specific enabling legislation in conformity with the amendments to § 2518(4) of Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control Act effective February 1, 1971), the court order may "direct" the telephone company to provide limited assistance in the form of the "information, facilities, and technical assistance" necessary to accomplish the wiretap unobtrusively and with a minimum disruption of service. Upon the receipt of such a directive in a court order valid on its face, our cooperation will usually take the form of furnishing a private line channel from terminal to terminal (i.e., a channel from a terminal which also services the telephone line under investiga

tion to a terminal servicing the listening post location designated by law enforcement). Additionally, the above described line access information will be furnished for the specific telephone lines judicially approved for interception. On occasion, assistance in the form of private line channels is furnished to Federal authorities in national security cases. This assistance is only rendered upon specific written request of the Attorney General of the United States or of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (upon the specific written authorization of the Attorney General to make such request) to the local telephone company for such facilities, as a necessary investigative technique under the Presidential power to protect the national security against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. For reasons of security, we are not informed in such cases of the specific nature of the national security matter under investigation.

In cooperating in court-ordered and national security cases, we endeavor to provide the very minimum assistance necessary to effectuate the particular wiretap. Under no circumstance, do we do the wiretapping itself; that is the exclusive province of the appropriate law enforcement officers. Nor do we furnish end equipment to be used in connection with a wiretap, such as tape recorders or pen registers. Nor do we design or build wiretap or eavesdrop devices for law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, our telephone companies do not train law enforcement, personnel in the general methods of wiretapping and eavesdropping, nor do we provide telephone company employee identification cards, uniforms or tools, or tlephone company trucks.

In conclusion, I wish to assure you that the Bell System continues to be wholly dedicated to the proposition that the public is entitled to telephone communications free from unlawful interception or divulgence. We are vitally interested in the protection of the privacy of communications and always welcome measures and techniques that will strengthen and preserve it.

The foregoing reflects our experience in the areas of wiretapping and electronic surveillance since the passage of Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control Act in 1968 and our continuing concern for maximizing the privacy of communications.

I shall be pleased to endeavor to answer any questions that the Subcommittee may have.

Mr. DRINAN. I would like to announce the hearings on eavesdropping and electronic surveillance will continue in this room on Monday, April 27. We will hear from a representative of the FBI, Professor William Bender of Rutgers University, and Representative Bella Abzug.

The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 the hearing was recessed to reconvene on Monday, April 29, 1974, at 10 a.m.]

WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,

AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Kastenmeier Drinan, Smith, and Cohen. Also present: Bruce A. Lehman, Counsel, and Thomas E. Mooney, associate counsel.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. The subcommittee will come to order this morning to hear further testimony relating to wiretapping and electronic surveillance.

We are very pleased to welcome our first witness this morning, Mr. Edward S. Miller, appearing on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as Deputy Associate Director. Mr. Miller is in charge of all of the investigative activities of the Bureau in both the criminal and national security areas.

Before proceeding, I should explain that the Chair recognizes that Mr. Miller is under some limitations in discussing publicly some aspects of national security electronic surveillance. He may, therefore, be unable to respond specifically to certain questions as the Chair understands it.

I might ask you to identify your colleagues, Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Decker, and to proceed sir. We have your extensive statement. If you desire you may read the entire statement or present an oral summary, whichever you choose.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD S. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION; ANDREW J. DECKER, JR., INSPECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin, I will introduce my Colleagues, Assistant Director William Cleveland, who is in charge of what we call our Special Investigative Division. One of its primary tasks is conducting investigations in the organized crime field.

(203)

Mr. Decker, on my right, is the inspector in charge of our counterintelligence in the Intelligence Division.

I will read excerpts from my statement-some six pages.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the gist of the bills before this subcommittee is aimed at either prohibiting all types of electronic surveillance, including those which Congress has already considered and found desirable, or at perceived actual or potential abuses of electronic surveillance. One bill, H.R. 13825, attempts to define and regulate the use of electronic surveillance by the President in cases in which only he may have authority to act under his constitutional powers.

In 1968, Congress decided that electronic surveillances provided an effective, and in some cases, indispensable law enforcement tool in the investigation of certain crimes. Congress provided that a commission would study the effect of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 6 years after implementation and within 1 year report its findings to the Congress. If corrective or remedial action appears necessary, Congress will then have extensive and objective data upon which to base further action. The commission has been fully appointed and will begin its study this year.

Any amendment to title III should await the results of the commission's study, which will reflect both the value of electronic surveillance in modern law enforcement, and the measures and difficulties in protecting individual rights while utilizing this investigative technique.

İ, like all of you, am concerned with the abuses of electronic surveillance. Abuses redound to the detriment of the legitimate, fair and effective use of electronic surveillance as a valuable tool against criminal activity and foreign intelligence operations.

Some would seek to outlaw the use of electronic surveillances in all cases, perhaps based on the fact that electronic surveillance is not sufficiently selective and often intercepts many communications not directly pertaining to the matter under investigation. This is often true, but in many cases it is not true. Use of electronic surveillance involves a delicate balancing of protecting the common good against individual rights. While some communications are intercepted which are extraneous to the offense which justifies the surveillance, evidence of the communications which form part of the offense cannot generally be obtained in any other way; consequently, many crimes would go undetected and unprosecuted without the use of electronic surveillances. In many cases electronic surveillances intercept no extraneous communications, for example, listening in to kidnapers' or extortionists' telephone calls, and the use of a body recorder by an undercover agent or informant.

The use of electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence cases is an absolutely essential and indispensable tool. Information of much value beyond neutralization is obtained in such cases.

While the Congress certainly should direct itself to abuses of electronic surveillance, it hopefully will include in its deliberation the effect such legislation might have on the practical necessities of criminal and intelligence investigations. For that reason, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to present my views on

« ForrigeFortsett »