think beft for the whole community. If fuch a subject as Achilles thould be ordered to do one thing by the existing government, and another by the genius or reprefentative of the public judgment and will, i. e. his own individual judgment and will (for it is the private judgment of individuals that must determine what the public must and would recommend if duly exercifed and fairly reprefented):-in such a cafe, such a powerful fubject ought, undoubtedly, according to our author, to disobey the real, and pay homage to the ideal and internal government of his own creation. To mark out the cases and circumstances when dif bedience and refiftance are juft, practicable, and prudent, and when not, is impoffible, on principles so abstracted as thofe affumed by this writer. He is, therefore, frequently aground and non-plushed, though he is never at a lots for a diftinction. He is not, indeed, filenced, but he ought to be filenced. In many, nay moft cafes, the profelytes to this fyf tem, and the whole nation, if profelyted, muft, according to a common proverb, be looking one way and drawing another; reverencing their metaphyfical, and yielding a reluctant obedience to their living king. The apoftle Paul exhorts the Romans * to be subject to the higher powers, not only for wrath, but alfo for confcience fake:' certes, the political fyftem under review is in quite a different fpirit.

We have judged it proper to exhibit this general outline of Mr. Godwin's fyftem, that the reader, bearing in his mind the chief points and general result of his philofophy, may not be bewildered and loft while he endeavours to follow him through all the traverses, windings, and fubterraneous paffages, by which he attempts to lead mankind to a state of the highest poffible felicity and perfection. We fhall now follow Mr. Godwin fomewhat clofer at the heels, and, as is fit and juft, make him fpeak for himself. ·

ཝ་

Mr. Godwin, as zealous an advocate as he is for liberty and equality, most completely and unequivocally gives up the rights of man. Political fociety is founded in the principles of morality and juftice. It is impoffible for intellectual beings to be brought into coalition and intercourfe without a certain mode of conduct, adapted to their nature and connexion, immediately becoming a duty on the parties concerned.' This is agreeable to the maxim of Cicero, Nullus locus, nulla ætas, nulla conditio, &c. officio vacare poteft; and, what is more, it is juft. But, Mr. Godwin obferves, there can neither be oppofite rights, nor rights and duties hoftile to each other. From

Chap. xiii. ver. 5.

hence

hence it inevitably follows, that' men have no rights. By C right, as the word is employed in this subject, has always been understood difcretion; that is, a full and complete power of either doing a thing or omitting it, without the perfon's becoming liable to animadverfion or cenfure from another; that is, in other words, without his incurring any degree of turpitude or guilt. Now, in this fenfe, I affirm that man has no rights, no difcretional power whatever.It is commonly faid, that man has a right to the difpofal of his own fortune, a right to the employment of his time, a right to the uncon trolled choice of his profeffion or purfuits.' But this can 'never be confiftently confirmed till it can be fhewn that he has no duties, prefcribing and limiting his mode of proceeding in all these refpects. My neighbour has just as much right to put an end to my existence with dagger or poison, as to deny me that pecuniary affiftance without which I muft <ftarve, or as to deny me that affiftance without which my intellectual attainments, or my moral exertions, will be materially injured. He has juft as much right to amuse himself with burning my house, or torturing my children upon the rack, as to shut himself up in a cell careless about his fellowmen, and to hide his talent in a napkin.'

Here Mr. Godwin does not make any diftinction between juftice and beneficence. There is a difference between these, in the opinion of Mr. Hume, Lord Kaims, and other philofophers, not only in refpect to their nature, or the cafes in which they are exercifed, but in refpect alfo of the principle that enforces and renders them obligatory. We fhall not, at prefent, enter into this question; it is ably and briefly ftated and examined in Outlines of Moral Philofophy, by profeffor Dugald Stewart, who takes the fame fide with Mr. Godwin, although he is obliged to admit, that the rules of juftice admit, in their statement, of a degree of accuracy peculiar to themselves; and therefore that the part of ethics which relates to them, has ⚫ been formed in modern times, into a separate branch of the fcience, under the title of natural jurifprudence.'

'

But there is one right, after all, that Mr. Godwin leaves in the poffeffion of man-the right of exercising, in all cafes, private judgment; from whence (as ftated in our Number for February) he draws the important conclufion, that no man is obliged to conform to any rule of conduct, farther than the <rule is consistent with juftice.' There are but few emergencies, Mr. Godwin thinks, that can demand an exception from a doctrine fo unfpeakably beautiful.' But he allows, that, as a preliminary to the exercise of private judgment in all cafes, there must be an extirpation of felfishness and vice.'

ENG. REV. VOL. XXVIII, OCT. 1796.

As

As he is obliged to admit that there are fome occafions in which it may be necellary to fuperfede private judgment for the fake of public good, he proceeds to inquire in what manner fuch acts are to be originated, or, in other words, to ascertain the foundation of political government.'-He examines the three famous fyftems of government: 1. That by force; 2. That jure divino; 3. That by focial contract.-Having rejected the hypotheses that have most generally been adduced to account for the origin of government confiftently with the principles of moal juftice, he inquires whether we may not arrive at the fame object by a fimple investigation of the obvious reafon of the cafe, without having recourse to any refinement of system, or fiction of process. He lays it down as a maxim, that, as government is a transaction in the name, and for the benefit, of the whole, every member of the community ought to have some share in its administration. Hence a fhare in the election of a house of representatives.

Mr. Godwin inquires next, who is it that has the authority to make laws?Reafon is the only legislator, and her decrees are irrevocable and uniform, To the public fupport of justice the authority of community extends. But, no fooner does it wander, in the fmallest degree, from the great line of justice, than its authority is at an end. It ftands upon a level with the obfcureft individual, and every man is bound to resist its decifions.'- Obedience is not the correlative of authority. I am bound to co-operate with government, as far as it ap'pears to me to coincide with the principles of juftice and truth. But I fubmit to government when I think it erroneous, merely because I have no remedy. Obedience seems to imply the unforced choice of the mind, and affent of the judgment. • But though morality, in its pureft conftruction, altogether excludes the idea of one man's yielding obedience to another, yet the greatest benefits will refult from mutual communication. There is scarcely any man whose communications will not fometimes enlighten my judgment, and rectify my con<duct. But the perfons to whom it becomes me to pay parti<cular attention in this refpect, are not fuch as may exercife any particular magiftracy, but fuch, whatever may be their ftation, as are wifer or better informed, in any respect, than 'myself.-If, by the fubject of any government, we mean a per'fon whose duty it is to obey, the true inference from the pre⚫ ceding principles is, that no government has any fubjects. If, on the contrary, we mean a perfon whom the government is bound to protect, or may juftly reftrain, the word is fuffi'ciently admiffible. This remark enables us to solve the long← disputed question, what it is that constitutes a man the subject

of

of any government. Every man is, in this fenfe, a fubject, whom the government is competent to protect on the one hand, or who, on the other, by the violence of his proceedings, renders force requifice to prevent him from difturbing that community, for the prefervation of whofe peace the government is instituted.'

In oppofition to those who maintain, that one form of government may be beft for one people, and a different form for another, Mr. Godwin contends, that there is one beft form of government for all; and this he endeavours to prove from the unity of truth, and the nature of man. Since government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object to be principally aimed at, is, that we fhould have as little of it as the general peace of human fociety will permit. Lefs and lefs restraint or constraint will be neceffary, in proportion as mankind advance in the im provement of the mind; the grand inftrument in the promotion of which, is, the publication of truth. Political renovation may ftrictly be confidered as one of the ftages in intellectual improvement. Literature and difquifition cannot, of themselves, be rendered fufficiently general. Thofe abftract and bold fpeculations, in which the value of literature principally confifts, muft neceffarily continue the portion of the favoured few. As foon as any important truth has become established to a fufficient extent in the minds of the enterprifing and the wife, it may, tranquilly and with ease, be rendered a part of the general fyftem.

Thus our author's fyftem is shortly this, there is no authority but reafon; and no legiflators but philofophers and propagators of truth; that is, writers of pamphlets and books. But, as he admits that the great mafs of the people must neceffarily be directed by the wife few, a question arifes, How are the people, amidft fuch an inundation of political writers, to diftinguish who are the wife, and who the foolish? The only standard by which they could judge would be, the fize of their volumes (in which cafe our author would have a good chance of being chofen a representative); and, to fay truth, this would be juft as good a criterion for judging of men, as the long-winded fpeeches in parliament.

[To be concluded in our next Number. ]

Z 2

ART.

ART. IV. The Life of Milton, in Three Parts. To whichare added, Conjectures on the Origin of Paradife Loft; with an Appendix. By William Hayley, Efq. pp. 328. 4to. 15s. boards. Cadell and Davies. London, 1796.

T would be difficult to find, in the whole compass of the hiftory of mankind, a more fplendid character than that of Milton. When we reflect on the fplendour of his poetical genius, the extent of his erudition, the independence of his mind, and, withal, the graces and accomplishments of his person; we confider him as an honourable and noble reprefentative of human nature. Although his manly virtue carried him, in fome inftances, to the verge of a haughty boldness, and pride, and paffion, we are to make allowance for that energy of fenfation and fentiment that commonly belongs to great and vigorous minds. The part which he acted on the political theatre, in times that gave birth to parties that have continued to this day, and his decided and bold avowal of his political fentiments in all his writings, have fubjected him to much prejudice and mifreprefentation; even by Dr. Johnson, whofe prepoffeffions were fometimes carried to the height of fomething approaching to infanity; and who exhibited a ftriking union of human power and human weakness. Though Mr. Hayley is very far from being a character congenial with Milton, and that without a certain degree of congeniality between an author and critic, nothing very great in any biographical and critical sketch is to be expected; yet he has treated Milton with candour and justice as a man, and with tafte and judgment as a poet.

EXTRACT.

The character of Milton has been fcrutinised with all the minuteness of investigation which oppofite paffions could fuggeft. The virulent antagonist, and the enraptured idolater, have pursued his fteps with equal pertinacity; nor have we wanted men of learning and virtue, who, devoid of prejudice and enthufiafm, both in politics and in poetry, have endeavoured to weigh his merits exactly in the balance of truth and reafon.

What new light, then, can be thrown upon a life, whose incidents have been fo eagerly collected, and fo frequently retailed? What novelty of remark can be expected in a review of poems, whofe beauties and blemishes have been elaborately examined in critical differtations that almost rival in excellence the poetry they difcufs? Affuredly but little; yet there remains, perhaps, one method of giv ing a degree of interest and illuftration to the life of Milton, which it has not hitherto received; a method which his accomplished friend of Italy, the Marquis of Villa, in fome measure adopted in his interefting