for coming years. Lord Elgin goes so far as to say, in one of his wise and charming letters, recently published-and to say not altogether ironically-that he foresees that the time is approaching when, in a democratic state of society, 'foresight 'will be considered a positive disqualification for a statesman,' because no Minister will dare to look beyond the circle which bounds the vision of his adherents and supporters. Yet this circumscribed horizon and imperfect vision of the future destroys some of the conditions of great statesmanship. It is absolutely fatal to a wise and enlightened system of foreign policy; because foreign States are unable to surmise or rely on what the conduct of this country will be under any given circumstances in the future. Nothing has contributed more to lower and weaken our influence abroad; and we are only repeating a remark commonly made by foreign critics, that this want of foresight and stability, which prevents English statesmen from following a broadly-marked path and adhering to it, has removed one of the landmarks of the policy of Europe. Mr. Helps is so impressed with the extreme importance of foresight in government, and with the singular and deplorable want of it which characterises our own system of government, that he has devoted a chapter to the subject-not the least significant of his work. We shall borrow from it the following sentences:

'Would that there were more of this valuable quality shown in every government that governs, or pretends to govern, throughout the world. Never was this quality more needed than in an age justly called an age of transition-when there is immense diversity of opinion; when the world of thought is more than ever divided into sects; and when that most dangerous form of thought, which is best described by the French word doctrinaire, is remarkably prevalent. As it is, even the bystander most favourable to the governments which exist, must admit, however reluctantly, that the action of government chiefly consists in a series of surprises.

'All observant people must agree in recognising this evil, which it will be desirable to examine minutely, in order to discover the causes, and, if possible, suggest some remedy. One of the main causes why government, even in this country, which justly claims to be the best governed country in the world, is still a government that acts in a faltering, hap-hazard, and uncertain manner, is the following :The persons, who are chiefly entrusted with carrying on the government, are so much immersed in the difficulties of the present hourtheir work from day to day so fully occupies them (especially in this age of unlimited correspondence)-that they have neither the leisure, nor the heart, nor the spare intellectual energy, to devote to a large consideration for the future. This work, therefore, is done mainly by writers unconnected with government. Now, with all their merits, we cannot expect these writers to be eminently practical. The views and

wishes, which they put forward, often lack that consideration of the circumstances surrounding them, that knowledge of practical difficulties, and that experience of men, which are only gained by converse with active life.

'What is wanted, in every State, is a body of philosophic-no, I am afraid of that word-of thoughtful statesmen; who, though partaking of some of the active duties of statesmen, should not be overweighted by their having too much of the conduct of ordinary business imposed upon them. I know that this proposal is a very difficult one to realise in action. But, then, the whole matter we are discussing-namely, the providing foresight for government-is confessedly a very difficult one, and we cannot expect the remedy to be facile. Moreover, such a remedy as is proposed, is rather contrary to what is called the spirit of the age. A single illustration will show what I mean. There are certain offices, in the Cabinet of Great Britain, to which no onerous duties are attached, and indeed, to speak frankly, scarcely any duties at all. The present outcry is, "Let those offices be abolished, or let onerous duties be attached to them." In a word, let every man engaged in the highest branches of statesmanship, be oppressed by the severe and urgent routine of office, which already prevents so many of the greatest men from being able to give due foresight to the affairs of the future. Well, be it so; only remember, that if the miller and his men are always employed in grinding for the necessities of the day, and there is no one left, a little outside, to watch the course of the stream, it may fail some day when it is most wanted; or it may come down in one tumultuous overflow, sweeping away the mill, the miller and his men, broadening, as it goes, into one vast torrent of destruction.' (Pp. 123–8.)

To a certain extent these defects, which are inherent in governments whose existence depends on a parliamentary majority, are remedied or palliated by the permanent staff of each public department: and one of the chief merits of Mr. Helps' volume is that it throws some light on this, which is the least known and least appreciated portion of the mechanism of our government. The permanent members of every office of State are the depositaries of its traditions, and they share no inconsiderable amount of its duties and its powers under the control of the Minister of the day. They forego the prizes of ambition: they work in the name of others; even their emoluments are inferior to the professional incomes which an equal amount of ability and industry would command in the market. But it must be acknowledged that there is something in the exercise of power, however occult, which is attractive to some minds of a high capacity.

Amongst a certain class of statesmen and economists, of which, perhaps, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer is the most distinguished member, an opinion prevails that Government ought to attempt nothing for the people which the people

can by possibility do for themselves, and that Government ought even to be restrained from aiding the original efforts of the nation, lest by aiding it discourage or supersede them. He even condemns the principle of endowments for the encouragement of learning. Mr. Lowe has more than once expressed his opinion that to call a Government paternal,' is the greatest reproach that can be addressed to it, and that paternal government implies a childish people. If these principles were fully carried out, it might be said without injustice that the functions of Government would be reduced to two-those of the taxgatherer and those of the policeman; or, as Lord Macaulay once expressed it with still greater energy, simply to that of the hangman. To this opinion Mr. Helps is radically opposed. He holds that as civilisation advances, Government is not less, but more wanted by the people; that its duties become infinitely more complicated and more essential; and that as the mechanism of society becomes more perfect, it requires more care, more labour, and more expense. The following passage is of great importance and value:

'It is an opinion of some people, but, as I contend, a wrong and delusive opinion, that, as civilisation advances, there will be less and less need for government. I maintain that, on the contrary, there will be more and more need. It is a melancholy fact, but it is a fact, that civilisation is mostly attended by complication. And, moreover, it is attended by a diminution of power, as regards individual effort. I always like to strengthen an abstract statement by some concrete illustration. Now, take lighting for instance. There was but little occasion for government regulations when the lighting of each particular house in great cities, entirely depended upon the owner of that house. But now, when the lighting, not only of public streets, but of private dwellings, is chiefly effected by four or five great centres of lighting in a town, the whole of this function has entered into the domain of government, for no one private person has power enough to regulate the matter for himself, or can in any way insure that the quality of his light shall be what he desires. A similar course of argument applies to several of the primary requisites for the well-being and comfort of human life. Water-supply, drainage, sewerage, means of locomotion, all enter the same category. I maintain, that the wisest and the richest man amongst us, the man too who shall have the most leisure, is perfectly incompetent, especially if he lives in a great town, to provide for himself some of these primary requisites of life. Having once thrown in his fate and his fortunes amongst an agglomerated mass of people, it is to the government alone that he can look for protection.

'One of the results of advancing civilisation has been an agglomeration of individuals in particular spots, peculiarly suited for commerce or for manufactures. That agglomeration always takes power out of the hands of the individual. It makes a thing too big for him to deal

with. The government is the only body that can control the fierce conflict of contending individual interests.' (Pp. 19-21.)

And again :

'In considering this most important subject of governmental interference, it is always to be recollected, that the common sense of the community will be for ever employed in restraining this interference within due limits. There will also be two great causes which will tend to make these limits within, rather than beyond what is requisite. In the first place, there will be the individual interest, often most powerful in Parliament, which is injured or menaced by any interference with its action on behalf of the public good. In the second place, there is the immense desire in every human breast to be allowed to act as freely as possible; which desire often militates against, and absolutely conquers the most manifest considerations of self-interest and welfare. People do not like to be controlled, or to lose any freedom of action, even for what they know to be for their good. Amongst a free people, the danger always is of too little governmental interference, rather than of too much.' (Pp. 28–30.)

Mr. Helps has the courage to say a good word for paternal government itself before he concludes:

'Paternal government prevents revolution. What socialists are always aiming at is a paternal government under which they are to be the spoilt children. But a government which should give considerable attention to the wants, and even to the pleasures, of the governed, would satisfy the reasonable part of the population, and make them very averse to revolution. When government limits itself, as regards the executive, to the maintenance of order, and to the administration of justice, it is not likely to have a very strong hold on the affections of the people. There are persons who theoretically declare, that they desire the least possible of governmental interference in all their affairs; but when any calamity occurs, or when any great evil, socially speaking, comes to the surface and is much talked about, these same persons will be found joining in the cry that government ought to have foreseen this-ought to look to that; and in short, all of a sudden (often when it is too late), they are willing greatly to extend their views with regard to the proper functions of government.

'I mean the conclusion, from all that I have said in this chapter, to be, that paternal government, as it is called, should be welcomed rather than abjured; and that we may be certain, in a free country, that limits will be put to its action, falling short of rather than exceeding those which are required for the welfare of the people governed.' (Pp. 32-4.)

Now this is a question in our day of the greatest practical importance, and it is one on which all policy may be said to turn. Are we in danger in this country of being too much or too little governed? Is it for the general interest rightly understood to carry the mechanism of government to the

highest perfection of which it is capable, or is it wiser to let it alone, and leave society to grope along in a species of savage independence? Good government, like any other good thing, is difficult and it is dear. There is no greater delusion than to suppose that any improvement which demands increased labour, capital, and intelligence can be obtained without paying for it. Nations have revolted against the extravagance and corruption of Courts, like the Court of France under the old régime, or the Court of Naples the other day; and they were so far right that the money of the nation was not spent by those Courts as it ought to be spent for the benefit of the nation. But in point of actual cost the sums lavished by the most profuse and profligate of monarchs on their pleasures are soon exceeded in actual amount by the demands of a growing and flourishing community. The Government of Italy is, doubtless, greatly improved in every respect since the independence and regeneration of that country; but it is prodigiously more expensive than the bad Governments which preceded it.

If there be any truth in the enumeration of the duties of modern government with which we commenced this article, it will at once be seen that these demands are enormous, and that they are continually increasing. They therefore occasion an increased expenditure. There are in Parliament and elsewhere a certain class of economists and politicians who speculate on the ignorant prejudices of the community, and who denounce this growing expenditure as a national calamity. They would even take us back some twenty or five-and-twenty years, when the population of the kingdom was considerably smaller, when the wealth of the nation was far less than it is and when many of the demands now considered to be urgent were unknown. We venture to take exactly the opposite view. We rejoice in the increase of the national expenditure, just as we rejoice in the increase of our personal expenditure, or that of our family, if we are satisfied that we can afford it, and that the money is well laid out for the public advantage.

now,

It was once remarked by Lord Overstone, we believe, that no part of a man's income is so well laid out, or procures for him in exchange so large an amount of positive benefit, as that which he pays to the State in the form of taxation. And it may well be so, because the sum levied in taxation is devoted to his collective interests, and is applied with the whole power of association, infinitely surpassing in its beneficial effects the results of any individual exertion. Suppose a man in this country to pay one-tenth of his income