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the permanent leased line situation, which is for a long-term intelligence gathering.

There has been much made lately about the state of the technology. And indeed the technology, aided and abetted by space-age developments and all, has gone on and gone forward.

I think another committee in the past looking into this problem was regaled with the olive-in-the-martini type transmitter. And while such a device exists, I think it is highly impractical and not one of the main problems confronting legislatures in this area for the simple reason that the thing is so impractical. It will hardly transmit more than a few feet. You know, you have to be a few stools down to pick anything up.

And there is talk about the CIA having perfected a laser device that aimed at a room window will pick up the room conservations from the minute vibrations of the glass pane. I am sure if that isn't in a perfected stage, it is very close to it.

But again you are getting to the problem that this type of device would be available simply to the agency that would perfect it and so it would take immense amounts of money needed to purchase one.

Tiny integrated circuits have been developed for the aerospace programs and these obviously don't bode well for future privacy as they are the breadboard upon which a bug can be made.

There is also a device called the infinity transmitter, or harmonica bug. And for example if I went into an apartment in Honoluluwell, let's use another example. I am not sure whether we have direct dial to Honolulu.

In Los Angeles, if I installed a little device in a telephone and I came back to Washington, if I had this infinity transmitter. I would simply direct dial that phone, and then, as soon as the line clicked on, I would activate this device which would then freeze the ringing system on that phone and it would at the same time activate the bug in the phone so that in Washington, D.C., via the telephone longdistance line, I would be monitoring the room conversations in that apartment in Los Angeles.

This state of the art is available to the bootleg eavesdropper. That particular device was marketed in the past before the 1968 law. And since it has now been disseminated throughout the eavesdropping underworld, I am sure that anybody who wanted to pay the price could lay their hands on it.

Next, prevention and detection. It is getting to an area here where again we have problems. If a telephone subscriber suspects a tap, he can request the telephone company to conduct an inspection, but, if the device is found, the telephone company merely turns it over to the proper law enforcement authority. It generally will not advise the customer that he has been invaded.

I think this is an area for legislation, because I don't know that in the 1968 law that under the civil recovery provisions, I don't know whether the plaintiff in a civil suit, the plaintiff having been injured in this fashion, has the availability of the law enforcement testimony and of the law enforcement evidence if a criminal case has not been brought.

And I think that is one area that might be considered in future legislation.

Most law enforcement taps that are conducted under court authority are in the telephone company's central office, which makes detection by the citizens or a private sweeping outfit on his behalf very difficult if not impossible to locate. And contrary to the mythology, a properly installed telephone tap will not cause clicks and

noises.

I have gone to the trouble of trying to outline a number of preliminary checks that a citizen can make for devices in the book that I wrote on this.

He can check his premises for such things as fresh plaster marks and alien wires, check for antenna wires of a bug transmitter.

He can hire at considerable cost a professional sweeper, but he should be aware of someone who advertises their services and shows up with simply a kind of wand they call a hound dog or field strength meter, and then declares the premises "clean". Some unscrupulous operators in this field have even planted their own bugs, and then discovered them. This is a prelude for their sales pitch for their periodic services.

A truly professional search requires anywhere from $8,000 to $10,000 worth of equipment and somebody that knows how to use that equipment, who should have gone to the manufacturers' school.

And it should also be noted that bugs that can be remotely turned on and off are very difficult to detect. And, the eavesdropper may plant a decoy bug that is easily found, to lull the victim into a sense of security.

Also the private citizens should beware of delivery men bearing gifts which may contain a bug. And repairmen and utility men who want to enter the premises uncalled for and the salesmen who drop by and leave a briefcase in the conference room and this kind of thing.

There was another area that was brought up and that is the area of voluntary conversations being surreptitiously recorded. And I draw a distinction between interception and that type of voluntary conversation. In other words, if I am talking to a second party faceto-face and the conversation is recorded surreptitiously, by me, I don't find that too much different than if I were taking notes or mentally recording it and later dictating it except of course, as has been brought up already, in the area of again the recording can be used as evidence against him. It does contain his exact words and his inflections.

But again, looking at it the other way, the fact that it does contain exact words and inflections, I think make a more valuable record of what was actually said and I feel that it is not right to legislate against a person protecting himself by recording a free and voluntary conversation.

And I am not talking about a third person being under the table, because that is an interception electronically as opposed to by notes or by mental retention.

And if I was interviewed by a law enforcement officer, in connection with my either being a material witness or possibly a suspect, I would like to have a recording of just what his questions were and what his remarks to me were. And I don't feel it is right that he should be allowed to wear a recorder and I should not be. And so my feeling is that in that area, that the law should be considered to provide for a private citizen also in that type of conversation, making his own recording.

To sum it up, my overall feeling in the area of electronic surveillance is something like the alcoholic who is reformed and doesn't touch a drop.

I am for abolition. And I think the real reason is I don't find any way to effectively control it once it is legitimitized for the law enforcement in the interests of that vaguely definable "national security" or unilaterally definable "national security", or in the area of crime investigation.

If the legislation is going to be that we allow it for certain instances and I doubt very much whether those of us who prefer abolition are going to get it-then I found that one suggestion that was brought up this morning of placing various heads of field offices under oath to find out exactly what is going on has a considerable amount of merit.

I might also propose the idea of a Federal kind of, well, I don't like to call it a "truth squad", because that implies dishonesty, but a kind of special squad that knows all about wiretapping, bugging, and would go around and have complete entry to the facilities and th agents of any agency that is permitted to use electronic eavesdropping.

I think this way that we would all be alerted to the fact that, if there was any boootleg eavesdropping, that there was a good chance of discovery, and I think this would cut down on it quite a bit.

Well, I as I said-I think that the area that you gentlemen. have embarked on here is one that does cry out for additional legislation and I am very happy to have been invited before the subcommittee to lend whatever I can to the discussions.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. I think your testimony will be very useful to the committee.

You have given us a background at least, historically, of some of the uses made of the subject matter of this particular hearing. We do have a quorum call. Let me ask the members of the committee whether you have questions of Mr. Turner, or whether Mr. Turner can leave?

Mr. MEZVINSKY. May I just ask one question?

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Well, I am trying to determine whether or not— Mr. MEZVINSKY. Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. KASTENMEIER [continuing]. Whether or not you all have questions.

In view of the quorum call, I want to find out whether we can release Mr. Turner or have him return after lunch.

I guess you had better return.

Mr. TURNER. Fine.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. I think we can continue our colloquy then, and trust that the members of the subcommittee will have questions to ask of you, Mr. Turner.

I apologize for the length of time it took with the first two witnesses.. Mr. Leon Friedman and Mr. Shattuck and Mr. Morton Halperin, also have kindly agreed to return after lunch.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there is a Judiciary Committee bill. We have the Police and Fire Benefits Act.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. That will not come up until sometime later. I think the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is up first.

I would like to reconvene the subcommittee, if it is agreeable, at 1:30 so we can proceed as far as we can. I trust we can complete the witnesses today.

If there is no objection, then, the subcommittee will stand in recess until 1:30 at which time we will reconvene in this room. [Whereupon at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. KASTENMEIER. The subcommittee will reconvene on matters relating to privacy, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. And the Chair would like to recall Mr. Turner, please.

Mr. Turner, I think your testimony this morning was extremely helpful. I am reassured somewhat that what might have been possible for the Government to do surreptitiously in years past is less possible today, partly because of people like yourself, some of them in the military services as well-and I can remember a case or two in your State-of former military personnel who literally blew the whistle on activities such as you have been describing.

Most of what you had described of your own experience in the Bureau was of course before 1968, and so I suppose much of what you might know in terms of present policy and operation would be a matter of not first-hand experience, but just judgments made from past experience.

For example, one of the things that statistics will not show in terms of wiretap applications is how many suicide missions are there. Isn't that correct? Have you any reason to believe that the same suicide missions are not pursued today that were pursued 15 years ago?

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, you are quite correct. Anything would be hearsay or an impression from staying in contact to some degree with what is going on both through investigative journalism and inside contacts. And there is no reason to believe that it has been terminated forevermore though.

I believe sometimes when the heat is on, especially by subcommittees such as yours, the agencies will pull in their horns quite a bit but I think the history of the thing has been that it has gone back to the status quo or situation normal and one of the problems that I see is in the justifications for say, criminal wiretaps or microphone installations. I find in my own experience that the justifica

tions offered invariably are ones with which we all would agree. For example, the legislative history of the 1968 act specifically points at a drive against organized crime. And of course I have long written about the dangers, about the corruptive dangers of organized crime and its menace to society as a whole as opposed to some criminals who, heinous as the crimes may be, victimize only one or two people. However, I think that in accepting this kind of justification, that we have to be very cautious as to the possibility that it might be altered at a later date.

For example, in the middle 1950's the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Unit, along with similar units from other departments, other major departments across the country, formed what they called The Law Enforcement Intelligence Union, LEIU. The stated purpose of this was to organize a drive against organized crime, recognizing that it was national in scope rather than just a problem confined to Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, whatever. They did get up quite a mechanism there in which exchange of information and surveillances, and I suspect they used electronic surveillances, a whole program was instituted. In the mid-1960's, after this apparatus had been set up and was functioning, then Chief Tom Reddin of the Los Angeles department in the course of a press conference, stated that the main danger to the United States was domestic turmoil, and that that particular law enforcement intelligence union had switched targets therefore; it had turned from organized crime and decided that the complete danger to the United States was the radical left, was civil disorder.

So there was a well-intentioned program I think getting a little out of hand there, away from the original intent.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Yes, sir. I agree. I would like to talk for a moment about the technical aspects of wiretapping. You draw certain distinctions. For example, there are phone interceptions, and there are nonphone interceptions.

Mr. TURNER. Telephone?

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Telephone.

Mr. TURNER. Yes.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. I take it you also referred to other categories such as wired interceptions and wireless interceptions?

Mr. TURNER. True.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. In terms just of the techonolgy, is there some sort of distinction of other catgeories that clearly are identifiable? For example, there is the old-fashioned telephone tap?

Mr. TURNER. Yes.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. There are I assume some of the new subtler devices that trigger the phones automatically from other cities and so forth?

Mr. TURNER. Yes.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. But basically still using the phone, and the telephone line as the means of interceptions?

Mr. TURNER. True. The old bread and butter tap is simply going to say an apartment house, and in the frame, in the basement, finding the subscriber's lugs and just put "alligator clips" across them

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