dresses the inanimate world: "Let the waters bring forth the moving creature," Gen. 1: 20; "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," Gen. 1:24. The "soul of life" in the instance of the animal is only the animal soul, which is physical and material in its nature, and perishes with the body of which it is the vital principle. The "soul of life" in the instance of the man is a higher principle, the rational soul, which was imbreathed by the Creator, and made in his image. Hence it is said, in Eccl. 3: 21, that "the spirit (17) of man goeth upward," and "the spirit (7) of the beast goeth downward to the earth."

Three theories have been formed of the mode of man's creation: 1. Pre-existence. 2. Traducianism. 3. Crea

tionism.

Pre-existence teaches that all human souls were created in the beginning of creation, and before the creation of Adam. Each individual human soul existed in an antemundane state, and is united with a human body by ordinary generation. This theory found some support in Plato's speculations respecting intuitive knowledge as the relics of a pre-existent state of the soul. Some of the Jewish Rabbinical schools adopted it, and Origen endeavored, unsuccessfully, to give it currency in the Christian church. Müller, in his work on Sin, has revived it in a modified form. He assumes, not an ante-temporal but a supra-temporal state, in which the soul existed and the origin of sin occurred. The fall of man was not in a time before time, but is timeless. This is virtually the same as Kant's conception of sin as a noumenon, or thing in itself, which is always timeless and spaceless, in distinction from a phenomenon, which always occurs in space and time. Philippi (Glaubenslehre, III. 96) contends that Müller's view is virtually that of preexistence. The propagation of the body still leaves the ego pre-existent.

Pre-existence confines the idea of species to the body. As this is propagated, it is derived out of a common physi

cal nature. The body, consequently, cannot be older than that physical human nature which was created on the sixth day. The spirit, on the other hand, was created prior to the sixth day. The human spirit is purely individual, like that of an angel.

Traducianism applies the idea of species to both body and soul. Upon the sixth day, God created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific psychico-physical nature from which all the subsequent individuals of the human family are procreated both psychically and physically. Hase (Hutterus Redivivus, § 79) represents this theory as having been adopted by Tertullian, Augustine, and the elder Protestant divines, in the interest of the stricter theory of original sin. Hagenbach ($55, 106) says that Tertullian was an earnest advocate of traducianism; that Augustine and Gregory the Great express themselves doubtfully and "with reserve respecting creationism;" and that "traducianism was professed not only by heterodox writers like Apollinaris, but by some orthodox theologians like Gregory of Nyssa." The writer in the Middle ages who maintains traducianism with most decision is Odo, bishop of Cambray. His treatise upon Original Sin has received little attention even from the historians of doctrine, though it is marked by great profundity and acumen.

Neander (I. 615) describes the traducianism of Tertullian in the following terms: "It was his opinion, that our first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind; that the soul of the first man was the fountain head of all human souls, and that all varieties of individual human nature are but different modifications of that one spiritual substance. Hence the whole nature became corrupted in the original father of the race, and sinfulness is propagated at the same time with souls. Although this mode of apprehending the matter, in Tertullian, is connected with his sensuous habits of conception, yet this is by no means a

necessary connection." This last remark of Neander is important. Bellarmine claims Augustine as a creationist. Melanchthon and Klee reckon him among traducianists. Gangauf says that he was undecided. Delitzsch (Biblical Psychology, & vii.) asserts that he was wrestling with the subject all his life. Luther, according to Delitzsch, was at first inclined to traducianism, being urged by Bugenhagen, but afterwards distinguished the creation and infusion of the soul into the body as the second conception, from the first bodily conception. Smith (Theology, 168) asserts that "traducianism, on the whole, has been the most widely spread theory."

Turrettin (Institutio, IX. xii. 6) remarks as follows respecting the traducian view. "Some are of opinion that the difficulties pertaining to the propagation of original sin are best resolved by the doctrine of the propagation of the soul (animae traducem); a view held by not a few of the Fathers, and to which Augustine frequently seems to incline. And there is no doubt that by this theory all the difficulty seems to be removed; but since it does not accord with scripture or with sound reason, and is exposed to great difficulties, we do not think that recourse should be had to it."

Maresius (De Marets), a Calvinistic theologian whose opinions had great weight, speaks as follows respecting traducianism. Although Augustine seems sometimes to have been undecided (fluctuasse aliquando) respecting the origin of the soul; whether it is by immediate creation or by propagation; he is fixed in the opinion that original sin cannot be transmitted otherwise than by propagation. And he is far more inclined (longe pronior) to the last mentioned doctrine, nay, to speak truly, he constantly held it (constanter retinuit), in order to save the justice of God; because it is difficult to show the justice of infusing a soul newly created, and destitute of sin, and having no guilt of its own, into a vitiated body, by whose concupiscence and

lust it is stained and burdened, is exposed to many and great evils in this life, and condemned to everlasting punishment hereafter. Augustine, Epist. 28, 137; De anima; and Jansenius, De statu naturae, I. 15. This was the opinion of Apollinaris, and of nearly all the western divines in Jerome's day; and is defended by Marnixius, Sohnius, and Combachius, truly great divines of our communion; to which, if this were the place to lay down the statements, I should not be much disinclined (valde alienus)." Maresius: Theologia Elenctica, Controversia XI.

Charnocke (Discourse I.), after remarking that wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, and other accidents of the soul, are not propagated, adds: "I do not dispute whether the soul were generated or not. Suppose the substance of it was generated by the parents, yet those more excellent qualities were not the result of them," i.e., of the parents. Hooker (Eccl. Pol., II. vii.), also, speaks doubtfully. “Of some things, we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable, and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that men have their souls rather by creation, than propagation."

Creationism confines the idea of species to the body. In this respect, it agrees with the theory of pre-existence; the difference relating only to the time when the soul is created. Creationism and pre-existence both alike maintain that the human soul is individual only, and never had a race-existence in Adam. The creationist holds that God on the sixth day created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific physical nature from which the bodies of all the subsequent individuals were procreated; the soul in each instance being a new creation ex nihilo, and infused into the propagated body.

Hase (Hutterus Redivivus, 79) represents this view as having been favored by Aristotle, and adopted by Ambrose, Jerome, Pelagius, Bellarmine, and Calixtus. Hagenbach (§ 106) mentions as advocates of creationism, Lactantius,

Hilary, and Jerome, and remarks (§ 173) that this theory gained gradually upon traducianism in the middle ages. John of Damascus, Anselm, and Aquinas were creationists. Heppe (Reformirte Doginatik, XII.) says that the Lutheran theologians almost without exception adopted traducianism, while the Reformed divines with very few exceptions maintained creationism. Creationism has been the most common view during the last two centuries.

The choice must be made between traducianism and creationism, since the opinion that man as to his soul existed before Adam has no support from revelation. The Bible plainly teaches that Adam was the first man; and that all finite spirits existing before him were angels.

The question between the traducianist and the creationist is this: When God created the first two human individuals, Adam and Eve, did he create in and with them the invisible substance of all the succeeding generations of men, both as to the soul and body, or only as to the body? Was the human nature that was created in Adam and Eve simple, or complex? Was it physical solely, or was it psychicophysical? Had the human nature in the first pair two sides, or only one? Was provision made for propagating out of the specific nature deposited in Adam, individuals who would be a union of body and soul, or only a mere body without a soul?1

The question, consequently, between the parties involves the quantity of being that was created on the sixth day, when God is said to have created "man." The traducianist asserts that the entire invisible substance of all the generations of mankind was originated ex nihilo, by that single act of God mentioned in Gen. 1: 27, by which he created

1 Augustine describes man as the union of spiritual and corporeal substance. "Persona hominis mixtura est animae et corporis, duarum rerum commixtio: unius incorporeae, et alterius corporeae; nam si anima in sua natura non fallatur, incorpoream se esse comprehendit." Ep. 137, Ad Volusianum. "Quicquid enim corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, jam recte spiritus dicitur." De Genesi ad literam, XII. vii. 16. Compare Gangauf: Aug. Psychologie, 101.