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really feels the hardship and bears the larger portion of the cost. Mr. Somers says that ' while cotton can be bought at • Liverpool at three or four cents. per lb. above its price on the plantations, anything from Liverpool can only be bought on the plantations at 200 or 300 per cent. above its value there.' One planter complains that the protected cotton manufacturers of the United States have been struggling hard, since the war, to use a million bales of cotton a year and cannot do it; and meanwhile there is not a negro on his cotton-growing estate who can afford to wear a cotton shirt, so expensive a luxury does Protection make such an article of clothing. “A pair of
coarse negro boots-one of the cheapest articles in the stores ·-is charged five dollars. Part of this excessive dearness of clothing is due to the system of trade in the South ; but even that system is an indirect result of Protection. The planter has to pay dearly for everything; for his clothes, his tools, his household goods, his manures, his coal, his very means of communication with the outer world, in order that a few “interests, which have the ear of Congress and the country, may flourish. Not only does he pay high prices but he gets bad goods, as must inevitably be the case where wholesome competition is quite shut out. Yet, while thus paying high prices for all he buys, he has to compete with new rivals in the market of the one commodity he sells. Laden with a heavy taxation, itself the enormous cost of suppressing their own effort after independence, the Southern States are doubly burdened and discouraged. They have to sell their cotton cheap and to buy everything dear; yet out of the small margin of profit thus left there is a vast taxation to pay. Mr. Somers takes the case of a New Orleans merchant with a capital of 10,000 dollars, a house worth 6,000, and furniture worth 2,000. He pays license duty to the State for liberty to pursue his avocation 100 dollars; another to the city of about the same amount. He pays direct taxes on his business capital and on the value of his house, furniture, and personal effects above 500 dollars' worth, to the amount of 43 per cent. If he has money invested in ships, sailing craft, or railway stocks, he is taxed on that; and when all these taxes have been paid, he must pay United States income tax of 21 per cent. There are, besides these taxes, stamp duties on all kinds of bills, cheques, and deeds; so that altogether, if he makes a profit of 6,000 dollars a year, which is assuming him to be very prosperous, he pays in direct taxes alone at least 1,500 dollars a year, or one-fourth of his income. In these circumstances it is no wonder that Mr. Somers everywhere found discontent.
• The dissatisfaction of the country folks of South Carolina' (and it was the same elsewhere), 'with the present state of the Government of the United States is palpable enough. They exclaim bitterly against the corruption which prevails in public life. They are utterly opposed to the high tariff on European goods, looking on it simply as a means of plundering the cultivators of the soil in the South and West for the benefit of Northern manufacturers, overgrown, they say, in wealth, and adepts in bribery and lobby-rolling. They point to the enormous prices of goods sold in the Southern towns, and long for the growth of manufactures among themselves and the direct importation of foreign goods into their own seaports. They express disappointment that more direct rtrade has not sprung up with the South since the close of the war, the high tariff notwithstanding. They declare American statesmen of the present day to be dwarfs and nobodies compared with those of former times; and when the whole gamut of political discontent has been sounded, one often hears the remark, so startling to any European admirer of American independence, that it would have been better for the country to have remained under the rule of England.'
The antagonism which is thus being produced is naturally perpetuating that other cause of discord which might else have passed away into history. The North instead of conciliating the South is actually irritating it. Instead of taking back the prodigal States into equal brotherhood, it is making them feel their inferior condition. Nor can anything be done to compensate the South by giving it Protection as a counterpoise to the Protection in the North. Of all the interests which are thus taxing the country for their support only one belongs to the South. The sugar of Louisiana is protected to the extent of from two to four cents a pound; and may, curiously enough, be said to be the only Southern interest to which peace has brought no signs of prosperity. The cotton culture cannot be protected; it can only be burdened, and the fact that it is not only burdened but weighted down is the worst omen for the future of the Southern States. It is, indeed, of evil omen even for the future of the Union itself. The South is not a Poland, but it is at least an Ireland. An active discontent prevails everywhere; and the Federal Government knows that it has a vulnerable point along its southern line. During the discussions on the Case which the statesmen of Washington thought it to be consistent with their honour and their statesmanship to present to the Geneva arbitrators, the representative Southern papers expressed, not only their disgust at the procedure, but their hope that it might meet with the frustration it deserved. No part of the American press has more firmly deprecated war with England than the Southern press; and there have not been wanting indications, if not threats, that the South would not consent to bear the crushing burden suclr a war would impose. Constantly, and to some extent justly, as the Federal Government, through its Department of Agriculture, is urging on the South to vary and multiply its agricultural products, the Southern people still rely more and more on the cotton trade with England for all their prosperity. In the event of a war between this country and the United States the cotton famine would be reversed. While we were actively pushing hostilities the Southern planters would be standing still with their cotton unsaleable and valueless, and their negro labourers everywhere asking for the wages that can only be paid when the cotton is sold. We do not believe that General Grant is reckless as a statesman; it is certain that he knows how great a weakness the discontented and starving South would be in the event of war; and therefore we conclude that he has never even contemplated the necessity of resorting to that terrible alternative. His supporters may think of Canada; but he at least thinks of the South; and to the South war with England would be desolation and death, or insurrection and independence.
It is not with any thought that our relations are in real danger of assuming this portentous form that we have referred to this. aspect of Southern polítics, but merely because no view of the political situation in the United States can be complete without it. The probable course of the domestic politics of the Union is one which will not depend for its solution on foreign war. By the inevitable operation of the Constitution, the power of electing members of the House of Representatives must go with population. Under slavery, the Southern States had representatives in numbers proportioned to the numbers of their free population and three-fifths of the slaves. The article in the Constitution still holds good, but the slaves are now free, and the whole Southern population is therefore counted. The re-apportionment of representatives has been made by the now existing Congress on the basis of the census of 1870; and the House of Representatives which will be elected in the autumn, and which will assemble on the 4th of March next, will represent the States in very different proportions from the present one. In order probably to mask in some degree the evident shifting of power westwards, and to prevent any States from greatly losing in the number of their representatives, Congress increased the number of members of the House of Representatives from 243 to 283. Of the forty new members thus gained, twelve Southern States got seventeen, six North-western States got fourteen, three far Western States five; while only four
VOL. CXXXVI. NO. CCLXXVII.
of the Eastern States had any gains at all, and those gains amounted only to four, two for Pennsylvania, and two for New Jersey; while a gain of one each in New York and Massachussets was counterbalanced by a loss of one each by New Hampshire and Vermont. The gain to the States whose condition and prospects we have been considering was eleven; and in their dislike of the prohibitory tariff, nearly all the States in which the most marked gains have taken place either are or will be with them. We shall therefore most certainly see before long a very marked progress in the Free-trade movement in the United States. The inevitable shifting of power has, however, been still further slightly masked by a supplementary bill, which has added nine more members to the House of Representatives, raising its numbers from 283 to 292. Of these nine new members, four go to the Southern States of Tennessee, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida, and five to the Northern States of New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. This new addition may have but little influence on the Free-trade question; it is, however, so much reduction of the growing influence of the West. Mr. Wells, basing his opinion solely on the political capacity of the people, and on their ability to understand any problem which is really forced upon their attention, gives Protection less than ten years to live. The shifting of power from States which are interested in high tariffs to those States which are peculiarly the victims of such tariffs must expedite the process of its extinction, while it will assure the permanence of a beneficent change.
What the Southern States really want as the guarantee of their prosperity is a more direct trade with the outside world. Their products are wanted in Europe, and European manufactures are needed by them. Shut in behind the Chinese wall of a prohibitory tariff, they cannot derive the profit from foreign intercourse which the world is ready to pour upon them. They have great ports which were formed by nature to be the outlets of their agriculture and the inlets of the conveniences and the luxuries their agricultural products will buy. Their hope of prosperity depends upon the balance of mutual advantage they can strike between their own products and those of other lands. They cannot sell to the world without buying of the world. The monopoly of the cotton market is not given them; it is only put within the reach of their earnest effort. They cannot have it under existing conditions. The falling price of cotton has ever since the close of the war clouded their prospects; but the disastrous effect of the recent rise on th eir
best and surest customers must have entirely convinced them that the problem of cheap production is the problem of Southern prosperity. We believe that problem will be solved. We have not been able to make this review of the condition and prospects of the Southern States without complete renewal of hope. They have lost much ; but they cannot lose their splendid country, their glorious sky, their noble rivers, or their teeming soil. They have not altogether lost their political sagacity; and now that they are fast emerging from their eclipse, they will gradually recover their legitimate influence, if not even their lost ascendency, in Federal politics. Our wish for them is that they may succeed in throwing off the burden of a fiscal policy which is ruinous to their welfare and will be fatal to their future; that they may so far recover their monopoly of the cotton trade as to be able to supply all our looms and spindles with the raw material and to take our products in exchange. The bonds thus woven across the sea will be stronger than those of either race or sympathy; they will be bonds of mutual interest and of a common prosperity, and will be an effectual assurance that between us two there shall be always peace.
their lost asdy recover that emerginot their politicheir teemind
ART. VI.-1. Mémoires de Sebastian Joseph de Carvalho at
Mélo, Comte d Ocyras, Marquis de Pombal, Secrétaire d'État et Premier Ministre du Roi de Portugal, Joseph 1. 4 vols.
12mo. 1784. 2. Memoirs of the Marquis de Pombal. By John Smitii,
Esq. 2 vols. 8vo. London: 1843. 3. Historia do Reinado de El-Rei D. José e da Administração
do Marquez de Pombal. Por Surão José Da Luz SORI
ANO. 2 vols. 8vo. Lisboa : 1867. 1. Étude historique sur le Marquis de Pombal. Par le
Baron EDOUARD DE SEPTENVILLE. Bruxelles : 1868. 5. Le Marquis de Pombal, Esquisse de sa vie publique. Par
FRANCISCO Luiz Gonis, Député aux Cortès de Portugal.
Lisbonne : 1869. 6. The Marquis of Pombal. By the COUNT OF CARNOTA. 2nd Edition, 8vo. London : 1871. NATURAL sentiment prompts the Portuguese of the pre
sent generation to revive the history of the remarkable man whose name gives a title to this article. Citizens of a