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that we had on Jessica and Bob Trufaft, her husband who is a civil liberties attorney, was exactly that.
Mr. RAILSBACK. I'll be darned.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. I know that you have written a number of books or articles on law enforcement, privacy, and electronic eavesdropping. Have you been personally subjected to harassing by the Bureau or others as a result of your rather open and candid disclosures about their operations and others'?
Mr. TURNER. Yes, I have. On two occasions I was notified by an editor, Murry Fisher, of "Playboy," that the FBI had been up to see the “Playboy” editors about articles that I had submitted to “Playboy” directly for consideration for publication. Both of the articles dealt with the FBI. And it was a mystery to me as to how the FBI knew “Playboy” held the articles since unless somebody inside, the mail clerk or somebody inside, tipped them off, they wouldn't know. But at any rate they showed up and Mr. Fisher told me it was very obvious that the idea was to intimidate “Playboy”, not to publish them. The same thing happened at “Saga”
, magazine on one occasion when I published "Hoover's FBI” in 1970. I went on the usual promotional tour that the publisher puts you through. And at that time the FBI distributed an anonymous so-called fact sheet on me, which was carried by an agent, unsigned, no letterhead, carried by the agent to the various producers. Their impression was that it would hopefully keep me off the air.
In Philadelphia, Tom Snyder, who is now at the “Tomorrow show, said “Well, I knew what kind of a suit you would be wearing, I knew you would wear a gray suit.”
The FBI had been there, you know, and they told him I was coming in there from Pittsburgh. So whenever I do get involved in publications that apparently they disapprove of, I do find there is that kind of harassment or surveillance.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. There is a vote on and we will have to again recess for about a period of 15 minutes. We will resume at 2:30. There are other questions we might ask of you, Mr. Turner, but I will not hold you any longer. I think that will conclude our inquiries of you.
We might like to keep in touch with you. To the extent that we are dependent on information and factual data, and sometimes merely allegations, to learn what does exist, your appearance here today has been most helpful and the committee appreciates it.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Mr. Turner's Statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. TURNER, A FORMER FBI AGENT, PRIVATE
INVESTIGATOR, AND AUTHOR OF SEVERAL BOOKS
OUTLINE OF PROPOSED TESTIMONY
Background.—After service in the Navy during World War II, attended Canisius College, graduating with B.S. in Chemistry 1949. Entered FBI as special agent in 1951 at age 23, serving for over ten years before being ousted for asking for Congressional review of Hoover's policies. Posted to five field offices, worked predominately criminal and counterespionage. Designated as Inspector's Aide, a kind of junior executive duty, and a Sound Man, a euphem
ism for a graduate of the FBI's school on bugging, tapping and burglary. Since leaving the FBI, have written numerous articles for the legal press on police science topics, edited the Police Evidence Library series, authored a number of articles in various magazines and newspapers, written five books on popular subjects, e.g. The Police Establishment (Putnam's); Hoover's FBI (Sherbourne Press; Dell); and The Ten-Second Jailbreak (Holt, Rinehart & Winston); as well as a mail order book How to Avoid Electronic Eavesdropping and Privacy Invasion. Possesses a California private investigator license, working primarily for attorneys on defense cases.
Training and Experience in Electronic Surveillance.-First involvement was in San Francisco FBI office in 1952-53 when assigned to the monitoring plants there. Description of the plants and how they operated, who was tapped, e.g. Al Richmond of the Daily People's World and the Yugoslav consulate. Anecdote about Jessica Mitford, who was also the subject of a tap.
After some mishaps, including a police raid on a monitoring plant suspected of being a bookie joint, FBI plants were relocated inside the field offices.
In April 1958 was selected to attend the Sound School held in Washington. Similar to schools conducted by the Treasury Department agencies, CIA and military intelligence. Little discussion of Constitutional issue-simply told that FBI tapped under two justifications: (1) that President Roosevelt gave executive authority and no succeeding president has descinded it; and (2) that the element of disclosure in the Communications Act of 1934 was not violated because information obtained was not disclosed outside the Justice Department. Instructor added that the act was intended not for the FBI but for telephone employees in league with private detectives.
We were told that the authority for any device connected to a telephone must come from the A.G., but that the Bureau installed microphone surveillance on its own authority. Thus the announced number of wiretapstalways around 100 nationwide—was only a part of the picture, not the whole. Illustration : once instructed to pull out a tap and install a mike, keeping the books in balance but necessitating a burglary.
The training sessions were conducted mainly in the Identification Building. There was a practice room where we planted bugs in walls and taps on the phone. We went down to the FBI radio station in rural Virginia to practice pole climbing. In an attic of the Justice Building there was a workshop where agent George Berley taught us how to make lockpicking devices and use them.
Back in Seattle I employed these skills, handling security of the office communications as well as installing taps and bugs. Recall taps on relatives of suspect in Coors kidnapping, CP functionaries, security. subjects. Permanent installations involved the leasing of a line from the telephone company under Some cover name such as Federal Research Bureau. The telco had to suspect the purpose since no hookup was ordered at either end—the subject's pole box where the jump was made or the FBI office building where the plant was. Liaison was maintained with the Special Agents of the telco. They would assist with arrangements, furnish information from the subscriber's cable card that was necessary to install the tap, and notify us if telco personnel found a tap or hug that we put in. Also they would place a recorder on a subscriber's line terminals in the Central Office for short periods of time. Most telcos around the country cooperated lavishly with the FBI.
Taps and bugs were supposed to be approved by Washington. However, there were “suicide taps," so called because the person installing them without permission was liable to disciplinary action if caught. The problem was that the Bureau trained and equipped people to use the technique, and couldn't hope to control the situation from Washington.
Burglaries.—The FBI alluded to burglaries as "black bag jobs.” after the tool kit usually taken along. When I entered the Bureau in 1951 BBJs were a standard technique, along with tapping and mail covers and trash covers. They were conducted for two main purposes: (1) to install a microphone inside, and (2) to gather intelligence and photograph documents. The BBJ is different from the conventional burglary in that nothing is removed and every effort is made to disguise the fact that entry was made. I participated in a number of BBJs, including a 1957 burglary of the Japanese Consulate in Seattle. In that operation George Berley flew out from Washington and used radioactive cobalt to gradually photograph the locking mechanism of the safe. The contents of the safe were photographed and returned in place.
Elaborate measures are taken to ensure the security of a BBJ. The premises is thoroughly "cased” to make sure the regular occupants' movements are known. Tails are put on them at the time of the BBJ. An agent sits at the police radio console to make sure complaints of a burglary in progress are not answered.
FBI agents who made a specialty of BBJs were rewarded for their risks in the form of meritorious cash awards.
Telephone Tap8.—Description of a telephone tap. Two kinds: direct and inductive. A tap-transmitter in which a phone line is tapped and the conversation sent over the air to receiving point. Security because if found, not traceable (Exhibit of such a device).
Explanation of multiple appearance and the security it affords a tapper. Cooperation of phone company necessary; otherwise difficult to determine where the multiple appearance is located.
Problem of control: a few years ago when Hoover contended there were less than one hundred taps nationwide, the Washington Post disclosed that the FBI had 450 “special service" leased lines feeding into the Washington field office from all over the city.
Microphones /Bugs.—These fall into two categories : wired and wireless, or the bug-transmitter.
The wired simply means that the microphone is connected to the listening post by a run of wire. Example: installation in Seattle were picked lock to enter dwelling, replaced the telephone connecting block with one hand-fabricated by FBI lab containing miniature microphone, ran fine wire down through basement to connect with special drop wire in which wire for mike built in and invisible, from drop wire terminal in pole box a bridge was made to a leased line. Trouble with commercial radio station nearby interferring—aerial wire acting like antenna. So designed low-pass filter to filter out the radio frequency.
The wireless type is the most common. It can be planted stategically, and if discovered is not traceable to the eavesdropper. He is simply out the $50 or so a decent one costs. The wired type is more vulnerable to detection because of the necessity for wires to be run in the premises and leave somewhere. Example: Polish Consulate, Chicago.
Exhibit of a bread-and-butter, inexpensive bug-transmitter. Depending on surroundings, transmits a hundred feet or so from room. Ordinary pocket FM radio will pick it up. More batteries, more power, greater range. Broadcast time limited to life of batteries. necessitating replacement. Eavesdropper may use radio switch to turn on and off and conserve power. May use repeater station, say, buried in yard. Or may pirate current from phone circuit or house power.
Hit-and-run eavesdropping. Stethoscope-like device pressed against wall. Very effective is the spike-mike. Exhibit: this one is disabled so not primary useful for anything, but the species was specifically named in the legislative history of the 1968 law as heing primarily useful. Other bugs may be used as baby-sitters. burglar warnings, etc.
State of the Technology.-Much has been made about futuristic devices and their deployment throughout the land. For instance, the olive-in-a-martini transmitter. Such a device does exist, but is quite impractical. It will transmit only a few feet, and without much clarity. The CIA is said to have a LASER device that aimed at a window will pick up the room conversations from the minute vibrations of the glass pane. Tiny integrated circuits developed for the aerospace programs don't auger well for the future of privacy. However, the cost and uniqueness of much of this exotica renders it available only to goverment agencies, not the average eavesdropper. It should be pointed out, however, that there are electronic engineers that moonlight making very sophisticated devices.
Prevention and Detection. If a subscriber suspects a tap he can have the telco conduct an inspection, but if a law enforcement tap is in the telco usually will not advise him. Most law enforcement taps are in the telco Central Office, which makes detection next to impossible. Contrary to mythology, a properly installed tap will not cause clicks and noises.
The citizen can conduct his own preliminary check for devices, checking his premises for such things as fresh plaster marks, alien wires, and antennae wires of a bug-transmitter.
Also, he can hire_at substantial cost-a professional "sweeper.” Beware of some who advertise their services, show up with simply a “hound dog" or field strength meter, and declare the premises "clean.” Some unscrupulous. operators have even planted bugs, then "discovered" them, as a prelude to a pitch for their periodic services. A truly professional search requires some $10,000 worth of equipment. It should also be noted that bugs that can be remotely turned on and off are very difficult to detect. Also, the eavesdropper may plant a decoy bug that is easily found, lulling the target into a false sense of security.
Beware of “gifts" that might contain bugs, of repairman and utilities men who want entry to the premises, of salesmen who drop by and leave a briefcase in the conference room,
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Until 2:30, the committee stands in recess. [Brief recess.]
Mr. KASTENMEIER. The subcommitte will come to order for the resumption of the afternoon hearings. I apologize to the witnesses for the frequent interruptions. Other members will join the panel, I am sure, and in the meantime I would like to continue with the next two witnesses who are Mr. Leon Freedman and John Shattuck, representing the American Civil Liberties Union.
Both Mr. Friedman and Mr. Shattuck have had broad experience in the area of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. They have been active in civil suits. Particularly, I am thinking of those against the government for recovery of damages for illegal eavesdropping. And in other regards they are very deeply interested in the issues that confront this subcommittee.
We welcome you both, and you may proceed as you wish. We have a copy of your testimony, which is some 19 pages. However you care to proceed, you may.
TESTIMONY OF LEON FRIEDMAN, ESQ., AND JOHN SHATTUCK, ESQ., OF NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Mr. SHATTUCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are very grateful for the invitation to testify on an issue as important as this one to the ACLU. As you have noted, we have a joint statement and both Mr. Friedman and I will be participating in this. And I will lead off, with the Chairman's leave, because I have a court appearance at 3 o'clock and I may have to leave the balance of the testimony to Mr. Friedman.
As Congressman Drinan noted this morning, the ACLU for more than a decade has been strongly opposed to all forms of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. We believe that the disclosures over the last 2 years with respect particularly to national security, to warrantless wiretapping, have underscored the original wisdom of our policy. In our testimony today we will attempt from the point of view of lawyers who are actively engaged in wiretapping litigation, to catalog national wire security tap abuses, and our principal focus will be a civil law suit in which we are representing Dr. Morton Halperin and his family. He was the target of a 21-month national security wiretap from May of 1969 to February of 1971, of which I am sure he will testify himself at further length.
His tap was one of the 17 so-called "Kissinger taps” purportedly installed to trace news leaks from the White House. And in our view, these taps illustrate some of the worst national security abuses.
Our statement, as you will notice, is divided into three parts. First is an explanation generally of why the ACLU is opposed to all forms of wiretapping and why the statutory regulation of wiretapping under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is really insufficient to regulate or rather to deal with the deficiencies which we have identified. Second, a description of national security wiretapping and why it represents the most serious abuse and invasion of constitutional rights of any of the various forms of wirewith renewals possible upon probable cause, make it possible to to cure the national security abuses.
I will attempt briefly to outline why it is that we are opposed to all forms of wiretapping and Mr. Friedman will then describe the civil suit brought on Dr. Halperin's behalf and a number of other national security wiretap cases. And then, if time permits, I will return with respect to some of the proposals that we see are necessary in this area.
The fundamental reason why we are opposed to all forms of wiretapping is that the major wiretap technology is such as to make the practice an inherently unreasonable search and seizure regardless of any safeguards that might be imposed by law. It is far more intrusive than a search of a person or of a house because it is indiscriminate; it picks up all conversations.
I think Senator McClellan has illustrated this point without intending to by pointing to the wiretap statistics as evidence of the kind of controls that Congress has brought to bear in this area. And I don't think they demonstrate any controls at all. Senator McClellan pointed out that in 1972 the Justice Department's statistics showed that an average tap intercepted 1,063 conversations among 66 persons for an average of 3 weeks. This is hardly a limited search.
The warrant procedure of title III merely underscores the breadth and intrusiveness of wiretapping. First, it is essentially unlimited even under the statute. The unrestricted 30-day renewal arrangements allow indefinite tapping.
Second, contrary to the general fourth amendment law, which requires that a search warrant particularly describe the things to be seized, wiretap warrants cannot comply with the particularity requirements, because it is so difficult to describe conversations which have not yet taken place as those conversations which are to be seized. And the statute merely says that the warrant must describe “the type of communication to be intercepted”, which really doesn't amount to very much.
Third, there is no prohibition in the statute against intercepting privileged communications. And it is no coincidence, therefore, that over the years the wiretap method has been one of the principal ways of invading the lawyer-client relationship. There are a number of instances of this in our testimony.
Fourth, both the wiretap statistics and the legislative history of title III demonstrate we believe that the principal purpose of wiretapping is not the investigation of specific crimes at all but in fact is general intelligence gathering or preventative surveillance, or really