On amendment No. 19, appropriates $5,000 for the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 20, appropriates $400 for the International Railway Congress, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 21, strikes out the words "for the calendar year 1913," from the item for the International Sanitary Bureau, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 22, appropriates $1,300 for the International Seismological Association, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 23, inserts the words "in accordance with the special agreement concluded for that purpose August eighteenth, nineteen hundred and ten, and the schedules of claims thereunder, including office rent in the District of Columbia, and," in the paragraph relating to the arbitration of outstanding pecuniary claims between the United States and Great Britain, as proposed by the

Senate.

On amendment No. 24, appropriates, in the language and amount proposed by the Senate, $40,000 for the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography, instead of $10,000 as proposed by the House.

On amendment No. 25, appropriates $7,156 for the Permanent International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 26, strikes out the appropriation of $50,000 for the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 27, strikes out the appropriation of $2,500 for the compilation of Chinese Treaties, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 28, strikes out the appropriation of $5,000 for the International Conference on Maritime Law, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 29, appropriates $5,900 for the International Radiotelegraphic Conference, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 30, appropriates $15,000 for expenses of Consular inspectors instead of $10,000, as proposed by the House. On amendment No. 31, strikes out the appropriation of $10,000 for 10 additional consular assistants, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 32, appropriates $340,000 for allowance for clerk hire at United States consulates, instead of $300,000 as proposed by the House and $350,000 as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 33, appropriates $450,000 for "Contingent expenses, United States consulates," instead of $400,000 as proposed by the House and $471,600 as proposed by the Senate.

The bill as finally agreed upon appropriates $3,638,047.41, and is $350,469 less than the appropriations for the current fiscal year.

WM. SULZER,

HENRY D. FLOOD,

WILLIAM B. MCKINLEY, Managers on the part of the House.

Dated April 22, 1912.

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62D CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2d Session.

INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES AND AGREEMENTS AMONG WORKINGMEN AND FARMERS.

APRIL 22, 1912.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on Labor, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 23189.]

The Committee on Labor, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 23189) to make lawful certain agreements between employees and laborers and persons engaged in agriculture and horticulture, and to limit issuance of injunctions in certain cases, and for other purposes, submits the following report, with a recommendation that the bill do pass with the following amendment:

On page 2, line 18, after the word "on," insert the words "business in such relation."

The bill as amended by the committee will read as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall not be unlawful for persons employed or seeking employment to enter into any arrangements, agreements, or combinations with the view of lessening the hours of labor, or of increasing their wages, or of bettering their condition; nor shall any arrangements, agreements, or combinations be unlawful ataong persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture when made with the view of enhancing the price of agricultural or horticultural products; and no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or by any judge thereof, in any case between an employer and employee, or between employers and employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, or involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment in any case, or concerning any agreement, arrangement, or combination of persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture with the view of enhancing prices as aforesaid, or any act or acts done in pursuance thereof, unless in either case said injunction be necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property or to a property right of the party making the application for which there is no adequate remedy at law; and such property or property right must be particularly described in the application, which must be sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.

In construing this act the right to enter into the relation of employer and employee, to change that relation and to assume and create a new relation of employer and employee and to perform and carry on business in such relation with any person in any place or do work and labor as an employee shall be held and construed to be a personal and not a property right. In all cases involving the violation of the contract of employment by either the employee or employer where no irreparable damage is about to be committed upon the property or property right of either no injunction shall be granted, but the parties shall be left to their remedy at law.

SEC. 2. That no person or persons who are employed or seeking employment or other labor shall be indicted, prosecuted, or tried in any court of the United States

for entering into any arrangements, agreements, or combinations between themselves as such employees or laborers, made with a view of lessening the number of hours of labor or increasing their wages or bettering their condition, or for any act done in pursuance thereof, unless said act is in itself unlawful; nor shall any person or persons who may enter into any arrangements or agreements or combinations among themselves for the purpose of engaging in horticulture or agriculture with a view of enhancing the price of agricultural or horticultural products, be indicted, prosecuted, or tried in any court of the United States on account of making or entering into such arrangements, agreements, or combinations, or any act done in pursuance thereof, unless said act is in itself unlawful.

The purpose of this bill is to make arrangements, agreements, or combinations of wageworkers or farmers lawful which the courts in interpreting the Sherman antitrust law have held to be illegal combinations in restraint of trade, and to restrict the injunctive power exercised by the courts over personal relations between individuals where no real property right is endangered or involved, and relegating causes in such personal relations to the adjudication of the law courts. There has been some doubt expressed as to whether or not the Sherman antitrust law was ever intended to apply to organizations of workingmen and farmers when dealing with their own labor or the products of their own labor; but whether or not it was intended to apply to organizations of that character the fact remains that it has been applied to them. An examination of the debates in the Senate discloses the fact that the author of the law, Senator Sherman, did not intend it to be and did not believe that it would be applied to organizations of workingmen or farmers. In the debate on the bill in the Senate on March 21 and March 24, 1890, Senators Hiscock and Teller called attention to the possibility of the measure applying to organizations of that character. Replying, Senator Sherman said:

The bill as reported contains three or four simple propositions which relate only to contracts, combinations, agreements made with a view and designed to carry out a certain purpose which the laws of all the States and of every civilized community declare to be unlawful. It does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made to affect public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation. It does not interfere with the Farmers' Alliance at all, because that is an association of farmers to advance their interests and to improve the growth and manner of production of their crops and to secure intelligent growth and to introduce new methods. No organizations in this country can be more beneficial in their character than farmers' alliances and farmers' associations. They are not business combinations. They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc. They have no connection with them. And so the combinations of workingmen to promote their interests, promote their welfare, and increase their pay if you please, to get their fair share in the division of production are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the words or intent of the bill as now reported.

There is a great difference in the effect upon the community between an association of farmers organized for their general welfare to protect themselves against the price of the products of their labor being arbitrarily depressed by the real combinations in restraint of trade, or associations of workingmen organized for the purpose of promoting their welfare and disposing of their labor power to the best advantage, and the combinations of those who deal in the products of labor for the purpose of being able to force down the price paid to the producer and force up the prices paid by the consumer. In the case of the former the welfare of the community is protected; in that of the latter the welfare of the community is injured.

The extension of the writ of injunction from the field of the protection of property rights into the personal relationship between man

and man is a renaissance of the theory of government by discretion. long since discarded by the Anglo-Saxon people.

For more than a thousand years there has been a continual conflict between the principle of government by law and the practice of government by discretion with the discretion vested first in the King and later in his representative, the chancellor or judge. Government by law is a government of democracy; government by discretion is a government of autocracy.

Injunctions in labor disputes are innovations in our modern jurisprudence. The original purpose for which injunctions were issued was to restrain parties to any dispute about the title or damages to property from interfering with the property in question, until the courts had determined the property rights involved. These restraining orders were made returnable at the next term of court, or at the session of court where the cases were to be heard and determined, and consequently were never permanent, expiring by their own limitations when the court had convened to determine the question at issue. That they are clearly intended to protect property rights and property rights only is demonstrated by the fact that the courts invariably insist upon a bond being furnished by the parties suing out the writ to indemnify the parties enjoined for any loss that may accrue to them by virtue of the writ having been issued. When such an order of court has been issued it is not a difficult matter for the court to determine the actual damages, if any, that have been sustained through the issuance of the injunction, thereby protecting the restrained parties against any unwarranted invasion of their rights, but when the court issues an injunction in a labor dispute, restraining persons in controversy with employers from doing those things that they have a legal and moral right to do, and as a result of that injunction the contest is lost to the workers, there is no court on earth that can determine the damage that has been sustained by the persons enjoined, and consequently they can not recover from the bond. When the court arrogates to itself the power to issue injunctions never contemplated by the rules of equity, and in direct violation of constitutional and statutory law, and assumes the right to issue injunctions for the purpose of enforcing criminal law, it departs from the domain of property rights and invades that of personal rights in a manner for which there can be no excuse except that the court thereby becomes the sole judge of the law and the fact, and, if the parties enjoined are declared guilty of contempt, the extent of the punishment. All of which is in direct violation of the fundamental laws of the land and the Anglo-Saxon concept of human liberty, as shown by the efforts of the people for more than a thousand years to destroy the arbitrary automatic power of kings and judges.

The peace of Wedmore, concluded between Alfred the Great and Guthram the Dane, A. D. 878, provided that "If a King's thane be charged with the killing of a man, if he dares to clear himself let it be before 12 King's thanes."

The great charter of human liberty, the Magna Charta of Great Britain, the basis upon which British and American freedom rests, in clause 39 declares:

No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, disseized, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor will we send upon him, save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

The Bill of Rights enunciated by the British Parliament for the protection of the common people and signed by William and Mary upon their accession to the British throne, as a condition upon which their title to sovereignty would rest, declares:

Paragraph 1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal.

Paragraph 2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.

The Declaration of Independence declares: "That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and it further assigns as one of the causes for the separation from the mother country and the establishment of an independent government, "for depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.'

The Constitution of the United States, which creates our judiciary, gives to it whatever power it can possibly exercise, and limits its jurisdictions, says, Article III, section 1: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."

First amendment. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Sixth amendment. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Ninth amendment. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Tenth amendment. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.

Thirteenth amendment, section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

It must be apparent to even the most casual investigators that the courts of the United States hold the same relationship to the Government of our country that the courts of Great Britain held and now hold to the regal power. No one will contend that any judge in Great Britain, either at the time of the adoption of our Constitution or since that time, could have any greater power than that conferred by regal authority expressed by the Parliament and approved by the King. It naturally follows that our courts can have no greater power than that granted to them by the Constitution.